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ABSTRACT
ONTOLOGICAL SUBORDINATION IN NOVATIAN OF ROME‘S
THEOLOGY OF THE SON

Daniel Lloyd, B.A., M.T.S.
Marquette University, 2012

This dissertation evaluates Novatian of Rome‘s theology of the Son in his De
Trinitate. It argues that Novatian presents the Son as ontologically subordinate to the
Father, which is not a conclusion shared by a majority of recent scholars. This
conclusion is reached by comparing Novatian‘s presentation of the Father‘s divinity with
that of the Son. The first half of this work, therefore, demonstrates the manner by which
Novatian affirms that the Father is transcendent, supreme, and unique in His attributes.
Novatian employs a range of concepts and terms found in Christian and non-Christian
sources. Specifically, I present and analyze Novatian‘s indebtedness to technical
terminology of divine ontology and divine attributes which were common to his
intellectual environment, especially in Middle Platonism. I show that Novatian expresses
the Father‘s transcendence through negative theology, but also acknowledges an array of
necessary attributes such as oneness and simplicity.
Novatian‘s understanding of the Son‘s nature depends on his conviction that the
Father alone is supreme in all of His divine attributes. The arguments Novatain
assembles to identify the Son as God do not suggest that the Son‘s divinity is based on
the idea of equality with the Father. In some respects, Novatian takes over
subordinationist themes in the Word Christology tradition, which was highly influential
to his perspective. This study shows that when Novatian turns his attention to a
comparison of the Son‘s divine nature with that of the Father, his emphasis on the
Father‘s uniqueness and supremacy act as the lens by which he speaks of the Son‘s
attributes. Although Novatian embraces the Son‘s derivation from the Father in terms of
a shared substance (what I identify as an ontological connection/relationship), he
consistently speaks of the Son‘s attributes as diminished and less than the Father‘s. This
dissertation attempts to correct the false impression that theological philosophy played a
minor role, or no role at all, on Novatian‘s thought. Novatian‘s theology of the Son is
both consistent and sophisticated because of his articulation of the Son‘s ontological
subordination to the Father.
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Introduction
I began this dissertation with the intent of analyzing Novatian‘s Christological
anthropology and eschatology in his De Trinitate (hereafter Trin.). My conclusions about
these topics derive from my understanding that Novatian teaches the ontological
subordination of the Son to the Father. By ontological subordination, I mean that
Novatian treats the Son as having a divine nature or divine attributes which are unequal
to those of the Father, the Supreme God. My understanding of Novatian‘s ontological
subordination comes from my analysis of Novatian‘s interaction with the theological
philosophy of his time as well as his articulation of the Word Christology tradition.
However, my board helped me to realize that Novatian‘s ontological subordination of the
Son to the Father is itself the scope of a dissertation. In its current form, this dissertation
investigates the framework by which Novatian maintains the Father‘s transcendence
through the Son‘s activities and immanence in the world, and I will demonstrate that
Novatian achieves this dynamic by teaching the Son‘s ontological subordination. At a
later date, I will use this project as the necessary springboard with which to evaluate
Novatian‘s theological anthropology and eschatology.
I conclude in this dissertation that Novatian presents a sophisticated theology of
the Son based on a Christology resembling that of Justin. Too often, scholars have
attempted to peg Novatian‘s theology within the confines of a description either as an
orthodox advancement or a regression of Tertullian‘s Trinitarian and Christological
theology. Although Tertullian‘s work plays a significant influence on Novatian‘s
theology, Novatian‘s thought should be presented according to its own structure. This
structure arises from Novatian‘s emphasis on the distinction of the Father as unique and
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supreme. The manner by which Novatian formulates his theology of the Son takes into
account Tertullian‘s theology of the Son as well as of the Trinity. However, Novatian
rejects some of Tertullian‘s positions, especially those which respond to the Sabellian
crisis by articulating a unity of the divine persons in a way which advances Trinitarian
concerns over the uniqueness of the Father. This in no way makes Novatian‘s theology
less sophisticated than Tertullian‘s. I will show that Novatian prefers some of
Tertullian‘s formulations from his earlier works, and I will read Novatian within the
context of his interaction with theological philosophy and Christian sources. With his
emphasis on articulating the divine transcendence of the Father with the divine
immanence of the Son, one could make the case that Novatian‘s theology is a
sophisticated version of Justin‘s theology.1 The scholarship which presents Novatian‘s
theology as a regression or a simplification of Tertullian‘s thought has failed to
accurately describe the structure and content of Trin in light of the broader Christological
tradition.
The Roman Environment and Novatian‟s Sources

During the second century and the first half of the third, Rome was one of the
critical crossroads of theological reflection and development, with many prominent
figures living in or having direct contact with the Roman community. Persons whose
writings we still possess include Hermas, Justin Martyr, Tatian, and Hippolytus. Other
significant theological figures, such as Marcion, Valentinus, Basilides, and Sabellius, also

1

In chapter 5, I will provide an overview of Word Christology traditions of those theologians
known to Novatian. I will show that Justin grounds his Christology on the properties of the Father‘s unique
transcendence, and I will point to similarities between Justin and Novatian‘s theological positions in
chapters 6 and 7.
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lived in Rome. In addition to contributing to the foundations of the Roman theological
environment, many of these authors also spread their influence throughout the Christian
communities of the Mediterranean and beyond.2 Conversely, important works by
Theophilus of Antioch, Irenaeus of Lyons, and Tertullian of Carthage were read in
Rome.3 By the second half of the third century many theological works travelled to
major cities throughout the Roman Empire. In this respect, Rome was a theological
center, both influencing and also being influenced by other Christian communities.
There is little dispute about the primary sources on which Novatian relied. These
include Justin, Theophilus, Hippolytus, Tertullian, and possibly Irenaeus. Scholars have
also identified Cicero, Seneca, and Apuleius as prominent philosophers whom Novatian
utilized.4
The Hippolytian corpus presents a challenge for analyzing the influence it may
have had on Novatian. Studies about Hippolytus and the works which should be
attributed to him, his school, or to multiple authors are contentious. For the purposes of
my project, the Refutation of All Heresies (hereafter Ref.) and the Contra Noetum
(hereafter Noet.) are the most significant works in terms of the probable influence on
Novatian. Most scholars now accept the idea that multiple authors penned, and perhaps
edited, the Hippolytean corpus. Though reaching different conclusions, two of the most
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Peter Lampe discusses many of these figures in their Roman context in From Paul to Valentinus:
Christians at Rome in the First Two Centuries. Trans. by Michael Steinhause. Ed. by Marshall D. Johnson
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003).
3
Hippolytus, for example, catalogs the teachings of numerous heretical sects and groups, and he
also discusses Irenaeus‘ comments against Marcus, in Refutation of All Heresies (hereafter Ref.) 6.37 and
50. He also mentions Tatian and Justin in Ref. 8.9. As I will discuss below, Novatian seems to have been
influenced by Justin, Theophilus, Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Tertullian, and others.
4
See, for example, Jean Daniélou, The Development of Christian Doctrine before the Council of
Nicaea. Vol. 3, The Origins of Latin Christianity. Translated and edited by John Austin Baker (London:
Darton, Longman & Todd, 1977), 233-250.
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recent proponents of multiple authorship are A. Brent and J. A. Cerrato.5 Brent argues
that the Ref. was written by Hippolytus‘ predecessor in a school or church opposed to
Callistus and his successors.6 According to Brent, Hippolytus went on to write Noet. as
the final representative of the school begun by the author of the Ref. Cerrato, on the other
hand, attributes Ref. to a Roman named Hippolytus and the Noet. to an Easterner with the
same name. In Cerrato‘s analysis, the Ref. and the Noet. do not stand in a line of
theological succession. Brent believes they do, yet he argues his position by suggesting
that the theology of Ref. differs from that of Hippolytus, the author of Noet.7 It was a
rejection of Callistus‘ practices which led Hippolytus to modify Ref. and write Noet. with
the definite purpose of theological rapprochement.8 Brent therefore sees Ref. as the first
work of a school which later made strides to accommodate some of Callistus‘ positions.
A final consensus on these issues appears unlikely in the near future.9
I will avoid the foregoing controversy for the following reasons. First, the Ref.‟s
Roman‘s provenance is not in dispute. It contains all the valuable evidence for the
theological quarrel between the author of the Ref. and Callistus, bishop of Rome.
Second, although Noet. may eventually be accepted as originating in the East,10 it
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Allen Brent, Hippolytus and the Roman Church in the Third Century: Communities in Tension
Before the Emergence of a Monarch-Bishop. Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, Vol. 31 (Leiden: Brill,
1995); J. A. Cerrato, Hippolytus between East and West: The Commentaries and the Provenance of the
Corpus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
6
This is a position Ronald Heine tentatively accepts, identifying the author as Hippolytus for
convenience. See his ―The Christology of Callistus,‖ JTS 49:1 (April, 1998): 56-91.
7
Brent discusses the scholarship, beginning with Nautin (1947), which rejects single authorship
based upon stylistic differences, Hippolytus and the Roman Church, 206 fn. 4. Brent, however, agrees with
those who see the style as indicative of ―a single author or with two different authors within the same
school,‖ 206. On largely theological grounds, Brent concludes multiple authors wrote the works.
8
Ibid. 210-212.
9
For a summary of the scholarly debates on authorship and theology see Robert Butterworth‘s
Hippolytus of Rome: Contra Noetum (London: Heythrop College, University of London, 1977), chapter 1.
10
I suggest that Novatian does know Noet. and borrows the idea of the simultaneity of the Father‘s
demiurgic will with the instantaneous production of whatever He wills. See chapter 6, ―The Word‘s
Obedience as Minister of the Father‘s Will.‖
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nevertheless represents an important parallel witness to the theological controversies in
Rome and the West in general.11 Tertullian‘s Adversus Praxean (hereafter Prax.) has
often been cited as a source for Noet. for a variety of reasons. These reasons include
shared points of structure and common points of theology.12 Furthermore, Noet.‘s
theology depends on Scripture and philosophy in a way similar to Ref. and Tertullian‘s
works. Noet. also appears to combat a kind of theology, which if it is not from the same
group opposed by Tertullian, the author of Ref., and even Novatian, then it is nearly
identical. This last point helps to explain why scholars often identify the provenance of
Noet. as Rome.13 Finally, it is important to note that Novatian is the first author in Rome
to write a theological treatise in Latin.14 I make this point to emphasize the fact that
Novatian‘s intellectual dependencies are wider than the more easily identified linguistic
parallels with other Latin authors.

11

In a similar though not analogous way, Heine, following the work of Hagemann and others,
views the first two books of Origen‘s Commentary on John as an important witness to the rejection of
monarchian theology articulated in Rome. Heine suggests that the first two books, probably written shortly
after Origen‘s trip to Rome, reflect something of the theological currents which he witnessed while in
Rome, ―Christology of Callistus,‖ 57-58.
12
So, for example, Ernest Evans determines that the presentation in Noet. of a scriptural refutation
of Noetus‘ theology relies on Tertullian: ―Throughout this section the influence of Tertullian is evident, the
method of approach and even the phraseology being identical,‖ Tertullian‟s Treatise against Praxeas
(London: S.P.C.K., 1948), 23. Cf. Brent who reads Noet. as a theology of rapprochement with the
community of Callistus and as consequently overturning important aspects of the Trinitarian and
Christological theologies of Justin, Theophilus, Irenaeus, and Hippolytus, in Hippolytus and the Roman
Church, 210-217.
13
I have not made a final decision about the provenance of the Noet, even in light of my
suggestion that Novatian borrows from it. This however does not affect my use of this work as a
comparative tool for assessing both the monarchian theology as well as the Logos theology inherited and
uniquely articulated by Novatian. None of my arguments about Novatian‘s Christology and theology stand
or fall on a dependence to the witness of the Noet. in Novatian‘s work. Regardless, Noet. remains a
valuable articulation of 3rd century theology.
14
Russell J. DeSimone, The Treatise of Novatian the Roman Presbyter on the Trinity. A Study of
the Text and the Doctrine (Rome: Institutum Patristicum, 1970), 7.
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The Content of De Trinitate

Novatian‘s Trin. offers a lengthy theological explanation of the regula (or regula
fidei),15 and was written probably sometime in the 240‘s.16 G. D. Dunn, for example,
notes, ―What gives the work its structure is the fact that Novatian was commenting on
and explaining the rule of truth (regula veritatis) as preserved in the early Roman
church‘s baptismal symbol of faith.‖17 Throughout the treatise, Novatian describes the
faith of the Church as espressing: 1) the transcendent, supreme, and one God who is the
Father, 2) how the Son of God, who is the Word and Jesus, is the instrument of demiurgic
activity and the personal fulfillment of the prophecies, and 3) how the Holy Spirit
empowers the Church with gifts that lead its members into eternal salvation.
The first eight chapters of Trin. detail Novatian‘s theology of the Father. The
majority of the rest of the work concerns Novatian‘s argument that the Son is both God
and man.18 His theological predecessors, Justin, Irenaeus, Hippolytus, and Tertullian,

15

Basing his work on C. P. Caspari‘s, Adhémar D‘Alès summarizes the elements of Novatian‘s
regula, in Novatien. Etude sur la theologie romaine au milieu du III siècle (Paris, 1924), 135-137. For
other versions of the regula, see also Irenaeus‘s Haer. 1.1.1, 3.3.2, Proof of the Apostolic Preaching 6, and
Tertullian‘s Prax. 2. In regard to the version of the regula which Tertullian states in his Prescriptions
against Heretics (Praescr.) 13, Jean Daniélou writes, ―This is a particularly valuable text because it
provides us with the full content of the ‗rule of faith‘ at the time of Tertullian. It is in fact a summary of the
Christian catechetic tradition which came from the apostles and which was handed down by the churches.
All that was required of the Chirstian was that he should adhere to and believe in this traditional rule of
faith,‖ in The Development of Christian Doctrine before the Council of Nicaea. Vol. 3, The Origins of Latin
Christianity. Translated and edited by John Austin Baker (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1977), 186.
16
For the dating of Trin., see DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 43-44; James Leonard Papandrea,
The Trinitarian Theology of Novatian of Rome: A study in third-century orthodoxy (Lewiston, NY: Edwin
Mellen, 2008), 44-47.
17
Geoffrey D. Dunn, ―The Diversity and Unity of God in Novatian‘s De Trinitate.‖ Ephemerides
Theologicae Lovanienses 28:4 (Dec. 2002), 390.
18
Papandrea, quoting a phrase from Pierre De Labriolle, states, ―The purpose of Novatian‘s socalled De Trinitate is not really to explain the Trinity. It is clear from the abbreviated treatment given the
Spirit that Novatian‘s intent was not so much to systematize Trinitarian theology, as it was to explain, ‗the
relationship of the Son to the Father.‘ In other word, the De Trinitate is primarily a christological treatise,
for which Novatian uses the Rule of Faith as his outline, and in which he gives attention to those
christological issues which were at the time a matter of debate within the church,‖ Trinitarian Theology,
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wrote extensively about the Son of God. For these authors, the Son was the Word of
God, distinct from the Father, and the one who had joined Himself to humanity in the
Incarnation. These authors all expressed various forms of what scholars label the Word
Christology tradition. This tradition accounts for more than simply an investigation of
the Son‘s incarnation, implied by the word ―Christology.‖ The Word Christology
tradition also includes teachings concerning the generation of the Son/Word from the
Father, the personal distinction of the Son/Word from the Father, and the nature of the
divinity which the Son/Word possesses. Novatian is another witness to this tradition, and
my dissertation will focus on these latter topics as I discuss Novatian‘s theology of the
Son in light of his theology of the Father. According to Novatian, the Word of God is not
the Father, but the one who takes on human nature. By emphasizing the personal
existence of the Son as the Word and as God, Novatian joined Tertullian and Hippolytus
in their assaults on several of the competing and contemporary Christologies.
One theological target of Novatian‘s work is monarchianism. It is a theology
based on the idea that the historical Jesus contained or manifested the Father or the Spirit
of the Father. Novatian writes that proponents of Sabellian theology ―declare (or at least
were of the opinion) that [the Son] was not the Son, but God the Father Himself.‖19 E.
Evans notes that this group identified themselves as ―Monarchians‖ and that Tertullian
mentions this name in Prax. 1.20 Eastern authors typically labeled these theologians
Sabellians, after one of its prominent exponents. In the West the term patripassian (in

47. I agree with this assessment, but compare J. Quasten‘s assessment in Patrology II: The Ante-Nicene
Literature After Irenaeus (Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1986), 217.
19
Trin. 23.2.
20
Evans, Tertullian‟s Treatise, 10. Tertullian uses the term monarchiani in Prax. 10. Evans adds,
―These are in modern times described as modalists (a term devised by Dr. Harnack), since their theory was
that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three modes or aspects of one divine existence,‖ Idem.
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reference to the suffering of the Father) became common.21 Because Novatian identifies
Sabellius by name, I will use the classification Sabellianism.22
A second theology which Novatian refutes identified Jesus as a mere man.
Although scholars usually identify this second target in Trin. with proponents of
Theodotus‘ theology, often labeled ―adoptionism,‖ this categorization lacks textual
support.23 Novatian does not in fact frame the second group as Hippolytus did in Ref.
7.23 where he writes of Theodotus‘ teaching:
…Jesus was a (mere) man, born of a virgin, according to the counsel of the
Father, and that after he had lived promiscuously with all men, and had become
pre-eminently religious, he subsequently at his baptism in Jordan received Christ,
who came from above and descended (upon him) in form of a dove.
According to Hippolytus, Theodotus explains that divine powers operated in Jesus only
after the baptism. For this reason, Jesus was considered to be only a man prior to his
baptism. Novatian, however, refers only to opponents who believe that Jesus was only
man;24 he might just as well be writing against the Ebionites to whom Hippolytus and
others also refer.25 I will refer to this group as humanitarian monarchianists.26

21

Idem.
Trin. 12.9.
23
See DeSimone‘s edition of Trin., On the Trinity. FC 67. Trans. and Intro. Russell J. DeSimone.
Ed. T. P. Halton (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1974), 15; James Leonard
Papandrea, ―Between Two Thieves: Novatian of Rome and Kenosis Christology,‖ in If These Stones Could
Speak…Studies on Patristic Texts and Archeology: Essays in Honor of Dennis E. Groh (Lewiston, NY:
Edwin Mellen, 2009), 51. T. E. Pollard accurately labels this group with the straightforward description: ―a
humanitarian form of monarchianism which preserved the ‗monarchy‘ of God by denying the divinity of
the Son,‖ in Johannine Christology and the Early Church (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970),
71. However, Pollard also seems to accept (confusingly) the general association of this group with
Adoptionism when he quotes Evan‘s description of these monarchians, Ibid, 51.
24
See, for example, Trin. 11.1-2; 13.7-8; 14.2-17; 15.1; 15.3-10; 16.1-6; 17.6.
25
In Ref. 7.22 Hippolytus describes Ebionite theology: ―They live conformably to the customs of
the Jews, alleging that they are justified according to the law, and saying that Jesus was justified by
fulfilling the law…And the (Ebionaeans allege) that they themselves also, when in like manner they fulfill
(the law), are able to become Christs; for they assert that our Lord Himself was a man in a like sense with
all (the rest of the human family).‖ See also Irenaeus‘ Haer. 1.26 and Tertullian‘s Prescription Against
Heretics 33.
26
I follow Pollard‘s description, yet do so without his supposition that this group had anything to
do with the theology labeled ―adoptionism.‖
22
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Novatian‘s theological attacks against these groups are well documented in the
literature on Novatian. Against the Sabellians, Novatian draws heavily from the Word
Christology traditions to show that the Father and Son are distinct. Against the
humanitarian monarchians, Novatian presses them to accept the Scriptural references to
Jesus as God, Word, and Son. He also argues that the references to the Word existing
before the world, creating the world, being subject only to the Father, fulfilling the divine
prophecies of Scripture, and manifesting divine power while doing so, should be
sufficient to convince the humanistic monarchians that Jesus, the Son and Word, is God.

A Response to Novatian Scholarship
All Novatian scholars acknowledge that Trin. teaches the Son‘s subordination to
the Father. One group of scholars understands the inequalities Novatian identifies
between the Father and Son as indicating the Son‘s ontological subordination to the
Father.27 A second group, however, argues that Novatian assumes only a subordination
in terms of the Son‘s lesser authority or rank, and members of this group make the case
that Novatian teaches the equality of the Father and Son‘s divinity.28 A third group of
scholars believes that Novatian never resolves the theological tension between his

27

Scholars in this group include J. Tixeront, History of Dogmas: The Antenicene Theology.Vo. 1.
Trans. and Ed. by H. L. B. (St. Louis: Herder, 1910); Émile Amann, ―Novatien et novatianism,‖ DTC 11
(1931): 816-849; Fernand Prat, The Theology of St. Paul. Vol. 1. Translated from the 11th Edition by J. L.
Stoddard (Westminster, Md.: Newman Bookshop, 1926); E. Peterson, ―Novaziano e Novazianismo,‖ EC 8
(1952): 1976-1980; Manlio Simonetti, ―Alcune osservasioni sul De Trinitate di Novaziano,‖ Studi in
ornore di Angelo Monteverdi, Vol. 2,. (Modena: Società Tipografica Editrice Modenese, 1959): 771-783;
Pollard, Johannine Christology; Vincenzo Loi, La Trinità (Torino: Società Editrice Internaziono, 1975).
28
Two scholars in particular are currently making this case. See Paul Mattei‘s, ―De Trinitate 31.
Texte et Traduction. Commentair philologique et doctrinal.‖ Memorie della Accademia delle scienze di
Torino 20 (1996): 159-257; Papandrea, Trinitarian Theology, and ―Between Two Thieves.‖ Papandrea
formulates his assessment based on the kenosis of the Son in regard to Novatian‘s interpretation of
Philippians 2.
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suggestions of equality and inequality.29 I disagree with both the second and the third
group, and I will demonstrate that Novatian advocates the Son‘s ontological
subordination to the Father. Furthermore, my analysis shows that Novatian understands
the Son‘s personal subordination in rank or authority to the Father as a supplement and
complement to his central teaching of the Son‘s ontological subordination.
Studies in the first group, those contending that Novatian clearly taught the
ontological subordination of the Son, offer two primary approaches to demonstrating this
position: 1) they point to statements Novatian makes about the distinction between the
Son‘s attributes as compared with the Father‘s; and 2) they emphasize the various ways
Novatian uses to insist that the Son is somehow ―less than‖ (minor) the Father. My
contribution to this group will be to clarify Novatian‘s theological and philosophical
influences, thus bringing to light his intellectual presuppositions and commitments. This
analysis is critical to effectively challenging the work of those scholars in the second and
third groups.
Two of the most recent works on Novatian comprise the second group of
interpretations I mention above. This group takes the position opposite to my own.
Arguments from this second group are based, in part, on the suggestion that Novatian
29

D‘Alès, Novatien; Gulielmus Kielbach, ―Divinitas Filii eiusque Patri subordination in Novatiani
libro De Trinitate‖ Bogoslovska Smotra 21 (1933): 193-244; Desimone, Treatise of Novatian. D‘Alès,
Kielbach, and DeSimone conclude that De Trinitate contains statements consistent with the Son‘s
ontological subordination to the Father, which are coupled with assertions seeming to suggest that the Son
possesses a divinity equal to the Father‘s. I also include W. Yorke Fausset in this, Novatiani Romanae
urbis presbyteri “De Trinitate” liber. Cambridge Patristic Texts. Edited by W. Yorke Fausset (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1909). Although Fausset argues that ―there is nothing in the conception of the
Son‘s subordination to conflict with the orthodoxy of a later time,‖ he also does not believe that Novatian
provides a doctrine which can ultimately articulate the Son‘s equality with the Father, Ibid. xlvii. Fausset‘s
reading is that Novatian‘s ―position would have been greately strengthened had he grasped the thought of
‗substantia‘ in its later metaphysical sense,‖ Idem. I do not group Fausset with Papandrea and Mattei
because he does not make the argument that Novatian clearly understood the importance of articulating the
equal divinity of the Father and the Son on a metaphysical level. The effort to establish the Son‘s equality
with the Father is central to the work of Papandrea and Mattei in a way different from Fausset‘s judgment
that the Son‘s subordination does not necessarily violate divine equality.

11
associates the limitations of the Son‘s divine attributes to the Son‘s dealings with creation
and incarnational presence. According to this reading, the distinction in attributes
between the Son and the Father are neither permanent nor detrimental to the assumption
of the Son‘s ontological equality with the Father. These scholars connect Novatian‘s
understanding of the Son‘s diminishment and subordination to the economy, rather than
to the inner life of God.30 My analysis challenges what I take to be the insufficient
attention paid by these scholars to Novatian‘s juxtaposition between his theology of the
Father, especially in Trin. 1-8, and his theology of the Son. To correct this oversight, this
dissertation argues that Novatian depends on various iterations of Middle Platonic
theological philosophy, which influence his understanding of the Father and therefore the
Son.31
The third group of studies, however, presents Novatian‘s theology as an
ambivalent mixture of statements which declare both the Son‘s ontological subordination
and the Son‘s equality with the Father.32 These scholars identify discrepancies in
Novatian‘s teaching to suggest that his theology is limited by the vocabulary and
30

Neither Papandrea nor Mattei explain their positions in such an ultimately simplistic formula.
Papandrea, however, coins the phrase ―dynamic subordinationism‖ in an attempt to explain the presence of
subordination language. He explains his phrase by suggesting that Novatian teaches a form of kenotic
Christology. See his, ―Between Two Thieves,‖ 70. Mattei speaks of the equality of substance and the
personal inequality of the persons expressed in the Son‘s obedience as it is manifested especially in the
Incarnation. See the first part of Mattei‘s conclusion, ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 243-244. See also G. L. Prestige
for a discussion of the development of the patristic use of the terms related to economic Trinitarianism, in
God in Patristic Thought (London: S.P.C.K., 1959), 97-111.
31
I use the phrase ―theological philosophy‖ in reference to non-Christian sources which
influenced Novatian. All of the Christian authors whom I treat as sources for Novatian interact with
contemporary philosophy to one degree or another.
32
There are a variety of positions to be found in this group regarding the Son‘s eternality and
eternal distinction from the Father. Some of the authors simply assert subordination or inequality while
maintaining that the Son exists eternally. For others, the Son‘s eternal existence is denied. There is no
uniform connection made between the ides of the Son‘s eternality and the Son‘s subordination which is
expressed through terms of inequality. See, for example, J. F. Bethune-Baker, ―Though he regards the
existence (or generation) of the Son as eternal in the past, he speaks of the future consummation as though
the distinction of persons (Father and Son) would cease. The idea of communion substantiae…is combined
with that of subordination,‖ in An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine. 3rd Edition
(London: Methuen & Co. LTD., 1923).
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theological formulations of his time.33 Such a framework of interpretation allows
Novatian to be presented as attempting to break free from the idea of divine ontological
subordination, yet failing to do so completely. I will respond to this group by showing
that the portions of Trin. which are taken to be suggestive of ontological equality are, in
fact, best understood as maintaining the Son‘s ontological subordination.
By categorizing scholars into three groups, I do not mean to suggest that each
group presents homogeneous interpretations of all the topics used to evaluate Novatian‘s
teaching about the Son. In this dissertation, for example, I will argue that Novatian
utilizes the idea of the Father sharing His substance with the Son as a basis for calling the
Son ―God.‖ I identify this teaching with the phrase ―ontological connection‖ or
―ontological relationship.‖ With these phrases I mean that the Son‘s nature and substance
come directly from the substance of the Father. However, I reject the understanding of
those scholars who assume that an ontological connection between the Father and Son
implies their ontological equality.34 Scholars from each of the groups have argued for
and against the judgment that Novatian believes the Father shares His substance with the
Son.35

33

For example, DeSimone writes of pre-Nicene authors, ―…one must carefully distinguish in
these authors the substance of their doctrine from their imperfect mode of expression and the more or less
unfortunate consequences which were neither foreseen nor intended. Their inaccuracy was in their
philosophy, not in their faith,‖ Treatise of Novatian, 135.
34
Papandrea argues that the Son‘s equality with the Father comes, in part, from his assertion that
equality in nature logically follows from the fact the Son‘s substance comes from the Father‘s, Trinitarian
Theology, 331-336. He also states, ―Certainly the fact that the Novatianists of 325 accepted Nicaea‘s
definition of ὁκννύζηνο implies that they saw it as compatible with the christology of their founder,‖ Ibid.
335. I am skeptical of the value of Papandrea‘s assertion. See also Mattei, ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 195, for his
argument that Novatian insinuates the Son‘s equality of substance as it determines Mattei‘s understanding
of the Son‘s possession of the divine nature.
35
DeSimone‘s work shows an ambivalence about this topic in Trin. On a possible interpretations
which he accepts of Trin. 27, DeSimone writes, ―…Novatian never tires of repeating (as we have seen) that
the Son is of the Father, is born of Him, and proceeds from Him. When he states here that the Son is
hierarchically inferior to the Father, he is referring to that ministerial subordination arising from the
functions attributed to the Son ad extra,‖ in Treatise of Novatian, 137. At the same time, DeSimone warns
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In a response to the newest developments in scholarship on Novatian, this
dissertation presents the ontological subordination of the Son as central to Novatian‘s
theology. I will begin by analyzing Novatian‘s theology of the Father, which is governed
by a strong negative theology and which shares critical assumptions with the theological
philosophy of his day. Novatian‘s positive theology draws on his argument that the
Father possesses a range of unique attributes associated with His transcendence. The
Father‘s generation of the Son from His own substance affirms a unique ontological
relationship. However, this unique relationship does not diminish the status of the
Father‘s uniquely supreme divine nature. Novatian uses the relationship between the
Father and Son to reject the possibility that the Son could possess the quality of the
Father‘s attributes.36

Novatian and Theological Philosophy
In his article on Trin., Dunn calls for a revised reading of Novatian‘s text. He
turns away from an interpretation of the text which emphasizes Novatian‘s speculation

that Novatian‘s mode of expression does not explicitly assert a substantial unity between the Father and
Son, Ibid. 135. Cf. Bethune-Baker who identified Novatian as accepting the shared substance of the Father
and Son in conjunction with ontological subordination. Bethune-Baker writes, ―The idea of communion
substantiae…is combined with that of subordination,‖ in An Introduction to the Early History, 107. For
support of the interpretation that Novatian teaches the substantial unity between the Father and Son see also
Pelland, ―Une Passage difficile de Novatien sur I Cor 15:27-28,‖ Greg 66:1 (1985), 29; Harnack, History of
Dogma Vol. 1 and 2. Trans. by Neil Buchanan (New York: Russell & Russell, 1958), 314; Fausset,
Novatini Romanae, xlvii; D‘Alès, Novatien, 117; DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 175; Papandrea,
Trinitarian Theology, 334; and Mattei, ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 217. For comments by scholars which reject
reading Novatian as supporting substantial unity in favor of a reading which advocates a moral unity, see
Simonetti, ―Alcune osservazione,‖ 772-775; Keilbach, ―Divinitas Filii,‖ 223-223; T. E. Pollard, ―The
Exegesis of John 10:30 in the Early Trinitarian Controversies.‖ NTS 3 (1956-1957), 337.
36
I discuss below the different interpretations in the scholarship on Novatian of whether a shared
substance equates to an equality of nature. Throughout this dissertation, I will treat shared substance as
integral to the teaching of a unique ontological relationship. However, I will argue against the assumption
that an equal nature or equality of attributes follows from the Son‘s sharing in the Father‘s substance. I do
not believe that Novatian treats substance (substantia) as a synonym for nature (natura) or his comments
about divine attributes.
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about immanent Trinitarian theology. As noted above, he views Novatian‘s work as a
sustained Scriptural investigation of the Rule of Truth.37 Dunn‘s perspective on Trin. is
partially a new direction in the scholarly works on Novatian,38 but his attempt to balance
the theological positions of the text as a whole is not.39 By beginning from the
proposition that Novatian shies away from advanced theological investigation or
speculation, Dunn‘s work suffers from the unproven, and as far as I can tell unjustified,
assertion that Novatian was unconcerned or unfamiliar with many important
philosophical and theological topics of his day.40
The philosophical environment in which Novatian wrote Trin., as well as the
degree to which that environment shaped his work, has often been neglected or
37

From this point, Dunn concludes that this structure somehow detracts from the theological
attention Novatian might have given to more advanced topics, stating, ―As such it could well be a work
designed more for catechetical instruction than for theological investigation. The symbol was explained in
terms of the Scripture that lay behind it. It would seem that an exploration of the doctrine of the Trinity
was less Novatian‘s concern (I am not saying thought this it was of no concern) than was helping his
readers to understand their faith in the activity of God throughout salvation history. If this be the case then
the evidence in the treatise of Novatian‘s shortcomings with regard to Trinitarian theology may not be
shortcomings at all but may be evidence that the Trinity per se was not at the centre of his pamphlet,‖
―Diversity and Unity,‖ 390. My primary disagreement with Dunn is in his assumption that Novatian needs
to be saved from those scholars who wish to identify him as either heretical/regressive in his Trinitarian
theology or as an ―orthodox‖ theologian ahead of his time. Dunn is correct to point out that scholarship
ought not to start with the goal of rescuing or accusing Novatian as a theologian. However, he cannot reach
the most accurate conclusions by arguing from the assumption of Novatian‘s limited interest in theological
sophistication or speculation, even if he concedes that theological speculation played some part in Trin.
38
I note this with the qualification that all contemporary scholars and many previous scholars
acknowledge some catechetical aspect to the text along with the idea that the title itself is an addition to the
text rather than Novatian‘s original title.
39
Many scholars treat the text as presenting a consistent theology and have come to conflicting
interpretations of Novatian‘s theology. Keilbach, for example, observes that Trin. 31 functions as an
elegant summarization (eleganter resumi) of the preceding 30 chapters, in ―Divinitas Filii,‖ 213.
40
Dunn states, for example, ―Arguing from reason, Novatian stated that there was no room for a
god superior to the creator, but did not say whether or not there was room for an inferior god, for that
simply was not at issue,‖ ―Diversity and Unity,‖ 392. Dunn‘s assertion cannot stand the reasonable
presumption of Novatian‘s familiarity with theological ideas found in Tertullian‘s texts, especially Herm.
and Prax., where Tertullian took up this very issue. Such issues were very much a part of Novatian‘s
intellectual environment. We can compare Dunn‘s statements, for example, to DeSimone‘s and his
willingness to follow Cyprian in identifying Novatian as a Stoic philosopher prior to his conversion, On the
Trinity, 2. Dunn must also presume that Novatian remained immune and isolated from the Middle Platonic
teachings and texts I identify in later chapters, as well as the various Gnostic systems which demanded the
theological replies of predecessors like Irenaeus and Hippolytus. Dunn‘s conclusion apparently rests on the
fact that Novatian does not say ―inferior‖ god.
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considerably downplayed by scholars.41 The arguments for and against Novatian‘s
acceptance of subordinationism have led to the judgment by some that Novatian‘s
theology either derived from or rejected Middle/Neo Platonism.42 The assumed central
point of contact between Novatian and Platonism is the idea of a divine hierarchy:
Platonism‘s hierarchy of divine beings is compared with the idea of the Son‘s ontological
subordination in some Christian authors.43 Adolf Harnack, for example, rejected the
suggestion that Novatian taught the Son‘s ontological subordination to the Father, and
therefore concluded that ―no trace of Platonism is to be found in [Novatian‘s]
dogmatic.‖44 Harnack‘s underlying presumption is problematic. He views ontological
subordination as a Hellenistic concept, and he bases his evaluation of Novatian‘s
theology on his reading of Novatian‘s strong fidelity to Christian thought.45 I do not

41

Notable exceptions are Vogt, Spanneut, and Daniélou. See Hermann Josef Vogt, Coetus
Sanctorum: Der Kirchenbegriff des Novatian und die Geschichte seiner Sonderkirche (Bonn: Verlag,
1968), in which he compares Novatian‘s ethical and moral understanding to the principles of Stoicism. As
mentioned already, Daniélou addresses the influence of Stoicism on Novatian as it is found in Cicero,
Seneca, and Apuleius, in Origins of Latin Christianity, 233-250. See the references to Novatian in Michel
Spanneut‘s, Le stöicism des pères de l‟Église: De Clément de Rome a Clément D‟Alexandrie (Paris:
Éditions du Seuil, 1957).
42
D‘Alès suggested a mix of philosophical influences. He speaks about Novatian, along with
Justin and Tertullian, as being influenced by a form of Alexandrian philosophy. He connects this
philosophy to teachings about divine intermediaries (similar to those of Middle Platonism) and then to the
pre-Nicene affinity with the teaching of the Son‘s ontological subordination. However, he also assumes
that the influence of Stoic philosophy on Novatian acted as a counterweight to any expression in Trin.
which supported a Christianized formulation of subordinationism. See D‘Alès, Novatien, 112-113.
Although I think D‘Alès is right to seek philosophical influences on Trin., his analysis lacks the
development of evidence which would be necessary to convince and challenge later scholars less inclined
to see the importance of philosophical influences on Trin.
43
Contact with Aristotelianism plays a far less central role in scholarship, although there is one
important issue which does concern the focus of this dissertation. In treating the Son as eternal, some
scholars identify Aristotle‘s Categories of Interpretation as providing a framework by which Novatian
speaks in temporal language about the Son‘s existence, while really rejecting a literal understanding of
these terms. See below in chapter 7‘s section ―Novatian‘s use of semper and tempus.‖ Stoicism also has an
influence on Novatian‘s work. The topics most directly related to the influence of Stoicism, however, have
to do with aspects of cosmology and the Incarnation which are not, in most cases, directly applicable to this
project.
44
Harnack, History of Dogma (2), 314, and see n. 2 on the same page.
45
We can also compare Harnack‘s treatment of the development of Logos theology as
representing a shift away from the ancient faith of the Church to a Hellenized theological system. He
writes, ―The establishment of the Logos-Christology within the faith of the Church—and indeed as
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share his bifurcation of Greek and Christian thought. Instead, I will suggest that parallels
and influences exist between Novatian and philosophical sources, especially Middle
Platonism. Ultimately these influences reinforced Novatian‘s understanding of the
Gospel and the Christian tradition, but they did not control it in the way that has been
suggested.
The work of R. J. DeSimone has been particularly valuable to my project. It
provides numerous insights into Novatian‘s work, but it does so in light of certain
assumptions and methodologies different from my own. For example, DeSimone‘s
monograph from 1970 frequently suggests that Novatian‘s theology appears to include
the ontological subordination of the Son. In his evaluation of Novatian‘s treatment of
Phil. 2:6-11, DeSimone takes a moment to suggest the influence of Platonism on
Novatian, ―Compare, also, this doctrine of Novatian with the tenets of neo-platonist
philosophy: A diminished God is still truly God; the inferior beings who come forth
directly from God are still divine although subordinate.‖46 This is one of the very few
times DeSimone compares Novatian with theological philosophy.47 Over twenty years
later, DeSimone corrects his comment from 1970 in an article which analyzes Novatian‘s
treatment of the Philippians hymn as upholding the Son‘s ontological equality with the
Father.48 In his later work, DeSimone offers the simple statement, ―Novatian‘s doctrine

articulus fundamentalis—was accomplished after severe conflicts during the course of a hundred years (till
about 300). It signified the transformation of the faith into a system of beliefs with an Hellenicphilosophical cast,‖ in Outlines of the History of Dogma. Trans. by Edwin Knox Mitchell (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1957), 167.
46
DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 113.
47
Although DeSimone makes this point, his analysis does not attempt to account for why there
would be influences or parallels with Platonsim.
48
DeSimone claims to change his position only on the interpretation of Novatian‘s exegesis of
Phil. 2:6-11. However, throughout DeSimone‘s earlier work, he presents Novatian as inconsistent in his
logic and presentation. For DeSimone, individual passages either denied ontological subordination or
upheld it. See Desimone, Treatise of Novatian, 137 for the former and 169 for the latter. Therefore,
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has nothing in common with the tenets of Neoplatonic philosophy.‖49 He then repeats his
description of neo-platonism from his earlier work.
I am not proposing that Novatian is a Middle Platonist, clothing his thinking in
Christian garb. Rather, I argue that Novatian‘s theological consistency appears as a
traditional Word Christology based on an overarching theology of the Father. His
theology of the Father is influenced not only by Scripture and his Christian sources, but
also by his knowledge of theological philosophy. I will show that he utilized the terms
and traditions of theological philosophy extensively, and I will show that he did so when
he believed it comported with his understanding of Christian belief.50
Furthermore, my position is not that of DeSimone, who followed Keilbach in
viewing Novatian‘s theology as deficient in regard to his underlying philosophy.51
DeSimone offers the following conclusion,
[Novatian] proclaims the equality of Father and Son; because he did not have an
adequate notion of metaphysical unity, he denies the Son certain inalienable
attributes. His error is basically philosophical: He transfers the properties of a
although DeSimone rejects the connection to Platonism in analyzing this passage, he completely leaves to
the side the possibility that Platonism may have influenced any of the other passages in Trin. which he
believed (in 1970) to suggest the Son‘s ontological subordination.
49
DeSimone, ―Again the Kenosis of Phil. 2: 6-11: Novatian Trin. 22,‖ Aug. 32 (1992): 96.
50
There is a discussion among Novatian scholars as to the state of the technical linguistic
development of theological Latin during the period when Novatian wrote Trin. Papandrea, for example,
agrees with Loi, who suggests that Latin technical terms had not developed very far. See Papandrea,
Trinitarian Theology, 59-64 for his discussion of this topic; Vincenzo Loi, ―La Latinità Cristiana nel De
Trinitate di Novaziano,‖ Rivista di Cultura Classica e Medioevale 13 (1971), 137. Cf. Christine
Mohrmann, ―Les origines de la latinité chrétienne à Rome,‖ VC 3 (1949), 163-164, for the opposing view.
These studies attempt to look at the development of widely accepted terms. My project, however, attempts
to show that Novatian borrows some technical language from Christian and non-Christian sources as well
as systematizing his own use of terms. Therefore, the question of whether Novatian pioneers later
vocabulary for orthodox use is an issue not directly related to this study.
51
See Keilbach, ―Divinitas Filii,‖ 222-224 and DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 181. Cf. Dunn
who seems to think that deep philosophical questions played almost no influence on the theology found in
Trin. ―Diversity and Unity,‖ 392. Douglas F. Kelly argues that Stoicism played a critical role in Novatian‘s
Trinitarian theology as well as his basic understanding of the nature of God in ―The Beneficial Influence of
Stoic Logic and Epistemology on Early Christian Theology: With Particular Reference to Novatian of
Rome,‖ in Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13, 2 (1981): 817-825. See also C. B. Daly, who connects Novatian‘s
moral rigorism to the influence of Stoicism directly and also to Tertullian‘s stoically inclined theology in
―Novatian and Tertullian: A Chapter in the History of Puritanism,‖ ITQ 19 (1952): 33-43.
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physical entity to the metaphysical domain where the laws of a physical entity
lose their specific value. [Treatise of Novatian, 181]
DeSimone seems to assume that Novatian‘s knowledge of theological philosophy helped
to foster an incomplete philosophy of his own. If one is judging Novatian entirely on
standards of later orthodoxy, DeSimone‘s statement makes sense.52 However, if we are
to understand the framework of Novatian‘s theology, then we must see the coherence of
the system which he presents.
Scholars like DeSimone, Keilbach, and D‘Ales, who see Novatian‘s theology as
marooned between the teachings of the Son‘s ontological subordination and teachings of
the Son‘s equality with the Father, address Novatian‘s view of divine substance. They
presume that Novatian‘s claim of a shared substance between the Father and the Son
implies ontological equality. In light of this interpretation, Novatian‘s insistence on the
diminished attributes of the Son stand as a confusing rejoinder to divine equality, which
these scholars take to be expressed in the Son‘s sharing in the divine substance.53 In
response to this suggestion, I will argue that Novatian does not make the Father‘s sharing
of the divine substance with the Son equivalent to the Father‘s sharing the divine
attributes, which make Him unique and supreme. Novatian‘s theology proposes that the
Father shares his substance with the Son (i.e., the ontological connection) even though
the Son receives a diminished divine nature (i.e., the Son is ontologically subordinate to
the Father).

52

In fact, this is an overriding criterion of DeSimone‘s work. See Dunn‘s rebuke of this as a
methodology in ―Diversity and Unity,‖ 387-390.
53
Keilbach, for example, speaks about an essential equality based on the Son‘s shared substance,
but sees Novatian calling that into question by distinguishing the Father‘s attributes from those of the Son,
―Divinitas Filii,‖ 208. Similarly, D‘Alès writes, ―Que la diversité meme des attributions extérieures
obscurcisse en quelque mesure la communauté d‘essence, cela est très sûr. On ne cherchera pas chez
Novatien la formule claire et precise du dogme nicéen,‖ Novatien, 117.
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Dissertation Outline

In chapter 1, I will outline several philosophical examples of negative theology in
sources known to Novatian or important to understanding his intellectual environment.
In particular, I will analyze the interplay between the expressions of divine attributes and
the affirmation of the Supreme God‘s transcendence in three Platonic authors. This
investigation will also shed light on the state of theological epistemology which would
have been familiar to Novatian. Although chapter 1 details the philosophic use of
negative theology to speak of divine transcendence, I will point out that the articulation
of negative theology did not, in fact, eliminate the simultaneous and coherent presence of
positive theological statements about the Supreme God.
Chapter 2 will analyze Novatian‘s theology of the Father as transcendent in light
of the philosophical intellectual environment presented in chapter 1. I will also show that
Novatian utilizes the language of negative theology discussed in chapter 1 in order to
illustrate the incomprehensibility of the Supreme God. Furthermore, I will describe how
Novatian‘s emphasis on the incomprehensibility of God as well as his insistence on the
inability to know the name or substance of the Supreme God is an important synthesis by
Novatian of the principles seen among the Middle Platonic tradition as well as in the
Christian tradition.
In chapter 3, I will discuss Novatian‘s theological epistemology. I will
demonstrate that Novatian sees natural and divine revelation as the bridge between his
use of negative theology for his presentation of the Supreme God and the positive
theology he offers of Father. The latter theology I will present in chapter 4. I use the
term ―positive‖ to describe Novatian‘s application of terms which portray the nature and
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activity of the Supreme God. By relying on revelation, Novatian distances himself from
the suggestions of a natural connection between the mind and the divine nature in the
Middle Platonist examples outlined in chapter 1.
Chapter 4 will investigate Novatian‘s descriptions of the Father‘s nature and
activity and then compare his theology with the language concerning the Supreme Father
in Christian and philosophic sources. Novatian offers a range of specific terms and ideas
which can apply only to the Supreme Father, such as aeternus, infinitus, and immensus.54
Novatian also establishes the uniqueness of the Supreme God by labeling Him as unus
and pater. Above all, I will demonstrate that Novatian designates the Father‘s divine
nature as necessarily unique.
Chapter 5 will outline the Word theology and Word Christology traditions. In this
chapter I will show how the development of the Stoic language associated with the Word
became incorporated in Middle Platonic usage. Before discussing the Word
Christologies of Novatian‘s theological predecessors, I will describe how the Word
theology of the Middle Platonic tradition influenced Christian theology. By looking
briefly at Christian authors who served as precedents to Novatian‘s Word Christology, I
will demonstrate the manner by which individual theologians spoke about the
Son/Word‘s divine immanence in relation to the Father‘s divine transcendence.
In chapter 6, I will present Novatian‘s six primary arguments for calling the Son
―God.‖ I will show that Novatian does not suggest the Son‘s divine equality with the
Father as necessary for identifying the Son as God. The purpose of this chapter is to
present and contextualize criticial aspects of Novatian‘s theology which do not support

54

In chapter 4, 6, and 7, I will describe how Novatian reserves a superlative meaning and unique
application of these terms for the Father alone.
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the suggestion of ontological equality. In fact, some of Novatian‘s arguments rely on the
distinction of the Father and Son‘s attributes in order to describe the distinction of the
divine persons.
In chapter 7, I will address those passages and topics in Trin. which contain
evidence for the Son‘s ontological subordination to the Father. I will show that
Novatian‘s theology of the Son depends on distinguishing the Son‘s attributes from those
of the unique Father. I will focus on the Son‘s generation and birth, contact with time
and space, as well as the manner by which the Father shares His substance to demonstrate
the importance which the Son‘s ontological subordination to the Father played in
Novatian‘s theology.
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Chapter One: Philosophic Approaches to Negative Theology and Divine
Transcendence

Introduction
Novatian makes the Father‘s transcendence and indescribability a foundation of
his theology in Trin. In light of the Father‘s transcendence, the manner by which he
speaks of the Father reflects his engagement with philosophical and Christian traditions,
especially the negative theology which was common in late antiquity.1 In this chapter, I
will present an outline of various expressions of negative theology found in philosophical
sources influential to Novatian and his intellectual environment.2 I will rely on the
analysis of the current chapter to show in chapter 2 that Novatian rejects all exhaustive
knowledge about the Father‘s nature with arguments similar to or dependent on those
found in philosophical texts.3
There is no doubt that while Hellenistic Judaism and Jewish Christianity played a
role in affirming the transcendence of God in Christian circles,4 the language used by

1

See D. W. Palmer, ―Atheism, Apologetic, and Negative Theology in the Greek Apologists of the
Second Century,‖ VC 37 (1983): 234-59; Raoul Mortley, From Word to Silence: Vol. 2 The Way of
Negation, Christian and Greek (Bonn: Hanstein, 1986), 13-44; and Helen Rhee, Early Christian Literature:
Christ and Culture in the Second and Third Centuries (New York: Routledge, 2005): 50.
2
As noted above, Novatian knew some of the works of Cicero and Apuleius, however I am not
arguing that Novatian knew Alcinous. I present Alcinous‘ work as a useful tool for comparing the
similarities between his theological philosophy and that of those authors known to Novatian.
3
By ―exhaustive knowledge,‖ I mean Novatian‘s emphasis on the philosophical position that the
identification of any divine attribute necessarily entails qualifications about the insufficiency of any terms
used in the description. Novatian‘s concerns about apophatic theological language concerning the Father
will be placed in contrast to the language he uses regarding the Son. In terms of descriptions about the Son,
I will use the difference in presentation as one argument for clarifying Novatian‘s understanding of the
Son‘s ontological subordination to the Father.
4
Christopher Stead notes that ―Jews had already taken steps to present their religion in a
philosophical form calculated to appeal to cultured pagans,‖ Philosophy in Christian Antiquity (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 99. See also A. Hillary Armstrong, Christian Faith and Greek
Philosophy (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1960), 8-15. Armstrong argues that the major distinction
between Christian and Greek thought can be found in the Christian acceptance of God as infinite and the
emphasis on negative theology. As I will point out in this chapter, sufficient evidence is available to
counter Armstrong‘s claim. Christians, such as Novatian, accepted a flourishing negative theology which
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Christian authors to speak about the Father‘s transcendence came primarily from
philosophic language.5 I accept the argument that Christians of the second and third
centuries discussed the nature of God the Father‘s transcendence in light of traditional
philosophical arguments and language.6 Although I do not deny that some of Novatian‘s
Christian sources also used Jewish and/or Jewish Christian traditions,7 Novatian
demonstrates little interest with such perspectives.8 I argue instead that Novatian relied,
to a degree, on Latin and Greek philosophical traditions. His worldview, having grown

involved expression of the divine nature as infinite and eternal. Middle Platonists offered a variety of
forms which Novatian was familiar with. See also Palmer, who notes the different sources of negative
theology which scholars have variously believed to be most influential on the Apologists, ―Atheism,
Apologetic, and Negative Theology,‖ 234-236.
5
On this topic, Daniélou writes of the Apologists, ―At this stage there is, of course, no question of
a theology of transcendence in the strict sense; what the Jewish and Christian writers are seeking to
establish in opposition at once to idolatry, mythology, astrology, and demonology is primarily the spiritual,
unique, and uncreated nature of God,‖ The Development of Christian Doctrine before the Council of
Nicaea. Vol. 2, Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture. Translated and edited by John Austin Baker
(London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1973), 324. See also Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr
(Jena: Frommann, 1923), 20, in which he attributes to later Platonism‘s metaphysics the greatest influence
on Christianity. Palmer, referring to Puech, Norris, Barnard, Grant and Osborn, notes the ―widely held
view….that the apologists take over their negative theology from contemporary Middle Platonism,‖
―Atheism, Apologetic, and Negative Theology,‖ 234.
6
Apart from the influences of Hellenistic thought apparent in some of the Apologists, such as
Justin, the explicit encounter between philosophy and Christianity can be seen, for example, in Theophilus‘
Autol., Tertullian‘s Herm., and Origen‘s Cels. These authors specifically challenge philosophical doctrines
and individual philosophers. Regardless of whether one accepts the broad influence of Philo on the
Apologists for philosophical language as found in Wolfson and others, the point remains that philosophical
language and tradition stands behind the language which I address in this chapter.
7
See, for example, William R. Schoedel‘s discussion of Theophilus‘ contact with Judaism, in
―Theophilus of Antioch: Jewish Christian?‖ ILC 18 (1993): 279-97.
8
For example, below I address Novatian‘s interpretation of the Tetragramaton. His exegesis of
Exodus 3:14 looks exclusively like arguments related to Platonic expressions of Being. Likewise,
Novatian‘s work does not explicitly engage Gnostic groups the way Irenaeus and Hippolytus do in that his
theological presumptions do attempt to argue with Gnostic thinking. For example, Novatian‘s argument for
God‘s ineffability does not include a rejection of the Gnostic use of agnostos. He presumes, like Justin and
Theophilus, that knowledge of the creator God is a part of intellectual pagan history rather than anything
having to do with the revelations of aeonic activity. Therefore, it is not surprising that Novatian does not
use the term ignotum (the Latin equivalent of the Gnostic term agnostos which can be found in Haer.
1.23.2). See Daniélou, Gospel Message, 335-40 for a discussion of Gnostic terminology and theology
related to God‘s transcendence. However, Edmondo Lupieri has argued that Novatian‘s interpretation of
Ez. 1:22 owes something to a Jewish or Jewish Christian tradition of the text, ―Contributo per un‘analisi
della citazioni veterotestamentarie ne De Trinitate di Novaziano,‖ Aug. 22 (1982): 211-227.
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up presumably as a non-Christian Roman,9 depends upon a classical education which
would have exposed him at least to the handbooks of philosophy.10

Negative Theology and Transcendence in Philosophical Works
R. Mortley identifies in late Hellenism ―a new transcendentalism in religious
thinking‖ associated with negative theology.11 Negative theology, however, is not the
same as what is commonly referred to as the via negativa. Though he acknowledges the
relationship between to the two, Morley helpfully clarifies a difference which scholars
have not always made. On the one hand, the via negativa, ―eliminates all personal and
human imagery from the description of the ontological essence, but not only this, it goes
further in order to eliminate every familiar characteristic, so that not only the image of the
personal is annulled, but also the entire language of the external world.‖12 Negative
theology highlights divine transcendence. However, certain attributes and characteristics
of divinity are also discussed under the assumption that such descriptions never
completely comprehend or grasp the divine nature. I will show in chapters 2-4 that
Novatian‘s writing is an example of negative theology rather than via negativa.

9

Ronald Heine, ―Cyprian and Novatian,‖ in The Cambridge History of Early Christianity, Eds.
Young, Francis, Lewis Ayres, Andrew Louth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 157.
10
Additionally, Stefan Freund also has argued that Novatian had an extensive knowledge of
Virgil, a primary subject of study in Roman education, Vergil im frühen Christentum. Untersuchungen zu
den Vergilzitaten bei Tertullian, Minucius Felix, Novatian, Cyprian und Arnobius (Paderborn: Schöningh,
2000).
11
Mortley, From Word to Silence (2), 14. Eric F. Osborn also talks about Middle Platonism‘s new
religious emphasis as well as the ―heightened transcendence of God,‖ in The Beginning of Christian
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 28.
12
Mortley, From Word to Silence (2), 15.
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Novatian favors a negative theology which does not eliminate all positive
knowledge about God.13 Like Christian authors, Middle Platonists, Aristotelians,
Epicureans and Stoics used a range of terminology related to God‘s nature.14 However,
Middle Platonists in particular advanced the use of negative theology in the intellectual
development of idealist philosophy, although they too accepted certain positive attributes
as descriptive of the divine nature. Kenney puts it this way,
But there was no escaping kataphasis. This was true in several ways. As Michael
Williams noted in reference to ‗gnostic‘ texts, apophatic theology was usually
connected up with kataphatic claims. This—we might now see—is a conceptual
necessity, for they are interrelated. Apophasis without kataphasis would be
empty. Moreover, even the most intensely apophatic theology is guided by a tacit
conception of its divine or ultimate principle. Otherwise, its process of negation
would be nothing but an exercise in skepticism.15
This passage from Kenney summarizes some of the most recent advances in scholarship
regarding the interaction between apophatic and kataphatic theology in the first few
centuries A.D. Kenney represents a developing interpretive framework which affects
scholarship related to hellenistic philosophy, patristics, and especially various ―Gnostic‖
groups.16 I agree with the major conclusion of this trend in scholarship: negative
13

John P. Kenney speaks of the ―critical value‖ of negative theology. He writes concerning it,
―This reading of the ancient Platonic texts suggests that the ascension of the spiritual intellect—which
apophatic theology seems meant to initiate among Platonists—could not have begun without a fairly wellgrounded conception of the divine world. Otherwise, there would have been nothing to negate, nothing for
the contemplative soul to exceed and surpass. An established theology would seem, then, to have been a
precondition of Platonic apophasis,‖ in ―Ancient Apophatic Theology,‖ in Gnosticism and Later
Platonism: Themes, Figures, and Texts. Eds. Turner, John D. and Ruth Majercik (Atlanta: Society of
Biblical Literature, 2000). 259-273, here 264-5. See also Kenney, ―The Critical Value of Negative
Theology,‖ HTR 86 (1993): 439-453.
14
I use ―God‖ acknowledging, with Eric Osborn, that ―among philosophers, the one first-principle
was not commonly called ‗God,‖ Emergence of Christian Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993), 39.
15
Kenney, ―Ancient Apophatic Theology,‖ 265.
16
Kenney cites A. H. Armstrong as supporting his thesis. Armstrong writes, ―A negative theology
needs a positive theology to wrestle with and transcend,‖ in ―On Not Knowing Too Much about God,‖ in
Hellenic and Christian Studies (Aldershot, Hampshire, Great Britain: Variorum; Brookfield, Vt.: Gower,
1990), 131. See the studies found in Gnosticism and Later Platonism: Themes, Figures, and Texts. Eds.
Turner, John D. and Ruth Majercik (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2000), for examples of this
trend.
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theology, leading up to and during Novatian‘s time, depended on the interplay between
kataphatic and apophatic language.
In the course of this chapter, I will note the debates in both philosophic and
theological scholarship regarding the range of interpretations concerning negative
theology. As will be shown below, the idea that negative theology includes positive
content about the divine is a key point in the discussions. I believe that Novatian, as well
as the authors on whom he relied, made a fundamental distinction between the ability to
speak about God‘s nature (and sometimes substance) and the inability to exhaustively
define or understand God‘s nature. This qualifying remark opens the way for me to
discuss how and why authors would embrace negative theology and then proceed to
speak about divine qualities.
When speaking about God, it is also important to recognize that both nonChristian and Christian authors identified the divine being with various names including
God, the One, and the Highest.17 Many early Christian authors identified this being as
God the Father, and they embraced some of the philosophical attributes associated with
the One or the Supreme Being as found in a variety of philosophical sources.18
Throughout this chapter, I will use the labels God and Father synonymously since
Novatian followed this tradition and seems to have read the philosophical sources in this
light.19

17

Mortley, From Word to Silence (2), 13.
Rhee, Early Christian Literature, 50-55. Daniélou uses a quotation from Clement of Alexandria
to make the same point, ―‗They admit, even though against their will, that God is One, that he is
unbegotten…and indestructible…‘ (Protrept. VI:68, 3; cf. XII: 120, 2), which is a quotation from Plato
(Timaeus 52 a),‖ Gospel Message, 330. See also Justin, who believed that Plato had read the Pentateuch
and borrowed ideas related to the Father, Son, and Spirit. He takes Plato‘s references to the demiurge as
references to God the Father in addition to finding references to the Son and Spirit in 1 Apol. 59-60.
19
Novatian, like Justin and Tertullian before him, at times reserves the term ―God‖ for the Father
and often ―Lord‖ for the Son or Jesus. I agree with Dunn‘s comment, regarding the first eight chapters of
18
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The Relationship Between God and Man

When the philosophical schools spoke about God, they began by positing several
theories about man‘s connection to the divine. Academic, Stoic, and Aristotelian
philosophers referred to the soul or the mind as the point of contact between man and
God.20 Some of the authors I will mention use ―soul‖ and ―mind‖ synonymously.21 In all
cases, the soul and the mind were seen to be related to man‘s highest function or highest
aspect of nature.22 For my discussion, the most important aspect concerning the nature of
the soul/mind concerns the question of whether the soul shared the divine nature. The
manner by which a particular philosopher or school addressed this question determined
certain epistemological boundaries related to speaking about the divine nature.

Trin.: ―It would seem that in most of this section when Novatian referred to God he meant Father, even
though only in some instances did he refer explicitly to the Father,‖ ―Diversity and Unity,‖ 393. See Prax.
7 and 13 for Tertullian‘s rationale for this practice.
20
F. E. Peters provides extensive citations and explanations of the connections between nous and
psyche in the respective entries in his Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon (New York: New
York University Press, 1967). There is a difficulty in my readiness to equate the use of technical school
terminology, specifically the Academic and the Stoic, with the English words ―mind‖ and ―soul.‖ Plato
relied on the concept of nous to describe both a cosmic principle and the nous in the psyche, while Stoics
spoke of the psyche‟s hegimonikon, which had the capacity to develop towards rationality. I believe
Novatian saw the emphasis on language of rationality (including mind, soul, word, etc.) in philosophical
parlance as creating something like a universal perspective. As I show below, he found other words, such
as ―spirit,‖ to be more problematic. Of course, a relationship between the head and the highest part of the
soul appears in numerous works, including Plato‘s Tim.
21
Apuleius, for example, quotes several authors who use the word mens. He then uses animus to
refer to mens when commenting on those quotations. It therefore appears that Apuleius saw the mind and
the soul as synonymous and thus interchangeable terms. Others, such as Tertullian, treat the terms as
descriptive of a faculty and its function, respectively. In chapter 18 of his The Soul (De anima), hereafter
An.), he provides an account of his these topics in his anthropological understanding. Man‘s governing
principle is his soul (anima). The soul‘s primary faculty of understanding objects of the intellect is the
mind (animus).
22
Though Stoics used hegimonikon as the technical word for the soul‘s commanding principle, the
immediate relationship such a principle had with Platonic language of nous is obvious. Sextus Empiricus
writes, ―Some [of the Stoics]…say that soul has two meanings, that which sustains the whole compound,
and in particular, the commanding-faculty. For when we say that man is a compound of soul and body, or
that death is separation of soul and body, we are referring particularly to the commanding-faculty,‖
(Against the professors 7.234, quoted in Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol. 1
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 315.
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Among the teachings of the philosophical schools important to my study, three
approaches characterized the relationship between the mind of man and God. These
approaches include 1) the human mind is a part or a piece of the divine mind and is
therefore able to grasp divine realities,23 2) the human mind possesses attributes similar to
those of the divine mind and therefore can make accurate predications about the nature of
God,24 and 3) the mind has no connection to the divine mind and therefore true
knowledge of the divine mind remains impossible.25
The third approach mentioned above found two distinct forms of expression. The
first expression rejected any connection between the mind and the divine nature. The
result of this thorough break between the human mind and the divine nature led to the
conclusion that man cannot say anything certain about the divine nature. However, a
different understanding of the third approach offered a less extreme epistemological gap.
23

Gretchen Reydams-Schils describes a form of the Stoic position in a similar way in Demiurge
and Providence: Stoic and Platonist Readings in Plato‟s Timaeus (Turnhout: Brepols, 1999), 66. See
Marcus Aurelius Meditations 2.1 where he speaks of a ζείαο ἀπνκνίξαο.
24
One expression of Middle Platonism held to this view. Daniélou comments, ―…in Platonist
thought λνῦο, mind, and the divine, ζεῖνλ, were of the same nature, and that as a result λνῦο, when purified,
possessed the power to contemplate the divine—a view expressed, for example, by Celcus (Origen, Cels.
VII, 36),‖ in Gospel Message, 333. See also Apuleius, De deo Socr. 12-13 in which he discusses the
common nature of mind and reason shared between the gods, daemons, and men. In Cicero‘s De legibus
1.22-23, a principle of unity existed, though he did not take the natures of the human mind and the divine to
be the same: ―Thus, since there is nothing better than reason, and reason exists in both man and God, the
principal link between man and God is reason. But those who share reason must also share right reason
and, since right reason is law, we must conclude that men and gods are also linked by law,‖ quoted in
Gersh, Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: The Latin Tradition, Vol. 1 (Indiana: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1986), 86. See also Reydams-Schils, Demiurge and Providence, 61. Finally, we can find this
doctrine treated in Ps.-Aristotle‘s Mund. 1: ―It was not possible by means of the body to reach the heavenly
region or to leave the earth and explore that heavenly place…so the soul, by means of philosophy, taking
the mind as its guide, has crossed the frontier, and made the journey out of its own land by a path that does
not tire the traveler. It has embraced in thought the things that are most widely separated from each other
in place; for it had no difficulty, I think, in recognizing things that were related to it, and with ‗the soul‘s
divine eye‘ it grasped things divine, and interpreted them for mankind.‖
25
One form of this can be found in the New Academy‘s skepticism prior to the period of the
Middle Platonists. The Academy‘s turn towards skepticism under the leadership of Arcesilaus may have
rejected certainty in knowledge. M. Schofield puts it this way, ―The main thesis to which Arcesilaus is said
to have subscribed is the claim that nothing is known for certain, or more precisely that there is no such
thing as what the Stoics called cognition,‖ in ―Academic Epistemology,‖ in The Cambridge History of
Hellenistic Philosophy, Eds. Algra, Keimpe, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, Malcom Schofield
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 327.
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This understanding included the idea that true things can be said of the divine, but
nothing can be said exhaustively. The upshot of this approach includes epistemological
possibilities similar to the second approach, but without relying on the idea of a shared
nature of the mind with the divine nature. Though the second form of the third approach
accepted the possibility that true and accurate things can be said of God, this position
nevertheless rejected a shared nature of the divine mind with the human mind (or soul).26
A primary source for considerations about the various views on contact between
man‘s mind and the divine was Plato.27 Stoics, Middle Platonists, and Aristotelians
mined his works for support of their differing positions. In the Phaedrus, Plato writes
about ―the ascent of the soul to the place of true being, accessible not to the senses, but to
reason alone, and the source of all true knowledge (247ce).‖28 In this passage, the
emphasis on reason demonstrates the association between the soul and the divine. A
radically different argument, found in Parmenides 137c-142a, challenges the possibility
of any categorization of the first principle with concepts, such as being, time, or place.29

26

The philosophic and Gnostic use of emanation language, including prolatus and profere, has a
certain role in these approaches. Novatian does not address them specifically, but see Tertullian‘s Prax. 8
for his argument that despite Valentian use of them, the terms are traditional and appropriate for Christians
to use. Fausset points to instances of the terms also in Justin‘s Dial. and Tertullian‘s Apology 21, in
Novatiani Romanae, 81 n. 4.
27
Related to this topic is the idea of the ―unknown God‖ and the roots of negative theology.
Palmer notes the work of Daniélou, Armstrong, Markus, and Hack in identifying both Hellenistic Judaism‘s
contribution as well as the tradition of negative theology in Presocratics, in ―Atheism, Apologetic, and
Negative Theology,‖ 234-5.
28
Cited by Osborn, Emergence of Christian Theology, 42.
29
This is the so-called first hypothesis. See Joseph C. McLelland, God the Anonymous: A Study
in Alexandrian Philosophical Theology. Patristic Monograph Series 4 (Cambridge, Mass: Philadelphia
Patristic Foundation, Ltd., 1976), 9-11, for a discussion of the two hypotheses in Christian, especially those
in the Alexandrian tradition, and in Middle Platonic works. Dillon attributes the influence of the
Parmenides to Alcinous‘ negative theology, The Middle Platonists: 80 B.C. to A.D. 220. Rev. Ed. (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 155. Salvatore Lilla suggests that the Parmenides had a very wide
scope of influence: ―Paricularly important is the doctrine of the absolute unknowability of the first
principle, which connects Clement very closely with Philo, with Gnosticism, and with Neoplatonism; it
derives from the Neopythagorean interpretation of the ‗one‘ of the first hypothesis of Plato‘s Parmenides,
although in the case of Philo and of Clement the influence of Scriptural passages cannot be excluded,‖
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In this view the mind shares no contact with the divine. The passage concludes, ―And
thus there is no name of it [the first principle], no reasoning concerning it, nor any
knowledge of it, no sensation of it, no opinion of it.‖30 The Parmenidian passage
suggests that the divine nature remains entirely out of the mind‘s reach. It represents the
third approach, mentioned above, in its most strict interpretation. Like most
philosophers, Plato accepted speech about the divine, while limiting the capacity of the
mind to think and express attributes of God.31 After a few centuries of epistemological
skepticism in the New Academy, Middle Platonists attempted to balance affirmations
about God‘s ineffability (arrhetos/ineffabilus)32 on the one hand with positive
predications about the Supreme nature on the other.
By the 3rd century A.D., Middle Platonism and Stoicism dominated philosophical
inquiry.33 These schools often cited Plato but interpreted passages according to traditions

Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1971), 231.
30
Parmenides 141e-142a. Osborn quotes this passage from the Parmenides and briefly suggests
the logical relevance to Christian negative theology, Beginning of Christian Philosophy, 31. He also points
out that second-century Christian authors agreed ―with Plato‘s Parmenides that the One was only capable
of negative description,‖ 32. However, he adds, ―But they said other things also,‖ which points to the
difficulty in assessing the influences and boundaries of negative theology on specific Christian authors.
Although negative theology is one of the primary subjects of this chapter, it is important to recognize the
distinctions between the negative theologies of Alcinous, Apuleius, Justin, and Novatian on the one hand,
and the form of negative theology which Hippolytus attributes to Basilides in Ref. 7.20.3. Basilides‘ is the
extreme form of negative theology which rejects any level of predication and which was arguably
influenced by this position found in the Parmenides. On this topic in general, see Daniélou, Gospel
Message, 339-340 and Harry Austryn Wolfson, ―Negative Attributes in the Church Fathers and in
Basilides,‖ HTR 50:2 (1957), 151-156.
31
See above the quotation from the Phaedrus. Cf. T. Taylor in the notes of his translation of
Dogm. Plat. who holds that the Parmenides is Plato‘s final word on the highest God, 325.
32
See Alcinous Did. 10.3-4 and Apuleius De deo Socr. 3.124.
33
Such a statement in some ways is problematic. Though I accept Dillon‘s caution of labeling
philosophy during this era as ―eclectic,‖ there is no doubt about the blending of doctrines between the
major schools. The blending makes discerning any particular school‘s influence on Novatian difficult since
influences include, for example, Cicero (who identified himself as a Platonist though clearly showing Stoic
leanings), Apuleius (who includes Aristotelian themes in his works—not the least of which is his own
translation into Latin of Ps.-Aristotle‘s Mund.), and Seneca (who, while mainly presenting a philosophy
marked by Stoicism, demonstrates sympathies with Middle Platonism).
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later than the original writings.34 In the case of the Stoics, their cosmology depended on
assertions concerning the pneuma‘s interpenetration of all things, including human
beings.35 We will see that Novatian rejected this kind of anthropology. However, some
of the Middle Platonist authors available to Novatian provided a set of doctrines more
easily harmonized with his Christianity. Ample evidence demonstrates Novatian‘s
familiarity with Cicero and Apuleius.36 In the following section I address Cicero,
Alcinous,37 and Apuleius in order to outline an important trend in the Middle Platonic
understanding of the mind. While Cicero‘s presentation of Platonism remains marked by
the skepticism of the New Academy,38 Alcinous and Apuleius, who write in the 2nd
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See Reydams-Schils‘ Demiurge and Providence, 32-40.
R. J. Hankinson writes about pneuma, ―The Stoics held that the world was permeated by a
dynamic substance responsible at the lowest level for the cohesion of material object; at the next level up
for the organization of a functioning metabolizing and self-reproducing organism; then for animal
perception and voluntary power; and, finally, in humans, for cognition and understanding,‖ ―Stoicism and
Medicine,‖ in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics. Edited by Brad Inwood (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), 298-299. Michael J. White, however, takes note of the overriding Stoic teaching
on cosmic unity and notes that pneuma seems to function as an extension of the divine activity if not the
principle itself: ―However, the problem remains that pneuma seems often to function in much the way that
the active principle (creative fire or god) does—whereas its ontological status appears to be not even that of
an element, but rather a synthese of elements. Part of the problem here—as with respect to the ontological
status of fire—may be the exiguous quantity and polemical quality of our evidence. Part of the problem
may be differences, now difficult to reconstruct accurately, among various Stoic thinkers. Yet it seems
reasonable to suppose that a third part of the problem is that of assimilating pre-existing traditions of
natural philosophy and physical explanation into the monistic ontological framework demanded by
fundamental Stoic commitments to cosmic unity and cohesion,‖ ―Stoic Natural Philosophy (Physics and
Cosmology),‖ in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, Ed. Brad Inwood (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), 135.
36
Scholars typically understand Cicero as a Stoically-influenced Platonist. McLelland, following
Philip Merlan, accepts Apuleius (and Alcinous) as offering a synthesis of Plato and Aristotle. See
McLelland, God the Anonymous, 16.
37
This author is known by scholarship as either Alcinous or Albinus. For clarity‘s sake, I will
refer throughout this dissertation to Alcinous and use Albinus only in quotations from scholars. Regarding
this confusion of identity, see Dillon‘s comments in Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism. Clarendon
Later Ancient Philosophers. Translated with an Introduction and Commentary by John Dillon (Oxford:
Clarendon; New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), ix-xiii.
38
Gersh writes, ―In passages where he [Cicero] describes his methodology, he seems to align
himself primarily with the New Academic tradition from Carneades onwards: in other words he adopts a
general skepticism regarding the attainment of absolute truth, at the same time holding that some
philosophical views are more probable than other. Thus, Cicero argues that he will not be bound to the
dogmatic assertions of any particular school but will always seek the ‗most probable‘ (maxime probabile)
solution to any philosophical problem, or that he belongs to a school which pursues the probable and will
35
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century, are unquestionably influenced by the rise of dogmatism regarding their
conclusions about the mind‘s contact with God.39

Cicero
Although Cicero declares his sympathies for Platonism,40 he suggests at the end
of de Natura Deorum (hereafter Nat. d.)41 that the Stoic line of reasoning on many of the
subjects contained in this work swayed him more than the arguments of the skepticallyoriented Platonist.42 In this dialogue, the Stoic interlocutor links the nature of the gods
with the human mind and virtues. He asks, ―Now if intelligence (mens) and faith, virtue
and concord exist in the human race, from where could these have emanated down to
earth except from the gods above?‖43 In this passage, the Stoic attempts to establish a
connection between the mind and virtues in man and their source in the divine.
The Academic‘s response to the Stoic shows the influence of the New Academy‘s
skepticism. He states,
Mind, Faith, Hope, Virtue, Honour, Victory, Safety, Harmony, and other concepts
of the same kind we must envisage as in essence abstractions, not as gods; for
not ‗advance beyond the point where likelihood has revealed itself‘ (ultra id quod veri simile occurrit
progredi),‖ in Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism, 58-59.
39
I am using ―dogmatic‖ in this case as opposite to skeptical. The typical scholarly approach
identifies Stoic dogmatism as eventually influencing the New Academy to turn away from its skepticism.
Dillon notes, ―Dogmatism revived in the Platonic tradition when Antiochus accepted the Stoic doctrine of
certainty, the doctrine of the katalêptikê phantasia, or, as we may term it, ‗cognitive impression‘. The
Stoic definition of a cognitive impression is as follows: ‗A cognitive impression is an impression derived
from an object which really exists, and which is impreinted and stamped (on the subject) in accordance
with such object, of such a kind as could not be derived from a non-existent object,‘‖ Middle Platonists, 64
(italics Dillon‘s).
40
Gersh notes, ―Thus, in the opening discussion of the Academica, Cicero describes the Old
Academy as ‗that school which, as you know, I approve‘ (quam nos ut scis probamus), and in another text
he declares that it is difficult for him to abandon the ethical position of Antiochus,‖ Middle Platonism and
Neoplatonism, 67-68.
41
I will make frequent reference to Cicero‘s Nat. d. in my analysis of Novatian. This work shows
an Epicurean, Stoic, and Academic arguing not so much about the attributes of divinity, but about the
different metaphysical conclusions each author reached based upon the different dogmas of each school.
42
Nat. d. 3.95.
43
Nat. d. 2.79. Translations of Nat. d. are Rackham‘s, unless otherwise stated.
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they are either qualities that reside within us, such as mind, hope, faith, virtue, and
harmony, or they are aims to which we aspire, like honour, safety, victory. I
appreciate that these are beneficial qualities, and I note that statues are dedicated
in their honour; but why divine powers [vis deorum] should reside in them I shall
understand only when my researches reveal it. [Nat. d. 3.61, translation Walsh]
Although noting the appreciation he has for the Stoic emphasis on such qualities and
characteristics, the Academic concludes his thoughts on the matter with a comment about
the limits of the epistemology:
This is about all I have to say about the nature of the gods. My purpose has been
not to deny their existence, but to make you realize how hard it is to understand it,
and how problematic are the explanations offered. [Nat. d. 3.93, translation
Walsh]
For a Platonist influenced by the New Academy, the epistemological gap between the
divine and the human mind remained practically unbridgeable (as opposed to
theoretically unbridgeable).44 This position stood in stark contrast to Stoic anthropology
which accepted a direct connection between the mind and God. As noted above, Stoics,
by the 2nd century A.D., spoke about the soul as a part of the divine.
Cicero‘s Academic rejects the anthropological foundations of the Stoic‘s
comments. The mind, while sharing a function or power with the divine, is not of the
same nature as the divine. Therefore, the Academic treats the idea of a direct
correspondence of nature between God and the mind/virtues as false. The position of
Cicero‘s Academic comes down to the distinction between the mind of man and the
divine. As noted, Cicero himself suggests that he believed the arguments of the Stoic
―approximated more nearly to a semblance of the truth.‖45 This endorsement does not
mean that Cicero accepted the full cosmology of Stoicism. Rather, it demonstrates the
44

See Schofield, ―Academic Epistemology,‖ 345-350 for a discussion of the New Academy‘s
formulations of probability.
45
Nat. d. 3.95. Cicero seems to fall somewhere between the typical tenets of the New Academy
and those common in Middle Platonic authors.
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intellectual turn away from the New Academy‘s skepticism and towards what would
become the Middle Platonic acceptance of the possibility for closing the epistemological
gap between man‘s mind and the divine nature.

Alcinous
While there is no evidence Novatian knew Alcinous‘ writings, Alcinous‘
Didaskalikos (hereafter Did.) provides another important witness to the 3rd century A.D.‘s
intellectual climate.46 The ideas presented in Did. reflect widely held philosophic and
religious beliefs on divine transcendence and immanence.47 The case is the same for
Apuleius‘ work, except that there is evidence Novatian knew at least some of Apuleius‘
work.48 The importance of these authors for my study lies in the fact that a resurgent
dogmatism in Middle Platonism posited some knowledge of the divine nature. As will be
pointed out in the following pages, the turn from the New Academy‘s skepticism did not

46

Much in Alcinous‘ presentation of the interplay between transcendence and divine attributes fits
Novatian‘s approach, even if there is no direct dependence. Perhaps of some importance to the
relationship between Novatian and Apuleius is Roelof Van Den Broek‘s suggestion that Apuleius depended
on Alcinous, in ―Apuleius, Gnostics and Magicians on the Nature of God,‖ in Studies in Gnosticism and
Alexandrian Christianity (Leiden, Brill: 1996), 42. Since Novatian knew at least some of Apuleius‘ work,
a possible, indirect influence might exist between Novatian‘s views and those of Alcinous.
47
Regarding transcendence, Armstrong identifies two sorts. Of the second, which he says starts to
show up in the first centuries A.D. and is found in Alcinous, he writes, ―But the other meaning of
transcendence is much more important for serious Christian thinking. This is that God is wholly other,
different from and better than everything that we are or can know. This kind of transcendence is
compatible with the deepest immanence; the two are in fact different ways of looking at the same thing,‖ in
Christian Faith, 8. His emphasis on ―wholly other‖ is certainly rhetorically justified, though I am more
willing to see an influence of Stoic dogmatism regarding the divine nature in the work of the Middle
Platonists which I address.
48
Dillon, Alcinous: Handbook, xi, notes that Alcinous‘ work and that of Apuleius ―agree no more
than might be expected for any two elementary handbooks of Platonism that might be produced at any time
in the first two centuries AD,‖ although his commentary points out numerous parallels. He also states, for
example, that Apuleius‘ Dogm. Plat. ―procedes along closely parallel lines to the work of A[lcinous],‖
Idem. See also Gerald Sandy who suggests parallels, The Greek World of Apuleius: Apuleius and the
Second Sophistic (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 216. S. J. Harrison discusses a ―considerable resemblance‖
between Dogm. Plat. and Did., in Apuleius: A Latin Sophist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 196197. Emily Hunt likewise points out similarities in these texts, in Christianity in the Second Century: The
case of Tatian (New York: Routledge, 2003), 80-82.
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lead to a uniform position on the expressions of diving transcendence. Rather, like
Cicero,49 individual authors came to various conclusions about the mind‘s contact with
the divine.
In reference to the Supreme God, Alcinous agrees with Plato‘s assertion that God
is ―more or less beyond description‖ (κηθξνῦ δεῖλ θαὶ ἄξξεηνλ).50 Some scholars take
Alcinous‘ reference to this passage as an indication of his endorsement of God‘s absolute
transcendence.51 Dillon, however, convincingly casts doubt on this interpretation. He
regards the identification of ―more or less‖ as an indication of the ability to gain some
knowledge rather than inability to gain exhaustive knowledge.52 He therefore places
greater weight on Alcinous‘ addition that God is ―ineffable and can be grasped only by
the intellect.‖53 R. Norris suggests an apparent lack of coherence, stating, ―This is the
Divinity which, he [Alcinous] remarks paradoxically, is grasped by the mind even though
its nature is inexpressible.‖54 As we shall see, Norris‘ estimation of the paradoxical

49

Gersh notes some of the most influential philosophers on Cicero: ―The Stoic Diodotus was a
close fried of Cicero and resided in his house for many years, in fact until the former‘s death. Yet more
important were the influences which came to bear after 88 B.C. when Philo of Larissa, then the most
eminent Academic philosopher, fled to Rome as a political refugee; and during the years 79-77 B.C. when
Cicero was in Athens hearing the lectures of Antiochus of Ascalon who, in reaction against Philo, was
teaching a form of dogmatic Platonism, a novel phenomenon at that date,‖ Middle Platonism and
Neoplatonism, 55.
50
Did. 10.1.
51
Hunt comments, ―Alcinous‘ divine principle is, not surprisingly, an absolutely transcendent
being. God is entirely above human forms of classification, and thus it is difficult for men to contemplate
him,‖ Christianity in the Second Century, 80
52
Dillon writes, ―The characterization ‗more or less beyond description (mikrou dein kai
arrhēton)‘ seems to have misled some commentators into assuming that A. declares his primary divinity to
be quite simply ineffable, but this is precisely what he does not do, by his careful qualification,‖ Alcinous:
Handbook, 101 (italics Dillon‘s). Dillon then points to Alcinous‘ dependence on Timaeus 28c: ―To
discover the maker and father of this universe is no light task; and having discovered him, to declare him to
all men is impossible,‖ Idem. He than suggests that one possible meaning of Alcinous‘ statement might be
(like Apuleius in Dogm. Plat. 1.5 and De deo Socr. 3) that, ―it is impossible to communicate the nature of
the deity to everyone.‖ Harrison appears to share Dillon‘s interpretation, Apuleius, 148. Cf. Wolfson who
argued for the position later endorsed by Hunt, in ―Negative Attributes,‖ 145-156.
53
Did. 10.4. Daniélou ties this passage to Plato‘s Tim. 52a, in Gospel Message, 332
54
Norris, God and World in Early Christian Theology (New York: Seabury, 1965), 35. R. M.
Grant finds Alcinous‘ position less problematic. Grant notes, ―The gods have nothing to do with the world
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nature of holding these two positions simultaneously was not shared by the second and
third century authors I will address. Some scholars indirectly (and convincingly) refute
Norris‘ conclusion by shedding light on the interplay between apophatic and kataphatic
theology.55
While declaring God‘s inexpressibility, Alcinous offers a list of characteristics
which he believes are necessarily attributable to God. In doing so, he rejects the New
Academy‘s skepticism when he affirms the mind‘s ability to grasp the divine in some
way.56 He writes,
The primary god, then, is eternal, ineffable, ‗self-perfect‘ (that is, deficient in no
respect), ‗ever-perfect‘ (that is, always perfect), and ‗all-perfect‘ (that is, perfect
in all respects); divinity, essentiality, truth, commensurability, <beauty>, good. I
am not listing these terms as being distinct from one another, but on the
assumption that one single thing is being denoted by all of them. (Did. 10.3)57

of sense perception, and since Mind is even better than Soul, the transcendent cause of Mind is the First
God, who works unmoved (the Aristotelian principle). He always knows himself and his own thoughts,
and this activity is called Form,‖ in Gods and the One God (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986), 80.
Grant explains Alcinous‘ use of negative theology as part of its popularity in philosophical and
theosophical works.
55
See, for example, McLelland, God the Anonymous, 15-21.
56
By Alcinous‘ time, the radical skepticism of the Academy was no longer embraced, and it had
moved back to the inclusion of some dogmatic positions following the teaching of Antiochus of Aschilon.
See Philip Merlan‘s, ―Greek Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus,‖ in The Cambridge History of Later Greek
and Early Medieval Philosophy, Ed. Armstrong, A. H. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967),
53. However, many scholars, beyond the first half of the 20th century, seem to assume that the New
Academy‘s skepticism continued perhaps until Plotinus. For example, Prestige takes note of Hippolytus‘
Ref. 1.20 in which he states that some Academics denied the possibility of knowledge. Prestige states,
―The idea expresses something that in the full sense lies beyond the measure of man‘s mind. Hence the
Academic school is said to have introduced the doctrine of ‗universal incomprehensibility,‘ alleging that
there is no truth to be found in the sphere either of mind or of sensation, and that the appearance of things is
an illusion of human consciousness,‖ God in Patristic Thought, 5-6. I take Prestige‘s comment to refer best
to the situation prior to Novatian‘s time. Middle Platonists such as Alcinous and Apuleius do not easily fit
Prestige‘s description. Frances M. Young agrees with Prestige and attributes an Aristotelian influence to
the Platonic tradition on this point in his ―The God of the Greeks and the Nature of Religious Language,‖ in
Early Christian Literature and the Greek Intellecutal Tradition. Ed. W. R. Schoedel and Robert Wilken
(Paris: Èditions Beauchesne, 1979), 50.
57
Καὶ κὴλ ὁ πξῶηνο ζεὸο ἀίδηόο ἐζηηλ, ἄξξεηνο, αὐηνηειὴο ηνπηέζηηλ ἀπξνζδεήο, ἀεηηειὴο
ηνπηέζηηλ ἀεὶ ηέιεηνο, παληειὴο ηνπηέζηη πάληε ηέιεηνο· ζεηόηεο, νὐζηόηεο, ἀιήζεηα, ζπκκεηξία, ἀγαζόλ.
Λέγσ δὲ νὐρ ὡο ρσξίδσλ ηαῦηα, ἀιι‘ ὡο θαηὰ πάληα ἑλὸο λννπκέλνπ.
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Alcinous distills his array of positive attributes about God down to God‘s simplicity.58
The emphasis on the ultimate unity of attributes came from Stoicism, but by this period
Academics also spoke this way.59 When Alcinous refers to God, he does so in light of
perceived necessary and logical categories. Among other attributes, his definition of
divinity includes perfect goodness, perfect beauty, and eternity. Together, all of the
attributes Alcinous brings up point to the Supreme God.
Alcinous also distinguishes between expression about the divine nature and
experiences of the divine. He outlines three ways of approaching the ineffable God.
Dillon describes them as 1) abstraction, 2) analogy, and 3) intuiting God in an ascent of
categorical reflection.60 These methods direct the mind towards the transcendent.61

58

By identifying ―positive attributes‖ in regard to Alcinous‘ Supreme God, I am advocating
Dillon‘s reading of the text. In regard to the passage quoted above, he writes, ―There now follows a most
interesting sequence of epithets of the supreme god. The nature of these attributes has caused problems for
commentators (e.g. Freudenthal (1879: 286f.); Festugière (1954: iv. 137f.); Wolfson (1952: 115-30),
Invernizzi (1976: i. ch. 8), because they seem to conflict with A.‘s repeated assertion (164. 7. 28; 165. 4)
that God is ‗ineffable‘ (arrhētos). The attributes cannot, therefore, it is argued, be describing his essence,
but only serve to characterize his relations to his creation. However, it is not clear to me that that is a
distinction that A. would make. Indeed, if one accepts that these epithets are taken from Philebus 65a…,
then the first two in that passage are precisely characterizing the essence of the Good, which is the first
principle,‖ Alcinous: Handbook, 103. Cf. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, 1-18.
59
See Jean-Cleaude Fredouille‘s mention of unity in regard to Tertullian‘s incorporation of this
tenet into his works, in Tertullien et la conversion de la culture antique (Paris: Études Augustiniennes,
1972), 282. Plato‘s writings played an obvious influence on this topic. As noted above, the concepts of
spirit and mind functioned as some of the most prevalent categories of divinity among pagan philosophers,
even amongst those philosophers founding their ideas on negative theology. Behind these instances of
divine language stand assertions of the oneness of the Supreme God. For example, Plato‘s Parmenides (see
137C-D) remained a fundamental text for later conversations of this issue. An implication of talking about
the One led to discussions about divine simplicity, or whether the One contained parts. Parts, however,
cannot but be discussed except through names.
60
Did. 10.5-6. Dillon categorizes these as negation or abstraction (aphairesis/via negationis),
analogy (analogia/via analogiae), and pre-eminence (hyperochē/via eminentiae). He also notes that these
methods of ―attaining to a concept of immaterial essence‖ showed up often in Middle-Platonist or Platonistinfluenced authors, especially Christians, in Middle Platonists, 109-111. See also Daniélou, Gospel
Message, 340-343, in which he describes two of the methods as ―positive ways of knowing‖ God, and
McLelland, God the Anonymous, 17-21. Novatian certainly demonstrates a similarity in argumentation.
See Trin. 3.5-6, where Novatian‘s concern is to declare that God ―ever desir[es] to become more
completely known to us and to incite our minds to His worship.‖ However, Novatian also maintains that
the Father remains unknown to direct apprehension of the mind. Origen‘s Cels. 7.42 also provides a
detailed description of these three ways of knowing.
61
Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, 5.
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Having moved away from Academic skepticism, it is not surprising that Alcinous uses
arguments typical of Stoicism and which can be found in Cicero‘s Nat. d. 2.62 The
Academic in Cicero‘s work rejects Stoic methodologies as lacking any fundamental
ontological connection between the ideal world and the material world.63 However, by
the 2nd century A.D., the Middle Platonic tendency towards a mix of idealism and
dogmatism led some authors to accept the possibility of gaining knowledge about the
divine through the mind‘s apprehension as well as through perception of the world.64
In his treatment of the origin of the soul, Alcinous follows the Platonic tripartition
model associated with Timaeus.65 He attributes the highest, immortal part of the soul to
the direct action of the Creator:
As for the human race, since there was a special concern on the part of the father
of all [παηξὶ πάλησλ] and of the gods who are his offspring for this, as being most
akin to the gods, the creator of the universe sent down to earth the souls [ςπρὰο]
of this race in number equal to the stars… [Did. 16.2]
Alcinous‘ Supreme God takes part in making only select aspects of creation. He couches
his explanation for this in terms of a principle regarding the ontological status imparted
by a creator onto a work. In so doing, Alcinous takes the common position that things

62

Nat. d. is one of the most complete pictures of the Stoic system which we possess. See Paul
Boyancé, ―Les preuves stoéciennes de l‘existence des dieux d‘aprés Cicéron (De natura deorum, livre II),‖
Hermes 90 (1962), 45-71.
63
See, for example, Nat. d. 3.26.
64
This point is critical to my understanding and analysis of the philosophical influences on
Novatian, since some scholars consider such epistemological categories as strictly within the bounds of
Stoicism. The fact that Middle Platonists took these ideas over from Stoicism by Novatian‘s time will allow
me to suggest the continuity of Middle Platonic influences on Novatian‘s articulation of epistemology and
the nature of the divine in Trin. D. F. Kelly‘s article, ―The Beneficial Influence of Stoic Logic,‖ is based
on the previously mentioned premise.
65
Dillon notes of Did. 16, ―There is nothing here that goes beyond the text of the Timeaus,‖
Alcinous: Handbook, 137.
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created by the lower gods impart mortality while the highest God necessarily imparts
immortality.66
Alcinous seems most concerned in these passages with recasting the Platonic
hierarchy between Being (the highest God) and Becoming (the participation or likeness to
Being which is imparted to the various levels of creation).67 His treatment of the origins
of the soul demonstrates the Academic acceptance of a natural likeness to divinity, which
is marked by the soul‘s possession of attributes such as rationality and, in the example
above, immortality. Such a position does not entail the kind of ontological sharing of
divinity indicative of the Stoic form of pantheism. Rather, the passage places an
emphasis on the idea that human beings share, to some degree, in divine attributes.
I categorize Alcinous‘ thought as an example of the second approach to the
relationship between the mind and God. He does not base his theological epistemology
on the supposition that the mind shares the divine nature, as in the first approach.
However, Alcinous allows for some positive predications about the divine nature by
suggesting that the soul shares in the gift of immortality because God took a direct role in
creating it. In this case, a sharing in attributes does not equate to a sharing in the divine
substance (such as the Stoics advocated). Alcinous neither accepts the skepticism of the
New Academy nor rejects all epistemological contact between the mind and God—as
seen in the Parmenidian version of the third approach.

66

Did. 16.1: ―When God had imposed order upon the universe as a whole, there were still left
(uncreated) the three classes of living being which were going to be mortal, the winged, the aquatic, and
those that go on land. The creation of these he now entrusted to the gods who were his offspring, to avoid
the consequence that, if they were made by him, they would be immortal.‖ Dillon points out that Alcinous
closely follows Tim. 41b7 for this doctrine.
67
See Reydams-Schils for a description of this hierarchy, Demiurge and Providence, 30-31.
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Apuleius
Apuleius‘ de Deo Socratis and de Dogmata Platonis (hereafter De deo Socr. and
Dogm. Plat.) contain different approaches to the topics of man‘s contact with the divine
and of man‘s knowledge of God. His treatment of man‘s nature and the divine nature
receive a far fuller treatment in Dogm. Plat. In both works, Apuleius attempts to portray
the thought of Plato, at least in part, through the lens of Tim. 28c, which was also quoted
in Alcinous‘ Did.
Only one passage in Apuleius‘ De deo Socr. accounts for his presentation of the
Supreme God. In it, Apuleius identifies three levels of gods in his description of divinity:
the daemons, gods of the Olympian order, and the transcendent God of all.68 He states,
But of the father (parentem) of these, who is the lord (dominator) and author
(auctor) of all things (omnium rerum), and who is liberated from all necessity of
acting or suffering, not being bound by any duty to the performance of any
offices, why should I now begin to speak? Since Plato, who was endued with
celestial eloquence, when employing language worthy of the immortal Gods,
frequently proclaims that this cause of all things, on account of his incredible
(incredibili) and ineffable (ineffabili) greatness (maiestatis), cannot be even
moderately comprehended (conprehendi) by any definition, through the poverty
of human speech; and that the intellectual apprehension of the God can scarcely
be obtained by wise men, when they have separated themselves from body, as
much as possible, through the vigorous energies of the mind (vigore animi). He
also adds, that this knowledge sometimes shines forth with a most rapid flash, like
a bright and clear light in the most profound darkness.69 I will therefore omit the
discussion of this, in which all words adequate to the amplitude of the thing are
not only wanting to me, but could not even be found by my master Plato. (De deo
Socr. 3.124; modified)70
68

De deo Socr. 1-2. Alcinous also makes a tripartite division of divinity, labeling gods below the
primary God as ―created gods,‖ in Did. 15.1. While Alcinous explores the traditionally Platonic tripartition
of Matter, Forms, and God, he also states, ―God is in fact himself the creator of the universe, and of the
gods and daemons, and by his will with universe admits of no dissolution,‖ Did. 15.2. The God, gods, and
daemons all share qualities of divinity.
69
This passage might help to explain Justin‘s comment about Platonists always hoping for a vision
of God. Little evidence exists in Middle Platonic sources for a vision such as Justin describes, though his
description may be his own interpretation of the kind of light Apuleius suggests.
70
Quorum parentem, qui omnium rerum dominator atque auctor est, solutum ab omnibus nexibus
patiendi aliquid gerendiue, nulla uice ad alicuius rei munia obstrictum, cur e[r]go nunc dicere exordiar, cum
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A comparison between this passage and Alcinous‘ Did. on the subject of God‘s
ineffability shows that Apuleius declines to express any content similar to the attributes
which Alcinous posits of the Supreme God, such as goodness, beauty, etc. However,
Apuleius sees no issue with labeling the Supreme God as parens, dominator, and auctor,
terms which often carried with them implications about God‘s nature, such as goodness
and beauty. In regard to addressing man‘s intellectual grasp of God or man‘s ability to
speak about God, Apuleius suggests that a wise man might apprehend some kind of
knowledge about God. He quickly moves on from this point because Plato was
apparently incapable of putting such pursuits of the mind/soul into words.71
Apuleius‘ statements related to divine transcendence in De deo Socr. do not
follow the same approach as his Dogm. Plat. or Alcinous‘ Did. In De deo Socr.,
Apuleius makes the difficulty of speech fundamental, while the experience of the divine
remains rare enough to make such a description unsuitable for the work. Certainly,
however, he does not reject all knowledge about the divine.
In Dogm. Plat., however, Apuleius discusses the teachings of Plato on the nature
of God in words similar to Alcinous‘.72 He writes,
But the following were his opinions of God, that [in the first place], he is
incorporeal. For he says, ‗That he alone is uncircumscribed (aperimetros), and
Plato caelesti facundia praeditus, aequiperabilia diis inmortalibus disserens, frequentissime praedicet hunc
solum maiestatis incredibili quadam nimietate et ineffabili non posse penuria sermonis humani quauis
oratione uel modice conprehendi, uix sapientibus uiris, cum se uigore animi, quantum licuit, a corpore
remouerunt, intellectum huius dei, id quoque interdum, uelut in artissimis tenebris rapidissimo coruscamine
lumen candidum intermicare? Missum igitur hunc locum faciam, in quo non mihi [quidem] tantum, sed ne
Platoni quidem meo quiuerunt ulla uerba pro amplitudine rei suppetere.
71
A. D. Nock cites this text and states, ―[I]t must, to be sure, be noted that Apuleius does not
formally state that God is beyond the reach of the intellect, but he approaches this when he speaks of
comprehension as coming to a few, and to them only in rare moments of illumination by grace,‖ in his ―The
Exegesis of Timaeus 28 C,‖ VC 16 (1962), 81. Nock then points to Apuleius‘ Dogm. Plat. 1.5 in order to
compare the above statement with one suggesting the ability to conceive of God.
72
Harrison, Apuleius, 196-197.
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the generator (genitor) of things, attracting all things to himself, blessed (beatus),
and beatific (beatificus), most excellent (optimus), in want of nothing, and himself
imparting all things.‘ He likewise asserts, ‗That he is celestial (caelestem),
ineffable (indictum), and incapable of being named (innominabilem), and in his
own words, αόξαηνλ, αδάκαζηνλ; whose nature it is difficult to discover, and
when found cannot be enunciated to many.‘ These are the words of Plato: It is
difficult to discover God, and impossible when found to enunciate him to the
multitude. (Dogm. Plat. 1.5; modified)73
Apuleius treats all of the attributes he mentions as logical necessities of divinity. I take
the separate approaches of Apuleius in De deo Socr. and Dogm. Plat. as reflecting
different rhetorical techniques when arguing for a distinction between the nature of God
and that of man.74 The two works differ in purpose, but the points about the divine nature
stated in Dogm. Plat. are neither pursued in, nor denied by, De deo Socr.
In addition to setting forth positive divine attributes similar to Alcinous, Apuleius
also categorizes existing things into two essences in Dogm. Plat. First essences include
God, the forms, mind, and soul.75 The second essence includes matter. By making a
bifurcation between two kinds of essences, Apuleius suggests at least some kind of
ontological relationship between God, forms, mind, and soul. He modifies the typical
Academic separation between Being (as the Primary God) and Becoming (a participation
in varying degrees of Being). As such, the reference to a ―first essences‖ category, which

73

Sed haec de Deo sentit, quod sit incorporeus. Is unus, ait, ἀπερίμεηρος, genitor rerumque
omnium exstructor, beatus et beatificus, optimus, nihil indigens, ipse conferens cuncta. Quem quidem
caelestem pronuntiat, indictum, innominabilem, et ut ait ipse, ἀόραηον, ἀδαμαζηον; cuius naturam invenire
difficile est; si inuenta sit, in multos eam enuntiari non posse. Platonis haec verba sunt: Θεὸλ εὑξεῖλ ηε
ἔξγνλ, εὑξόληα ηὲ εἰο πνιινὺο ἐθθέξεηλ ἀδύλαηνλ.
74
Nock, ―The Exegesis of Timaeus 28 C,‖ 81 fn. 3 notes that some scholars question Apuleius‘
authorship of Dogm. Plat. Separate authorship would be one possible explanation of dogmatic discrepancy
between Dogm. Plat. and de Deo Soc. However, Harrison makes a strong case for Apuleius‘ authorship of
both works in Apuleius, 203-209.
75
In Dogm. Plat. 1.6, Apuleius ranks God, mind, forms, and soul (Deum esse, et mentem
formasque rerum, et animam) together as the first substance/essence (substantia/essentia). He does not
retain the singular form of the words however, but rather immediately speaks about the essences of God,
forms, mind, and soul. The identification of the first essence appears to be relational to the second essence
(material essence) rather than the affirmation that God, mind, forms, and soul are all the exact same
essence. This topic will be further addressed again in chapter 4.
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includes God, the forms, mind, and soul, probably demonstrates the influence of
Stoicism. Apuleius‘ teaching suggests that he considers the ontological status of the first
essences on a continuum of Being: the Supreme God is the fullness of Being and the
forms, mind, and soul participate in (to a degree) the essence or nature of the Supreme
God. For Apuleius, it seems that mind and soul‘s similarity to divinity, at least in terms
of rationality, establishes a place on the continuum.
Apuleius says that the first essence ―is comprehended by the eyes of the mind
(mentis oculis), is always found to subsist with invariable sameness, to be equal and
similar to itself, and to be that which truly is.‖76 His basis for claiming knowledge about
the first essence, including God, depends on the ontological connection he makes
between divinity and the mind (mens). In De deo Socr., he uses the terms mens and
animus synonymous, and without any explanation for the change in terminology.77
Between De deo Socr. and Dogm. Plat., Apuleius consistently emphasizes the role of the
mind/soul as having some natural contact with the Supreme God.78
A brief look at Apuleius‘ description of the incorporeal gods in De deo Socr. (the
work in which Apuleius refuses to speak of the Supreme God) provides a final important
element to the attributes he sees as integral to divinity. He writes of the lower gods,
Plato thought these Gods to be incorporeal and animated natures, without any end
or beginning, but eternal both with reference to time past and the time to come;
76

Dogm. Plat. 1.6: Sed illa, quae mentis oculis conprehenditur, semper et eodem modo et sui par
ac similis inuenitur, ut quae uere sit. In chapters 4 and 7 I will address the theological assertion that God is
equal to himself, a formulation found in both Irenaeus and Novatian and possibly suggested by Tertullian.
Without Christological concerns in mind, Apuleius gives us the framework for understanding this idea,
namely that the Supreme God is simple; He neither changes nor has He an equal.
77
For example, in De deo Socr. 15 and 16 Apuleius quotes authors who use mens and he simply
replaces this term with animus when explaining the passages.
78
It is important to note that in Dogm. Plat. Apuleius puts both mens and anima into the category
of first essence, although he also uses animus throughout that text. In De deo Socr. the term he treats
synonymously with mens is animus. He does not use anima in that work, which adds to the case for
distinct authorship based on differing terminology.
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spontaneously separated from the contagion of body; through a perfect intellect
possessing supreme beatitude; good, not through the participation of any
extraneous good, but from themselves; and able to procure for themselves every
thing which is requisite, with prompt facility, with simple, unrestrained, and
absolute power. (De deo Socr. 3.123)79
We can compare Apuleius‘ statement with that of Alcinous (see Did. 10.3 quoted above);
both describe the attributes divinity with a similar set of ideas and terms, namely
goodness, eternity, self-sufficiency, and intelligence.80 I also point out that these are
similar, but not exactly the same attributes which Apuleius gives to the first essence
mentioned above in the citation of Dogm. Plat. 1.5. When speaking of the first essence
as ―that which truly is‖ (ut quae uere sit), Apuleius frames the discussion around the
Platonic language of Being.81 By doing so, he indicates the ontological relationship
among the gods. All divine beings share in the divine nature, though he acknowledges
that the difference in transcendence between the Supreme God and the lower gods makes
the lower gods to some degree more comprehensible. Apuleius provides a clear example
of a Platonism which identifies a hierarchy of gods sharing in the divine nature, but to
different degrees. This hierarchy can be called ontological subordination.
Apuleius and Alcinous do not differ widely in their assertions about the qualities
which make God, or the gods, divine. Both authors assume the same qualities for
divinity, which are almost universally accepted by the philosophical schools. The point

79

Quos deos Plato existimat naturas incorporalis, animalis, neque fine ullo neque exordio, sed
prorsus ac retro aeuiternas, <a> corporis contagione suapte natura remotas, ingenio ad summan
beatitudinem perfecto, nullius extrarii boni participatione sed ex sese bonas et ad omnia conpetentia sibi
promptu facili, simplici, livero, absoluto.
80
These qualities are repeated numerous times through Cicero‘s Nat. d., even by the Academic
who looks mostly to be a student of the New Academy‘s skepticism.
81
Gersh notes, ―Apuleius is the first Latin writer to reestablish the metaphysical transcendence
characteristic of ancient Platonism as opposed to the physical transcendence advocated by Antiochus of
Ascalon, Cicero, Varro, and Seneca,‖ Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism, 271. Another way of stating
Gersh‘s conclusion is that Apuleius breaks from the influence of Stoicism by downplaying physicality in
his description of the divine nature.
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where they differ concerns the manner by which they balance negative theology with
qualities intended to represent the Supreme God. Alcinous affirms the Supreme God‘s
ineffability while simultaneously identifying a range of divine attributes. Apuleius, in De
deo Socr., emphasizes transcendence of the Supreme God, though he also posits a
relationship between this God and the lower gods. His Dogm. Plat. offers a
counterbalance to De deo Socr.‘s timidity. In the former, Apuleius identifies a range of
attributes for his ineffable God in a manner similar to Alcinous‘ statements.
Ultimately, Dogm. Plat. makes an assertion which Alcinous avoids: it joins the
substance of mind, soul, forms, and God into a single category of essence. This move
places Apuleius into a gray area between the approach of the Stoics (a shared substance
of divinity) and the second approach seen with Alcinous in which the divine attributes are
imparted to man by the lowers gods responsible for his creation. Although Apuleius and
Alcinous share a similar range of terms for describing the ineffable God, Apuleius‘
theological epistemology depends, in part, on a shared category of substance (the first
essences), unlike Alcinous‘ reliance on shared attributes.82

Conclusion
My description of the philosophic environment of Novatian‘s time does not
provide background for all of Novatian‘s comments on the transcendent God, although I
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References above to contact with God refer not only to mental perceptions of the divine, but
also to some form of a sharing of nature. I do not refer to specific interactions between humans and divine
beings, which Middle Platonists continued to address through intermediaries. Merlan writes, ―The
theology of Apuleius makes demons indispensable. For according to him the supreme god and all the other
gods are absolutely transcendental, and there is no possibility of any contact between them and man. Thus,
our prayers actually go to the demons,‖ ―Greek Philosophy,‖ 72. This analysis can only be justified if
Dogm. Plat.‘s insistence on the categorization of first and second essences goes largely ignored. Therefore,
although demons may be an integral part of Apuleius‘ theology, this aspect cannot be attributed primarily
to questions of transcendence.
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will show in the next several chapters some important points of convergence and
dependence. The perspectives of Cicero, Alcinous, and Apuleius demonstrate the
complexity of the views about the ontological connections between man and the divine
nature as well as the theological epistemologies which arise from different positions on
this issue. The authors associated with the Academy, whether the New Academy or the
Middle Platonism, attempted to balance what they viewed as necessary divine attributes
with expressions of negative theology, which they accepted as a philosophic
commitment.
Apart from a likely influence of Stoicism on Apuleius, Cicero and Alcinous did
not make a straightforward association of the ontological connection between the
mind/soul and the divine nature. They did, however, link their expressions of theological
epistemology to a similarity of attributes between the mind/soul and God. Taking into
account Apuleius‘ negative theology, all three authors embraced non-exhaustive
descriptions of the divine nature and attributes.83 In the shift from the New Academy to
Middle Platonism, the trend toward dogmatism led to the acceptance of identifying divine
attributes, even those of the ineffable Supreme God. Such a development away from the
skepticism of the New Academy‘s understanding of theological epistemology remained
comparatively more moderate than the dogmatic formulations found in Stoicism.
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As noted above, Apuleius‘ De deo Socr. and Dogm. Plat. allow only for a flash of epistemic
contact between man and the Supreme God, due of course to the Supreme God‘s transcendence.
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Chapter Two: Novatian’s Transcendent God

Introduction

Chapter 1 provides an analysis of the philosophic trend towards negative theology
influential to Novatian‘s intellectual climate. Interest in negative theology among
Christian and ―Gnostic‖ groups grew concurrently with the development of this thinking
in the philosophical community, making it extremely difficult to judge specific
influences. For example, Aristides‘ Apology offers a compressed presentation of most of
the points which Novatian makes regarding this topic. I quote the Athenian at length
because the following passage demonstrates how widespread negative theology had
become. Since there is no evidence that Novatian knew Aristides‘ work, this passage
provides proof of the widespread use of negative theology among diverse Christian
writers. Aristides states,
I say, then, that God is not born, not made, an ever-abiding nature without
beginning and without end, immortal, perfect, and incomprehensible. Now when I
say that he is "perfect," this means that there is not in him any defect, and he is
not in need of anything but all things are in need of him. And when I say that he is
"without beginning," this means that everything which has beginning has also an
end, and that which has an end may be brought to an end. He has no name, for
everything which has a name is kindred to things created. Form he has none, nor
yet any union of members; for whatsoever possesses these is kindred to things
fashioned. He is neither male nor female. The heavens do not limit him, but the
heavens and all things, visible and invisible, receive their bounds from him.
Adversary he has none, for there exists not any stronger than he. Wrath and
indignation he possesses not, for there is nothing which is able to stand against
him. Ignorance and forgetfulness are not in his nature, for he is altogether wisdom
and understanding; and in Him stands fast all that exists. He requires not sacrifice
and libation, nor even one of things visible; He requires not aught from any, but
all living creatures stand in need of him. [Apology 1]
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As a set of creedal-like affirmations about the divine, Novatian would have little to add.
However, Novatian‘s unique theological perspective arises from his explanations for
making similar statements.
I will identify three topics in Trin. related to negative theology in the expression
of the Father‘s transcendence. These include Novatian‘s teachings that 1) God is beyond
mind or reason, 2) God‘s nature or substance is beyond knowing, and 3) God‘s name is
beyond knowing. I will demonstrate Novatian‘s awareness of the philosophical traditions
related to these topics and also the relationship between his theological position and the
Christian sources which he knew.1

God as beyond mind or reason: Trin. 2.9

In Trin. 2.9, Novatian rejects the ability to understand, think, or speak about the
nature of God the Father.2 He writes,3
For what can you worthily say or perceive about Him who is above [maior est] all
language [sermonibus] and perception [sensibus]? Only this one thing: however
we are able, however we grasp [capimus], however one may understand
[intellegere licet] what God might be, if we think we will mentally grasp Him, His
nature [quale] and His greatness [quantum] are not able to be understood. It is not
1

Pollard makes the following comment about philosophical influences on theology in the East and
West: ―Western theologians lived in an atmosphere that was practical rather than speculative, more
interested in law and action than in philosophy; the only philosophy which had any lasting influence on the
life an culture of the west was Stoicism with its strongly ethical and practical emphasis. Alexandria, on the
other hand, was a centre of cosmopolitan culture, where any and every philosophy and religion could gain a
hearing and gather a following,‖ Johannine Christology, 50. As I demonstrate below, Pollard‘s assumption
of the absolute prominence of Stoicism in the West fails to accurately describe both the complexities of
intellectual traditions which are found in an author such as Novatian and also the incorporation of certain
elements of Stoicism into other philosophical schools. Chapter 1, for example, demonstrates Apuleius‘
teaching that the first essences include God, the forms, mind, and soul. As I noted above, the bifurcation
between first and second essences suggests Stoic influence. However, because Apuleius ties this teaching
into the Platonic language of Being and Becoming, he essentially converts a Stoic principle into a Middle
Platonic one. Pollard‘s understanding of static school doctrines fails to account for interplay of dogmas
among the schools and among individual authors, especially Middle Platonists.
2
In chapter 4, I discuss why the references to God in Trin. 1-8 are references specifically to the
Father.
3
DeSimone‘s translation is used throughout this study, unless otherwise stated.

49
even possible for [human] thought [cogitationem] to approach Him. [Trin. 2.9,
translation Papandrea]4
When Novatian says that God is above language and perception, he accepts the thinking
seen already in Alcinous, Apuleius, and Cicero‘s Academic. However, Novatian‘s
thought looks very similar to some of Apuleius‘ comments in particular. Apuleius writes,
Plato…frequently proclaims that this cause of all things, on account of his
incredible [incredibili] and ineffable [ineffabili] greatness [maiestatis], cannot be
even moderately comprehended [non…conprehendi] by any definition, through
the poverty of human speech [sermonis humani]. [De deo Socr. 3, slightly
modified]
Although the terminology of De deo Socr. does not match that of Trin. in the two
passages quoted above, both works present a similar conclusion about theological
epistemology. While Novatian nowhere uses Apuleius‘ term ineffibilis, his affirmation
that God remains entirely above speech or thought demonstrates his commitment to the
same robust rhetoric of negative theology found in Apuleius‘ work. Furthermore, I take
Novatian‘s quale in the above quotation to refer to the essence or substance of God,5
since Cicero established a precedent for this use of the term.6

4

Quid enim de eo condigne aut dicas aut sentias qui omnibus et sermonibus et sensibus maior est,
nisi quod uno modo et hoc ipsum, quomodo possumus, quomodo capimus, quomodo intellegere licet, quid
sit Deus, mente capiemus, si cogitauerimus id illum esse, quod quale et quantum sit non possit intellegi nec
in ipsam quidem cogitationem possit uenire?
5
See also Trin. 2.4 in which Novatian uses the same terminology, stating, ―Concerning Him,
therefore, and concerning those things which are of Him and in Him, the mind of man cannot fittingly
conceive what they are, how great they are, and of what their nature; nor has human eloquence the power to
express His greatness.‖ [De hoc ergo ac de eis quae sunt ipsius et in eo sunt nec mens hominis quae sint,
quanta sint et qualia sint digne concipere potest nec eloquentia sermonis humani aequabilem maiestati eius
uirtutem sermonis expromit.]
6
Part of Cicero‘s Nat. d. involves the investigation by the Platonist regarding the four topics
brought up by the Stoic, Balbus. The second section of the discussion involves the attempt ―to describe [the
gods‘] nature (deinde quales essent),‖ Nat. d. 3.6. See also Nat. d. 3.20: ―You intended to show what the
gods are like (quales di essent), but you actually showed them to be non-existent. For you said that it is
very difficult to divert the mind from its association with the eyes; yet you did not hesitate to argue that,
since nothing is more excellent than god, the world must be god, because there is nothing in the universe
superior to the world. Yes, if we could but imagine the world to be alive, or rather, if we could but discern
this truth with our minds exactly as we see external objects with our eyes!‖
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If Trin. 2.9 stood alone in Novatian‘s work, it would mirror the quotation cited
from Plato‘s Parmenides, in which nothing can ever be said about God. Of course
Novatian‘s final word on divine attributes does not rest with an unqualified negative
theology. Although his theology fits into the framework established by Christian
tradition, I will show in chapter 4 that his position depends upon a similar progression of
language already seen in the works of Alcinous and Apuleius: the transcendent and
Supreme God cannot be conceived, yet logic demands the attribution of several key
categories.
Important Christian sources for Novatian‘s use of negative theology are
Theophilus and Justin. Like Apuleius in de Deo Soc. 3 and Alcinous in Did. 10.3,
Theophilus and Justin attribute ineffability to the Supreme God. Ineffability serves as a
primary indication of an underlying negative theology. Theophilus writes in To
Autolycus (hereafter Autol.),
Hear me, O man: the form (εἶδνο) of God is ineffable (ἄξξεηνλ) and inexpressible
(ἀλέθθξαζηόλ), since it cannot be seen with merely human eyes. For he is in
glory (δόμῃ) uncontainable (ἀρώξεηνο), in greatness (κεγέζεη) incomprehensible
(ἀθαηάιεπηνο), in loftiness inconceivable, in strength incomparable, in wisdom
unteachable, in goodness inimitable, in beneficence inexpressible. [Autol. 1.3]7
In this case, Theophilus describes God as ineffable and then proceeds to speak about the
inability to comprehend or express Him. Justin likewise makes use of the same term to
describe the Father in the Dialogue with Trypho (hereafter Dial.).8

7

Though Daniélou acknowledges the fact that Middle Platonists used άξξεηνο as a central
description of the divine, he argues that Theophilus‘ use of this term ―must derive from Jewish gnosis,‖
Gospel Message, 331. See Carl Curry, ―The Theogony of Theophilus,‖ VC 42 (1988): 318-26 and Deirdre
Good, "Rhetoric and Wisdom in Theophilus." ATR 73.3 (1991): 323-30, on the more recent trend in
scholarship which sees Theophilus as having a stronger contact with Hellenistic religious and philosophical
thought than Daniélou gives credit. Note, however, that Daniélou attributes Justin‘s use of the term
explicitly to Middle Platonism and to the school of Alcinous. He then ties Theophilus‘ emphasis on
invisibility to Middle Platonism, Gospel Message, 331; 333.
8
See, for example, Dial. 127, where Justin affirms that the Father is ineffable.
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Like Alcinous, Theophilus, and Justin, Novatian bases his opinion in Trin. 2.9 on
the ontological gulf he asserts between man‘s mind and God. Similarly, Novatian denies,
in Trin. 2.5, that the human mind is a direct point of contact with God. He relates the
greatness of God directly to the human mind‘s inability to conceive Him when he writes,
In fact, He is greater [maior] than the mind [mente] itself, so that His greatness
[quantus] is inconceivable; for if He could be conceived, He would be less than
the human mind which could conceive Him. He is also greater than all speech, so
that He cannot be expressed; for if He could be expressed, He would be less
[minor] than human speech, which through expressing Him would then
comprehend and contain [circumiri] Him. [Trin. 2.5]9
Trin. 2 connects God‘s quantus (greatness) to His quale (essence), making them both
inaccessible to the human mind. Novatian‘s argument in this passage amounts to
preserving God‘s transcendence by making it a logical impossibility to exhaustively
comprehend God‘s greatness.10 He suggests that fully comprehending God equates to
containing Him, which makes the mind greater than God.
Novatian focuses part of his discussion on the visible creation as the
epistemological avenue for the human mind. The visible world leads the mind to an
intellectual perception of God, albeit a perception which excludes exhaustive knowledge:
―Thus the human mind (animus), learning to know the hidden things from those which
are manifest, may consider the greatness of the Maker from the greatness of His works

9

Maior est enim mente ipsa nec cogitari possit quantus sit, ne si potuerit cogitari, mente humana
minor sit qua concipi possit. Maior est quoque omni sermone nec edici possit, ne si potuerit edici, humano
sermone minor sit, quo cum edicitur et circumiri et colligi possit.
10
Stead uses the phrase ―complete knowledge‖ to describe the same difficulty in terminology: ―In
Greek thought ‗knowledge‘ is commonly taken to imply complete or perfect knowledge. Aristotle defines
it as ‗the mind‘s identity with its object‘; and this interpretation clearly leaves no room for a knowledge
which is genuine but incomplete: St. Paul‘s ‗I know in part‘, 1 Corinthians 13:12. But with negative terms
the situation is reversed; if ‗knowledge‘ suggests ‗complete knowledge‘, then ‗unknowable‘ can be taken to
mean that complete knowledge is impossible; it need not exclude every kind of genuine apprehension,‖
Philosophy, 133.
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which it sees with the eyes of the mind (mentis oculis).‖11 Novatian uses the phrase
―eyes of the mind‖ in a different way than Apuleius, who uses the same phrase in Dogm.
Plat. 1.6.12 In that passage, Apuleius implies that the eyes of the mind perceive God,
since he classifies both as first essences or substances. Novatian, however, rejects the
essential connection between the mind and God. He treats his approach to the human
mind‘s inadequate conception of the divine as an anthropological issue based on the
ontological difference between God and the human mind.
Theophilus makes use of a similar idea when he states that God can be seen
(blepo) with the eyes of the soul (ophthalmos psyche).13 Theophilus‘ concern appears to
be most concerned with the subject of morality. He continues, ―God does not become
visible to those who do [bad] things unless they first cleanse themselves from all
defilement [2 Cor. 7:1].‖14 Novatian similarly connects the fact of man‘s morality to his
contact with God. He addresses this topic with the term for obedience: ―[Man] could
have avoided mortality by obedience, but he subjected himself to it by his headlong and
perverse determination to be God.‖15 Man‘s departure from God‘s company, according
to Novatian, involved man forgetting or ignoring the basis of the ontological difference
between him and God. Man also abandoned the desire to emulate God, which was his

11

Trin. 3.6, modified slightly. It looks in this passage as through Novatian conflates the terms
animus and mens, perhaps following the practice of Apuleius. See also Trin. 8.1: ―All nature, whether
visible or invisible, gives unceasing witness to Him. Angels adore Him, stars wonder at Him, seas bless
Him, lands revere Him, and even the lower regions look up at Him. Every human mind is conscious of
Him, even though it cannot express Him.‖ [Cui testimonium reddit tam inuisibilium quam etiam uisibilium
et semper et tota natura, quem angeli adorant, astra mirantur, maria benedicunt, terrae uerentur, inferna
quaeque suspiciunt, quem mens omnis humana sentit, etiam si non exprimit.]
12
Cited in chapter 1‘s section on Apuleius.
13
Autol. 1.2.
14
Idem. This statement by Theophilus appears to make sense in light of an eschatological vision.
See Autol. 1.7. Though the vision of God is an important matter to Theophilus, I will simply point out here
his suggestion, in Autol. 1.11, that a purified soul or mind results (eventually) in direct contact with God.
15
Trin. 1.11: qui cum illam de oboedientia posset euadere, in eandem incurrit, dum ex consilio
peruerso Deus esse festinat.
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purpose in being made in God‘s image and likeness.16 From his understanding of
Genesis, Novatian teaches that man‘s incapacity to approach or conceive of God has to
do with man‘s false understanding of the difference between his ontology and God‘s.17
Novatian also employs the common analogy of the inability to look at the sun to
suggest the mind‘s limited capacity.18 He writes, ―If the keen sight of our eyes (oculorum
acies) grows dim by looking at the sun so that their gaze, overpowered by the bright rays
that meet it, cannot look at the orb itself, our mental vision (mentis acies) undergoes this
very same thing in its every thought of God (cogitatione omni de Deo).‖19 Novatian may
have borrowed this image from Theophilus. ―For if a man cannot look upon the sun,‖
Theophilus states, ―though it be a very small heavenly body, on account of its exceeding
heat and power, how shall not a mortal man be much more unable to face the glory of
God, which is unutterable?‖20 Novatian‘s use of the sun analogy highlights his emphasis
on God‘s incomprehensibility. Furthermore, by suggesting that only the mind‘s eye can
contemplate and appreciate God‘s existence, Novatian rejects the idea of a shared nature
between God and the mind. If Novatian knew Apuleius‘ Dogm. Plat., he distanced his
theology from the Stoically-influenced connection made between the mind and God.

16

Trin. 1.8.
I will not be addressing Novatian‘s eschatological vision of the Father, yet it is clear that the
repaired relationship between man and God will lead not only to a sharing in divine attributes, but also
man‘s ability to see the Father in Trin. 28.5.
18
The sun, for example, was used frequently in descriptions of the via analogia to demonstrate
how one cannot look at the sun directly while needing the sun all the same in order for sight to be possible.
Plato‘s metaphor of the sun (Republic 507b-509c) is an important witness to the role of the sun as the
vehicle of illumination.
19
Trin. 2.10: Nam si ad solis aspectum oculorum nostrorum acies hebetescit, ne orbem ipsum
17

obtutus inspiciat obuiorum sibi superatus fulgore radiorum, hoc idem mentis acies patitur in
cogitatione omni de Deo.
20

Autol. 1.3. In chapter 5, I quote Tertullian‘s Prax. 14, which ties the brightness of the sun to the
Father‘s transcendence and invisibility. Alcinous uses sun imagery to suggest the opposite of Theophilus
and Novatian. In Did. 10.5 he talks about the second way of conceiving God (through analogy): ―the sun is
to vision and to visible objects as the primal intellect is to the power of intellection in the soul and to its
objects.‖
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Novatian‘s teaching looks similar to the forms of negative theology found in the
philosophic writings discussed above, and the Christian tradition offered various
witnesses to the rejection of an ontological connection between the mind and the divine
nature. This rejection in turn affected the Christian approach to theological epistemology
and the use of negative theology. Justin, for example, highlights the tension between
knowledge of God and the close association between God and the mind/soul. In the
introductory section of his Dial., Justin recounts his conversation with the old man,
whom Justin credits with prompting his conversion to Christianity. Justin speaks of his
rash acceptance of the Platonic position that the soul or mind shares the nature of the
divine mind.21 He eventually concludes, after being challenged by the old man, that
philosophers do not know the nature of the soul and therefore cannot begin to understand
the nature of divinity itself.22
Tertullian also argues for the distinction between the divine nature and the nature
of the soul.23 In Marc. 2.9, he rejects the idea of shared substance between God and
man‘s soul by distinguishing between man‘s soul (anima) and the Spirit of God (spiritus

21

Justin writes in Dial. 4: ―‗Plato truly states,‘ I retorted, ‗that the eye of the mind has this special
power, which has been given to us in order that we may see with it, when it is pure, the very Being who is
the cause of everything the mind perceives, who has neither color, nor form, nor size, nor anything the eye
can see, but who is beyond all essence, who is ineffable and indescribable, who alone is beautiful and good,
and who comes at once into those souls which are well disposed because of their affinity to and desire of
seeing Him.‘ ‗What affinity, then,‘ [the old man] asked, ‗have we with God? Is the soul also divine and
immortal and part of the Supreme Mind itself? And as this Supreme Mind sees God, are we, in like
manner, able to perceive the Deity in our mind, and thus be happy even now.‘ ‗Absolutely,‘ I replied.‖
Justin offers evidence that the same teaching which can be found in Apuleius also made its way into
Justin‘s Platonist source. As noted in chapter 1, Stoic doctrine appears to be the likely source of this
teaching, See also Daniélou‘s emphasis on the Holy Spirit‘s role in Justin‘s presentation of the vision of
God. Justin thereby accentuates the role of God‘s activity in bringing man into a more intimate relationship
which contrasts with some Middle Platonists concerning the shared nature of divinity and the soul. See
Daniélou, Gospel Message, 333.
22
Dial. 5. The old man also leads Justin to the confession that God is uniquely immortal and thus
uniquely unbegotten, against Platonic assertions of the soul and the world‘s immortality.
23
See chapter 1, fn. 21. Tertullian uses the term animus for the mind and defines it as the faculty
of the soul (anima), which he teaches is man‘s governing principle.
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dei). Tertullian castigates sloppy translations of Genesis 2.7, which suggest that God
breathed into man a spiritus rather than an afflatus. Spiritus, Tertullian remarks, is God,
but afflatus refers to the image of God in man. This afflatus is man‘s anima. Tertullian
works anima into the text as a synonym for afflatus in Marc. 2, and he eventually
acknowledges that the shift in terminology can lead to objections from those who believe
the soul is divine. Tertullian responds,
This very fact, that the breath is designated ‗soul‘—it seems as if it had changed
over from the rank or condition of breath, into some lower quality or degree. ‗In
that case,‘ you object, ‗you admit the soul‘s infirmity, which you just now
denied.‘ Certainly, when you argue its equality with god, its immunity from sin, I
claim it is weak… (Marc. 2.9.7)24
Like other Christian authors, Tertullian‘s theology and anthropology depend upon the
distinction between the soul‘s nature and God‘s.
This section outlined the manner by which Novatian utilizes negative theology as
a boundary for theological epistemology. I also mentioned other cases in which Christian
authors emphasized the Father‘s transcendence. The most significant similarity between
Novatian, his Christian predecessors, and some Middle Platonic expression (such as
Alcinous‘) involves the distinction in nature between the Father and the soul. Novatian
describes the Father‘s transcendence, in part, with the suggestion that the mind‘s eye
provides no ontological link to the divine nature and thus no theological epistemology
through a teaching of shared nature. Such a position can be found in both Christian and
some non-Christian authors alike, and we have seen that Novatian‘s argument that God
must be incomprehensible owes its formulation to a common set of principles found in
both Christian and Middle Platonic sources.
24

Ipsum quod anima vocatatus est flatus, vide ne etiam de afflatus condicione transierit in aliquam
deminutiorem qualitatem. Ergo, inquis, dedisti animae infirmitatem supra negatam. Plane cum illam
exigis deo parem, id est delicti immunem, dico infirmam.
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Rejecting God‟s Substantia as Spiritus: Trin. 7.1,9
Apart from the affirmation that God must be incomprehensible, Novatian‘s
negative theology rejects the identification of God‘s nature as ―spirit.‖ The Gospel of
John (4:24), for example, explicitly claims that God is spirit. Novatian acknowledges this
fact and then refutes a literal reading of the text. He writes, ―When Our Lord affirms that
God is spirit I think that Christ spoke thus about the Father because He wanted to imply
that something more is to be understood than merely that God is spirit.‖25 Other authors,
as I point out below, accepted ―spirit‖ as the category which names God‘s nature or
substance.26
Novatian then points to 1 John‘s association of God as ―love‖ (1 John 4:8) and
―light‖ (1 John 1:5). In neither case, argues Novatian, are we to understand that God‘s
substance is either love or light.27 In explaining the scriptural passages which seem to
identify God‘s substance, Novatian always invokes the greater principle of God‘s
transcendence to demonstrate the need for a reliance on negative theology. He continues
in Trin. 7.4: ―Furthermore, if you take spirit to be the substance of God, you make God a
created thing (creaturam) because every spirit (spiritus) is a created thing (creatura).‖28
Novatian concludes his exegesis of John 4:24 by pressing for a complete association of
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Trin. 7.1: Sed illud quod dicit Dominus spiritum Deum, puto ego sic locutum Christum de Patre,
ut adhuc aliquid plus intellegi uelit quam spiritum Deum.
26
Throughout the first chapter and the first half of the current chapter, my references to
transcendence have refered more generally to identifying the magnitude of divine attributes. The topic of
the divine substance is related to, but not the same as, the subject of divine attributes. As will be seen,
especially in chapters 6 and 7, not all scholars make this distinction in addressing Novatian‘s theology.
27
See Trin. 7.2, in which Novatian also quotes 1 Cor. 2:9 and then states in 7.3, ―What must He
be, and how great must He be who promises these things which the mind and the nature of man fail to
comprehend?‖
28
Trin. 7.4: Denique si acceperis spiritum substantium Dei, creaturam feceris Deum. Omnis enim
spiritus creatura est.
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the term ―spirit‖ with ―creature.‖29 Because Novatian makes the impossibility of
grasping or knowing the substance of God a centerpiece of his theology, the terms love,
light, and spirit can only point toward God. No term can name God‘s nature.
Theophilus likely influenced Novatian‘s rejection of naming God‘s nature. In
Autol., Theophilus writes, ―If I call him Spirit, I speak of his breath; if I call him Wisdom,
I speak of his offspring; if I call him Strength, I speak of his might…‖30 Theophilus‘
insistence on God‘s transcendent nature stands behind this passage. He continues in the
same passage, ―If I call him light, I speak of his creature.‖ Theophilus associates the
term ―light‖ not only with God‘s nature, but also with God‘s creative activity and the
creature itself. He understands all terms associated with God‘s nature, including spirit, as
figurative. Similarly, Novatian draws attention to the association between God‘s nature
and light in 1 John 1:5 as an opportunity to argue for the necessity of a figurative
interpretation about any term designating God‘s nature.31
When Theophilus uses spirit as a designation for God,32 he does so having
established the point that the divine nature lies beyond all terminology or classification.
For example, Theophilus states, ―The whole creation is surrounded by the spirit of
God.‖33 The notion that God encompasses creation is central to the idea that the Creator
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Novatian adds, ―Therefore it would follow that God was made (factus).‖
Autol. 1.3. Palmer argues that Novatian imitates this passage by Theophilus and makes the
―inadequacy‖ of terms associated with God ―clearer,‖ ―Atheism, Apologetics and Negative Theology,‖ 258
n. 74.
31
See Trin. 7.5: ―These expressions are used figuratively, rather than literally (Sed haec figurantur
potius quam ita sunt). For in the Old Testament, God is called fire to strike fear in the hearts of sinful
people by appearing as their Judge, whereas in the New Testament He is revealed as a spirit, that the
Renewer and Creator of those who are dead in their sins may be acknowledged by the goodness of His
mercy granted to those who believe.‖
32
When Theophilus speaks about the Spirit, he almost always does so in reference to the creative
spirit mentioned in Genesis or to the Holy/Prophetic Spirit who speaks through the prophets. In the case of
Autol. 1.5, I believe that Theophilus is identifying God generally with spirit. In Autol. 2.4, he also claims
that this identification is common to some of the philosophers.
33
Autol. 1.5
30
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has power over creation and is greater than it. Spirit indicates both God‘s power as well
as God as a subject; spirit does not indicate God‘s nature as categorizable by the term
itself. In this, Theophilus and Novatian share a common understanding.
However, since Novatian identifies all spirits as creatures in Trin. 7.4, he offers a
more robust expression of negative theology than Theophilus. Where Theophilus
associates light with creatures, Novatian connects spirit with creatures. By doing so,
Novatian takes one of the most widespread terms for identifying divinity and empties it
of the transcendent content by which even Theophilus seems to base his comment about
the spirit of God surrounding the whole creation in Autol. 1.5. At the very least,
Theophilus accepts the rhetorical force of utilizing the term spirit, with its presumed
transcendent quality, while simultaneously denying its actual correspondence to the
divine nature. Novatian, however, safeguards his negative theology by rejecting any
correspondence between divinity and spirit in anything other than a figurative
revelation.34
The contrast between Novatian‘s theology on naming God‘s substance and those
of Justin and Irenaeus is more extreme. Justin, for example, does not directly connect the
term for spirit to an expression of negative theology. In 1 Apology 33 (hereafter 1 Apol.),
he identifies Jesus as the Spirit and Power of God. Justin writes, ―The Spirit and the
Power from God cannot therefore be understood as anything else than the Word who is
also the First begotten of God.‖35 I see this passage as particularly important for two
reasons. First, I began this section noting that spirit was often used as a term for

34
35

See again Trin. 7.5.
1 Apol. 33.
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identifying God‘s nature. I believe Justin‘s passage speaks to this kind of thinking.36
Second, Justin often highlights Trinitarian ideas throughout his writings, identifying the
Father, Son, and Holy/Prophetic Spirit in a variety of complimentary roles.37 Although
Justin gives the Holy/Prophetic Spirit a considerable role in his works, 1 Apol. 33 shows
that Justin is capable of employing the typical language of his times. By identifying the
Word as spirit, Justin justifies the claim he makes for the Word‘s divinity.38
Like Justin, Irenaeus speaks about the activity of God in Trinitarian language, and
he also connects the terms spirit and spiritual to the divine substance itself.39 For
example, when attacking the Valentinians, Irenaeus states, ―If…they acknowledge that
He is vacuity, then they fall into the greatest blasphemy; they deny His spiritual nature.
For how can He be a spiritual being, who cannot fill even those things which are within
Him.‖40 Irenaeus identifies God‘s spiritual nature as the justification for claiming the
metaphysical possibility of God‘s all-pervasiveness.41 In addition to Irenaeus‘ language
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Barnard, however, hedges on this interpretation, calling it a ―difficult passage.‖ First, he
suggests that the passage ―implies that, for Justin, the Spirit and the logos are two names for the same
person.‖ He then notes that, ―In strict logic, and with his Middle Platonist idea of God, there is no place in
Justin‘s thought for the Person of the Spirit as the logos carries out His functions.‖ Barnard finally
concludes, ―But the fact that he has so much to say about the Spirit and refers to the traditional formulas
shows that he was strongly influenced by Christian experience and worship as he knew it in the life of the
Church,‖ The First and Second Apologies, Translated by Leslie William Barnard (New York: Paulist Press,
1967), 149-150 n. 228. I think it more likely that Justin could comfortably move between identifying the
Spirit (and Power) with the activities/nature of the divine as well as with the personal activities of a being
identified as the Spirit or the Prophetic Spirit.
37
See Barnard‘s comments about the difficulties interpreting 1 Apol. 33‘s use of ―Spirit‖ in
reference to the Word, in The First and Second Apologies, 149-50 fn. 228.
38
Noet. 16.1-2 shares a similar theology which centers on Jesus as the Power of God and as Spirit:
―…it really was the Father‘s own Power, brethren,--which is the Word—that came down from heaven, and
not the Father in person…What is it that has been born from him if not Spirit—that is, the Word?‖
39
I also recognize Irenaeus‘ inclusion of the idea that knowledge of God occurs only through the
Son (and Spirit). See for example Against Heresies 3.6.3 (hereafter, Haer.): ―For no one can know the
Father, unless through the Word of God, that is, unless by the Son revealing [Him]; neither can he have
knowledge of the Son, unless through the good pleasure of the Father.‖
40
Haer. 2.13.7.
41
Cf. Tatian who embraces the categorization of God as spirit when he differentiates between a
divine and a created spirit: ―‗God is a spirit‘, not pervading matter, but the constructor of material spirits
and the shapes that are in matter…For the spirit that pervades matter is inferior to the more divine spirit,‖
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about God having a spiritual nature, M. R. Barnes notes that Irenaeus appears to refer, at
least once, to the Father as the Spirit of God.42 This identification shows that Irenaeus
was capable of using spirit as a marker for speaking about the divine substance, without
sacrificing the distinctions he makes between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.43
Justin and Irenaeus share a similar approach when they 1) accept the idea that the
term ―spirit‖ is capable of naming the divine substance and 2) point to the Trinitarian
distinctions of name in which Spirit refers to the Holy Spirit. Theophilus, however,
demonstrates a more pointed concern for negative theology by rejecting the identification
of God‘s substance as spirit or anything else. For this reason, Novatian‘s negative
theology displays more in common with Theophilus‘ work in that both reject the
categorization of God‘s nature as spirit, unlike Justin and Irenaeus.
Finally, it is helpful to compare Tertullian‘s classification of God‘s substance as
spirit to Novatian‘s perspective on this topic since such a comparison demonstrates the
difference between critical aspects of their theologies.44 Tertullian‘s comments make
Irenaeus and Justin‘s comments look timid and undeveloped in comparison. Before
addressing this aspect of Tertullian‘s thought, we can gain a more nuanced view his work

Oratio ad Graecos 4.2. See also Oratio ad Graecos 12, and 13. Tatian‘s logic about God as spirit
functions differently from Irenaeus‘. In the case of both, however, the identification of God as spirit
remains central.
42
Michel R. Barnes points to Haer. 5.2.3, which states, ―And just as a cutting from the vine
planted in the ground fructifies in its season, or as a corn of wheat falling into the earth and becoming
decomposed, rises with manifold increase by the Spirit of God, who contains all things, and then, through
the wisdom of God, serves for the use of men, and having received the Word of God, becomes the
Eucharist, which is the body and blood of Christ,‖ in ―Irenaeus‘s Trinitarian Theology.‖ NV 7 (2009), 79.
See also Anthony Briggman, The Theology of the Holy Spirit According to Irenaeus of Lyon (Dissertation,
Marquette University, 2009), 283.
43
On the other hand, Irenaeus offers a litany of God‘s attributes, namely that He is entirely
understanding, entirely spirit, entirely thought, etc (Haer. 2.13.3-4). He concludes these sections writing,
―He is, however, above these properties, and therefore indescribable.‖
44
For descriptions of Tertullian‘s categorization of God‘s nature as spirit, see Christopher Stead,
―Divine Substance in Tertullian,‖ JTS 14.1 (1963): 46-66 and E. Osborn, Tertullian: First Theologian of
the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 130-33.
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by acknowledging his clear concern with God‘s transcendence.45 Tertullian writes, for
example,
The eye cannot see Him, though He is visible. He is incomprehensible, though in
grace He is manifested. He is beyond our utmost thought, though our human
faculties conceive of Him…This it is which gives some notion of God, while yet
beyond all our conceptions—our very incapacity of fully grasping Him affords us
the idea of what He really is. He is presented to our minds in His transcendent
greatness, as at once known and unknown. [Apologeticum 17, slightly modified]46
Such a statement could have been made by Novatian himself. We can compare, for
example, Trin. 31.11 quoted above in which Novatian speaks of the Father as
incomprehensible.47 Likewise, I earlier pointed to Novatian‘s comments which mirror
Tertullian‘s insistence that God remains beyond thought or conception.48
Tertullian‘s suggestion that God is known by human faculties refers to the
knowledge of God through creation rather through the connection between the mind/soul
and God. In the next chapter of the Apologeticus (18), Tertullian speaks about the
manifestion of God‘s sovereignty through rain and fire. He also notes the witness of the
prophets who performed miracles, which were recorded for evangelization. Although
Novatian does not make a similar point regarding human faculties,49 his emphasis on
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Of course, neither Justin nor Irenaeus‘ works lack the concept of God‘s transcendence.
However, I have found the differences in the extent to which negative theology forms the overall
framework of their theologies (in this case, I refer to the inclusion of ―spirit‖ as a category used by Justin
and Ireneaus for speaking about the divine nature) as compared with Novatian‘s to be significant in
understanding all of the topics associated with the Son‘s ontological subordination.
46
Invisibilis est, etsi videatur; incomprehensibilis, etsi per gratiam repraesentetur; inaestimabilis,
etsi humanis sensibus aestimetur…Hoc est, quod deum aestimari facit, dum aestimari non capit; ita eum vis
magnitudinis et notum hominibus obicit et ignotum. Et haec est summa delicti nolentium recognoscere,
quem ignorare non possunt.
47
This is the only instance of incomprehensibilis in Trin. and Novatian‘s statement specifically
denies the incomprehensibility of the Son since this attribute must be singularly possessed by the Father:
―If He [the Word] had been incomprehensible, if He [the Word] had also possessed whatever other
attributes belong to the Father, then we assert He [the Word] would have certainly occasioned the
controversy of two gods that these heretics raise,‖ Trin. 31.11.
48
Trin. 2.9 (cited above) makes this point.
49
Cf. Novatian‘s use of humanis sensibus as failing to understand or anticipate God‘s future plans
for man in Trin. 7.3.
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knowledge of God through creation appears to agree with Tertullian‘s Apologeticus 18.
Finally, Tertullian insists that human beings know God by understanding man‘s inability
to fully grasp God. Novatian, in Trin. 2.9, also identifies the need to realize that the only
mental conception of God is the knowledge that God is beyond all thinking.
However, Tertullian also insists on categorizing God‘s substance as ―spirit,‖50
which likely demonstrates his reliance on Stoic physics. Stoic thought included the idea
that all things, including God, exist corporeally.51 Tertullian rejects any tradition similar
to the negative theology shared by Theophilus and Novatian. Instead, he identifies
spiritus with the nature of God, while he develops a variation on the theology seen above
in John‘s Gospel, Justin, Irenaeus.
In Prax. 7, Tertullian exegetes John 4:24 (God is Spirit), which Novatian
addressed a few decades later. Tertullian reads the passage literally: ―For who will deny
that God is a body, although ‗God is a Spirit?‘ For Spirit is body, of its own kind, in its
own form.‖52 He continues, ―Moreover if those invisible things, whatever they are, have
in God's presence both their own body and their own shape by which they are visible to
God alone, how much more will that which has been sent forth from his substance not be
devoid of substance.‖53 Tertullian therefore speaks about God‘s substance as spirit,
although a certain amount of incomprehensibility remains because of metaphysical
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See De resurrectione carnis 17, An. 5, and Prax. 7 and 26.
See Osborn, Tertullian, 131-32, for a discussion about the false assumption that corporeality and
materiality are synonymous in Tertullian‘s mind.
52
Prax. 7: quis enim negabit deum corpus esse, etsi deus spiritus est? spiritus enim corpus sui
generis in sua effigie. See also Prax. 26.
53
Idem.: sed et si invisibilia illa, quaecunque sunt, habent apud deum et suum corpus et suam
formam per quae sali deo visibilia sunt, quanto magis quod ex ipsius substantia emissum est sine substantia
non erit.
51
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concerns.54 He accepts the term spiritus for the substance of God because of its scriptural
and traditional use.55 It is crucial to point out here that Tertullian does not make the
claim that he can explain the full content of the term spiritus. Rather, he simply believes
that spiritus (and any term which represents the same ideas associated with the Latin
word in other languages—such as the Greek pneuma) correctly classifies the substance of
God.
The difference between the thought of Tertullian and that of Novatian can be
overestimated. Tertullian‘s willingness to name God‘s substance derives from the
connection he makes between epistemology and language theory. By affirming the
ability to positively identify God‘s substance as spirit, Tertullian does not claim
exhaustive knowledge about the content of the term.56 There is no doubt, however, that
Novatian judged Tertullian‘s perspective to be wrong.
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Tertullian addresses these ideas in Apologeticus 17. Knowledge of the Father and ineffability
share center stage, in part because of Tertullian‘s understanding of epistemology in light of his
anthropology. Chapter 18 of Tertullian‘s An. provides a clear account of his anthropological
understanding. Man‘s governing principle is his soul (anima). The soul‘s primary faculty of understanding
objects of the intellect is the mind (animus). The objects of the intellect are spiritual and thus of a higher
nature than the objects of the senses. However, the objects of the senses are also of great value and they are
necessary to the soul as stepping stones which enable man to learn about higher truths. Tertullian states,
―By what, in short, are corporeal things perceived? If it is by the soul, then the mind is a sensuous faculty,
and not merely an intellectual power; for while it understands, it also perceives, because without the
perception there is no understanding,‖ An. 18. These comments can be summed up by saying that Tertullian
identified the soul as the part of man which processes both the objects of the senses and the objects of the
mind.
55
Although this statement is accurate, it is incomplete. Tertullian does speak about divine natura
in a general sense, which was certainly more congenial to Novatian‘s use. In Against Hermogenes
(hereafter Herm.) 13.1-2, Tertullian attributes to God a natura both unique and wholly good. The idea of
the divine nature being good is, for Tertullian and all other Christian authors, both a scriptural and
philosophic necessity of categorization. For the majority of philosophers, divine goodness is likewise an a
priori attribute of divinity.
56
Similarly, Novatian states in Trin. 5.6, ―He is simple, without any corporeal admixture—
whatever be the total of the being that only He Himself knows—since He is called spirit (spiritus sit
dictus)‖ (emphasis mine). Kelly attributes the epistemological framework of this example to the influence
of Stoicism, ―The Beneficial Influence of Stoic Logic,‖ 822-823. I think positing a Stoic influence in this
case is entirely unnecessary since Christian traditions seen in this chapter provide similar assertions.
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The common identification between divinity and spirit led to a range of differing
assertions about the topic. Irenaeus and Justin accept the general validity of the
association, however their focus on language about Father, Son, and Holy Spirit sets the
connection in the background of their thinking. Theophilus utilizes negative theology to
a greater degree than either Irenaeus or Justin. He brings the term spirit into an
amorphous relationship with other terms designating divine nature or activity. For
Theophilus, all the terms associated with God ultimately find their meaning in a united
reference to the subject who is God. Tertullian affirms that God‘s substance is spirit
without declaring the ability to exhaustively comprehend the term spirit. Novatian
overtly rejects Tertullian‘s claim about naming God‘s substance. He embraces the
negative theology gaining ground in the first few centuries, and he stakes out a more
uncompromising negative theology than Justin, Irenaeus, Tertullian, and even
Theophilus. He, therefore, firmly holds that words which describe God‘s nature, such as
spirit, are used figuratively.57
Novatian‟s Non-Technical Use of Natura and Substantia in Reference to God
When Novatian rejects the naming of God‘s quale (or whatness), he does not
reject the assumption that God has a substance, and he uses the terms natura and
substantia when discussing God.58 For Novatian the term natura expresses being in
general, such as the existence of the cosmos,59 or it sums up the qualities of a particular
57

Again, see Trin. 7.5.
See Papandrea, Trinitarian Theology, 77-81. He writes, ―In Novatian‘s use, this word
[substantia] is basically synonymous with natura, and at times also with forma. Substantia does not
necessarily refer to material ‗substance.‘ When it refers to God, it means ontological essence, in the sense
of the substance of divinity as opposed to the substance of humanity. Novatian contrasts the ‗passible
matter‘ of human nature with the ‗impassible substance‘ of divine nature,‖ Ibid., 77-78.
59
Trin. 8.1.
58
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being.60 Therefore he speaks of the ―nature of things‖61 as well as the ―demands of
nature.‖62 Such uses were common.63 In reference to divinity, Novatian uses the term
natura to refer to what he accepts as necessary and logical statements predicated of the
Supreme God. For example, Novatian affirms the common belief that God cannot
contain a diversity of elements: ―But this diversity of elements cannot exist in God either
by nature (natura) or from vice, because He cannot conceivably be made up of a union of
corporeal parts.‖64 Natura in this instance refers to Novatian‘s definition of divinity,
which he bases on simplicity. Novatian speaks of divine nature by rejecting what he
takes to be impossible attributes of the divine nature.
Cicero‘s Nat. d. provides a primary background for some of Novatian‘s
theological terminology, such as the use of natura.65 When Novatian affirms knowledge
about God as Creator, he states,
He said: ―I am the Lord who made the light and created the darkness,‖ that we
may not think that a certain ‗nature‘ (naturam)—I know not what—was the
artificer of those alternations whereby the nights and days are regulated; but
rather, and with greater truth, we may acknowledge God as their Creator. [Trin.
3.5]
DeSimone points to Cicero‘s Nat. d. 1.100 as offering a useful comparison with the
theology presented in Trin. 3.5.66 In this portion of Nat. d., the speaker, the Academic
Cotta, criticizes the Epicurean for attacking Stoic theological epistemology:
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Trin.. 6.5; 8.9.
Trin. 4.9.
62
Trin. 4.10.
63
See Apuleius, De deo Socr. 1 for examples of both uses. Cicero‘s Nat. d. contains too many
references to list.
64
Trin. 5.5.
65
Daniélou, Origins of Latin Christianity, 233-250.
66
Both Desimone, The Trinity, 30 fn. 18, and Daniélou, Origins of Latin Christianity, 241-242,
also compare Trin. 3.5 to Nat. d. 2.58. Of course, the title of Cicero‘s work indicates the fact that natura is
a predominant and acceptable term used to describe God.
61
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Then you censured those who argued from the splendour and the beauty of
creation, and who, observing the world itself, and the parts of the world, the sky
and earth and sea, and the sun, moon and stars that adorn them, and discovering
the laws of the seasons and their periodic successions, conjectured that there must
exist some supreme and transcendent being (excellentem esse praestantemque
naturam) who had created these things, and who imparted motion to them and
guided and governed them. [Nat. d. 1.100]
Both passages describe the workings of the universe, especially celestial phenomena, in
light of a creator and organizer.67 However, in Trin. 3.5, Novatian denounces the typical
Stoic conflation of God with natura, which can be found elsewhere in Cicero‘s
descriptions of Stoic cosmology.68 According to Seneca, the Stoics used natura as one of
the designations for the single divinity.69 Novatian refers to God‘s natura, but only after
eliminating any correlation between God and the world (natura).70
Novatian treats substantia synonymously with natura, unlike Tertullian who uses
spiritus as a term for God‘s substantia. When Novatian speaks about God‘s substantia,71
he simply affirms the fact that God has a nature, while claiming that the name of the
substance is inexpressible.72 Tertullian, however, does not use natura and substantia
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Novatian‘s use of Isaiah 45:6-7 to support the context of Cicero‘s comments demonstrates, in a
small but important way, his willingness to accept and clarify pagan source material if it corresponds to his
understanding of Christian teaching.
68
Gersh provides examples in Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism, 93-99. Cicero‘s witness is
crucial on this point as his is one of the most complete pictures of the Stoic system left to us, as is pointed
out by Boyancé, ―Les preuves stoéciennes,‖ 45-71. According to Bruce Fairgray Harris, Nat. d. also
contains invaluable information about the Academic response to Epicureanism. Harris notes, ―With all its
shortcomings, however, this section remains valuable as our only sizeable example of the Academic attack
on the theology of the Epicureans. The nearest approach is the work of Sextus Empiricus, which is rather a
compilation of skeptical arguments from all the opposing schools,‖ in Cicero as an Academic: A Study of
De Natura Deorum (Auckland: University of Auckland, 1961), 17-18.
69
Aldo Setaioli points to Naturales quaestiones 2.45 and De beneficiis 4.7-8 in which fatum,
providentia, natura, and mundus, among others, are all offered as names for god.. Sataioli adds, ―Seneca is
familiar with the Stoic doctrine of πνιπσλπκία (‗multiplicity of names‘), which explained the multiplicity
of the traditional gods by the one god‘s multiple functions addressed by corresponding multiple names,‖ in
―Seneca and the Divine: Stoic Tradition and Personal Developments.‖ International Journal of the
Classical Tradition 13:3 (Winter, 2007): 348.
70
See Daniélou, Origins of Latin Christianity, 242
71
E.g. Trin. 5.3 and 7.2.
72
Hence God‘s substantia is not spiritus in Trin. 7.4.
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synonymously.73 For him, natura refers to a general characteristic while substantia refers
to a thing‘s essence. Novatian‘s understanding of these two terms shows that he chooses
to emphasize God‘s transcendent nature rather than follow Tertullian‘s theology.
The foregoing presentation of the understandings of natura and substantia
highlights a set of related ideas and terms which individual authors defined with
flexibility. Cicero, on the one hand, used natura and quale at times to identify both the
attributes and substance of God. He did not however use the word substantia. On the
other hand, Tertullian spoke often of the substantia of God as spiritus based upon the
Stoic idea that all things logically possess corporeality. Novatian uses natura and
substantia interchangeably, feeling comfortable putting forward a set of positive
attributes for God‘s nature while denying any specific term for the divine substance.
Ultimately, Novatian‘s negative theology governs his restraint about naming God‘s
substance as spiritus (or anything else), which makes his much different than Tertullian‘s
teaching.
God‟s Name Beyond Knowing: Trin. 4.10
Novatian states in Trin. 4.10 that God‘s name (nomen) cannot be conceived or
spoken. He writes,
It results from this that God‘s name is ineffable (nec edici) because it cannot even
be conceived (nec concipi). The name of a thing connotes whatever comes under
(comprehenditur) the demands of its nature. For a name is significant of the
reality which could be grasped (comprehendi) from the name. [Trin. 4.10]74

73

See Herm. 17.2
Ex quo effectum est ut nec nomen Dei proprium possit edici, quoniam non possit nec concipi. Id
enim nomine continetur, quicquid etiam ex naturae suae condicione comprehenditur. Nomen enim
significantia est eius rei quae comprehendi potuit ex nomine.
74
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Novatian acknowledges that God has a name. However, he insists on God‘s
transcendence when he claims that God‘s name must be incomprehensible.75 The
principle that to know God‘s name would be to intellectually grasp the transcendent is a
facet of Novatian‘s use of negative theology.76 According to Novatian, God‘s name and
substance must remain ineffable, otherwise God would logically be less than divine.
Novatian explains his position on the inexpressibility and incomprehensibility of
God‘s name by pointing to the divine Name (the Tetragrammaton) found in Exodus 3:14.
He writes, ―For—whatever that Being may be that is God—this must always be true of
Him, that He always is God, preserving Himself by His own powers. And therefore He
says: ‗I am who am.‘ That which is has this name because it always preserves its same
manner of being.‖77 Novatian understands the phrase Ego sum qui sum as an expression
of eternity and incorruptibility: God has always been and has always been the same.78
Such attributes are philosophic commonplaces touched on earlier in this chapter and
explored in greater depth in chapter 4. For Novatian, Exodus 3:14 speaks to the
philosophical assertion of God‘s eternality; it establishes the logical necessity of a basic
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I will mention Novatian‘s use of the term comprehendere below in chapter 7. He uses the term
only three times in the work, but a fourth instance of a form of the word appears in Trin. 31.11 in which he
says that the Son cannot be incomprehensibilis like the Father.
76
Trin. 4.10 continues, ―However, when it is a question of something of such a nature that not
even the intellectual powers themselves can form a proper concept, then how will it be expressed fittingly
by a single word of designation, for it so exceeds the intellect that it is necessarily beyond the
comprehension of any name?‖ (At quando id de quo agitur tale est, ut condigne nec ipsis intellectibus
colligatur, quomodo appellationis digne uocabulo pronuntiabitur, quod dum extra intellectum est etiam
supra appellationis significantiam sit necesse est?)
77
Trin. 4.6: Hoc enim in ipso, quicquid illud potest quod est Deus, semper sit necesse est, ut
semper sit Deus, seruans sese uirtutibus suis. Et ideo dicit: Ego sum qui sum. Quod enim est, ideo hoc
habet nomen, quoniam eandem semper sui obtinet qualitatem.
78
I will address Trin. 4 again in chapter 4. Novatian ties the logical necessity of God‘s eternality
and incorruptibility to God‘s inability to change. God‘s eternal and unchanging self-sufficiency therefore
plays a part in Novatian‘s articulation of God‘s simplicity and immutability.
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philosophical proposition, rather than containing any element conducive to a mystical
interpretation.79
Novatian accepts the idea that God takes a symbolic name at times for man‘s
benefit. He writes,
When God takes for Himself a name or manifests it for certain reasons and on
certain occasions, we know that it is not so much the real nature of the name that
has been made known to us as a vague symbol appointed for our use, to which
men may have recourse and find that they can appeal to God‘s mercy through it.
Trin. 4.1180
First, Novatian argues that any name of God acts only as a symbol. By symbol, Novatian
means that mankind is given names by which it may address God as a subject, rather than
names which identify God‘s substance. Otherwise, a name would paradoxically (and
impossibly) contain the divine nature.81 Second, we see in this passage the critical role
God‘s activity plays in initiating a relationship with mankind in Novatian‘s theology.
Novatian, most likely, did not fail to notice the treatments by Justin and Tertullian
on the topic of the divine name. In 2 Apol. 6,82 Justin states,

79

Justin, 1 Apol. 63, understands Ex. 3:14 as a theophany of the Logos in which Logos proclaims
the living status of the patriarchs rather than any information about God‘s name. He begins by affirming
that no one knows the Father or the Father‘s name except the Son (Mt. 11:27 and Lk. 10:22). Irenaeus
refers to Ex. 3:14 twice. In Haer. 3.6.2 it is the Father speaking and Irenaeus interprets the passage as
bolstering the argument that no other gods have been mentioned by Scripture. In Proof of the Apostolic
Preaching 2, Irenaeus suggests that the Word spoke this phrase, and again, his concern is on establishing
identity of the single, true God. Tertullian alludes to Ex. 3:14 in Prax. 2 to bolser his argument that the Son
shares the names which designate the Father, such as Almighty. Novatian‘s interpretation is relatively
different from these, but his emphasis on expressing the Father through philosophical categories also makes
it unsurprising.
80
Vt merito quando nomen suum Deus ex quibusdam rationibus et occasionibus adicit et praefert,
non tam legitimam proprietatem appellationis sciamus esse depromptam quam significantiam quandam
constitutam, ad quam dum homines decurrunt Dei misericordiam per ipsam impetrare posse uideantur.
81
This is Novatian‘s core teaching in Trin. 4.10, which I cite above.
82
In 1 Apol. 10 Justin notes that God ―is called by no given name.‖ He makes the same point
more emphatically in 1 Apol. 61: ―For no one can give a name to the ineffable God; and if anyone should
dare say there is one, he raves with a hopeless insanity.‖ Barnard notes, concerning this passage, ―The
namelessnesss of God is a corollary, for Justin, to the divine Transcendence….No doubt he was aware that
the Old Testament divine name was used for magical purposes and this gave an edge to his denunciation,‖
The First and Second Apologies, 174 n. 376.
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No proper name has been bestowed upon God, the Father of all, since He is
unbegotten. For, whoever has a proper name received it from a person older than
himself. The words Father, and God, and Creator, and Lord, and Master are not
real names, but rather terms of address derived from His beneficent deeds.83
Like Novatian‘s, Justin‘s logic regarding a divine name begins with God‘s eternality. 84
Eternality separates God from the process of naming, since a thing‘s name depends upon
something older which can bestow a name. Justin argues that God stands outside of such
a relationship and therefore it cannot be said that God has proper name.
Justin also singles out the name ―God‖ and addresses its significance. He states
that the term has an unknown meaning, ―which is not a real name, but the expression of
man‘s innate opinion of a thing that can scarcely be defined.‖85 The overarching theory
behind Justin‘s statement resembles Novatian‘s concern for identifying transcendence as
the deciding factor for approaching any appellation for God. Daniélou connects Justin‘s
name theory directly to the influence of Middle Platonism‘s theology derived from its use
of the term a;rrhtoj Daniélou writes,
[Justin] links the concept of God as ineffable with a theory of language according
to which names are established (ζεηόο) by men, but in keeping with the nature
(θύζηο) of the things signified. This explains why there is no proper name for
God (…[see] I Apol. X, I; cf. I Apol. LXI, II; II Apol. VI, I), because his nature is
hidden. This argument reflects the theory of language put forward by Albinus
(Ep. VI, 10-11), and derived by him from Cratylus. [Gospel Message, 331-332]

83

Justin defends the idea that names carry no intrinsic good or evil, but rather either truly or
falsely reflect the conception behind them. See 1 Apol. 4, ―Nothing good or evil is included in the mere use
of a name, apart form the actions which are associated with that name.‖ See also 1 Apol. 10 and 61.
84
Peter Widdicombe connects Justin‘s understanding of God‘s ineffability to God‘s
ingenerateness, in ―Justin Martyr‘s Apophaticism,‖ StPatr 36 (Leuven: Peeters, 2001), 313-314.
85
Thomas Falls notes, ―Tertullian expressed the same thought with those famous words: O
testimonium animae naturaliter Christianae (Apol. 17),‖ The First Apology, The Second Apology, Dialogue
with Trypho, Exhortation to the Greeks, Discourse to the Greeks, The Monarcy; or the Rule of God. FC 3.
Translated by Thomas B. Falls (New York, Christian Heritage, 1949), 125 fn 2.
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Justin‘s ideas stand within a philosophical debate regarding the correspondence between
a thing‘s name and its nature.86 The Middle Platonic influence upon Justin is apparent,
since the Stoics accepted a direct correspondence between the nature of a thing and a
thing‘s name.87 Novatian agrees with Justin about the ineffability of the divine name,
however, he differs from Justin since he accepts the idea that God has a name.88
Tertullian continues the tradition of dismissing the possibility of knowing a
proper name for God the Father. When he exegetes the Lord‘s Prayer in De oratione, he
says,
The name of ―God the Father‖ had been published to none. Even Moses, who had
interrogated Him on that very point, had heard a different name. To us it has been
revealed in the Son, for the Son is now the Father‘s new name. ―I am come,‖ he
says, ―in the Father‘s name;‖ and again, ―Father, glorify Thy name;‖ and more
openly, ―I have manifested Thy name to men.‖ That name, therefore, we pray
may ―be hallowed.‖ [De oratione 3, modified slightly]
Tertullian appears to be making a passing reference to Exodus 3:14 in order to suggest
that the new (and economically important) name for God is found in the Son. Tertullian
claims that the Father never revealed His name. This suggestion defies Justin‘s belief
that the Father has no proper name, and may have influenced Novatian‘s position on the
86

Commenting on chapter 6 of Justin‘s 2 Apol. and citing Alcinous‘ Did. 6.10-11, Osborn states,
―The originality of this paragraph lies in the way in which two philosophical ideas, the ineffable God and
the innate God, are brought from different sources and tied into the Christian gospel,‖ Justin Martyr
(Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck, 1973), 23.
87
Cf. D. F. Kelly, who writes, ―The Stoic understanding that language unquestionably conveys
reality, and yet at the same time can not contain or exhaust the reality to which it can nonetheless point, is
the central thesis that attracted the church to ‗the Porch‘ in its search for an appropriate philosophical
structure through which to convey the intelligible realities of the Faith to humanity, ―The Beneficial
Influence of Stoic Logic,‖ 818. The qualification I would add to Kelly‘s comment is to point out that the
Middle Platonists, discussed above, were already moving away from the New Academy‘s skepticism
towards a Stoically influenced epistemology. When non-exhaustive knowledge of the divine is the focus of
Christian authors, it can be difficult to determine which philosophical school may have influenced them.
88
This comment raises the question of which theologian holds to a ―higher‖ transcendence of God
the Father. Although interesting and worthy of pursuit, I understand the greater concern for this
dissertation not to reside primarily with comparing the ultimate statements of transcendence between
authors. The purpose of this dissertation rather is to investigate the structure of Novatian‘s understanding
of the Father‘s transcendence (via negative theology and the influences of Christian and non-Christian
authors) and then determine how that structure shaped his theology of the Son.
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subject. However, unlike Justin and Novatian, Tertullian does not include God‘s
eternality as part of his explanation.
In another way, Tertullian‘s treatment of the word ―God‖ differs from that of
Justin‘s and Novatian‘s. As described earlier, Tertullian identifies the substance of God
as ―spirit,‖89 and he makes the same claim for the name ―God.‖90 Tertullian states, ―The
name of God, so we say, has always been with Himself and in Himself, but not always
that of Lord, for the state of being inherent in the one is different from that of the other:
God is the name of the substance itself, that is, of the Divinity, but Lord is the name, not
of a substance, but of a power.‖91 According to Tertullian, ―God‖ names the divine
substance (which is spiritus) apart from any consideration of His relationship with the
creation,92 since to be Lord means to be a lord over something.93

89

Tertullian often speaks of the idea that knowledge, not only of God but of all subjects of
intellectual pursuit requires language, which names in actuality the thing being discussed. See, for
example, On the Flesh of Christ 13 in which he states, ―All things will be in danger of being taken in a
sense different from their own proper sense, and, whilst taken in that different sense, of losing their proper
one, if they are called by a name which differs from their natural designation.‖ Tertullian puts this same
principle to use in Prax. 10 when he states that the Father and the Son must be distinct since they possess
distinct names. In Herm 5.1, Tertullian makes the reverse argument to Hermogenes, who claimed that God
and Matter were distinct as demonstrated by different names and unequal in nature, though, according to
Hermogenes they shared eternity, ―‗But God is God, and matter is matter.‘ As if a difference in names
could prevent equality, when an identity of condition is asserted!‖ Tertullian argues that if both are eternal,
then both must have the name nature. Offering different names for two things that share the same nature
defies comprehension in Tertullian‘s opinion.
90
One basis for Tertullian‘s logic goes back at least as far as Plato‘s Sophist. In the dialog, the
Visitor and Theatetus attempt to speak about what is meant when they say ―being.‖ The Visitor states,
―Surely it‘s absurd for someone to agree that there are two names when he maintains that there‘s only one
thing…And it‘s completely absurd, and unacceptable, for someone to say that there‘s a name if there‘s no
account of it…If he supposes that a thing is different from its name, then surely he‘s mentioning two
things,‖ Sophist 244c-d, translation by White.
91
Herm. 3.3
92
Minucius Felix takes a similar approach, without identifying God‘s substance as spirit. Rather,
he concludes that God is the name which represents the totality of necessarily applicable qualities for the
Supreme God. In Octavius 18, he writes: ―He who thinks that he knows the magnitude of God, is
diminishing it; he who desires not to lessen it, knows it not. Neither must you ask a name for God. God is
His name. We have need of names when a multitude is to be separated into individuals by the special
characteristics of names; to God, who is alone, the name God is the whole. If I were to call Him Father, you
would judge Him to be earthly; if a King, you would suspect Him to be carnal; if a Lord, you will certainly
understand Him to be mortal.‖
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Novatian‘s emphasis on the transcendence of the Father leads him to
uncompromisingly assert the ineffability both of God‘s substance and God‘s name. The
fundamental difference between his and Tertullian‘s logic turns on the question of
whether a name signifies a thing‘s nature. For Tertullian, the terms God and spirit name
the divinity, otherwise he argues, people would not understand the object of the words.
For Novatian, ignorance of God‘s substance does not affect knowledge of God‘s
existence, and he believes that if the apprehension of nature follows naming (or thinking),
then the incomprehensible and infinite God would find Himself somehow explicitly in
the confines of a human mind. Such a suggestion Novatian discounts as logically
impossible.
Novatian rejects Tertullian‘s conclusion about knowing the substance of God, but
he does not reject the structure of Tertullian‘s argument. Tertullian claims that God has
revealed His substance in the words ―God‖ and ―spirit.‖ To a limited degree, Tertullian
thus claims some knowledge about the substance of God. Novatian relies on Tertullian‘s
logic to make the opposite case; Novatian denies human beings have a word for God‘s
substance. Absent an accurate word for God‘s substance, Novatian claims that God‘s
substance remains entirely transcendent. Therefore, Novatian dismisses the possibility of
knowing God‘s substance or name, but he utilizes the form of Tertullian‘s argument in
order to reach a different conclusion.

93

Tertullian argues in Herm. 3.4 that the Father could not always be Father by the same logic. I
address this important statement in relation to Novatian‘s apparent rejection of it in chapter 4.
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Conclusion

In this chapter, I pointed to several important topics by which Novatian analyzes
God‘s transcendence, making special reference to his Christian sources. The picture
which emerges shows that Novatian utilizes major elements of negative theology and an
expression of God‘s transcendence to a degree unique among his Christian predecessors.
In regard to his statements about God as beyond mind or reason, God‘s nature or
substance as beyond knowing, and God‘s name as beyond knowing, Novatian‘s
allegiance lies with broadly available expressions of negative theology, especially those
found in the works of Middle Platonists as seen in chapter 1. By reading Novatian in
light of these Middle Platonic influences, my assessment differs from typical assessments
of Trin. in that this study will be able to account for the distinctions which Novatian
asserts between the attributes of the Father and Son. The negative theology used to
discuss the Supreme God, which appears to influence Novatian‘s description of the
Father, provides us with a framework for discussing the Father‘s unique ontology as it is
related to the Son‘s. I will treat this topic most directly in chapter 7. In the next chapter,
I will address the elements of Novatian‘s epistemology in light of chapters 1 and 2. I will
show how Novatian tempers the theological philosophy which contributed to his negative
theology with a Christian structure of epistemology.
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Chapter Three: Theological Epistemology

Introduction
Novatian argues that man‘s comprehension of God would make man greater than
God.1 He bases this position on the principle that God cannot be contained (using the
term continere), and he applies it as equally relevant to spatial and intellectual contact
with God.2 Positive knowledge about God would appear to conflict with Novatian‘s
negative theology, however Novatian speaks confidently about many of God‘s attributes.
The current chapter, with its analysis of Novatian‘s theological epistemology, serves as a
bridge between chapter 2‘s analysis of Novatian‘s use of negative theology in
proclaiming God‘s transcendence and chapter 4‘s analysis of his use of positive theology.
My purpose will be to show that Novatian bases his understanding of theological
epistemology on specific Christian teachings about the Father.3 In this way, we can
speak about Novatian‘s Christian epistemology.

1

Trin. 2.5: ―For all eloquence is certainly dumb and every mind (mens) is inadequate to conceive
(cogitandam) and to utter His greatness (maiestatem). In fact, He is greater (maior) than the mind itself, so
that His greatness is inconceivable (cogitari); for if He could be conceived (cogitari), He would be less
than (minor) the human mind (mente humana) which could conceive (concipi possit) Him.‖
2
In chapter 4, I will present Novatian‘s use of continere to speak about God‘s relationship to
space under the category of topological theology.
3
There is a growing body of literature focusing on Christian revelation and experience as the root
of theological anthropology for some patristic authors. Clement of Alexandria, in particular, has received a
great amount of attention by scholars in regard to this topic. The recent study by Dragoş Andrei Giulea
makes just such a point: ―[H]ow can God be known to us? The Alexandrian then concludes, in a quite
Aristotelian way, by affirming that it is not demonstration that reaches the first principle, that is, God, but
faith, intuition. Moreover, Clement inserts in this epistemology his Christian assumptions, producing in this
way a Christian epistemology. The intuition of God is possible solely on the basis of a divine opening and
revelation, a manifestation toward us, namely, God‘s divine grace or Logos. The intuition represents,
therefore, the apprehension of this divine manifestation,‖ ―Apprehending ‗Demonstrations‘ from the First
Principle: Clement of Alexandria‘s Phenomenology of Faith,‖ JR 89:2 (2009): 196-197. Although some
philosophical traditions looked to various forms of divine inspiritation, I speak in this chapter about
Novatian‘s reliance on matters of Christian faith as justification for speaking about his Christian
epistemology. See also Giulea, ―Apprehending ‗Demonstrations,‘‖ 188-189 n. 2 for an extensive
bibliography on Clement‘s understanding of faith as it is informed by philosophy.

76
Novatian asserts God‘s activity as the justification for everything he says about
cosmology, anthropology, and revelation. Based on the Bible‘s witness, he describes the
order of the universe as a cosmological principle by which all of creation gives witness to
God. Novatian also treats the relationship between man and God as the culmination of all
cosmology. His anthropology begins with man‘s creation for the purpose of imitating
God‘s rationality. Man imitates God in a universe designed to help him understand and
speak about God. Finally, Novatian identifies revelation as the most explicit source of
epistemology. God offers mankind first the Spirit and the saints, and finally Christ
Himself, the Son and Word, as the clearest and most specific means of knowing God.
Some Christian authors made elaborate use of the logic and terminology found in
the traditions of philosophical epistemology.4 Although Novatian does not polemically
reject philosophical epistemology, his own presentation of theological epistemology
rebuffs a core philosophic position, namely the presumption of the natural or essential
contact of the soul/mind with divinity. I will not spend time presenting various technical
arguments of the philosophical schools regarding impressions, apprehensions, and
scientific knowledge; Novatian neither sets his theological epistemology explicitly
against them nor clearly embraces any discernable tradition other than Christianity,
including a strong emphasis on Scripture.5 I will, however, point out where Novatian‘s
epistemology resulted in conclusions similar to those held by philosophers and other
4

Again, studies on Clement of Alexandria dominate the scholarship on early Christian
epistemology because of his strong advocacy for philosophy as the goal of the Christian gnostic. Daniélou
writes, ―[T]he word ‗philosophy‘ may also denote the training aimed at the practice of exact thought, which
forms part of Greek παηδεία. For philosophy in this sense Clement does acknowledge a role, a subordinate
one certainly, but genuine even for the Christian,‖ Gospel Message, 305. See Lilla, Clement of Alexandria,
118-234 for a detailed study of Clement‘s interplay with philosophy.
5
In chapters 1 and 2, I dealt with the background of negative theology because Novatian arranged
his own presentation of God‘s transcendence in contrast to other available models in philosophic and
Christian authors. See D‘Alès, Novatien, 31-82, for an analysis of Trin. as an important witness to the
earliest Latin translations of the Bible in Rome.
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Christian authors. I see such similarities as evidence that Novatian understood the
interplay of the Christian and non-Christian intellectual traditions as partially
harmonious, since the rational God establishes the rationality in all human beings. All
rational creatures can begin with some perception of God, but it is in response to
revelation that Novatian places man‘s greatest ability to know and have a relationship
with God.

Cosmology Directed toward Anthropology

Trin. begins by extolling the Creator God and some specific attributes of the
creation. Nearly everything mentioned about creation includes a comment about its
orientation towards an anthropological purpose. For instance, Novatian notes that
celestial objects ―encircle the entire earth‘s surface to form days, months, years, seasons,
signs, and other things useful for mankind.‖6 All aspects of geography, the mountains,
lowlands, and plains, as well as the variety of animals were created ―for the various needs
of man.‖7 Novatian likewise states that lumber, agricultural fruits, and springs were
created for man‘s benefit.8 God also created things of beauty so that man would have
delightful things at which to look.9
God, however, does not structure the universe simply as a tool which enables man
to prosper materially. Instead, Novatian treats the pedagogical value of God‘s creation as
critical to his cosmology. He writes that God created the boundaries of the waters to
illustrate the expectation of man‘s obedience to God: ―They [the waters] would obey their

6

Trin. 1.2.
Trin. 1.3.
8
Trin. 1.4.
9
Trin. 1.5.
7
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prescribed laws, in order that man would more readily keep God‘s laws, seeing that even
the elements themselves obey them.‖10 Man should infer the importance of moral
fortitude through God‘s ordering of nature. Furthermore, Novatian insists that the
material benefits bestowed on mankind and the pedagogical example of the orderly
universe contribute to a direct appreciation of the Maker. He states, ―Thus, after having
considered the greatness of His works, we can fittingly admire the Maker of such a might
mass.‖11
Christians, Jews, and many philosophers shared a belief that God‘s ordering of the
world led to an anthropocentric view of cosmology.12 Some scholars have argued that
Novatian‘s own praise of the universe suggests the traces of an underlying Stoic
cosmology in Trin.13 However, from the numerous citations and allusions to Scripture, I
understand Novatian as forming his cosmological reflection and the theological
epistemology on Scripture.14 His citation of Romans 1.20 is not an addendum to some
philosophically articulated cosmology, but the core of his thinking:
Since we cannot see Him with the sight of our eyes, we learn from the greatness,
the power, and the majesty of His works. ―For since the creation of the world,‖
says the Apostle, ―His invisible attributes are clearly seen—His everlasting power
also and divinity—being understood through the things that are made.‖ Thus the
10

Trin. 1.7: ut diuinas leges tanto magis homo custodiret, quanto illas etiam elementa seruassent.
Trin. 1.14: sic considerata operum magnitudine tantae molis digne mirari possemus artificem.
12
Other Christian and Jewish authors relied on Genesis 1 and 2 to emphasize an anthropocentric
cosmology. Stoics, Middle Platonists, and Aristotelians shared similar views. Stoics, for example, argued
that mankind possesses attributes or parts of divinity which set it in a unique relationship to the divine. See
Osborn, Justin Martyr, 51, who identifies Christians (Clement of Rome, the writer of To Diognetus, Tatian,
Aristides, Athenagoras, Justin, Theophilus, Tertullian, Minucius Felix and Clement) and Stoics as
especially developing a tradition of anthropocentric cosmology.
13
DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 23 n. 1, sees praise of the creation to betray Stoic influence.
Other scholars have proven beyond a doubt that Trin. makes use of several Stoic or Stoically influenced
works containing cosmological teachings. See Daniélou, Origins of Latin Christianity, 233-250 and his
article ―Novatian et la De Mundo d‘Apulée,‖ in Romantas et Christianitas, Edited by Jan Hendrik Waszink
and Willem den Boer (London: North Holland Publishing Co., 1973): 71-80, and Spanneut, Stöicism de
pères, 340-341.
14
Trin. 1 contains nearly 20 possible allusions to Genesis, Psalms, and a few other texts. See
DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 23-5 (notes).
11
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human mind, learning to know the hidden things from those which are manifest,
may consider the greatness of the Maker from the greatness of His works which it
sees with the eyes of the mind. [Trin. 3.6]15
Novatian identifies the cosmos as encouraging development of the divine-human
relationship, having found this idea in Scripture. Trin. 3.6 also provides a form of the
traditional philosophical notion of the via eminentia.16 This is the way of knowing or
understanding the divine through the world, and Novatian embraces this epistemological
tradition by basing it on biblical testimony.17
Novatian asserts a universal human awareness of God in Trin. 8.1 as part of his
theological epistemology:
All nature, whether visible or invisible, gives unceasing witness to Him. Angels
adore Him, stars wonder at Him, seas bless Him, lands revere Him, and even the

15

Quem quoniam obtutu oculorum uidere non possumus, de operum magnitudine et uirtute et
maiestate condiscimus. Inuisibilia enim ipsius, inquit apostolus Paulus, a creatura mundi per ea quae facta
sunt intellecta conspiciuntur, sempiterna quoque eius uirtus et diuinitas, ut animus humanus ex manifestis
occulta condiscens de operum magnitudine quae uideret mentis oculis artificis magnitudinem cogitaret.
16
We can compare Cicero‘s Academic. He challenges the Epicurean who had criticized, ―those
who took account of the magnificent and pre-eminent works of creation, who contemplated the universe
itself and its parts—the sky, lands, and seas, and their adornments the sun, moon, and constellations—and
who recognized the developments, changes, and transformations of the seasons, and accordingly
conjectured that there was some outstanding, pre-eminent nature which had created them, and now
impelled, governed and guided them,‖ Nat. d. 1.100.
17
See also Trin. 4.1 which alludes to Jesus‘ comment in Luke 18:19 that God alone is good: ―The
Lord rightly declares that God alone is good, of whose goodness the whole world is a witness.‖ Novatian
justifies the goodness of creation with the assertion of God‘s goodness in Scripture. Daniélou describes
Theophilus‘ comments in Autol. 1.5 (in which the soul is known by the movements of the body) as
following a similar patter: ―Theophilus thus outlines two complementary ways of knowing the God who is
utterly inaccessible to bodily sense. The one, the knowledge of the existence of God from his works, is
taken directly from Greek philosophy. The other, that of the vision of God in the mirror of the purified
soul, is ultimately Platonic; but whereas for the Platonist this purification is simply detachment from
corporeity, for the Christian it is transformation by the Holy Spirit,‖ Gospel Message, 334. Daniélou seems
to suggest that Theophilus borrowed this doctrine from Platonism rather than to Jesus‘ words in Matt. 5:8.
I am not sure why Daniélou uses the word ―ultimately.‖ Although Theophilus does not cite Matt. 5:8, it
could just as easily be the basis of Theophilus‘ position. Bertil Gärtner analyzes epistemology in Jewish
sources and then compares Christian epistemology with philosophic precedents, in his The Areopagus
Speech and Natural Revelation. Trans. Carolyn Hannay King (Uppsala: Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1955),
116-164. About Rom. 1:20, he writes ―Both the verbs (―see‖ and ―understand‖) thus describe how, on
contemplating God‘s works, man can grasp enough of His nature to prevent him from the error of
identifying any of the created things with the Creator, enabling him to keep his conception of the Deity free
from idolatry. According to Paul, the knowledge of God thus gained from His works comprises His
invisibility, everlastingness, power and divinity,‖ Areopagus Speech, 137.
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lower regions look up at Him. Every human mind is conscious of Him, even
though it cannot express Him.18
The final phrase in the quotation makes it clear that he does not believe the affirmation of
man‘s knowledge of God runs contrary to his negative theology. Novatian never
questions knowledge of God‘s existence, only the comprehensiveness of articulations
about Him.
Novatian also uses themes found in Genesis 1 and 2 to develop his anthropology.
He writes,
After all these things had been accomplished, He placed man at the head of the
world—man made to the image of God (imaginem Dei), endowed with
intelligence (mentem), discernment (rationem), and prudence (prudentiam) so that
he could imitate (imitare) God. Although the primordial elements of his body
were earthly, nevertheless the substance was infused by a heavenly and divine
breath (halitus). [Trin. 1.8]19
By structuring man with intelligence, discernment, and prudence, God gives him the
ability to act like and, therefore, know something about Him.20 God‘s activity lies not
only in the preliminary creation of the world and man; it also lies in the gift of breath,

18

Cui testimonium reddit tam inuisibilium quam etiam uisibilium et semper et tota natura, quem
angeli adorant, astra mirantur, maria benedicunt, terrae uerentur, inferna quaeque suspiciunt, quem mens
omnis humana sentit, etiam si non exprimit. The argument concerning a universal knowledge of God had a
long history and is discussed in Nat. d. The Epicurean argues, for example, ―For he [Epicurus] alone
perceived, first, that the gods exist, because nature (natura) herself has imprinted a conception of them on
the minds of all mankind. For what nation or what tribe of men is there but possesses untaught some
‗preconception‘ of the gods?‖ The Academic skeptically remarks that Epicurean does not have knowledge
about the beliefs of all people and then suggests that he himself thinks ―that there are many nation so
uncivilized and barbarous as to have no notion of any gods at all,‖ Nat. d. 1.62.
19
Post quae hominem quoque mundo praeposuit, et quidem ad imaginem Dei factum, cui mentem
et rationem indidit et prudentiam, ut Deum posset imitari, cuius etsi corporis terrene primordial, caelestis
tamen et diuini halitus inspirata substantia.
20
Irenaeus‘ Haer. 4.Preface.4 provides a similar anthropology to Novatian‘s: ―Now man is a
mixed organization of soul and flesh, who was formed after the likeness of God, and moulded by His
hands, that is, by the Son and Holy Spirit, to whom also He said, ‗Let Us make man.‘ This, then, is the aim
of him who envies our life, to render men disbelievers in their own salvation, and blasphemous against God
the Creator. For whatsoever all the heretics may have advanced with the utmost solemnity, they come to
this at last, that they blaspheme the Creator, and disallow the salvation of God‘s workmanship, which the
flesh truly is; on behalf of which I have proved, in a variety of ways, that the Son of God accomplished the
whole dispensation [of mercy], and have shown that there is none other called God by the Scriptures except
the Father of all, and the Son, and those who possess the adoption.‖
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which somehow safeguards man as the image of God.21 The allusion to Gen. 2:7
indicates Novatian‘s affirmation of God‘s unique gift to man, but he does not attempt to
deal with any interpretation of the passage.22 I suspect he wishes to avoid any suggestion
of an outright shared nature between God and man.23
In Novatian‘s thinking, obedience to God takes the place of any suggestion that a
shared nature with divinity assures mankind of immortality.24 Man‘s first path to
immortal life depended on man‘s freedom to exercise obedience to God:
On the one hand, man ought to be free lest the image of God serve in unbecoming
manner. On the other hand, a law had to be imposed that unrestrained liberty
might not break forth even to contempt for its Giver. Hence, man might receive
either merited rewards or due punishments as the result of his actions, recognizing
these actions as his own doings, because it was in his power to act, through the
movement of his mind (mentes) in the one or the other direction. [Trin. 1.10]

21

For Gen. 2:7‘s ―breath,‖ Novatian uses the word halitus, whereas Tertullian uses the term flatus.
The one passage which may relate to this is Trin. 8.9, which states, ―And within their very
bosom is a fire of glowing coals, to signify that this world is hastening to the fiery day of judgment, or that
all the works of God are fiery, and not obscure, but full of vigor; or for fear that these beings that have
sprung from terrestrial beginnings would naturally grow numb because of the rigid nature of their origin.
All were endowed, therefore, with the warm nature (calida natura) of and interior spirit (interioris
spiritus).‖ Novatian‘s task in this passage, and Trin. 8.7-11, is the exegesis of Ezechiel‘s chariot vision.
The reference to ―beings‖ in the above quotation are not clearly directed at humans alone. I am therefore
hesitant to associate the halitus given to man in Trin. 1.8 with the calida spiritus in Trin. 8.9. See
Daniélou, Origins of Latin Christianity, 242-243 and Spanneut, Stöicism des pères, 340-341, for a
discussion of the Stoic influence on Novatian‘s thought concerning a warm spirit.
23
Tertullian explained at length the difference between God‘s spirit and the breath given to man in
An. 11. However, although Tertullian regarded the distinction between the natures of the soul and God as
central to his thought, he also connected God‘s creation of the soul to the soul‘s ability to perceive its
Creator in Apologeticus 17.5-6: ―The soul, though it be repressed by the prison house of the body, though
it be circumscribed by base institutions, weakened by lust and concupiscence, and enslaved to false gods,
yet, when it revives, as from intoxication or sleep or some sickness and enjoys health again, names ‗God‘
with this name alone because, properly speaking, He alone is true. ‗Good God!‘ ‗God Almighty!‘ and
‗God grant it!‘ are expressions used by all mankind. That He is a Judge, also, is testified by the phrases:
‗God sees,‘ and ‗I commend it to God,‘ and ‗God will reward me.‘ O testimony of the soul, which is by
natural instinct Christian! In fine, then, the soul, as it utters these phrases, looks not to the Capitol but to
heaven. It knows the abode of the living God; from Him and from there it has come.‖ Cf. Irenaeus on the
breath given to man in Haer. 5.1.3, quoted in the section on Irenaeus in chapter 5.
24
Platonists shared the belief that the Demiurge offered the world immortality. Reydams-Schils
comments on the Timeaus, ―The universe is exempt from destruction by the will of the Demiurge, which
functions as an everlasting bond. The providential involvement of the Demiurge, then, is not limited to the
origin of the universe, but also guarantees its preservation,‖ Demiurge and Providence, 23.
22
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This passage serves to highlight two important points to Novatian‘s theology. First, he
makes it clear that man‘s rationality works in conjunction with his freedom to obey or
disobey God. Second, Novatian connects the free and righteous use of rationality to
God‘s desire to give immortality to mankind. Novatian writes, ―He [man] could have
avoided mortality by obedience, but he subjected himself to it by his headlong and
perverse determination to be God.‖25 In the previous chapter, I connected this passage to
man‘s role in abandoning the morality which God directed. This in turn led to a rupture
in the divine-human relationship because of man‘s failed attempt to be divine himself.26

Revelation

Novatian never treats the activity of pursuing knowledge of God as an exercise of
an independent rational being; man never can understand his rationality as untouched by
God‘s activities. Man‘s being is defined by his intellectual capacities as well as the
structure of the universe, which, according to Novatian, are specific gifts of God meant to
lead man towards progressive stages and expressions of theological epistemology. His
view of man‘s understanding depends entirely on God‘s activity, gifts, and providence.
In the previous section, I cited quotations related to cosmology and anthropology which
describe man‘s awareness of God‘s existence. This awareness is nurtured by the
correlation between the order found in the universe and the attributes of God. For
example, an orderly and rational progression of the celestial bodies or of the seasons
indicates a Creator God who is orderly and rational.

25
26

Trin. 1.11.
See above, in chapter 2‘s section, ―God as beyond mind and reason.‖
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In a sense, God‘s activities of structuring both man‘s capacities and organizing
man‘s environment appear to be relatively passive activities. They describe God as He
sets the world in motion and allows man the opportunity to respond to the situation.
However, the most specific developments of theological epistemology, according to
Novatian, involve God‘s constant interaction with mankind through revelation. Novatian
asserts that God‘s revelations lead mankind into a progressively intimate relationship
with Him. For this reason, Novatian writes in Trin. 3.5 that God ―desir[es] to become
more completely known to us and to incite our minds to His worship.‖27
In regard to revelation, Scripture plays a central role in Novatian‘s presentation.
He quotes, in one instance, several passages from Isaiah addressing God‘s lordship,
dominance, and transcendence over materiality.28 Novatian concludes by saying in Trin.
3.3 that ―God says these things for our instruction (scientiam), not to boast of Himself.
Nor does He seek glory for His own greatness; rather, as a Father, He desires to bestow
on us God-fearing wisdom (religiosam sapientiam).‖ The term scientia could be used in
both a broad sense of instruction on any matter, but it was also used in reference to
theological epistemology. Cicero‘s Nat. d. 1.91, for example, provides the latter meaning
for the term: ―For you gave a full and accurate review, which caused me for one to
wonder at so much learning (scientiam) in a Roman, of the theological doctrines of the
philosophers (de deorum natura philosophorum sententias) from Thales of Miletus

27

Qui similiter adhuc magis in notitiam nostri uolens peruenire, ad culturam sui nostros excitans
animos aiebat.
28
Novatian quotes Isa. 45:22-23 and 42:8 (and 48:11). He then states in Trin. 3.3, ―Again, He
says through the prophet: ‗Heaven is My throne, earth the footstool under My feet: what sort of home will
you build for Me, or what is the place of My rest?‘ [Isa. 66:1]—this to make it clear that since the world
cannot contain Him, much less can a temple enclose Him.‖
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downward.‖29 Novatian offers a competing understanding to the connection between
scientia and theological investigations as the one found in Nat. d. by holding that our
scientia originates from God‘s activity: God develops mankind‘s religious wisdom
through Scripture. It does not originate from a philosophical course of study.
Elsewhere, Novatian speaks about the relationship between man‘s understanding
of Scripture and man‘s mind being freed from certain confines. He notes that the
meaning (ratio) of Scripture comes from an awareness of the dispensation of the
historical development of man‘s relationship with God.30 After stating that certain
parables or descriptions of God were appropriate at certain times, Novatian puts his
emphasis on the development of man‘s understanding. ―Therefore God is not limited,‖
says Novatian, ―but the perception of the people is limited, God [is] not confined, but the
understanding nature (rationes) of the people‘s reason (intellectus) is confined.‖31
Above, I noted that Novatian identified mens, ratio, and prudentia as the endowments
which God gave for man to imitate the divine life. God‘s revelations in Scripture serve
the purpose of developing man‘s ratio to better understand his relationship to God.
After arguing that the revelations found in the Scriptures provide an essential
route to knowledge about God and His will, Novatian turns to the activities of the Spirit
and the Son. He says,
And this besides, wishing to draw our wild minds, both proud and rough, from
rude inhumanity to gentleness, He says, "And upon whom will my Spirit rest, but
29

Etenim enumerasti memoriter et copiose, ut mihi quidem admarari luberet in homine esse
Romano tantam scientiam, usque a Thale Milesio de deorum natura philosophorum sententias. See also
Nat. d. 1.116 in which the Academic criticizes the Epicurean by stating, ―Piety is justice towards the gods;
but how can any claims of justice exist between us and them, if god and man have nothing in common?
Holiness is the science (scientia) of divine worship (colendorum deorum); but I fail to see why the gods
should be worshipped if we neither have received nor hope to receive benefit from them.‖
30
Trin. 6.2.
31
Trin. 6.3, trans. Papandrea: Non igitur mediocris est Deus, sed populi mediocris est sensus, nec
angustus Deus, sed rationis populi angustus est intellectus habitus.
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upon the humble and the peaceful and the one who trembles at my words?" so that
to some degree [humanity] might be able to acknowledge how great God is, while
he learns to fear [God] by the Spirit given [to him]. [Trin. 3.4, trans. Papandrea,
modified]32
Here we see Novatian moving beyond a theological epistemology based on cosmology
and anthropology. When man chooses to listen to God‘s words (presumably Scripture),
God‘s Spirit expands or deepens the divine-human relationship.33 A critical phrase in the
above passage is ―to some degree‖ (aliquatenus), implying the limited capacity for
mankind to speak about God. Novatian does not suggest that a deepened relationship
with God, as well as a developed sense of God‘s greatness, negates the limits he imposes
on conceptualizing God. He does, however, argue that the Spirit is critical to maintaining
the true faith:
Grounded in this Spirit, ―no one‖ ever ―says ‗Anathema‘ to Jesus‖; no one has
denied that Christ is the Son of God, nor has rejected God the Creator; no one
utters any words against the Scriptures: no one lays down alien and sacrilegious
ordinances; no one makes contradictory laws. [Trin. 29.24]34

32

Quique praeterea ferinos nostros animos et de agresti immanitate tumidos et abruptos ad
lenitatem trahere uolens dicit: Et super quem requiescat spiritus meus, nisi super humilem et quietum et
trementem uerba mea?, ut Deum aliquatenus quantus sit possit agnoscere, dum illum per spiritum collatum
discit timere. DeSimone comments regarding this passage, ―The concept of advancing from feritas to
humanitas is frequent in classical Latin; cf. Lucretius 5.927; Cicero, De officiis 3.6.32,‖ The Trinity, 30 n.
15.
33
I take Novatian‘s reference to ―Spirit‖ be a reference to the Holy Spirit. See also Trin. 29.2:
―He [the Holy Spirit] was indeed promised by the prophet Joel but bestowed through Christ. ‗In the last
days,‘ says the prophet, ‗I will pour out from My spirit upon My servants and handmaids.‘ And the Lord
said: ‗Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven; and whose sins you shall
retain, they are retained.‘‖ Trin. 29 is entirely about the work of the Holy Spirit, and Novatian declares a
lengthy list of the Spirit‘s activities associated with knowledge and guidance, including Trin. 29.10: ―In
fact, it is He [the Holy Spirit] who places prophets in the Church, instructs teachers, bestows the gift of
tongues, effects cures and miracles, does wondrous deeds, grants the power of discerning spirits, confers
the power of administration, suggests what decisions should be made, and sets in order and arranges
whatever charismatic gifts there are.‖ For a discussion of the evidence which Novatian‘s Trin. provides
concerning the Roman church and charismatic activities drawn from contact with the Spirit, see Ronald
Kydd, ―Novatian‘s De Trinitate, 29: Evidence of the Charismatic?‖ SJT 30 (1977): 313-18.
34
In hoc spiritu positus nemo umquam dicit anathema Iesum, nemo negauit Christum Dei Filium
aut repudiauit creatorem Deum, nemo contra scripturas ulla sua uerba depromit, nemo alia et sacrilega
decreta constituit, nemo diuersa iura conscribit.
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Novatian insists that the Holy Spirit provides the only sure strength for maintaining a
belief in God‘s revelations which lead to knowledge of Him. Departing from the truth of
the Faith is a matter of heretical choice.35
Novatian makes it clear that the goal and climax of revelation is Christ. The
revelations of the Spirit, the prophets, and the Scriptures all point to the Son of God as
the most explicit source for man‘s development of theological epistemology. Novatian
writes,
He instructed the prophets by the Spirit, and through all these He promised Christ,
His own Son, and He sent Him when He had promised to give Him. Through this
He willed us to come into a knowledge (notitiam) (of Him) and He poured forth
His abundant reserve of mercy upon us, bringing the all-sufficient Spirit to the
poor and despondent. [Trin. 8.3, trans. Papandrea, modified slightly]36
Novatian continues by noting that the Father‘s revelatory activity is itself the work of the
Son and that the Son can lead humanity towards the most explicit acknowledgement of
the Father:
And because He is so generous, benevolent, and good, lest this whole world
should wither after it had turned away the streams of His grace, He willed that
apostles as spiritual fathers of our human race be sent by His Son into the entire
world, so that poor humanity might acknowledge its Creator. If it should choose
to follow Him [Chirst], the human race would have One [the Father] whom they
could now address in their prayers as Father, instead of God. [Trin. 8.4]37

35

Trin. 30.20: ―Certainly, this [heretical belief] is not due to any fault of the Heavenly Scriptures,
which never can deceive, but rather results from the prejudice of human error, whereby they willed to be
heretics (qua haeretici esse uoluerunt).‖
36
Prophetas spiritu instruxit et per hos omnes Filium suum Christum repromisit et quando
daturum se spoponderat misit. Per quem nobis in notitiam uenire uoluit et in nos indulgentiae suae sinus
largos profudit, egenis et abiectis locupletem spiritum conferendo. See also Trin. 29.3: ―Now the Lord
sometimes calls the Holy Spirit the Paraclete and at other times proclaims Him to be the Spirit of truth. He
is not new in the Gospel, nor has He been given in a novel way. For it was He who in the prophets
reproved the people and in the apostles gave an invitation to the Gentiles.‖
37
Et quia ultro et largus et bonus est, ne totus hic orbis auersus gratiae eius fluminibus aresceret,
apostolos institutores generis nostri in totum orbem mitti per Filium suum uoluit, ut condicio generis
humani agnosceret institutorem et, si sequi maluisset, haberet quem pro Deo in suis iam postulationibus
Patrem diceret.
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The Son, who is the image of the Father,38 provides the final step towards an encounter
with the Father.39 Furthermore, Novatian‘s suggestion of an eschatological vision of the
Father depends on the mediation of the Son‘s revelation as the image of the Father.40
Novatian understands the topic of theological epistemology through God‘s
activity of guiding man towards greater knowledge through progressive steps. He
indicates that God‘s activity and initiative in cosmology, anthropology, and revelation
stands behind every progressive step which man makes towards Him.

The Role of Providence and Grace

Both philosophical and Christian traditions employed the terms providentia and
gratia when speaking about God‘s contact with the world. Below, I will briefly detail
Novatian‘s use of these terms and their contribution to his theological epistemology.
Novatian describes God‘s interaction with the universe as well as His allencompassing organization of it with the term providentia. Novatian writes,
His providence (prouidentia) has run and at present runs its course not only
among individual men but also though whole cities and states, whose overthrow
38

Trin. 28.14. Novatian places special emphasis on the Son as the image of God because the Son
perfectly imitates the works of the Father. In Trin. 22.2, he notes that mankind is also made in the image of
the Father, but that only the Son is in the ―form‖ of God. In several passages, however, Novatian treats the
idea of the Son as the image of the Father as unique. See Trin. 28.25 and 28.29.
39
Daniélou draws attention to the central place of Christ in Clement of Alexandria‘s theology in
words equally applicable to Novatian. He writes, ―God is beyond not only bodies but minds; he is
absolutely transcendent and unapproachable. He can be known only by grace, that is to say, by the
revelation which he makes of himself; and this revelation is Christ. Through him alone can we have access
to the abyss of the Father, since he alone knows the Father. This is no longer Middle Platonism, but the
God of the Bible, the deus absconditus,‖ Gospel Message, 342. Barnard makes the same observation about
Justin Martyr regarding the Logos‘ role in bring man into the knowledge of God: ―If the spermatic logos is
the natural reason, it has seemed to some that intellectualism has conquered all, and the difference between
Christ and the philosophers is merely one of degree. But grace plays always the decisive role and can alone
lead to participation in the logos himself,‖ Justin Martyr: His Life and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1967), 39-40. In this citation Barnard is referring to 2 Apol. 13.
40
See especially Trin. 18.3: ―In fact, He is ‗the image of the invisible God,‘ that our limited
human nature and frailty might in time grow accustomed to see God the Father in Him who is the Image of
God, that is, in the Son of God. Gradually and by degrees human frailty had to be strengthened by means
of the Image for the glory of being able one day to see God the Father.‖
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He predicted by the words of the prophets. In fact, His providence runs its course
even through the whole world itself. He has described as consequences of its
unbelief the world‘s punishment, its plagues, losses, and final fate. And lest
anyone should think that this indefatigable providence (infatigabilem
prouidentiam)41 of God does not also embrace the least things, the Lord said:
―One of two sparrows shall not fall to the ground without the Father‘s Will; for
even the very hairs of your head are numbered.‖ [Trin. 8.5-6]42
After this passage, Novatian notes God‘s providential care of the Israelites as they left
Egypt and during the Babylonian Captivity. God, according to Novatian, takes equal
interest in all things and cares for every aspect of creation.
Novatian‘s understanding of God‘s providence derives from his assertion that
God contains all things.43 In Trin. 2.1, Novatian chastises those who think that a superior
God exists above the creator.44 He states that God ―contains all things‖ and ―has
enclosed all things in the bosom of His perfect greatness and power, He is always intent
on His own work and pervades all things, moves all things, gives life to all things, and
observes all things.‖45 Novatian argues for the theological necessity of affirming God‘s

41

Daniélou demonstrates the influence of Apuleius‘ translation of Ps.-Aristotle‘s de Mundo on
Novatian‘s theology, Origins of Latin Christianity, 233-250. I think it likely that Novatian borrowed the
phrase infatigabilem prouidentiam from chapter 24 of that work. In Apuleius‘ translation, he identifies an
indefatigable power which preserves and guides the world, rather than God‘s actual presence: ―non tamen
ut corporei laboris officio orbem istum manibus suis instruxerit, sed qui quadam infatigabili prouidentia et
procul posita cuncta contingit, et maximis interuallis disiuncta conplectitur.‖
42
Cuius prouidentia non tantummodo singillatim per homines cucurrit aut currit, sed etiam per
ipsas urbes et ciuitates, quarum exitus prophetarum uocibus cecinit, immo etiam per ipsum totum orbem,
cuius propter incredulitatem exitus, plagas, deminutiones poenasque descripsit. Et ne quis non etiam ad
minima quaeque Dei putaret istam infatigabilem prouidentiam peruenire, Ex duobus, inquit Dominus,
passeribus unus non cadet sine Patris uoluntate, sed et capilli capitis uestri omnes numerati sunt.
43
Novatian also speaks of God‘s providential care with the term voluntas. This term allows
Novatian to place the Father at the center of all divine activity regarding the world. See, for example, Trin.
6.7: ―[Bodily members] are not necessary to God, whose works not only immediately follow His Will
(voluntatem) without any effort, but even proceed simultaneously with His Will (voluntate).‖
44
He is most likely alluding to Marcionites, DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 26 n. 1.
45
Trin. 2.1: Super quae omnia ipse continens cuncta, nihil extra se uacuum deserens, nulli deo
superiori, ut quidam putant, locum reliquit, quandoquidem ipse uniuersa sinu perfectae magnitudinis et
potestatis incluserit, intentus semper operi suo et uadens per omnia et mouens cuncta et uiuificans uniuersa
et conspiciens tota.
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creative activity and enduring care for the world against those who refuse to identify the
Creator God with the Supreme God.46
Trin. 8.5-6‘s description of God‘s providential care looks very similar to the Stoic
position found in Nat. d. 2.164-5. Balbus, the Stoic, also declares God‘s care for nations,
cities, and individuals. He states,
Nor is the care and providence (consuli et provideri) of the immortal gods
bestowed only upon the human race in its entirety, but it is also wont to be
extended to individuals. We may narrow down the entirety of the human race and
bring it gradually down to smaller and smaller groups, and finally to single
individuals. [Nat. d. 2.164]
The difference between Novatian‘s position and that of the Stoics concerns the nature of
the God, rather than the resulting activity.47 Christian theologians rejected the explicit
connection between Stoic doctrine and their own presentation of God‘s providence,48 in

46

See chapter 4‘s section ―Topological Theology,‖ for my discussion of these passages from Trin.
2 and 8. See also chapter 6 in the section ―All things are through the Word,‖ for my discussion of the
instrumentality of the Logos related to God‘s contact with the world. Such instrumentality shows up in the
Logos traditions Novatian inherited from Theophilus, Justin, Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Hippolytus. Middle
Platonists and Aristotelians also made use of the idea of intermediate powers to describe the nature of
contact between the Supreme God and the universe.
47
Since Stoics defined divinity through rationality, they interpreted the activity of the world‘s
ordered movement and self-sufficiency as the activity of providence. Plutarch writes in On Stoic selfcontradictions 1052C-D, ―In the same book [On providence] he [Chrysippus] has written clearly: ‗The
world alone is said to be self-sufficent because it alone has within itself everything it needs, and it gets its
nourishment and growth from itself since its different parts change into one another,‖ quoted in Long and
Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers (1), 275. This position elicited the total scorn of Epicureans as seen in
Nat. d. 1.52: ―Your Stoic god seems to us to be grievously overworked. If the world itself is god, what can
be less restful than to revolve at incredible speed round the axis of the heavens without a single moment of
respite?‖ (Loeb). Aristotelians and Academics also accepted the idea of divine providence; the former
speaking about power as a moderating principle between the Supreme God and all else and the former
speaking about intermediate divinities; see Sandy, The Greek World of Apuleius, 197. Daniélou also points
to the influence of Nat. d. as well as Mund. on Novatian‘s understanding of providence, Origins of Latin
Christianity, 238-244. Daniélou makes the following observation with which I agree: ―It is clear, then, that
Novatian makes use of Cicero‘s idea that providence penetrates everything, but it is equally evident that
providence is not, in his opinion, the same as nature. It is, on the contrary, the transcendent God.
Conversely, he retains from De mundo the idea of God‘s transcendence over the universe, but rejects the
idea of a divine activity that can affect the world only through intermediaries. We can see from this both
the complexity of Novatian‘s sources and the freedom with which he uses them, retaining only what was in
accordance with Christain faith,‖ 242.
48
Wolfson provides numerous examples of Christian authors in Philosophy of the Church Fathers,
Vol. 1, Rev. 3rd Ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 83-4 and 87-8.
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part because of the Stoic emphasis on fate.49 We recall that Novatian‘s anthropology
depends on the exercise of man‘s free will to gain immortality through obedience.
Furthermore, Stoicism denied God‘s transcendence, making God‘s immanence appear as
dependence on the world. The Stoic God could not be viewed by Christians as the
Supreme God who chooses to create.
Like Novatian, Tertullian defines providentia as God‘s interactions with the world
in fulfillment of His all-encompassing plan.50 At one point, Tertullian associates
providentia with Wisdom and Power, and he classifies it as an attribute of the divine
substance rather than the substance of divinity itself, which is spirit.51 He also says that
the acceptance of the concept of providence apart from the assertion of the direct
guidance of God leads to mere human opinions rather than God‘s truth.52 In all cases,
providentia, for Tertullian, corresponds to God‘s revelatory activities. Sometimes God
acts upon individuals, and at other times He shapes the general course of history. By
God‘s activities, argues Tertullian, we come to know Him.53 Novatian does not offer the

49

Reydams-Schils notes, ―For the Stoics, then, it appears that nature, Providence, necessity, and
fate all represent different aspects of one and the same active principle, the divine ιόγνο,‖ Demiurge and
Providence, 70.
50
See, for example, Marc. 2.15.3, ―And yet, if you were to accept the gospel in its true form, you
would learn to whom applies this judgement of God who turns the fathers‘ sins back upon their children,
namely to those who were, at a time then future, going of their own will to call down this judgement upon
themselves, His blood be on our heads and on our children‟s. So then God‘s providence (providentia) in
its fullness passed censure upon this which he heard long before it was spoken‖ (modified slightly). See
also Marc. 2.23.3-24.2 in which Tertullian speaks about the interplay between God, individuals (Saul), and
nations (Ninevites).
51
Prax. 26.6.
52
De praesciptione haereticorum 7.7: ―[T]he Apostle expressly mentions philosophy as that
which we ought to beware of, writing to the Colossians, ‗Take heed lest any one beguile you through
philosophy or vain deceit, according to the tradition of men,‘ beyond the providence of the Holy Spirit
(praeter prouidentiam Spiritus sancti). The Apostle had been at Athens, and in his argumentative
encounters there had become acquainted with that human wisdom which affects and corrupts the Truth,
itself also being many times divided into its own heresies by the variety of its mutually antagonistic sects.‖
53
Tertullian is well known for several strong statements about man‘s natural capacity to know
God, especially chapter 12 in his Apology. There he writes, ―Though under the oppressive bondage of the
body, though led astray by depraving customs, though enervated by lusts and passions, though in slavery to
false gods; yet, whenever the soul comes to itself, as out of a surfeit, or a sleep, or a sickness, and attains
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same range of meanings for providentia, but he does utilize the term in such a way as to
show that nothing in the creation, whether it relates to cosmology, anthropology, or the
work of the Spirit and Christ, occurs apart from God‘s activity.
Novatian also briefly takes note of the Father‘s grace (gratia) in reference to His
activities. He mentions the ―streams of His grace‖ (gratiae eius fluminibus) in Trin. 8.4
(cited above). The ―streams of grace‖ is a reference to the Garden of Eden and the tree of
life (mentioned in Trin. 8.2), as well as to God‘s saving activity with Noah, Enoch,
Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Moses. Novatian‘s use of gratia to convey God‘s care is not
unique, although I am unaware of any literary parallel with this specific quotation.54 By
presenting the structure of the universe as a grace from God rather than simply as a
reflection of the divine, rational nature (which Novatian did not deny), Novatian follows
in a Christian tradition unlike the teachings found in the Stoic or Middle Platonic uses of
the via eminentia argument.55
Furthermore, God, through the Spirit, actively draws man into inspired
understanding. In Trin. 29, Novatian writes about the Holy Spirit‘s many activities. He
identifies the work of the Spirit in the prophets and apostles. Novatian also quotes John
16:13‘s promise that ―when the Spirit of truth has come, He will guide you to all truth.‖56
―It is He [the Holy Spirit],‖ Novatian continues, ―who strengthened their hearts and
minds, who clearly brought out for them the mysteries of the Gospel, who was within
something of its natural soundness, it speaks of God.‖ However, he tempers this statement in the next
chapter, writing, ―We are of your stock and nature: men are made, not born, Christians.‖ Tertullian implies
the activity and initiative of God in educating men towards divine knowledge since men need to accept the
guidance of God‘s revelatory teachings to become Christians.
54
We can look, for example, to Justin‘s Dial. 78 for his argument that the grace of redemption
now resides with Christians rather than continuing among the Jews. This position shares similar overtones
of providential care as Novatian‘s quotation, yet contains a supersessionism which is not a part of Trin.
55
See chapter 1‘s section, ―Alcinous,‖ and also the conclusion of this chapter for comments on the
traditional three ways of knowledge.
56
Trin. 29.7.
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them the enlightener of divine things.‖57 The culmination of the Spirit‘s activity
emanates directly from Christ, from whom grace is outpoured:
It is He who came upon the Lord like a dove after He was baptized, and He
remained, living fully and entirely in Christ alone, not diminished in any
proportion or division, but with all His overflowing abundance He has been given
and sent, so that others might be able to obtain from Him a kind of sample of
[His] graces (gratiarum), [and] so that streams of gifts and works (donorum atque
operum uenae) might be drawn from the Holy Spirit living abundantly in Christ,
since the spring of the whole Holy Spirit resides in Christ. [Trin. 29.11, trans.
Papandrea]58
Man‘s knowledge about God comes from the Holy Spirit‘s activity among individuals, in
the graces divested through Christ‘s work, as well as in the subsequent activity of the
Spirit amongst the saints. Novatian therefore shares with Justin and Tertullian similar
ideas about graces associated with theological epistemology.59 Although not using the
term for ―grace,‖ Justin‘s old man speaks in Dial. 7.3 about the need to pray for the
―gates of Light‖ to be opened in order to understand the Gospel.60 Justin identifies the
old man as the instigator of his conversion as well as the exemplar of the intellectual
defense of the faith against philosophical challenges to Christianity.
Much in Tertullian‘s presentation of theological epistemology looks similar to
Novatian‘s. Tertullian, for example, emphasizes the idea of growth in man‘s ability to

57

Trin. 29.9.
Hic est qui in modum columbae, posteaquam Dominus baptizatus est, super eum uenit et mansit,
habitans in solo Christo plenus et totus nec in aliqua mensura aut portione mutilatus, sed cum tota sua
redundantia cumulate distributus et missus, ut ex illo delibationem quandam gratiarum ceteri consequi
possint, totius Sancti Spiritus in Christo fonte remanente, ut ex illo donorum atque operum uenae
ducerentur, Spiritu Sancto in Christo affluenter habitante.
59
Daniélou, Gospel Message, 337-338, offers the example of Clement of Alexandria in describing
paidiea as coming by the grace of God and by the Word alone. Young likewise mentions Clement in this
respect and adds Origen as another example in ―God of the Greeks,‖ 62-63. Furthermore, Young notes,
―Thus the notion of divine revelation also provided justification for the Christian claim to religious
knowledge. The Logos of God was not simply identified with the person incarnate in Jesus, but with
revelation in the word of scripture and in the works of creation,‖ 63.
60
C. J. De Vogel cites this passage and regards it as demonstrating Justin‘s teaching that ―‗Faith‘
is based on Revelation and received only by grace,‖ in his ―Problems Concerning Justin Martyr,‖ in
Mnemosyne 4:31:4 (1978), 363.
58
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perceive something of the divine. Osborn recounts Tertullian‘s position (at least against
Marcion) that knowledge of God begins with the cosmos. The intellect, functioning as
the activity of the soul, draws out further conclusions and finally one comes to an
understanding about revelation. Osborn combines references from Apology 17 and also
Marc. 1.18.2 in order to convincingly make this argument.61 In Apology 17.2 Tertullian
writes, ―[God] is incomprehensible, though in grace (gratiam) He is manifested.‖62
Novatian joins Tertullian in suggesting anthropological and cosmological factors which
lead to a recognition of God‘s desire to become known to man. For both authors, gratia
serves as a phrase indicative of God‘s providence and the development of theological
epistemology.

Conclusion

DeSimone speaks about the difference between imperfect knowledge and
knowledge of God‘s attributes through reason.63 He notes,
He [Novatian] uses the classic three-fold method by which man can know God:
(a) by way of affirmation or causation (via affirmationis seu causalitatis),
deducing the nature of His attributes from the nature of His works; (b) by way of
negation (via negationis), excluding the idea of finite limitation; (c) by way of
intensification or eminence (via superlationis seu eminentiae), ascribing to God
every perfection which is consistent with His infinity, to the exclusion of all
quantitative and temporal measures.64
DeSimone‘s comments offer a good starting place for understanding Novatian‘s work.65
Novatian excludes quantitative and temporal measures in order to justify the use of the
61

Osborn, Tertullian, 80-81.
Incomprehensibilis, etsi per gratiam repraesentetur.
63
DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 60.
64
Idem. These methods can be found in Alcinous‘ Did. and discussed in chapter 1‘s section on
62

him.
65

Cf. Dunn, who, after listing the statements Novatian makes about God‘s attributes, concludes,
―All the designations and names of God tell us not that God is this or that particular quality but that this is a
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attributes he believes necessary to a discussion about the highest God, while accepting
typical intellectual models for speaking about the divine.
Stead, however, provides an even better framework by which we can connect
topics seen in chapters 1-3 of this dissertation. He suggests that negative theology, as
seen among the Middle Platonists, took advantage of the growing ambivalence between
knowledge and exhaustive knowledge.66 What is apparent from chapter 1‘s investigation
of Platonic authors is that the logical methods of both Stoicism and Aristotelianism no
longer operated as foreign inclusions within the philosophical synthesis of the Middle
Platonists.67 Middle Platonists utilized negative theology to shed, and in fact counteract,
the skepticism of the New Academy. Apuleius, for example, shows the possibility of a
revitalized theological epistemology because of the ontological connection between first
substances.68 In terms of his theology of the Father, Novatian accepted much of what he

human attempt to try to grasp something of the ungraspable. Indeed, human capacity is very limited when
it comes to God,‖ ―Diversity and Unity,‖ 392-393.
66
Stead provides a hypothesis for viewing the early Christian embrace of the scriptural God who
is good, righteous, and merciful with the philosophic conception of God who is unknowable,
incomprehensible, and ineffable. He writes, ―These problems can be mitigated, though possibly not
resolved, by attending to the philosophical background of the negative terms. In Greek thought
‗knowledge‘ is commonly taken to imply complete or perfect knowledge. Aristotle defined it as ‗the
mind‘s identity with its object‘; and this interpretation clearly leaves no room for a knowledge which is
genuine but incomplete: St. Paul‘s ‗I know in part‘, 1 Corinthians 13:12. But with negative terms the
situation is reversed; if ‗knowledge‘ suggests ‗complete knowledge‘, then ‗unknowable‘ can be taken to
mean that complete knowledge is impossible; it need not exclude every kind of genuine apprehension.
Thus to say that God is akatalēptos, incomprehensible, suggests a comparison with the Stoic katalēptikē
phantasia, the completely certain apprehension of some perceived fact; it is not difficult to admit that God
cannot be known in this fashion! Whether the escape-route which I have suggested was actually taken, I
cannot say; it seems more probable that the negative adjectives were used in rhetorical, maximizing sense
to stress the depth of the divine mystery, without regard for the problems that necessarily followed,‖ in
Philosophy, 133-134. I think Stead‘s explanation is very close to how Novatian thinks.
67
Therefore, studies such as D. F. Kelly‘s ―Beneficial Influence of Stoic Logic‖ prove
problematic, as I pointed out above. There can be no doubt that Middle Platonism sought for greater
connections with the dogmatic Platonism of the Academy without seeking wholesale agreement with
Stoicism and Aristotelianism.
68
In the introduction, I quoted Harnack as claiming that ―no trace of Platonism‖ could be found in
Novatian‘s work. He justified this claim, in part, by pointing to syllogistic and dialectic arguments,
arguments favored by Stoics and Aristotelians, which Novatian employs in response to Monarchian
teachings. As such, it appears that Harnack assumes the impossibility of Middle Platonic influence on
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found in the negative theology throughout his intellectual environment. As a Christian,
however, he rejected the philosophical justifications for some of these claims and
reformulated the logic in harmony with his Christian beliefs. He counters the suggestion
of a natural connection between man and God with a system based on the principle of the
Creator God‘s activity and revelation.
In this chapter, I set forth the structure by which Novatian offers positive content
to his theology. As I have shown, this structure depends entirely on the sense that the
rational God initiates and makes possible epistemology in general, and theological
epistemology in particular. The key element missing in DeSimone‘s discussion is the
idea of God‘s activity as the central factor of Novatian‘s theological epistemology. The
three ways of knowledge are not the sources of man‘s understanding; they merely reflect
attempts at comprehending the graces which God establishes through His providential
involvement with creation. Novatian‘s treatment of cosmology, anthropology, and
revelation reflect God‘s activity as the source of theological epistemology. Since these
topics are dealt with in a Christian framework, we can rightfully identify Novatian‘s
epistemology as a Christian epistemology. With that principle fixed, the other significant
aspect of our investigation points to the strong influence of Middle Platonic formulations
of negative theology.

Novatian because Novatian chooses to use argument types from other philosophical schools. I think such
an assumption fails to do justice to Novatian‘s knowledge of the philosophic environment.
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Chapter Four: The One and Eternal Father

Introduction

In chapter 1, I pointed to a growing body of scholarship which offers a new
analysis of the use of negative theology in philosophical works of the first few centuries.1
Some scholars call attention to the formulaic and structural purpose of the combination of
negative and positive language in both philosophic and ―Gnostic‖ works,2 arguing that no
theological incoherence arises from the combination of negative and positive language. 3
Numerous historians of early Christian thought also address the consistency of Christian
authors who employ negative and positive language. Works on Justin Martyr supply
some examples. Following Prestige,4 Osborn states, ―Justin‘s negative theology [did not]
fight with his positive theology; even the negative attributes of God were shown to have
positive consequences and his positive attributes of God were shown to have negative
consequences such as the exclusion of certain kinds of worship.‖5 According to this
interpretation, Osborn sees Justin‘s negative theology as intertwined with underlying
positive assertions.
Novatian‘s work provides a further example of the use of positive and negative
theologies which Osborn describes. For instance, although he affirms the Father‘s
1

For bibliographic information, see the notes in chapter 1‘s section, ―Negative theology and
transcendence in philosophical works.‖
2
See Michael A. Williams, ―Negative Theologies and Demiurgical Myths in Late Antiquity,‖ in
Gnosticism and Later Platonism: Themes, Figures, and Texts. Eds. Turner, John D. and Ruth Majercik
(Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2000): 277-302.
3
Norris‘ assessment of Alcinous is an example of the earlier scholarly belief that the combination
of negative and positive theological approaches produced an incoherent position. See chapter 1 in the
section on Alcinous for comments by Norris and others.
4
Prestige writes, ―The philologically privative terms connote ultimate self-dependency and
universal responsibility, and their connotation is therefore positive rather than negative. The philologically
positive terms imply the lack of these things and are therefore to some extent tinged with negation,‖ in God
in Patristic Thought, 41
5
Osborn, Justin Martyr, 17.
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transcendence through negative theology, Novatian also states that creation must come
from a Being which lacks a beginning. This axiom leads Novatian to assert eternality as
a positive attribute of the Supreme God.6
The current chapter will look at Novatian‘s presentation of God through his use of
positive theological language, beginning with his references to the Supreme God as
Father (Pater) and as one (unus).7 Although Novatian calls the Son ―God,‖ he only
identifies the Supreme God as ―Father‖ and as ―one.‖ Furthermore, Novatian‘s positive
theology includes a focus on the relationship of the Father with time and space, leading
me to analyze Novatian‘s use of the terms aeternus, infinitus, and immensus. These are
all important terms in theological philosophy. This chapter will demonstrate that
philosophical sources influence Novatian‘s positive theology of the Father, just as we
saw that such sources influenced his negative theology.
Throughout Trin., terms related to time and space carry a specific or technical
meaning when Novatian attributes them to the Supreme God, because of his focus on the
uniqueness of God the Father. In later chapters, I will outline Novatian‘s application of
6

Trin. 2.12 states, ―He is, so to speak, an intelligent Being who without any beginning or ending
in time engenders and fills all things and governs, for the good of all, with supreme and perfect reason, the
causes of things naturally linked together.‖ Novatian‘s position would have been accepted by Academics
who envisioned the creation of the world out of eternal matter. Daniélou points to Nat. d. 2.11 as the
source of Novatian‘s comment, Origins of Latin Christianity, 241.
7
The underlying problem in analyzing a statement about the Supreme God involves identifying
where negative theology ends and positive theology begins. The intellectual period which this dissertation
examines provides no clear answer. I distinguish between Novatian‘s negative theology and positive
theology in part through the idea of exhaustive knowledge. He protects God‘s superiority by making
exhaustive knowledge about God‘s nature impossible. Novatian‘s positive theology includes all of the
attributes which he takes to be required by the definition of divinity. Some of the terms which Novatian
applies to God depend on avoiding incoherence. Novatian, for example, thinks that the supreme divine
nature requires the attribute of eternality. Eternality, by definition of Novatian‘s most strict understanding,
requires the rejection of God having a beginning. Both ideas, divine eternality and a lack of a beginning, I
treat as positive attributes. In Novatian‘s thinking, eternality itself defies exhaustive knowledge.
Novatian‘s thinking on God‘s eternity resembles the mathematical representation of a line capped by
arrows pointing in opposite directions. Identifying the line and the arrows as indicators of time represents
positive theology. The representation itself, however, retains the quality of negative theology since the
symbol only indicates the idea of an infinite line.
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some of the same terms to the Son by participation or through a qualified definition.8 By
focusing on the multiple levels of meaning for select terms in Novatian, I lay the
foundation for disputing several contemporary scholars who argue against or overlook
this hierarchy of meaning in Novatian‘s terminology. For Novatian, the particular subject
about whom he writes dictates the specific meaning for the term he uses.9 Although he
had numerous scriptural passages which he might have used as proof texts for his
theology, Novatian depends primarily on a philosophical and logical approach for his
positive attributes which describe the highest God as Father, one, eternal, infinite, and
immense. For this reason, I will demonstrate that Novatian‘s theology of the Father is
indebted to the theological philosophy of his time, particularly that which was
represented by Middle Platonists. In chapters 6 and 7, I will contrast his philosophicallybased approach of speaking about the Father‘s attributes with his dependence on the
Scriptures in articulating the Son‘s attributes.

The Supreme God Is the Father
When Novatian dismisses the possibility of knowing God‘s name,10 he does so
based on the philosophical principle, shared by Tertullian, that a thing‘s name designates
its nature or its attributes.11 However, from the beginning of Trin., Novatian identifies
the Supreme God, like the Middle Platonists and Aristotelians, with the assertion that this

8

One example of this can be found in Trin. 20. There Novatian argues that the Son should rightly
be named God because the Scriptures (e.g. Ps. 81 and Exod. 7:1) identify both angels and humans as gods.
Novatian‘s point is one of linguistic degree: if angels and humans can be identified with the term god in an
appropriate fashion, then a greater justification exists for claiming the Son to be God. See also Novatian‘s
conclusion of this topic in Trin. 20.8-9.
9
Such a method is prevalent in Tertullian‘s work. See the notes in the next section.
10
See my analysis of Trin. 4.10-12 in chapter 2‘s section, ―God‘s name is beyond knowing.‖
11
Trin. 4.10: ―The name of a thing connotes whatever comes under the demands of its nature.‖
Tertullian, as shown in chapter 2, uses this principle to claim that God‘s nature is identifiable as spirit.
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Being creates and cares for creation.12 In Trin. 1.1 Novatian starts his treatise by
referencing the regula: ―The rule of truth requires that we believe, first in God the Father
and almighty Lord, the most perfect Creator (conditorem) of all things.‖13 Novatian calls
the Supreme God conditor, and other terms throughout the work function as synonyms to
this identification, namely artifex,14 parens,15 and institutor.16 Some of these terms
shared a strong presence in philosophical works, such as parens.17 In another passage
where he brings together some of these terms, Novatian states, ―We acknowledge,
therefore, and know that He is God, the Creator (conditor) of all things; their Lord,
because of His power; their Author (parentem), because of creation.‖18 Novatian
assumes a necessary link between the Supreme God‘s initial creative activity and God‘s
continued care and preservation.19
Novatian insists on the role of Christian revelation for the ability to recognize the
Supreme God who creates as the ―Father.‖ God sent his Son and the apostles, ―so that
poor humanity might acknowledge its Creator (institutorem). If it should choose to
follow Him, the human race would have One whom they could now address in their
12

Epicureans were frequently recognized as unique in rejecting divine providential care; see
Hippolytus‘ Ref. 1.19. Although Stoic theology emphasized the rational divine substance which pervades
all things, their rejection of a personally distinct God led to the charge by some Christians of divine
indifference. Theophilus, in Autol. 2.4, accuses the Stoics of denying a personal creator and therefore not
believing in the same kind of divinity. Hippolytus, however, shows no such hostility. In Ref. 1.18 he
describes Stoic theology by stating, ―And they likewise supposed God to be the one originating principle of
all things, being a body of the utmost refinement, and that His providential care pervaded everything.‖
13
Regula exigit ueritatis ut primo omnium credamus in Deum Patrem et Dominum omnipotentem,
id est rerum omnium perfectissimum conditorem.
14
Trin. 1.14.
15
Trin. 2.12 and 3.1.
16
Trin. 8.4.
17
See Apuleius‘ Dogm. Plat. 1.18 and De deo Socr. 3 and 23; Cicero‘s Nat. d. 2.83; 3.44; 3.67;
and 3.72.
18
Trin. 3.1: Hunc igitur agnoscimus et scimus Deum, conditorem rerum omnium, Dominum
propter potestatem, parentem propter institutionem.
19
Trin. 1 identifies God as the creator and then attributes the organization of creation as the means
by which he takes care of and provides for mankind. Providing for mankind includes offering beautiful
things to look at and offering man laws for his benefit. Through creation, man can immediately recognize
beauty, goodness, and justice, which all reflect God‘s nature.
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prayers as Father (Patrem), instead of God (Deo).‖20 For Novatian, God‘s activities
through the Son and apostles provide the means by which man recognizes the Creator
God as Father. By focusing on the activity of the Son‘s revelation, Novatian asserts a
Christian justification for the longstanding philosophical tradition which identified the
creator as Parent or Father.
In chapter 1, I discussed the references to the Maker and Father in Plato‘s
Timaeus 28c and the importance they had on the philosophical tradition leading up to
Novatian‘s time.21 In this tradition, the application of fatherhood to the Supreme Being
was connected to the creation or ordering of the universe.22 Apuleius provides one of the
many examples,
[Plato also says, that] there are three species of Gods; the first of which is that one
and alone supreme (prima unus et solus summus) God, who is super-mundane and
incorporeal, and whom we have above shown to be the father and architect
(patrem et architectum) of this divine world. [Dogm. Plat. 1.11]23

20

Trin. 8.4: ut condicio generis humani agnosceret institutorem et, si sequi maluisset, haberet
quem pro Deo in suis iam postulationibus Patrem diceret. DeSimone notes the influence of Matt. 6:9 and
Luke 11:2, On the Trinity, 39 n. 14.
21
See also Hippolytus‘ Ref. 1.2 in which he notes that Pythagoras identified a father and a mother
as the original cause of all things.
22
Alcinous‘ Did. 10.3 states, ―He is Father through being the cause of all things and bestowing
order on the heavenly Intellect and the soul of the world in accordance with himself and his own thoughts.‖
Apuleius remarks, ―But of the father of these, who is the lord and the author of all things…,‖ De deo Socr.
3. Cf. Dunn who sees no connection between ―fatherhood‖ and creative activity: ―Although DeSimone
heads his fifth chapter ‗God the Father and Creation‘, his analysis of the first eight chapters of Novatian‘s
de Trinitate has nothing to say about the Fatherhood of God. This is not surprising because it is not a topic
which Novatian himself discussed in these chapters. The word pater occurs only five times while words
like conditor, auctor, institutor, artifex, parens and initiator occur at least fourteen times, not to mention
the verbs that refer to the creative activity of God,‖ ―Diversity and Unity,‖ 390-391. Dunn misses the
influences of the traditions which connected divine Fatherhood which creative activity, leading him to
conclude, ―It is hard therefore simply to make the assertion that the first eight chapters of the treatise are
about God the Father; they are more about God the creator,‖ Ibid., 391. In his analysis, it appears that
Dunn downplays the importance of Novatian‘s identification of God‘s Fatherhood because he is looking for
Novatian to make a connection in light of Trinitarian concerns. I, however, think that Novatian draws out
the Fatherhood of God in light of teachings regarding God as one, supreme, and unique.
23
Deorum trinas nuncupat species, quarum est, prima unus et solus summus ille, ultramundanus,
incorporeus, quem patrem et architectum huius divini orbis superius ostendimus.
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Novatian accepts this tradition and Christianizes it, believing that humanity only fully
recognizes the Creator as Father through the Son. The fact that God is recognized by
humanity as Father does not mean that Novatian suggests that God‘s fatherhood began
with creation.24

The Supreme God Is One

As with the term pater, Novatian argues that identifying God as unus protects His
simplicity and His inability to change. He also follows Christian and Academic
traditions, endorsed by Apuleius and others, when he uses unus to affirm God‘s
uniqueness.25
Trin. 27.3 provides the only instance in which Novatian defines his understanding
of the term unus, making the definition he offers an important element to my reading of
Novatian‘s repeated labeling of the Father as unus. In Trin. 27, he explains the
relationship between the Father and the Son when he exegetes John 10:30‘s declaration,
―I and the Father are one‖ (Ego et Pater unum sumus). Novatian defines his use of the
masculine and neuter versions of the word for ―one,‖ writing,
Furthermore, since He said ―one‖ [unum], let the heretics realize that He did not
say ―one‖ [unus]. For ―one‖ in the neuter gender denotes harmony of fellowship,
not unity of person. He is said to be ―one‖ [unum], and not ―one‖ [unus], because
there is no reference to number but to association of fellowship with another.
[Trin. 27.3]26

24

In chapters 6 and 7, I discuss Trin. 31.3: ―He [the Logos] is always in the Father, lest the Father
be not always the Father.‖
25
See above the quotation of Dogm. Plat. in which the Supreme God is unus, solus, pater, and
architectus. Christian examples are numerous. One can look, for instance, to 1 Clement 46‘s identification
of ―one God and one Christ and the one Spirit of grace.‖
26
Et quia dixit unum, intellegant haeretici quia non dixit ‗unus‘. Vnum enim neutraliter positum
societatis concordiam, non unitatem personae sonat. Vnum enim, non ‗unus‘ esse dicitur, quoniam nec ad
numerum refertur, sed ad societatem alterius expromitur.
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Novatian defines unus (m) as referring to an individual and unum (n) as referring to the
common will or the fellowship among individuals. His argument comes from
Tertullian‘s Prax.27 Novatian‘s passage begins a section in which he defends calling
Christ ―God,‖ while also justifying the identification of the Father as the unus God.
Although he calls the Son ―God,‖ Novatian never calls the Son the ―one God‖ nor does
he clarify the content of the phrase ―one God‖ with a Trinitarian explanation, which some
of his sources had done.28 Such a terminological distinction forms, in part, Novatian‘s
basis for asserting a distinction between the attributes of the Father and those of the Son.
Three major factors contribute to Novatian‘s identification of the Father as the
one (unus) God. First, Novatian appears to draw from the philosophical traditions which
identified a single, supreme creator. Other philosophic traditions, besides the Platonic

27

In Prax. 22, Tertullian writes concerning John 10:30: ―Here then they wish to make a stand,
these fools, yea blind, who see not, first, that ‗I and the Father‘ is an indication of two; secondly, at the end
<of the sentence>, that ‗are‘ is not from the person of one, because it is, spoken in the plural; and then, that
he says ‗are one <thing>‘, not ‗are one <person>‘. For if he had said ‗are one <person>‘ he would have
been able to assist their case: for ‗one <person>‘ is apparently an indication of the singular number. Yet
when he says that two, of the masculine gender, are one <thing>, in the neuter-which is not concerned with
singularity but with unity, with similitude, with conjunction, with the love of the Father who loveth the
Son, and with the obedience of the Son who obeys the Father's will-when he says, One <thing> are I and
the Father, he shows that those whom he equates and conjoins are two.‖ See also Noet. 7.1 which uses
John 10:30 to suggest that the divine unity must be set in the framework of two persons (prosopa) and one
power (dunamis).
28
Noet. affirms the distinction of divine persons, but uses the idea of oneness to describe the union
of all three or as the ultimate power which reverts (logically at least) back to the Father. Noet. 14.4-6
states: ―The Father gives orders, the Word performs the work, and is revealed as Son, through whom belief
is accorded to the Father. By a harmonious economy the result is a single God. This is because there is
one God. For the one who commands is the Father, the one who obeys is the Son, and the one who
promotes mutual understandings is the Holy Spirit. He who is Father is over all things, and the Son is
through all things, and the Holy Spirit is in all things. We can get no idea of the one God other than by
really believing in the Father and Son and Holy Spirit.‖ Papandrea briefly offers an interpretation of
Novatian‘s thought, which makes it sound like Novatian shares an understanding similar to that found in
Noet. He writes, ―But since the Son‘s divinity is derived from, and therefore shared with, the Father, there
is only one divine substance between the two, and therefore both the Father and the Son (indeed also the
Spirit, who proceeds as well) together constitute one Divinity,‖ Trinitarian Theology, 329-330. Dunn
makes a similar mistake when he claims, ―Novatian took for granted what he has inherited: a faith
statement that records that there is Father, Son and Spirit who is the one God,‖ ―Diversity and Unity,‖ 390.
See also Ibid. 400. I am convinced that Novatian does not think about God as unus in any such way.
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ones seen above, made similar claims about the divine oneness.29 For example, Ps.Aristotle‘s Mund. addresses the multiple names of the gods in addition to the Supreme
God who preserves and creates all things.30 He writes of the highest God, ―Though he is
one, he has many names, according to the many effects he himself produces.‖31 For this
author, any culture‘s reference to a Supreme God must ultimately refer to the one,
Supreme God, since there cannot be more than one Supreme Being.32
The second factor contributing to Novatian‘s attribution of unus to the Supreme
God came from the influence of Christian authors, such as Justin, Theophilus, Irenaeus,
Hippolytus, and Tertullian (in addition to the Bible, of course). The affirmation of God
as one is ubiquitous in these authors, and Scripture was often cited to justify the point.
However, in the first eight chapters of Trin., those which concern the Father specifically,
Novatian does not use any scriptural passage to declare that the Father is the unus Dei.33
He presents his views simply as logically irrefutable, based upon his theological and
philosophical formulations.

29

The claim about divine oneness and unity produced various and competing propositions
concerning the nature and/or possibility of one and many. See for example Ps.-Aristotle‘s presentation of
Eleatic philosophy in On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, including the following statement which Ps.Aristotle later attacks, ―But anything eternal must be infinite, because it has not a beginning from which its
existence arose, nor any end into which it could ever terminate (for it is universal). Again, anything eternal
must be a unity. For if it were two or more, these would terminate in each other,‖ On Melissus 974a.
30
Mund. 397b. Mund. represents a stoically influenced theology. Reydams-Schils notes,
―Aristotle‘s Unmoved Mover does not ‗care‘ for the universe,‖ Demiurge and Providence, 200.
31
Mund. 401a.
32
Osborn presents a variety of the Christian responses to this philosophical tradition, in
Emergence of Christian Theology, 109-118.
33
Novatian does cite John 17:3 in Trin. 16.4 when discussing the divinity of the Son. There he
seems to take for granted the distinction which he already established without the help of Scripture: ―If
Christ is only man, why did He lay down for us a rule to be believed when He said: ‗Now this is everlasting
life, that they may know Thee, the one and true God (unum et uerum), and Jesus Christ, whom Though hast
sent‘?‖
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Some scholars have attributed the influence of the old Roman creed on Novatian‘s
affirmation of God as unus.34 In light of the fact that Novatian organizes Trin. around an
explanation of the Roman baptismal creed, such a theory appears at first sight
promising.35 However, J. N. D. Kelly puts to rest the speculation about the Roman
creed‘s containment of unus during the first few centuries, since no evidence exists to
support this assertion.36 Novatian‘s use of the term demonstrates that he believed it
expressed a necessary concept of theology. Kelly concedes the basis of this point,
writing, ―The Roman creed implies and is based upon the belief in one God, but the belief
is not asserted in so many words.‖37 The identification of God as unus was certainly a
part of Novatian‘s understanding of the regula, even if it was not explicitly found in it.
The third factor leading to Novatian‘s emphasis on the term unus involves the
polemical nature of Trin. Novatian attacks several theological traditions which preached
God‘s oneness while denying any distinction between the Father and Son (and Holy
Spirit). One such tradition included Sabellianism, a primary polemical target of Trin.
Sabellians employed scriptural statements about God as unus to claim that the names
Father and the Son merely describe a distinction in the activity of a single being referred
to as God.38 Like Tertullian and Hippolytus, Novatian argues from the personal
distinction of the Father and Son:

34

Fausset proposed that the creed might have already begun with a statement of belief in one
(unus) God, although the inclusion of this term at this early period is debatable. See Fausset, Novatiani
Romanae, xxvi-xxvii and 28 n. 6. He also briefly outlines some of the various scholarly positions on this
subject which developed in the 19th century.
35
As noted in the Introduction, the original title might have been De regula veritatis or De regula
fidei. See DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 49 and Dunn, ―Diversity and Unity,‖ 390.
36
J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds (London: Longmans, 1960), 132.
37
Idem.
38
Epiphanius writes of the Sabellians, ―[Sabellius] and the Sabellians who derive from him teach
that he who is the Father is the same one who is the Son and the same one who is the Holy Spirit, so that
there are three names in one hypostasis,‖ Panarion 62.4.
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Therefore, that all heretical calumny against our Faith may cease, it is right that
we should discuss the fact the Christ is also God (in such a way that it will not
interfere with the truth of Scripture or with our faith) because the Scriptures assert
and because we maintain and believe that there is only one God. [Trin. 30.2]39
As is the case throughout Trin., Novatian argues that Christ is God, but he retains the
classification of the Father as the one God.40
Other instances of Novatian distinguishing the Father from the Son add further
clarification to what Novatian means when he calls the Father the unus Dei. In Trin. 31,
he states, ―There is, then, God the Father, the Founder and Creator of all things, who
alone is without origin, invisible, immense, immortal, eternal, the one God.‖41 Pater and
unus identify the subject, who is the Supreme God possessing all of the other attributes
named.42 Novatian argues throughout Trin. that the one God is the Father who must

39

Merito a nobis, ut omnis a fide nostra auferri possit haeretica calumnia, de eo quod et Deus sit
Christus sic est disputandum, ut non impediat scripturae ueritatem, sed nec nostram fidem, qua unus Deus
et per scripturas promittitur et a nobis tenetur et creditur.
40
See also Trin. 31. 5 in which Novatian calls the Son the second person (secundam personam)
after God the Father who is unus.
41
Trin. 31.1: Est ergo Deus Pater omnium institutor et creator, solus originem nesciens,
inuisibilis, immensus, immortalis, aeternus, unus Deus. While the word solus appears in this case to modify
―origin,‖ the next portion of Trin. 31.1 includes Novatian‘s typical statement that the Father‘s attributes
must be considered unique. He writes, ―Nothing whatever, I will not say can be preferred, but can even be
compared to His greatness, His majesty, and His power.‖ Trin. 31.1 also shares some similarities with 1
Tim. 1:17: Now to the king of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God, be honour and glory for ever and
ever. Amen. (Regi autem saeculorum inmortali invisibili soli Deo honor et gloria in saecula saeculorum
amen.) There are clearly more theological themes at work in Trin. 31.1 for it to be simply a decorated
version of 1 Tim. 1:17.
42
For instance, Papandrea states, ―Novatian can hold in tension the divinity of Christ and the
oneness of God by maintaining that only the Father is the one God, while the Son is God in a derivative
sense, since His authority, His divinity, and indeed His very existence are derived from the Father as His
source,‖ Trinitarian Theology, 263; see also 261-262 and 329-336. Although I think the above statement is
accurate, I disagree with his later conclusion that Novatian must also be speaking about full and equal
divinity of the Father and Son with the difference found only in the Father as ―source.‖ The Father is
certainly the source of the Son‘s divinity, but Novatian‘s logic behind emphasizing the Father as the one
God undercuts Papandrea‘s reading. Furthermore, Novatian‘s use of ―Father‖ and ―one‖ play the same role
as they do in Trin. 30.2, which I quote above. Papandrea‘s error, which is shared by Dunn (see ―Diversity
and Unity,‖ 404), has to do with using the phrase ―oneness of God.‖ These scholars use it in such a way as
to suggest Trinitarian implications. The better phrase to describe the issues which Papandrea, Dunn, and
others address is ―unity of divinity.‖ Novatian asserts that the Son shares the Father‘s divinity, but he,
unlike some of his scholarly interpreters, never confuses this topic with the Trinitarian ―oneness of God‖
seen in Tertullian and Noet. See the sections in chapter 5 on Hippolytus and Tertullian for a discussion of
the Trinitarian phraseology related to God‘s oneness.
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uniquely be seen as alone without origin, invisible, immense, immortal, and eternal. By
calling God unus in Trin. 31, Novatain relies on his earlier insistence that the term
indicates numerical singularity, which for him means the Father. Additionally we see
that a constellation of unique attributes are assumed when he makes reference to the one
God.
Trin. 9 also starts with a statement proclaiming Novatian‘s regula.43 This chapter
begins his treatment of the Son after eight chapters devoted to the Father. He writes,
The same Rule of Truth teaches us, after we believe in the Father, to believe also
in the Son of God, Christ Jesus, the Lord Our God, nevertheless the Son of God.
We are to believe in the Son of this God who is the one and only (unus et solus)
God; namely, the Creator of all things, as has already been set forth above. [Trin.
9.1]44
Novatian refers to the Father with the terms unus and solus as well as by the designation
of the Father as Creator (conditor).45 Elsewhere in Trin., Novatian quotes Isaiah 37:20
which uses the term solus within a set of texts meant to proclaim the one God.46 It is
arguable that unus and solus reflect synonymous usage in 9.1. They identify the single
subject, the Father, and they imply or contain the attributes which Novatian applies to the
Supreme God‘s nature. These attributes include invisibility, immensity, immortality, and
eternity. By designating the Father alone as unus et solus, Novatian confirms that the

43

See also Trin. 31.20: ―Hence one God (unus Deus) is demonstrated, the true and eternal Father
(verus et aeternus Pater), from whom alone this power of the Godhead is sent forth, transmitted and
directed to the Son, and is returned again, by a communion of substance, to the Father.‖
44
Eadem regula ueritatis docet nos credere post Patrem etiam in Filium Dei Christum Iesum
Dominum Deum nostrum, sed Dei Filium, huius Dei qui et unus et solus est, conditor scilicet rerum
omnium, ut iam et superius expressum est. In this passage we also see the particular manner by which
Novatian connects Deus with Pater, unus, and solus.
45
In Trin. 31.1 Novatian identifies the Father as ―institutor et creator.‖
46
Trin. 30.12: ―And Hezekiah says: ‗That all men may know that you alone are God.‘‖ (Et
Ezechias: ut sciant omnes quia tu es Deus solus.‖ A version of this also can be found in 2 Kings 19:19. I
am unaware of these passages being used in early Christian literature to make the point about the one God
as Novatian does in Trin. 30.12
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Father possesses all of the attributes he assigns to Him in a uniquely superlative way.
They establish the Father‘s singularity.47
I conclude this section by identifying Tertullian‘s Herm. as a fundamental literary
source influencing Novatian‘s presentation of the Father as one and unique. Although
some scholars point to Herm. as important for Novatian‘s work, none have looked very
closely at many of the important textual parallels.48 Tertullian‘s work arose as a response
to Hermogenes‘ acceptance of the typical Academic position on the eternity of matter.49
Hermogenes differed from the growing Christian consensus on the doctrine of God as the
creator ex nihilo.50 While some Middle Platonists, including Apuleius,51 believed that the
world had a beginning, this position was not based on God as the creator from nothing,
but rather on God as the creator who used eternally existing, undefined matter. This is
the position with which Hermogenes agreed.
In response to Hermogenes‘ teachings,52 Tertullian argues that the one God‘s
attributes must be unique. Hermogenes contends that God and matter must both be

47

See Trin. 31.6-19 and my treatment of these passages in chapter 7 in the section ―Inequality of
the Father and the Son.‖
48
The following analysis serves as an example of my larger argument that Novatian‘s theology of
the Father derives more so from themes found in Herm. rather than in Prax. In this case, Tertullian‘s
emphasis on the Father as one in Herm. can be contrasted with his use of unus in reference to the unity of
the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in Prax. 2. We see a similar idea of divine unity in Noet. 14.5-6 as that
found in Prax. Novatian avoids the suggestion found in Prax. and Noet. and relies on the association of
unus exclusively with the Father.
49
See J. H. Waszink, The Treatise Against Hermogenes, 3-13 for a brief presentation of
Hermogenes‘ biography along with his major theological concerns.
50
N. Joseph Torchia, ―Theories of Creation in the Second Century Apologists and their Middle
Platonic Background,‖ StPatr 26 (1993): 192-99.
51
Dogm. Plat. 1.8.
52
Waszink‘s Introduction to his translation of Herm. provides a discussion about the probable
influence which Theophilus‘ Against the Heresy of Hermogenes had on Tertullian‘s theology and scriptural
citations. See Waszink, Treatise Against Hermogenes, 9-13. The following description comes from Herm.
2: according to Tertullian, Hermogenes claims that God made all things either 1) out of Himself, 2) out of
nothing, or 3) out of something. Hermogenes rejects the first because it would entail the necessity of God
being dissoluble into parts. This cannot be God since He is indivisible, unchangeable, and always the
same. Timaeus 28a, for example, discusses the Forms as always having being, without regard to becoming,
and also as never changing. Hermogenes rebuffs the second proposition with the argument based on the
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eternal, but that matter is still somehow inferior to God. Tertullian dismisses
Hermogenes‘ thinking, saying that the possession of the divine attributes makes the
suggestion of matter‘s inferiority impossible.53 Tertullian writes,
But God must be One (unum), because that is God which is supreme (summum);
but nothing can be supreme save that which is unique (unicum); but nothing can
be unique if something can be put on a level with it (aliquid adaequabitur); but
matter will be put on a level with God, when it is authoritatively declared to be
eternal (aeterna). [Herm. 4.6]54
Just before this passage, Tertullian offers a shortened form of 1 Cor. 8:5-6 which
acknowledges that some beings are called gods, but these are not to be confused with the
one Father.55 Tertullian emphasizes the sharing of divine attributes with the recognition
that divine names or attributes come by grace and not by nature.56 This logic controls
Tertullian‘s understanding of how divine names and attributes can be used of various
subjects, such as the Father, Son, angels, and human beings.57 The plurality of beings
sharing in divine attributes is not what Tertullian condemns; he condemns the possibility
that two beings could simultaneously, independently, and equally possess the attributes of
the Supreme God. As will be seen in the Word Christologies in the next chapter, the

idea that a very good God could not have created ex nihilo. Had such a good God created ex nihilo then all
things created out of nothing and in accordance with God‘s very good will would likewise have to be very
good in all ways. Any encounter with the world defies such a thought, according to Hermogenes.
Therefore, concludes Hermogenes, God must have created out of something.
53
Herm. 7.1.
54
Deum autem unum esse oportet, quia quod summum sit deus est; summum autem non erit nisi
quod unicum fuerit; unicum autem esse non poterit cui aliquid adaequabitur; adaequabitur autem deo
materia cum aeterna censetur.
55
Herm. 4.3: ―For though there be that are called gods in name, whether in heaven or in earth,
yet for us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things‖ (Nam etsi sunt qui dicuntur dii siue in
caelo siue in terra nomine, ceterum nobis unus deus pater ex quo omnia). Tertullian leaves out the
reference to Jesus Christ in 1 Cor. 8:6 because his purpose is to secure the uniqueness of the Father.
56
Herm. 5.3-4.
57
See Prax. 13 in which Tertullian argues that the Son and Spirit can rightly be called God and
Lord. His qualification is that if the Son and the Father are mentioned together, God must refer to the
Father and Lord to the Son so as to give no impression that he is speaking about two gods. The Father
deserves the name God uniquely.
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possibility of God bringing forth or making other gods is common, and Tertullian
provides an applicable structure for making such claims.
Novatian follows the content of Tertullian‘s argument:
And so God is said to be one (unus) since he has not equal (parem non habet).
For God (whatever that Being may be that is God) must necessarily be supreme
(summum). Now whatever is supreme must be supreme in such wise that an equal
(comparem) is excluded. Therefore He must be the one and only (solum et unum)
Being with whom nothing can be compared, because He has no equal (dum parem
non habet). [Trin. 4.8, modified slightly]58
The parallels with Tertullian‘s passage in Herm. are clear, although the terminology is
not uniform.59 Both authors begin by declaring God to be unus. Novatian uses the
phrase parem non habet as well as the term comparem to account for Tertullian‘s
connection between God as unique (unicum) and as having no equal (adaequabitur).
Novatian never uses the term unicum, but his classification of God as solus acts as a
synonym. For both men, the one God must also be described as Supreme (summum).
Tertullian attaches eternality to his portrait of God‘s unique attributes in this passage
while Novatian waits until he has first declared God to be alone in infinity.60
The importance of Novatian‘s dependence on Herm. is critical to my reading of
Novatian‘s subordinationist theology of the Son. In Herm., Tertullian is unconcerned
with articulating a theology which includes a robust theology of the Son.61 What we find
58

Ideo et unus pronuntiatus est, dum parem non habet. Deus enim, quicquid esse potest quod Deus
est, summum sit necesse est. Summum autem quicquid est, ita demum summum esse oportet, dum extra
comparem est. Et ideo solum et unum sit necesse est, cui conferri nihil potest, dum parem non habet. See
also Trin. 31.18 and Mattei‘s comments in ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 220-222 on the Son‘s equality with the Father
in regard to Trin. 31.18-22.
59
The only significant difference between the two passages is Novatian‘s insistence on adding a
reference to his negative theology: quicquid esse potest quod Deus est. As noted in chapter 2, Tertullian‘s
naming of God‘s nature as spirit was neither lost on, nor condoned by Novatian. In this case, Novatian
breaks his flow of repeating Tertullian‘s argument by inserting a rebuke to the part of it with which he
disagreed.
60
Trin. 4.9-12.
61
Only in Herm. 8 does Tertullian mention the Son. There, however, Tertullian does so to point
out that the Son must be greater than the matter which Hermogenes claims is eternal.
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in Herm. is an emphasis on the uniqueness, simplicity, and transcendence of the Father.
Novatian appears to have used Herm. to shape his own theology of the Father. As will be
seen in chapters 6 and 7, the upshot of this influence is Novatian‘s understanding of the
Son in light of the Father‘s supremacy. I will show that Novatian fully embraces the
singularity and uniqueness of the Father in order to articulate a Word Christology based
on a distinction in attributes between the Son and the Father.

Aeternus: Time as Dependent on Beginning and End

Novatian applies the term aeternus (and in some cases the cognate aeternitatis) to
the Father, Son, Holy Spirit, life for man in the Garden of Eden, man‘s future state of life,
and the bread which is Christ. His use resembles the theological philosophy with which
he was familiar. Stoics, Epicureans, Aristotelians, Academics, ―Gnostics,‖ Jews, and
Christians accepted aeternus as a divine attribute or as descriptive of the result of contact
with the divine. In this section, my comments will be directed towards the relationship
between time, beginning, and end. In the next section, I will broaden my analysis of
Novatian‘s understanding of aeternus in light of the literary influences presented below.
The idea that God exists entirely and strictly outside of linear progression was not
the predominant understanding of aeternus‘ meaning before or during Novatian‘s time.62

62

Modern scholarship offers mixed conclusions about the ancient understandings of the Platonic
doctrines of time and eternity. One approach to interpreting Plato‘s understanding of eternity, time, and
everlasting time includes the conclusion that he contrasted time from eternity to the point that eternity
stands entirely apart from and outside of time. Conversely, Aristotle held to the belief that eternity refers to
eternal, progressive duration. For this view, see William Kneale‘s, "Time and Eternity in Theology,"
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61 (1960-61): 101-107. The analysis with which I agree views the
Platonic distinction between time and eternity as far less pronounced. For this argument, see W. von
Leyden‘s, "Time, Number, and Eternity in Plato and Aristotle," Philosophical Quarterly 14:54 (Jan., 1964):
35-52 and also Oscar Cullmann, Christ and Time: The Primitive Christian Conception of Time and History.
Translated by Floyd V. Filson (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1964), 61-68. Cullman‘s work includes the
conclusion that the early Christians understood eternity as that time ―is possible only as an attribute of
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In many instances, aeternus refers to infinite temporal progression in the past and
future.63 The philosophical schools treated the subject of time differently, and I will
address this issue again in regard to the generation of the Son. I take note of Cicero‘s
Epicurean speaker who offers an example of one ancient approach to the concepts.64
Velleius states, ―One cannot measure [eternity from the boundless past] by any definite
period of time, but one can understand what it must have been in extent, for one cannot
even envisage that there may have been a time when no time existed.‖65 In fact, a version
of proposing a time when there was no time may have been the position of some Stoics,
and this theory also seems to have involved temporal progression of some sort apart from
the specific or technical understanding of time.66 Therefore, for some Stoics, ―time‖

God…or, to put it better, what we call ‗time‘ is nothing but a part, defined and delimited by God, of this
same unending duration of God‘s time,‖ 62.
63
See Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early
Middle Ages (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 98-130 for a discussion of numerous, ancient
texts.
64
I identify Cicero‘s work for its value both as a literary source for Novatian and also as a witness
to a relatively universalistic understanding of divinity‘s description. The range of themes seen in the shared
positions of the Epicurean, Academic, and Stoic include a rejection of a beginning, birth, or end, as well as
the rejection that the divine can change, break down, or succumb to mortality. Tertullian‘s Herm. also
includes a similar set of arguments and terminology.
65
Nat. d. 1.21: [Sed fuit quaedam ab infinito tempore aeternitas,] quam nulla circumscriptio
temporum metiebatur, spatio tamen qualis ea fuerit intellegi potest, quod ne in cogitationem quidem cadit,
ut fuerit tempus aliquod, nullum cum tempus esset). Walsh comments, ―Velleius argues that we can
comprehend the notion of eternity before creation by thinking of it as a spatial extension back from the
moment of creation,‖ Nature of the Gods, 151 n. 21.
66
John Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 274-280. Rist
suggests that some Stoics (Chrysippus in particular) may have spoken about time as specifically related to
the beginning and end of the world. In that case, and similar to the thinking of Cicero‘s Velleius, temporal
progression would have occurred prior to the beginning time. Cicero‘s Stoic, Balbus, speaks about the
eternal progression of time through the allegorical interpretation of the traditional gods in Nat. d. 2.64. D.
M. Schenkeveld presents the Stoic understanding of time in light of the Stoic understanding of the temporal
continuum. He writes, ―To the Stoics time is an incorporeal continuum which can be infinitely divided.
For this reason no time is wholly present inasmuch as the present consists of a part of the past and a part of
the future. Past and future are parts of time and stretch out infinitely on one side but are limited by the
present, which acts as a kind of joining,‖ ―Language,‖ in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy,
Eds. Algra, Keimpe, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, Malcom Schofield (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 191. Rist and Schenkeveld‘s presentations do not harmonize easily. Either
Schenkeveld is identifying Stoics (other than Chrysippus and those who followed him) or ―infinitely‖ must
be taken as really referring to ending at either the past or future occurrence of a conflagration.
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itself is a technical term related to the movements of the world;67 speaking of time as
related to the movements of the world did not negate divine temporal progression apart
from those movements. Temporal progression, therefore, may have included a pretempus progression and a progression of tempus, strictly speaking.68 In both instances,
what we think of as temporal progression is assumed and maintained.
Apuleius also presents Plato‘s doctrines in a way similar to Velleius‘ position,
namely in light of eternal, temporal progression. Apuleius writes, ―Plato thought these
Gods to be incorporeal and animated natures, without any end or beginning, but eternal
both with reference to the time past and the time to come.‖69 At the very least, we have
ancient examples which prove that Epicureans, Middle Platonists, and Stoics (as well as
Aristotelians) agreed that temporal progression is associated with eternity, as long as a
beginning or end point in time is somehow explicitly rejected.70
Furthermore, the logical presumption that any thing with a beginning necessitated
that it also must have an end was almost universally held by philosophers.71 Conversely,

67

Stobaeus claimed, for example, that ―Chrysippus said time is the dimension of motion according
to which the measure of speed and slowness is spoken of ; or the dimension accompanying the world‘s
motion,‖ quoted in Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers 1, 304.
68
Chrysippus‘ position does not negate this possibility, and neither does Zeno‘s. Simplicius
wrote, ―Of the Stoics, Zeno said time is the dimension of all motion without qualification, but Chrysippus
said it is the dimension of the world‘s motion,‖ quoted in Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers 1,
304.
69
De deo Socr. 3: Quos deos Plato existimat naturas incorporalis, animalis, neque fine ullo neque
exordio, sed prorsus ac retro aeviternas. Aeviternus is an old form of aeternus and this passage is the only
one in which Apuleius uses this spelling. In all others, he chooses aeternus.
70
Daniélou treats the emphasis on ―beginning‖ as having its primary origin within Middle
Platonism, Gospel Message, 328-330.
71
The well known modification of this principle was the Academic notion that the divine had the
power to bring some things (like the world and souls) into existence and also the power to keep them in
everlasting existence. See Walsh‘s comment in his edition of Nat. d., 151 n. 20, in which he identifies the
assertion that everything with a beginning has an end: ―Velleius‘s logic is strong; it can be met only by
Plato‘s claim (Timeaus 32c) that the creation is made eternal by the will of the Creator.‖ Hippolytus notes
this teaching as a major tenet of Plato‘s doctrine in Ref. 1.16. Novatian makes the same argument in Trin.
2.1 when he states, ―[God] binds together the discordant materials of all the elements into such harmony
that out of these dissimilar elements, there exists a unique world so compacted by this consolidated
harmony that no force can dissolve it, save when He alone who created it orders it to be dissolved in order
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it was held that a thing which had no beginning could have no end. For example,
Velleius states, ―Can you suppose that a man can have even dipped into natural
philosophy if he imagines that anything that has come into being can be eternal?
(aeternum)...What thing is there that has a beginning (principium) but not an end
(extremum)?‖72 The Epicurean presents the consensus view of the philosophic schools.
All of Cicero‘s speakers rely on the aphorism: that which begins must end. The idea was
ubiquitous in Roman writing, and versions of it can be found in such authors as
Quintillian73 and Seneca.74
Tertullian provides another example regarding the same aphorism. He writes,
For what other essential property of God is there than eternity (aeternitas)? What
other essence has eternity (aeternitatis) than ever to have existed and to go on
existing forever because of its privilege of being without a beginning (initii) and
without an end (finis)?75 If this is the special property of God, it must belong to
God alone, since it is His special property—for clearly if it should be assigned to

to grant us greater blessings.‖ (in concordiam elementorum omnium discordantes materias sic connectens,
ut ex disparibus elementis ita sit unus mundus ista coagmentata conspiratione solidatus, ut nulla ui dissolui
possit, nisi cum ilium solus ipse qui fecit ad maiora alia praestanda nobis solui iusserit.)
72
Nat. d. 1.20: Hunc censes primis ut dicitur labris gustasse physiologiam, ed est naturae
rationem, qui quicquam quod ortum sit putet aeternum esse posse?...aut quid est cui principium aliquod sit,
nihil sit extremum.
73
Quintilian, Institutione oratoria (5.10.79): ―Arguments which prove the same thing from
opposites are also mutually consequential; for instance, we may argue that he who says that the world was
created thereby implies that it is suffering decay, since this is the property of all created things.‖ (Est
invicem consequens et quod ex diversis idem ostendit; ut, qui mundum nasi decit, per hoc ipsum et deficere
significet, quia deficit omne quod nascitur.‖
74
Seneca, Ad Polybium de consolatione (1): ―Whatever begins also ends.‖ (Quicquid coepit et
desinit.) In Ref. 1.1., Hippolytus identifies Thales as the originator of the connection made between divinity
and the lack of a beginning and end.
75
Tertullian uses an array of terms throughout Herm. for the concepts of ―beginning‖ and ―end.‖
Tertullian‘s initio and fine reflect synonymous usage as Velleius‘ principium and extremum. In Herm 3.7,
Tertullian uses originem to express the same idea of initio (beginning). But Tertullian‘s application of
principium is reserved for a specific discussion of its exegetical significance regarding Genesis 1.1. He
extensively treats this verse in order to eliminate any suggestion that in principio, from his Latin translation
of Genesis 1.1, could possibly stand Hermogenes‘ interpretation of God‘s use of eternal matter in the
world‘s creation. In that case, argues Tertullian, the text of Genesis would begin ex principio (see Herm.
19-21). For Tertullian, the synonyms initio and originem seem to function based on the authority and usage
of Genesis‘ principio. Tertullian remains clearly within the boundaries seen established in Roman
philosophy, yet he organizes the language to best suit Christian thought and Scripture.
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some other being as well, it will no longer be the special property of God, but a
property shared with that being to which it is also assigned. [Herm. 4.1-2]76
Tertullian‘s point is clear, God‘s eternality, which excludes a beginning or an end, must
be a unique attribute by definition of divinity. Tertullian‘s logic regarding the singularity
of divine attributes as noted in the prior section applies in this case as well; for Tertullian,
the attribute of eternality must be held by the Supreme God alone.
Tertullian, however, offers a teaching more complex than the simple link between
eternity and a lack of a beginning and end. He also suggestions that God not only does
not have time but that divinity is all time. Tertullian writes,
Eternity (aeternitatis) has no time (tempus), for itself is the whole of time (Omne
enim tempus ipsa est): it cannot be affected by that which it causes to be: that
which cannot have birth is exempt from age. If a god is old, he will have to come
to an end: if he is new, he once was not. Newness gives evidence of a beginning:
oldness holds the threat of an ending. But God is as much a stranger to beginning
and ending as he is to time, which is the judge and divider of the beginning and of
the ending. [Marc. 1.8]77
The passage is difficult to interpret since tempus could be used technically to refer to
cosmic movements without negating the idea of divine temporal progression.78 On the
one hand, this was a Stoic position with which Tertullian would have been familiar. On
the other hand, the statement that ―eternity has not time‖ may indicate sympathies for a
Platonically influenced position of divine atemporality, mentioned above. With the
statement that eternity ―is itself all time,‖ I think it unlikely that Tertullian is expressing

76

Quis enim alius dei census quam aeternitas? Quis alius aeternitatis status quam semper fuisse et
futurum esse ex praerogatiua nullius initii et nullius finis? Hoc si dei est proprium, solius dei erit, cuius est
proprium, scilicet quia et si alii adscribatur, iam non erit dei proprium sed commune cum eo cui et
adscribitur.
77
Non habet tempus aeternitas. Omne enim tempus ipsa est. Quod facit, pati non potest. Caret
aetate quod non licet nasci. Deus si est vetus, non erit; si est novus, non fuit. Novitas initium testifictur,
vetustas finem comminatur. Deus autem tam alienus ab initio et fine est quam a tempore, arbitro et
metatore initii et finis.
78
Fredouille, for example, treats Tertullian‘s approach as a mixture of the biblical view of
duration without beginning or end and the Platonic notion of divine atemporality, in Tertullien, 282-3.
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an adherence to Platonic atemporality. If he believes that eternity is all time, then
Tertullian appears to be emphasizing divine containment of time, rather than an absolute
divine separation from time (if that is how Plato is to be understood).
Novatian also takes up the argument that God‘s unique eternal status is equal to a
lack of beginning and end. However, some references to time (tempus) set him apart
from Cicero‘s speakers and more clearly in dependence of Tertullian. He identifies the
Father as eternal, not only by claiming that God has neither beginning nor end, but by
concluding from this that God lacks time.79 According to Novatian, God is, ―ever eternal
(semper aeternus), because nothing is more ancient than He. In fact, that which is
without a beginning (origine) can be preceded (praecedi) by nothing, because it lacks
time (dum non habet tempus).‖80 Novatian identifies the applicability of time (tempus)
only to those things which have a beginning (origine).81 His justification for denying the
Father‘s contact with time derives from his position that the Father cannot have an
beginning (origo).82
Novatian continues Trin. 2.3 by stating,

79

Novatian also identifies the Son as being given the divine name without reference to time (Trin.
20.8) and also that the Son is before all time (Trin. 31.3). These references to time include the Son‘s birth
or beginning and therefore must be treated somewhat differently than the strict association Novatian makes
between the lack of a beginning and therefore the lack of a relationship to time as it concerns the Father.
80
Trin. 2.3: semper aeternus, quia nihil illo antiquius. Id enim quod sine origine est, praecedi a
nullo potest, dum non habet tempus. Because Novatian also uses aeternus to mean ―everlasting‖ (Trin.
1.2, 8.2, 9.7, 15.7, 15.9, 16.1, 16.4, 26.17, 29.7, 29.16), I take his modifier semper, in this case, to indicate
that he intends aeternus not only as eternal, but in a superlative sense.
81
The passage from Cicero‘s Nat. d. 1.21 noted above suggests something different. Tertullian
shows little interest in tempus throughout either Prax. or Herm. Also, as seen in the passages quoted from
Tertullian and Cicero, Novatian accepted a handful of synonyms to express a beginning, including
principium, originem and initium.
82
In Trin. 2.2, Novatian states, ―For indeed He who has no beginning (originem) whatsoever, must
necessarily experience no end (exitum); unless—far be the thought from us—He began to exist at a certain
time (aliquando) and is therefore not above all things.‖ In this example, aliquando stands in for tempus.
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Therefore He is immortal (immortalis), for He does not pass away to a
consummate end (exitu).83 And since whatever is without a beginning (origine) is
without a law (lege), He excludes the restrictions of time (modum temporis)
because He feels Himself a debtor (debitorem) to no one. [Trin. 2.3]84
Although Novatian begins Trin. 2.3 claiming that God‘s lack of a beginning means that
He lacks time (tempus), the second half of the passage recasts God‘s lack of a beginning
and end in terms of God‘s exclusion from the restrictions of time (modus temporis).85
Tertullian does not use the term debitor in Herm., but he attacks Hermogenes with the
claim that Hermogenes makes God a servant to, or less than, matter. Both Tertullian and
Novatian separate God from time without fully clarifying their philosophical influences.
Since Novatian associates time (tempus) with things that begin, I am arguing that we
should read Novatian as holding to the idea of the Father‘s eternal progression apart from
tempus, without suggesting a strict atemporality. Novatian in this way treats tempus as
having a technical meaning without discounting the Father‘s eternal temporal
progression.
For Tertullian and Novatian, supremacy and power ultimately stand behind the
relationship of the divine to creation and time.86 Novatian states, ―But if He began to
exist after something else, He would be inferior to that previously existing thing; hence
He would be found to be of lesser power (minor potestate), since designated as
83

Novatian uses originem and principium in reference to time. He also uses initio and terminus as
synonyms for these terms, respectively.
84
Ideo immortalis, non deficiens in consummationis exitu. Et quoniam sine lege est quicquid sine
origine est, modum temporis excludit, dum se debitorem nemini sentit.
85
Novatian‘s inclusion of the idea that the Father‘s lack of a beginning excludes him from the law
(leges) of a beginning is given another articulation in Trin. 6.9: ―Those things which are not composite
cannot experience this; for what is immortal, whatever it is, must be one, simple, and eternal. Since it is
one, it cannot be dissolved because it lies outside the law (ius) of dissolution, and it is not subject to the law
(legibus) of death.‖ The terms Novatian associates with laws all include the sense of dependency and
causality within the natural order, and they are all based on the idea that anything with a beginning or birth
must be subject to laws of change.
86
See for example Herm. 9 in which Tertullian argues that Hermogenes makes God weak because
God lacks the power (potestas) to create from Himself. See also Herm. 14.2 and 19.5.
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subsequent even in time itself.‖87 Novatian‘s comments consist of two aspects. First,
since the Father lacks a beginning, Novatian excludes Him from his understanding of
time. Second, Novatian‘s understanding of time depends on the idea of a progression of
causes so that a first cause can (and must) be established. According to Novatian‘s
statements, ancientness of beginning corresponds to power (potestas). Novatian also
removes the Supreme God from association with a beginning and an end, or what he
refers to as time‘s law (leges) and the restrictions of time (modum temporis). His
exclusion of God the Father from time is the manner by which he safeguards the Father‘s
uniqueness and power, yet Novatian also appears to acknowledge some sense of temporal
progression related to the Father‘s eternality.

Aeternus and Aeternitatis: Immortality and Incorruptibility

The previous section demonstrated that Novatian defined time (tempus) as
dependent on a beginning (originem). Since the Father lacks a beginning, He is eternal
(aeternus). In this section, I will present other significant terms and concepts associated
with eternity, beginning with Novatian‘s sources.
In Nat. d. 1.45, Velleius, Cicero‘s Epicurean, says that the gods are eternal and
blessed (beatum aeternumque). He immediately ties eternity (aeternus) to immortality
(inmortalitas). His explanation of inmortalitas is based on the idea that the gods neither
become angered nor cause trouble for others. Velleius uses inmortalitas to identify the
gods as not changing and thus not interactive.

87

Trin. 2.2: sed dum post aliquid esse coeperit, infra id sit quod ante ipsum fuerit, minor inuentus
potestate, dum posterior denotatur etiam ipso tempore.
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The Epicurean next equates having a beginning (ortus) to mortality (mortalitas).88
In response, Cotta the Academic accepts the connection made between a beginning and
mortality. Up to this point in Cicero‘s dialogue, references to a beginning are undefined
and therefore include both animate and inanimate things.89 Cotta follows Velleius‘ lead
and develops Velleius‘ language by specifying a beginning as ―birth‖ (natus).90 By doing
so, he glosses the idea of a beginning to specifically animate things. All of the dialogue‘s
speakers accept the proposition that a beginning and end, of both inanimate and animate
things, is inconsistent with divinity. All speakers likewise accept the conversation‘s
development which rejects any association between divinity‘s eternality and the concepts
of birth and death.
The Academic‘s primary criticism of the Epicurean position rests on the latter‘s
supposition that the gods had bodies composed of atoms. If the gods have bodies made
of parts, argues the Academic, then the gods are not simple and they can and must break
down. Gods who possess a bodily frame therefore cannot be immortal (inmortalitate).91
As with Christian authors, however, the Academic shares the same eagerness as the
Epicurean in assuming and maintaining the necessity of the gods‘ immortality or their
unchanging quality. In Cicero, inmortalitas refers to something which lacks an end and
also something which does not change.
Like Cicero, Tertullian accepts 1) the position that any reference to a beginning
negates the possibility of eternality and 2) the notion that an eternal being cannot change.

88

―(Just as if) anything that has had a beginning must not necessarily be mortal.‖ [aut non omne
quod ortum sit mortalitas consequatur (Loeb 1.26).]
89
Cicero‘s interlocutors use ortus and principium synonymously throughout Nat. d.
90
Nat. d. 1.90.
91
At root in this criticism is the Epicurean belief in the gods as composed of atoms—a belief
ridiculed by all the other schools as violating the premise of divine simplicity.
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In regard to the first position, Tertullian attacks Hermogenes‘ suggestion that the
―depths,‖ referred to in Prov. 8:24, could be considered a form of eternal matter. He
writes,
You have Wisdom saying, And before the depths was I begotten, that you may
believe that the depth, too, was begotten, that is, made (for we also ‗make‘ sons,
though we ‗beget them‘). It makes no difference whether the depth was made or
born, provided it is accorded a beginning, which could not be the case if the depth
were incorporated in matter. [Herm. 32.2]92
In this passage, Tertullian argues against Hermogenes‘ belief in the eternality of matter
and the fact that Hermogenes interprets ―depth‖ as ―matter.‖ Tertullian‘s point is that
Hermogenes must deny the eternality of ―depth,‖ because the quotation from Prov. 8:24
implies that ―depth‖ had a beginning. Any beginning, whether it is associated with
making (factum) or birth (natus), negates the definition of eternality to which
Hermogenes and Tertullian both adhere.
Tertullian also accepts the proposition that an eternal being or thing cannot
change. He writes, ―But as for matter, keep in mind that it has been determined [by
Hermogenes] once for all to be eternal (aeternam), because it is unmade (infectam) and
unborn (innatam), and that therefore it must also be deemed to possess an immutable
(indemutabilis) and incorruptible (incorruptibilis) nature.‖93 Since Hermogenes claims
that matter is eternal, Tertullian demands in the above passage that he must also accept 1)
matter‘s lack of a beginning and 2) matter‘s stability from all manner of change or
corruption. Tertullian‘s demand is a rhetorical effort meant to show that Hermogenes
contradicts himself. Tertullian simultaneously argues that only a single and unique being
92

Habes Sophiam prior autem abysso genita sum dicentem, ut credas abyssum quoque genitam, id
est factam, quia et filios facimus, licet generemus. Nihil interest facta an nata sit abyssus, dum initium detur
illi, quod non daretur, si materiae subiecta esset.
93
Herm. 12.3: Materiam uero tene semel aeternam determinatam ut infectam, ut innatam et ideo
indemutabilis et incorruptibilis naturae credendam.
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can logically possess the divine attributes, which include a lack of a beginning and
therefore eternality.
Novatian approaches the subject of the Father‘s eternality with a set of attributes
similar to those found in Cicero and Tertullian.94 God‘s simplicity and oneness eliminate
the possibility of change. Novatian writes,
God is, therefore, immortal (immortalis) and incorruptible (incorruptibilis),
experiencing neither diminution (detrimenta) nor end (finem) of any sort.
Because He is incorruptible, He is also immortal, and because He is immortal, He
is therefore also incorruptible. Both attributes are reciprocally linked together
between and in themselves by a mutual relationship. Thus are they brought by the
ensuing union to the condition of eternity (aeternitatis). [Trin. 4.12]95
Novatian argues from the interdependence of the concepts of immortality and
incorruptibility, with eternality expressing the union of the two.96 Immortalis and
incorruptibilis are set off as opposing attributes to detrimentum and finem.97
Additionally, he rejects the possibility of change for God, either in the form of corruption
94

Stead states, ―Christian writers almost without exception adopted the doctrine of God‘s
changeless being, often confirming their belief with the argument derived from Plato‘s Republic (2.380-1):
God, being all-powerful, cannot suffer change at the hands of any other; he could only change if he were to
change himself. But this is impossible; being perfect, he cannot change for the better; and being good, he
will not make himself worse; and this seems to exhaust all the possibilities,‖ Philosophy, 128.
95
Est ergo et immortalis et incorruptibilis, nec detrimenta sentiens omnino, nec finem. Nam et
quia incorruptibilis, ideo et immortalis; et quia immortalis, utique et incorruptibilis; utroque inuicem sibi et
in se connexione mutua perplexo, et ad statum aeternitatis uicaria concatenatione producto, et immortalitate
de incorruptione descendente, et incorruptione de immortalitate ueniente.
96
Papandrea treats these three terms simply as synonymous and with an opposite meaning to be
found in the term fragilitas, in Trinitarian Theology, 67. Papandrea underestimates the individual value of
these terms by reading them as equivalent, since Novatian‘s work presents a more sophisticated
relationship between them. At one point, Papandrea acknowledges the levels of meaning between eternal
and everlasting in addition to the fact that ―Novatian implies that the Son cannot be ‗infinite,‘ since
infinitum implies, not only an existence without beginning (originem nesciens), but also an existence which
encompasses all other being,‖ Trinitarian Theology, 71. However, Papandrea reads this distinction as
relevant only to the Father as logically causal in relation to the Son rather than as significant for qualifying
the nature of the Son‘s divinity. I will address these topics in chapter 7.
97
I think that it makes sense to read the second set of terms as oppositional to the first set, but in
reverse order (immortalis/finem and incorruptibilis/detrimentum). The link between these terms is not
novel. For example, Tertullian states in An. 50, ―He pretends to have received such a commission from the
secret power of One above, that all who partake of his baptism become immortal, incorruptible and
instantaneously invested with resurrection-life.‖ In Trin. 2.3, Novatian also declares God‘s lack of time
and concludes, ―Therefore He is immortal, for He does not pass away (deficiens) to a consummate end
(exitu).‖ Here deficiens and detrimentum may function as parallels since finem and exitum certainly do in
Trin.
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or diminution (incorruptibilis and detrimenta). Novatian is most likely influenced by
Tertullian‘s use of the term incorruptibilis.98
Novatian also argues that God‘s inability to change derives from God‘s simple
nature. This position was widely shared not only by Christians, but also by most
philosophers.99 Novatian speaks of God being ―simple, without any corporeal
mixture.‖100 The affirmation of God‘s simplicity stands behind his logic in other
passages related to God‘s inability to change through increase or decrease. Novatian
views the ideas of growth or diminishment as being at odds with a simple nature. He
states,
Therefore there is never any addition of parts or of glory in Him, lest anything
should seem to have ever been wanting to the perfect one. Nor can there be any
question of diminution (detrimentum) in Him for that would imply that some
degree of mortality is in Him. On the contrary, what He is, He always is; who He
is He always is; such as He is, He always is. For increase indicates a beginning;
whereas any wasting away (detrimenta) evidences death and destruction (mortem
atque interitum). [Trin. 4.4-5, slightly modified]101

98

See above for the quotation of Herm. 12.3. Cicero uses the term incorrupta once in Nat. d. 2.71
in reference only to the need for a pure heart and mind in worshipping. It is not a term used of divinity
itself. However, Novatian‘s determination that the concept of incorruptibility parallels the inability of
divinity to breakdown or die can be easily applied to other parts of the tradition, especially Cicero‘s
formulations about having a beginning and end. In Dogm. Plat. 1.9, Apuleius uses incorrupta once in
describing matter, which shares such a trait with the first essences because of its median position between
these and creation. Tertullian‘s influence on Novatian regarding the use of the term is therefore probable.
99
As noted above, the Epicurean school was the exception to this teaching based upon the doctrine
of divine atomism.
100
Trin. 5.6: Est enim simplex et sine ulla corporea concretione. Novatian follows typical
language which can be found in any number of philosophic and Christian texts. See, for example,
Irenaeus‘ Haer. 2.13.3: ―…He is a simple, uncompounded Being, without diverse members, and altogether
like, and equal to Himself…‖ (…simplex et non compositus et similimembrius et totus ipse sibimetipsi
similis et aequalis est…) Stead quotes this passage from Irenaeus to illustrate the following point: ―The
mathematical approach to theology culminates in the doctrine that God is not only unchanging and selfconsistent, but also undivided in the most radical sense; he is pure Being; he has nothing corresponding to
distinct organs or faculties, because his whole being is involved in each perception and action. It is
nevertheless held by many orthodox Christians that the one God can exercise a variety of powers or
energies, and that these do not compromise his perfect simplicity,‖ Philosophy, 108.
101
Ideo nec adiectio in illo umquam ullius aut partis aut honoris accedit, ne quid umquam perfecto
defuisse uideatur, nec detrimentum in eo aliquod agitur, ne gradus mortalitatis receptus esse uideatur, sed
quod est, id semper est, et qui est, semper ipse est, et qualis est, semper talis est. Nam et incrementa
originem monstrant et detrimenta mortem atque interitum probant.
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Novatian denies the addition of parts to God because it violates the idea of divine
simplicity. With the same logic, he denies any form of change in God, because it implies
mortality.
It appears that Novatian wrote Trin. 4 with Tertullian‘s Herm. 12 in mind.
Novatian‘s detrimenta refers to the action of change by diminishment, whereas Tertullian
chides Hermogenes repeatedly with various forms of the word demuto (to change through
diminishment). Since Tertullian equates eternality with the inability to change, he argues
that Hermogenes‘ understanding of Matter as the source of evil and God as the source of
good must be absolute. Tertullian writes,
Now it will be necessary to regard nature as certain and fixed, no less persisting in
evil when it occurs in matter, than in good when it occurs in God; it must of
course be inconvertible and immutable (inconuertibilem et indemutabilem),
because if in matter nature can be changed (demutabitur) from evil to good, it can
also be changed (demutari) in God from good to evil. [Herm. 12.1]102
Tertullian dismisses the logical possibility that change, diminishment, mortality, or
corruption could apply to the eternal (and therefore good and simple) God. He repeatedly
suggests that Hermogenes‘ position must lead to the conclusion that either God is not
supreme or that God is subject to diminishment.
Following Tertullian‘s reliance on the term demuto, Novatian emphasizes God‘s
immutable nature with the term muto. When he denounces the possibility of any change
in God,103 Novatian states,

102

Naturam certam et fixam haberi oportebit, tam in malo perseuerantem apud materiam quam et
in bono apud deum, inconuertibilem et indemutabilem scilicet, qu<i>a, si demutabitur natura in materia de
malo in bonum, demutari poterit et in deo de bono [non] in malum.
103
Novatian cites Mal. 3:6, stating, ―and therefore He says: ‗I am God, and have not changed
(mutates),‘ He always retains His manner (statum) of Being, because what is not born (natum) is not
subject to change (conuerti),‖ Trin. 4.5. When Evans analyzes Tertullian‘s terminology, he writes, ―We
shall therefore suspect that the difference between status and substantia is that the former means
‗existence‘, while the latter means the existent thing: i.e., if substantia is indicated by the existential verb,
status represents the copula in so far as it attaches attributes which are permanent (the proprietates), those
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He is always, therefore, equal to Himself; he never changes (uertit) or transforms
(mutat) Himself into other forms, lest through changes (immutationem) He should
appear to be also mortal. For the modification (immutatio) implied in change
(conuersionis) from one thing to another involves a share in death of some sort.‖
[Trin. 4.4]104
Novatian makes the possibility of divine change a logical paradox, since he defines
eternality as the inability to change.105 Novatian uses the phrase ―equal to Himself‖ to
identify the Father‘s simplicity and inability to change.106 We recall that Apuleius
offered a similar statement about God, which may have influenced Novatian‘s
phrasing.107 However, I believe Tertullian‘s influence is greatest on Novatian in the
passage above. Tertullian makes the same point at the end of Herm. 12, although his
formulation differs from Novatian‘s. Tertullian writes, ―But eternity cannot be lost
because, unless it cannot be lost, it is not eternity. For the same reason it could not have
admitted of changer either, because if it is eternity, it cannot be changed in any way.‖108
Novatian follows Tertullian‘s understanding that change is the negation of eternality.

which are secundum condicionem, and constitute the natura of the object,‖ Tertullian‟s Treatise, 52. In the
case of status, I think it likely that Tertullian‘s usage influenced Novatian‘s. See also Novatian‘s use of the
term in Trin. 4.7.
104
Hic ergo semper sui est similis nec se umquam in aliquas formas uertit aut mutat, ne per
immutationem etiam mortalis esse uideatur. Immutatio enim conuersionis portio cuiusdam comprehenditur
mortis.
105
D. F. Kelly reads Novatian in the opposite way. He writes, ―…the stoic logic aided Novatian
and his predecessors to retain the temporal element in God‘s Being and Acts for us (against the ‗timeless‘
immovable mover of Greek philosophy). The stoic practice of examining a real individual subject in its
own light leads the observer to see it as a living whole, which involves movement in its very wholeness.
Hence because individuals change without ceasing to be real, change per se is not degrading. This advance
in thought opens up whole new areas of reality that earlier had been ruled out,‖ ―Beneficial Influence of
Stoic Logic,‖ 825.
106
The phrase is used only in regard to the Supreme God in that it carries with it the assumption
that the Supreme God can have no equal.
107
See my citation of Dogm. Plat. 1.6 in chapter 1 in the section ―Apuleius.‖ The possible
influence on Novatian and the similarity with which Apuleius and he formulate divine simplicity with
phrasing about the Father being equal to himself as an expression of simplicity and the inability to change
convinces me that D. F. Kelly‘s assessment (cited above) is incorrect. It is also important to point out that
Tertullian speaks throughout Herm. about the Father having no equal. in a way which may have suggested
the same idea to Novatian.
108
Herm. 12.4: Sed aeternitas amitti non potest, quia nisi amitti non possit, aeternitas non est. Ergo
nec demutationem potuit admisisse, quia si aeternitas est, demutari nullo modo potest.

124
I suggest that Novatian opted for muto, in place of Tertullian‘s demuto, because
of the difference in polemical targets. Tertullian challenges Hermogenes by saying that
his theology leads to God‘s ultimate diminishment. Although Novatian‘s Sabellian
opponents did not eternalize matter, they taught that the Father became the Son.
Novatian found the change in the Supreme God‘s place and function intolerable.
Therefore, he sets his sights on the notion of any kind of change. Novatian wanted to
emphasize the point that change (muto), not just Tertullian‘s emphasis on diminishing
change (demuto), cannot apply to the Supreme God because it violates the understanding
that the divine nature is incorruptible.

Topological Theology

W. Schoedel wrote several articles which examine the theological tradition of
identifying God as enclosing or containing the world as well as the corollary position that
God cannot be enclosed or contained by the world or anything in it.109 Schoedel coins
the term ―topological theology,‖ which refers to the connection between the subjects of
God enclosing/containing the world and God‘s relationship to place or location
(topos/locus). According to Schoedel, these categories originally came from pre-Socratic
philosophers as well as Aristotle,110 but by the second century A.D. philosophers, Jews,
Gnostics, and Christians had incorporated them into their thinking.

109

William R. Schoedel, ―‗Topological‘ Theology and Some Monistic Tendencies in Gnosticism,‖
in Essays on the Nag Hammadi Texts in Honour of Alexander Böhlig, Ed. Krause, Martin (Leiden: Brill,
1972), 88-108, and ―Enclosing, not Enclosed: The Early Christian Doctrine of God,‖ in Early Christian
Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition. Eds. William R. Schoedel and Robert L. Wilkin (Paris:
Éditions Beauchesne, 1979), 75-86.
110
Shoedel writes, ―The debate in the early church came to a focus in the formula ‗enclosing, not
enclosed‘ and related expressions. The use here of the verb ‗to enclose‘ (πεξηέρεηλ) seems to have two
main sources: (a) the pre-Socratic description of the originative substance as divine and the enclosing all
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Schoedel argues that the original formulation of this tradition dealt with the
interaction between two substances (material and divine) interacting in a given space. He
credits Philo with eliminating the notion of substantial interaction by emphasizing a
description of God as transcendent.111 Schoedel writes, ―To say that God encloses all
things and is not enclosed means for Philo (a) that God is immaterial and not in a place,
(b) that he is unknowable in his essence, and (c) that he is creator of all things.‖112
Furthermore, Schoedel suggests, ―An indication of the novelty of Philo‘s thought in this
connection is the emphasis, perhaps for the first time, on the idea that the essence of God
is unknowable.‖113 This description of Philo‘s theology can be applied to Novatian, as
well as to Irenaeus and others. By the time Novatian wrote, the enclosing/not enclosed
antithesis includes a number of terms and ideas which were often linked, albeit expressed
with different emphases.114 These ideas consist of discussions about 1) the possibility of
the physical intersection between some substance and the substance of the Supreme
being, 2) the correspondence between the power and supremacy of a containing
thing/being, and finally 3) the question of divine transcendence and immanence.
Novatian‘s writing addresses, to one degree or another, these three topics. For
example, he denies the possibility of the Father‘s specific manifestation in any particular

things, (b) Aristotle‘s discussion of the infinite (Phys. 3.4-8, 202b 30), of place (4.1-5, 208a 27), and of the
void (4.6-9, 213a 12),‖ ―Enclosing, not Enclosed,‖ 75-76.
111
Schoedel notes Wolfson‘s contention that the formula originally came from Rabbinic teachings
as well as Dillon‘s suggestion that Philo gleaned his interpretation from now-lost Platonic sources. See
Schoedel ―‗Topological‘ Theology,‖ 96, for his own suggestion concerning the possible influence of
―Posidonian Stoicism‖ based on the heavy use of the terms cohibere, continere, and complecti in Nat. d. 2.
Schoedel also explains, ―Philo‘s use of the formula presupposes a new concern in the philosophical
tradition. A sharp distinction between God and anthropomorphic conceptions of deity is made. This
contrast is expressed with the help of the philosophical distinction between immutable spiritual substance
and material substance subject to movement and change,‖ ―‗Topological‘ Theology,‖ 95.
112
Schoedel, ―Enclosing, not Enclosed,‖ 76.
113
Idem.
114
Schoedel takes note of examples that God cannot be contained, which are found in the works of
Justin, Theophilus, and Irenaeus, among others in, ―‗Topological‘ Theology,‖ 90-91.
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place. In Trin. 3.3, for example, he rebuts the idea that a temple can enclose (capere)
God.115 He argues the same point when he states,
Thus the people were permitted to erect the tabernacle, although God cannot be
contained (continetur) within a temple. The temple was constructed, although
God cannot possibly be enclosed (saepitur) within the narrow limits of a temple.
God is not finite (non mediocris), but the people‘s faculty of perceiving is finite
(mediocris). [Trin. 6.3]116
He believes the Father‘s divinity precludes localization.117 ―If they say that God the
Father almighty came,‖ Novatian writes, ―then God the Father came from a place (loco);
consequently, He is also enclosed (cluditur) by space (loco) and contained (continetur)
within the limits of some abode.‖118
As noted in chapter 2, Novatian treats the possibility of man knowing God as
impossible because this would mean that man somehow contains God. Novatian also
affirms the reciprocal position: God must contain the universe, otherwise the universe
will be greater than God.119 Novatian may have found inspiration for these positions in
Theophilus‘ work. In Autol. 2.3, Theophilus succinctly connects the above topics,
stating,
But it is characteristic of the Most High and Almighty God, who is actually God,
not only to be everywhere but to look upon everything and hear everything [Od.
xi. 108], and not to be confined in a place; otherwise, the place containing him
115

Trin. 3.3 states, ―Again, He says through the prophet: ‗Heaven is My throne, earth the footstool
under My feet: what sort of home will you build for Me, or what is the Place of My rest?‘—this to make it
clear that since the world cannot contain Him, much less can a temple enclose Him.‖ This is not the
theology of, for example, 1 Kings 8:27-30, which speaks of the Temple being unable to contain God but
also affirms God‘s position in heaven as a distant dwelling place.
116
Sic et tabernaculum erigere populo permittitur, nec tamen Deus intra tabernaculum clusus
continetur. Sic et templum extruitur, nec tamen Deus intra templi angustias omnino saepitur. Non igitur
mediocris est Deus, sed populi mediocris est sensus.
117
Schoedel notes an applicable distinction Aristotle makes in De caelo 312a 12: ―In a discussion
of the disposition of the elements in the universe we learn that ‗that which encloses has to do with form,
whereas that which is enclosed has to do with matter,‘‖ ―‗Topological‘ Theology,‖ 94. See also Justin‘s
Dial. 114 where he argues that only an anthropomorphic understanding of the Father can justify the
Father‘s theophanic appearance. He concludes therefore that the theophanies necessarily involve the Word.
118
Trin. 12.7.
119
Trin. 4.9.
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would be greater than he is, for what contains is greater than what is contained.
God is not contained but is himself the locus (ηόπνο) of the universe.120
As Theophilus suggests in this passage, Novatian also blended the topics of the spatial
and intellectual containment of God into a question of dominance.121 If God can be
localized in a temple or understood by a mind, then God would be less supreme than the
containing things (the temple or the mind).
Novatian‘s rejection of divine localization came with an equally forceful
affirmation of God‘s all-pervasiveness.122 Forms of this theological position can be
found in various traditions.123 Novatian begins Trin. 6.3 (quoted on the previous page)
by citing Ps. 139:8-10, ―For it is written: ‗If I ascend into heaven, You are there; if I
descend into hell, You are present; and if I take my wings and depart across the sea, there

120

Schoedel notes several instances of Irenaeus‘ affirmation that the Father cannot be contained,
such as Haer. 1.15.5, and he also suggests that Haer. 2.1.2 ―is only verbally distinct from Theophilus‘
remark‖ in Autol. 2.3, in ―‗Topological‘ Theology,‖ 92. Like Theophilus, and Novatian after him, Irenaeus
attributes greatness to that which contains. See also Justin‘s Dial. 127 for an exposition of the same
themes.
121
Trin. 3.3-4.
122
Schoedel‘s discussion of Philo applies: ―From the earliest period, the term ‗enclosing‘ served to
express not only transcendence but also immanence. Philo more than once couples ‗enclosing‘ with
‗filling‘ or ‗pervading‘ in his description of God‘s relation to the world (Conf. ling. 136; Leg. alleg. 1.44;
Post. Cain 14). In this connection he introduces the important distinction between God as transcendent
(that is, enclosing all, in the proper sense of the term) according to his nature or essence and God as
immanent according to his power and goodness (Migr. Abr. 182). Such themes were later taken over into
Christian theology and were naturally extended to include the theme of incarnation,‖ ―Enclosing, not
Enclosed‖ 85.
123
See, for example, the Teachings of Silvanus, a work which M. Peel and J. Zandee describe as
―clearly indebted to Jewish and Hellenistic Jewish wisdom literature,‖ in ―The Teachings of Silvanus,‖ in
The Nag Hammadi Library in English. Edited by James M. Robinson (New York: Harper Collins, 1990):
379. The work states, ―Furthermore, I shall speak of what is more exalted than this: the mind, with respect
to actual being, is in a place, which means it is in the body; but with respect to thought, the mind is not in a
place. For how can it be in a place when it contemplates every place? But we are able to mention what is
more exalted than this: for do not think in your heart that God exists [in a] place. If you localize the [Lord
of] all in a place, then it is fitting for you to say that the place is more exalted than he who dwells in it. For
that which contains is more exalted than that which is contained,‖ Ibid. 387. I note in the next chapter that
Stoic theories of the pervasiveness of the divine substance most likely played an influence on Middle
Platonic thinking.
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shall Your hand take hold of me, and Your right hand hold me fast.‘‖124 God contains all
because of His supremacy, but His immanence also testifies to His supremacy.
After using Trin. 1 to discuss the work of creation, Novatian begins chapter 2 by
introducing God‘s immanence with enclosing language. He states,
Over all these things is He, who contains (continens) all things and who leaves
nothing devoid (uacuum) of Himself; He has left no room for a superior god as
some think. Since He Himself has enclosed (incluserit) all things in the bosom of
His perfect greatness and power (magnitudinis et potestatis), He is always intent
(intentus) on His own work and pervades (uadens) all things, moves (mouens) all
things, gives life (uiuificans) to all things, and observes (conspiciens) all things.
[Trin. 2.1]125
In this case, Novatian connects ―containing‖ language to God‘s personal care and contact
with creation.126
Novatian also uses Trin. 2.1, quoted just above, to identify God‘s greatness and
power (magnitudinis and potestas) as the means by which He encloses the world and
therefore cares for it. Although the term providentia does not appear in this passage, I
showed in chapter 3 that Novatian uses this term to describe the care which God
constantly provides the creation. Providentia is also a term which Novatian connects to
God‘s containment of all things.

124

Trin. 6.2: Scriptum est enim: Si ascendero in caelum, tu ibi es; si descendero ad inferos, ades;
et si assumpsero alas meas et abiero trans mare, ibi manus tua apprehendet me et dextera tua detinebit me.
125
Super quae omnia ipse continens cuncta, nihil extra se uacuum deserens, nulli deo superiori, ut
quidam putant, locum reliquit, quandoquidem ipse uniuersa sinu perfectae magnitudinis et potestatis
incluserit, intentus semper operi suo et uadens per omnia et mouens cuncta et uiuificans uniuersa et
conspiciens tota…
126
Novatian certainly rejects some of Tertullian‘s language concerning the Father‘s transcendence,
such as can be found in Prax. 16: ―Besides, how can it be that God Almighty, that invisible one whom none
of men hath seen nor can see, he who dwelleth in light unapproachable, he who dwelleth not in things made
with hands, before whose aspect the earth trembleth, and the mountains melt as wax, who graspeth the
whole world in his hand like a nest, whose throne is the heaven and the earth his footstool, in whom is all
space but he not in space (in quo omnis locus, non ipse in loco), who is the boundary line of the
universe…‖
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The clearest example of Novatian explaining providentia is found in Trin. 8.6.
Although I cited this passage in chapter 3, I cite it again in order to point out other
important aspects of Novatian‘s theology:
And lest anyone should think that this indefatigable providence (infatigabilem
prouidentiam) of God does not also embrace the least things, the Lord said: ―One
of two sparrows shall not fall to the ground without the Father‘s Will (Patris
uoluntate); for even the very hairs of your head are all numbered.‖ His care and
providence (cura et prouidentia) neither allowed the garments of the Israelites to
perish…And this is not without reason for if He who contains (continens) all
things embraces (complexus) all things (all things, however, and the whole sum
are made up of individual parts), then it follows logically that His care (cura) will
be bestowed on every individual part because His providence (prouidentia)
extends to the whole, whatever it be. [Trin. 8.6]127
Trin. 2.1 and 8.6 both describe the same relationship between God and the world: through
His greatness, power, and providence, God contains, permeates, and cares for the world.
Novatian‘s use of power and providence brings to mind the theology of Ps.Aristotle‘s Mund. According to Mund, God sustains and maintains all things through
power rather than through the presence of God Himself.128 Apuleius, in his translation of
Ps.-Aristotle‘s work,129 explains the concept of God‘s immanence as power with the
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Et ne quis non etiam ad minima quaeque Dei putaret istam infatigabilem prouidentiam
peruenire, Ex duobus, inquit Dominus, passeribus unus non cadet sine Patris uoluntate, sed et capilli
capitis uestri omnes numerati sunt. Cuius etiam cura et prouidentia Israelitarum non siuit nec uestes
consumi… Nec immerito, nam si hic omnia complexus est omnia continens, omnia autem et totum ex
singulis constant, pertinget consequenter eius ad usque singula quaeque cura, cuius ad totum quicquid est
peruenit prouidentia.
128
Mund. 24 explains the notion that gods existed in the world by claiming that God‘s power was
the thing present, ―Neque ulla res est tam praestantibus uiribus, quae <eius> uiduata auxilio sui natura
contenta sit. Hanc opinionem uates secuti profiteri ausi sunt, omnia Ioue plena esse, cuius praesentiam non
iam cogitatio sola, sed oculi et aures et sensibilis substantia conprehendit. At haec conposita est pot<estati,
non autem mai>estati dei conueniens oratio.‖ See Apuleius‘ use of potestas throughout his translation of
Mund. 24-5. Other uses of power were available to Novatian. Compare, for example, 1 Clement 33 which
identifies power with God‘s control over the world: ―So likewise, when He had formed the sea, and the
living creatures which are in it, He enclosed them [within their proper bounds] by His own power
(dunamis).‖
129
Harrison writes, ―The De Mundo is a relatively faithful translation of the extant pseudoAristotelian Πεξὶ Κόζκνπ, an influential treatise on the nature of the universe most probably written in the
first century BC, with considerable literary pretensions which De Mundo follows,‖ Apuleius, 181.
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phrase infatigabilis providentia.130 I am unaware of this phrase being used by an author
other than Novatian. In light of the fact that Novatian and Apuleius are each speaking
about providence and power to describe the immanent presence of God, I believe it
probable that Novatian borrows Apuleius‘ language.
However, Novatian limits his dependence on the theology of Mund. He does not
follow Mund. in suggesting that the Supreme God remains above and apart from creation
with only His power permeating all things.131 Instead, Novatian implies God‘s personal
pervasiveness. Such a position calls to mind Philo‘s development of this this idea, which
Schoedel notes in his description. Novatian states, ―As for the rest, He Himself [is] all
eye, because the whole sees, and all ear because the whole hears, and all hand because
the whole is at work, and all foot because the whole is everywhere. Likewise, whatever it
is that He is, the whole is consistent and all is everywhere.‖132 Novatian relies on the
affirmation of God‘s simplicity to suggest that God‘s presence or nature, whatever it is, is
everywhere equally.133 When Novatian suggests that God as a whole is consistent and
thus everywhere, he marks the difference between, on the one hand speaking about
immanence through activity and/or power such as found in the theology of Mund., and on
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Mund. 24: Sospitator quidem ille et genitor est omnium, qui ad conplendum mundum nati
factique sunt; non tamen ut corporei laboris officio orbem istum manibus suis instruxerit, sed qui quadam
infatigabili providentia et procul posita cuncta contingit, et maximis intervallis disiuncta conplectitur.
131
See Mund. 25. There is some disagreement in scholarship over whether the Supreme God in
Mund. stands completely outside of the universe or in the highest realm of it. See Armstrong, Christian
Faith, 8 for the first view, and Hunt, Christianity in the Second Century, 90 for the second.
132
Trin. 6.8 [trans. Papandrea]: Ceterum ipse totus oculus, quia totus uidet, et totus auris, quia
totus audit, et totus manus, quia totus operatur, et totus pes, quia totus ubique est. Idem enirn, quicquid illud
est, totus aequalis est et totus ubique est. As pointed out by Schoedel, ―‗Topological‘ Theology,‖ 101, the
phrasing which attributes wholeness in mind along with anthropomorphic terminology of completeness has
a long history. He offers numerous examples, including Ps.-Aristotle‘s On Melissus, Xenophanes, and
Gorgias 3, Clement of Alexandria‘s Stromata 7.5.5, and Irenaeus‘ Haer. 1.12.2; 2.13.2; 2.13.8; 2.28.4;
4.11.1.
133
Trin. 6.9.
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the other hand speaking about God‘s nature as somehow immanent. His understanding of
God‘s immanence depends on the idea that all place is contained in Him.
Irenaeus‘ Haer. 2.13.7 provides another possible source for Novatian‘s thought.
Irenaeus writes,
Further, they must also confess either that He is mere vacuity, or that the entire
universe is within Him; and in that case all will in like degree partake of the
Father…If on the other hand, they acknowledge that He is vacuity, then they fall
into the greatest blasphemy; they deny His spiritual nature. For how can He be a
spiritual being, who cannot fill even those things which are within Him?134
I quoted this passage in chapter 2 because of Irenaeus‘ attachment to the idea that God‘s
nature is spiritual. Novatian‘s denial of a correspondence between the term ―spirit‖ and
God‘s substance sets him apart from Irenaeus and Tertullian; however, Novatian‘s
thought aligns with both authors in terms of the expression of divine immanence.
Novatian adds some clarity to Trin. 6.8 in chapter 17 by connecting ―containing‖
language to the term locus. I refer to this passage here and again in a few pages, taking
note of different aspects of his terminology. Novatian writes,
Finally, what would you reply if I should say that the same Moses everywhere
represents God the Father as boundless (immensus), without end (fine)? He
cannot be confined (cludatur) by space (loco), for He includes (cludat) all space
(locum). He is not in one place (loco), but rather all place (locus) is in Him. He
contains (continentem) all things and embraces (complexum) all things; therefore
He cannot descend or ascend inasmuch as He contains (continent) all things and
fills (implet) all things. [Trin. 17.7]135
Novatian links God‘s containing and embracing all things to the idea that all place
resides in God. This connection allows him to claim that God fills all things. It is
134

Translations of Haer. are Roberts and Donaldson‘s.
Quid si idem Moyses ubique introducit Deum Patrem immensum atque sine fine, non qui loco
c1udatur, sed qui omnem locum cludat, nec eum qui in loco sit, sed potius in quo omnis locus sit, omnia
continentem et cuncta complexum, ut merito nec descendat nec ascendat, quoniam ipse omnia et continet et
implet. This passage repeats some of the same terms and themes as already seen in Trin. 8.6. There, and
only there, Novatian conjoined the terms cura and providentia in order to gloss the idea of God containing
and embracing all things.
135
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tempting to read the above passage as merely a rephrasing of Trin. 2.1, in which Novatian
states that God ―enclosed all things in the bosom of His perfect greatness and power.‖ In
that case, Trin. 17.7 would only correspond to the idea of God‘s immanence as power or
activity such as in Mund. Novatian, however, makes a point similar to the one found in
Theophilus‘ Autol. 2.3. Unlike Irenaeus and Tertullian, Theophilus and Novatian
maintain God‘s essential pervasiveness without resorting to the category of spirit. In this,
Theophilus and Novatian distance themselves from one aspect of Stoic language about
divine pervasiveness.136

God as Infinitus and Immensus
The terms infinitus and immensus contribute to Novatian‘s explanation of the
topological theology already presented. Like his nuanced articulation of God‘s
relationship to time, Novatian does not simply affirm God‘s incomprehensible (and
uncategorizable) nature as transcending, containing, and pervading all things. He also
develops a technical sense of the terms infinitus and immensus when referring to the
Father. These terms appear in both his Christian and non-Christian sources. When
Novatian speaks about creation with the words infinitas and immensus, he refers to
vastness. However, as with aeternus, Novatian reserves a superlative and incomparable
meaning for infinitus and immensus when he writes about the Father‘s relationship with
space.

136

I use language here instead of ―logic,‖ because it is important to concede the point that
Novatian and Theophilus may yet be influenced by other aspects of Stoic theories of divine pervasiveness.
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In Cicero‘s Nat. d. the terms infinita/us and inmensus137 refer to both space138 and
time.139 The closest any of the speakers come in Cicero‘s work to technical language is
the Epicurean, who speaks about the physical necessity of the gods and atoms as
infinite.140 In Herm., Tertullian brings up the terms briefly to challenge Hermogenes‘
disciples in their application of infinitas to time. According to Tertullian, Hermogenes
used the terms infinitas and immensus to speak only about Matter‘s spatial aspect. He
writes,
And if one of your pupils proposes to argue that you will have it understood that
matter is infinite in time (infinitam aeuo), not in the quantity of its body, then the
words which follow show that it is, on the contrary, infinite in regard to its body
(corporaliter infinitam), since it is regarding its body that it is unmeasurable
(immensam) and unbounded (incircumscriptam). ―Wherefore, too,‖ you say, ―it is
worked up, not as a whole, but in its parts.‖ Hence it is infinite in body (corpore
infinita), not in time and you will stand refuted when you make it infinite in body,
whereas <, on the other hand,> by assigning a place in space to it, you include it
within that place and its outline. [Herm. 38.3]141
Tertullian does not fear that the change of terminological meaning will lead to theological
concessions on his part.142 Rather, he wants to force the followers of Hermogenes into
following the definitions of the terms which Hermogenes himself apparently fixed.

137

In Cicero‘s work, the spelling is almost always inmensus. The same spelling discrepancy was
seen with Cicero‘s inmortalitas as compared with the later customary spelling immortalitas.
138
E.g. Nat. d. 1.26 which states, ―Next Anaximenes held that air is god, and that it has a
beginning in time, and is immeasurable (inmensum) and infinite (infinitum) in extent.‖ See also Nat. d.
1.54, 1.73, and 2.15.
139
E.g. Nat. d. 1.22, which states, ―Well then, Balbus, what I ask is, why did your Providence
remain idle all through that extent of time (inmenso spatio) of which you speak?...If it was to embellish his
own abode, then it seems that he had previously been dwelling for an infinite time (tempore infinito) in a
dark and gloomy hovel!‖ See also Nat. d. 1.22, 2.15, and 2.85.
140
Nat. d.. 1.50; 54. The language chosen by the Epicurean is influenced by the position that the
universe must be infinite in order to account for atoms and void.
141
Et si qui discipulorum tuorum uoluerit argumentari, quasi infinitam? aeuo, non modo corporis
intellegi uelis, atquin corporaliter infinitam, ut corporaliter immensam et incircumscriptam, sequentia
ostendunt. 'Vnde,' inquis, 'nec tota fabricatur sed partes eius.' Adeo corpore infinita, non tempore est et
obduceris corpore <e>am infinitam faciens, cum locum ei adscribens intra locum et extremam loci lineam
includis.
142
A significant amount of Herm. contains Tertullian‘s argument that divine attributes can only be
possessed by one being. They must be either God‘s or Matter‘s.
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According to Tertullian, Hermogenes used the terms infinitas, immensus, and
incircumscriptus only in reference to space and mass.
The evidence from Cicero and Tertullian shows no philosophical consensus for
infinitas and immensus as technical terms. However, Tertullian‘s depiction of
Hermogenes‘ students suggests that some people may have attempted to mark off a more
limited definition, at least for infinitus. For his part, Tertullian spends little time with
either term. Neither show up in Adversus Praxean, De carne Christe, or De
resurrectione carnis, but both terms appear a few times in Adversus Marcionem.143 In
that work, Tertullian offers a description of the Supreme God which Marcion should
accept. He states, ―Exempt then both from order of beginning and from measure of time
(modo temporis), <God‘s goodness> must be accounted of age unmeasurable (immensa)
and without end.‖144 In this passage, Tertullian uses immensus to speak about God‘s
eternity, but the term seems incidental to the actual concept. Tertullian prefers words and
phrases related to God‘s lack of a beginning and an end to discuss God‘s eternality. In
regard to his own theological expression, the terms were not important enough for him to
attempt consistency.
Novatian sets the meanings of the terms infinitus/um and immensus solely within
spatial expression, and he also uses these terms synonymously. It is likely then that
Herm. influenced his decision; Cicero‘s work demonstrates no uniform meaning for the
terms by any of the schools.145 In two places, Novatian uses infinitus and immensus in
143

It is not known how many of Tertullian‘s works were known to Novatian, but scholars have
found literary or thematic connections between Trin. and all of these works.
144
Marc. 2.3.5: Atque ita carens et ordine initii et modo temporis de immensa et interminabili
aetate censebitur.
145
As noted above, Tertullian used the terms only in refuting the definitions posed by the
followers of Hermogenes. Tertullian himself shows no interest in either developing the terms or in making
them central to his description of the Father.
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light of the vastness of the universe.146 In the other instances, Novatian treats the terms
as unique attributes of the Father‘s divinity. As noted, the two different levels of
meaning for these terms correspond to the levels of meaning I pointed out for Novatian‘s
use of aeternus. References to the Father‘s nature as aeternus represent God‘s lack of
time through the absence of a beginning. Novatian‘s use of aeternus in the more general
sense refers to an everlasting state, or something which begins but does not end. He
presents the Father alone as uniquely aeternus, immensus, and infinitus, even though
these terms can be applied in a more general, non-exclusive sense.
For Novatian, God‘s spatial greatness corresponds to his understanding of God‘s
supremacy and dominion over all other things. Novatian teaches that no being or thing
can share the Father‘s attributes, which include spatial immensity. He explains his
thinking in two passages. The first is Trin. 4.9:
As the very nature of things demands, there cannot be two infinities (infinita).
That alone is infinite (infinitum) which has neither beginning (originem) nor end
(finem); for whatever occupies the whole excludes the beginning (initium) of
another. If the infinite does not contain (continent) all that exists (whatever it be),
then it will find itself within that which contains (continentur) it and therefore it
will be less than the containing (continentur) element. Hence it will cease to be
God, since it has been brought under the dominion (potestatem) of another whose
magnitude will include it because it is the smaller. As a result what contained
(continuit) it would itself claim to be God.147

146

In Trin. 1.13 Novatian states, ―In the higher regions—those above the very firmament itself,
which at present are beyond our sight—He previously called the angels into being, arranged the spiritual
powers, set over them the Thrones and Powers, created many other measureless spaces (immensa spatia) of
heavens and mysterious works without limit (infinita). Therefore, even this measureless (immensus)
universe seems to be the latest of God‘s material creations rather than His only work.‖ After referencing
passages from the book of Ezekiel in which Novatian identifies the world as God‘s chariot. Novatian states
in Trin. 8.10, ―This according to David, is God‘s chariot. ‗The chariot of God,‘ he says, ‗is multiplied ten
times a thousand time‘; that is, it is incalculable, infinite (infinitus), immeasurable (immensus).‖
147
Quoniam nec duo infinita esse possunt, ut rerum dictat ipsa natura. Infinitum est autem
quicquid nec originem habet omnino nec finem. Excludit enim alterius initium, quicquid occupauerit totum.
Quoniam si non omne id quod est quicquid est continet, dum intra id inuenitur quo continetur, minus
inuentum eo quo continetur, Deus esse desierit, in alterius potestatem redactus, cuius magnitudine, qua
minor, fuerit inclusus, et ideo quod continuit Deus potius esse iam coeperit.
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Novatian‘s argument resembles Tertullian‘s in Herm. in that he starts from the
requirement of uniqueness. God the Father is infinitus because there can be only one
thing without beginning or end. Novatian‘s explanation relies entirely on the idea that
God uniquely contains all things and therefore retains power and dominion over all
things. Novatian therefore gives infinitus a superlative meaning which can only be
attributed to the Father.
In the previous section, I quoted Trin. 17.7 in order to show how Novatian‘s
topological theology emphasized all place as residing in God. I cite the passage again to
show how Novatian uses the term immensus to develop containment language in his
topological theology:
Finally, what would you reply if I should say that the same Moses everywhere
represents God the Father as boundless (immensus), without end (fine)? He
cannot be confined (cludatur) by space (loco), for He includes (cludat) all space
(locum). He is not in one place (loco), but rather all place (locus) is in Him. He
contains (continentem) all things and embraces (complexum) all things; therefore
He cannot descend or ascend inasmuch as He contains (continent) all things and
fills (implet) all things. [Trin. 17.7]148
Novatian use of the term immensus relates to the Father‘s unique relationship to space.
Like infinitus, immensus indicates that God contains and embraces all things (the
topological language), because any being which is infinite has neither end nor beginning.
Both terms are attributed to the Father alone in this sense.
The terms infinitus and immensus play a critical role in Novatian‘s topological
theology; they identify the Father‘s unique relationship to space. These terms categorize
the Father‘s nature as containing and pervading all things. His use of infinitus and

148

Quid si idem Moyses ubique introducit Deum Patrem immensum atque sine fine, non qui loco
c1udatur, sed qui omnem locum cludat, nec eum qui in loco sit, sed potius in quo omnis locus sit, omnia
continentem et cuncta complexum, ut merito nec descendat nec ascendat, quoniam ipse omnia et continet et
implet.
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immensus is consistent with knowledge of the philosophical discussions which Cicero
lays out in Nat. d., but Novatian demonstrates a unique systematization of the terms to
reflect the influence of spatial exclusivity which Tertullian suggests in Herm.

Conclusion

Novatian offers a positive theology of the Father in terminology unremarkable to
his time.149 That being said, it is important to this study that I have shown Novatian‘s
familiarity and interaction with topics prevalent in philosophical texts and Christian
sources. The importance of Novatian‘s presentation in regard to the theology of Trin. lies
in the unique qualities he associates with the Supreme God. In the last chapter, I
described the structure by which Novatian placed God at the center of epistemology and
theological epistemology. My analysis of Novatian‘s positive theology in this chapter
concludes that the Father possesses attributes which are unique. The Supreme God alone
is the Father, one, eternal, and infinite. Because of his theological epistemology,
Novatian does not presume that these statements offer exhaustive knowledge about God‘s
attributes. They do, however, offer the ability to point to divine transcendence and
supremacy, which Novatian connects uniquely to God the Father.
In the next chapter, I will discuss the philosophic and Christian developments in
the Word theology tradition. By keeping in mind the comments made in chapter 1 about
the philosophic range of beliefs concerning a hierarchy of divinities, we will notice the
importance of Word traditions for addressing the topics of divine transcendence and
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I have limited my attention in this chapter to those categories of positive theology Novatian
utilizes to identify the unique Father. The focus of this dissertation prevents me the time to explore other
themes, such as the affirmation of God‘s goodness or His concern with justice. See Trin. 4.1-3, for
examples of Novatian‘s discussion of these topics.
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immanence. I will then show in chapters 6 and 7 the influence which the Word traditions
had on Trin. and demonstrate that Novatian sets his understanding of the Son‘s attributes
against the unique attributes of the Father. This aspect of my study sets it apart from
other scholarly readings of Novatian‘s work. As seen in the current chapter, as well as in
chapter 2, I demonstrated that both philosophic and Christian sources shaped Novatian‘s
theology of the Father. My reading of Novatian‘s theology of the Son will demonstrate
that the theological philosophy which influences him helps to establish the framework by
which Novatian juxtaposes his understanding of the Word‘s divinity with the divinity of
the Father.
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Chapter Five: The Development of Word Christology

Introduction

In this chapter, I will connect the Logos theologies of Hellenistic philosophy to
that of Philo, and then to the Word Christologies leading up to Novatian. As mentioned
in the Introduction, my analysis of Word Christology identifies the Word of God (also the
Son of God) as the one who became the incarnate Jesus.1 The topic of Word Christology,
therefore, has to do with everything related to the Son‘s existence, including the
generation of the Word, the justification for calling the Son both God the Word (or the
Word both Son and God), and all the topics associated with the Word‘s incarnation.2 Of
these subjects, I will be addressing topics related to the Word‘s generation as it is
associated with creation and recreation, as well as the Word‘s distinction from and
relationship with the Father in the works of Justin, Theophilus, Irenaeus, Hippolytus, and
Tertullian.3 Novatian‘s dependence on all of these writers is either clearly demonstrable
or very likely.4

1

With this definition, I am narrowing the scholarly usage of ‗Word (or Logos) Christology‘ in
order to speak most directly about the Christian development of Logos theology. I, therefore, avoid the
Gnostic systems as part of the trajectory which I describe. Pheme Perkins comments on the distinction
between ―catholic‖ and Gnostic Logos Christologies: ―When compared with other second century Christian
writers, Gnostic Logos Christology is peculiar in its refusal to identify the Logos with the highest God or
with an incarnate Christ,‖ in her ―Logos Christologies in the Nag Hammadi Codices,‖ VC 35 (1981): 382.
2
The inclusion of ―Christology‖ in the phrase ―Word Christology‖ means that all of the topics
associated with the Incarnation have a place in this tradition.
3
For the scope of this dissertation, I will not be covering all the topics of Word Christology, such
as Christological anthropology. My more modest goal will be to lay emphasis on the relationship between
the Father and the Son.
4
Although Theophilus may have known Justin‘s work, Irenaeus certainly knew both of them.
Hippolytus and Tertullian used Irenaeus‘ writings, and most scholars agree that a literary relationship also
exists between Tertullian and Hippolytus. Irenaeus refers to the work of Justin in 4.6.2 as well as 5.26.2.
For Irenaeus‘ use of Theophilus, see Anthony Briggman, ―Dating Irenaeus‘ Acquisition of Theophilus‘
Correspondence To Autolycus: A Pneumatological Perspective‖ StPatr 45 (2010): 397-402. See the my
Introduction for comments related to the Hippolytean corpus, in the section ―The Roman environment and
Novatian‘s sources.‖
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I will show in this chapter the development of Word Christology in light of
attempts to connect the Son to the transcendant Father. This development cannot be
viewed as linear in terms of later orthodox positions. The point of the current chapter is
to lay out the variety of forms which Word theology took, especially those Christian
forms familiar to Novatian. I suggest that Novatian looked at these sources as equally
worthy of theological authority. The choices Novatian makes to follow central
theological teachings in Justin and Tertullian‘s work, especially Herm., witnesses to the
fact that Novatian did not share the scholarly fixation on the trajectory of an advancing
orthodox Word Christology, which can be found on occasion.
For example, although scholars often assess Tertullian‘s writings as a watershed
in Trinitarian thinking (based in no small part on his articulation of Word Christology in
his later writings), much of this assessment stands on his theology in Prax. I cover Prax.
in this chapter to analyize specific themes with which Novatian was familiar, even though
I will argue that he did not accept all of them. I believe that Novatian disagrees with
some of Tertullian‘s principle theological assertions concerning the nature of the
relationship between the Father and Son. To make my case in chapters 6 and 7 for my
understanding of Novatian‘s theology of the Son, I will point to Tertullian‘s Herm. as the
primary influence on Novatian. Herm. places its theological emphasis on the uniqueness
of the transcendent Father, and I believe that Novatian‘s theology stands within this
trajectory.
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Prior to its use in Christian theology, some philosophers began incorporating
logos language into discussions of divine immanence and divine transcendence.5
Therefore, I will start this chapter with a brief look at Logos theology in the philosophical
traditions. My purpose in tying the philosophical use of logos language to Word
Christology arises from the conscious effort on the part of the Christian authors with
whom I deal to compare similarities between the Gospel and philosophy. All of the
Christian authors I present clearly demonstrate the influence of philosophy in their
writings.
I will also touch on Philo of Alexandria‘s Logos theology. Although his influence
on Christian authors remains far from certain, Philo‘s Logos theology includes a
personalization of the logos. Some scholars argue that this development arises from a
Middle Platonic influence. Since we do not possess many Middle Platonic texts of this
period, Philo‘s works provide a possible intellectual bridge for judging early Middle
Platonism‘s influence on Christian Word theology. Finally, I will sketch the
development of Word Christology up to Novatian‘s time. In this tradition, authors
advance different forms of Word Christology as a means of expressing the relationship
between divine transcendence and divine immanence.
The Gospel of John, especially the Prologue, provides the primary basis for the
identification of Jesus the Son as the Word of God. John‘s Gospel quickly became the
source of varied theological speculation throughout the West and the East.6 For example,
Heracleon, the well known Valentinian, was the first author to write a commentary on

5

Numerous studies treat divine transcendence, divine immanence, or the relationship between
them. See for example Armstrong and Markus, Christian Faith, chapters 1-3; Prestige, God in Patristic
Thought, chapters 2 and 6; and Osborn‘s, Emergence of Christian Theology, chapters 4 and 6.
6
Pollard, Johannine Christology, 52.
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John.7 Several 2nd and 3rd century authors used John‘s Gospel to connect the Johannine
logos with Old Testament passages about God‘s Word and Law.8 This situation as allow
some authors, such as D. Boyarin, to offer accounts of competing Jewish and Christian
exegetical traditions of Old Testament passages related to various forms of Logos
theologies.9 Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Novatian make the Gospel of John central to
their formulation of Christology as did the Monarchians.10 I defer from commenting on
either John‘s Gospel or other scriptural texts until later chapters when I will contextualize
the use of such passages, specifically in Trin.

Logos Theology in Philosophy

The Stoics used logos language to differentiate between a logos endiathetos
(ελδηάζεηνs--internal rationalization or mathematical ratio) and a logos prophorikos
(πξνθνξηθόs--external expression, or voice).11 At times, the Stoics identified the logos

7

Maurice Wiles. The Spiritual Gospel: The interpretation of the fourth gospel in the early church
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 3.
8
Mark J. Edwards notes the scholarship on both Justin and Melito in analyzing the connection
between Nomos and Logos, in ―Justin‘s Logos and the Word of God,‖ JECS 3:3 (1995), 266. Citing W.
Rordorf‘s, ―Christus als Nomos und Logos‖ in A. M. Ritter (ed.), Kerygma und Logos (Gottingen:
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1979), 424-434, Edwards identifies Isa. 2:3 and Mic. 4:2 for the connection
between law and word: ―there shall come forth a law and word from Zion.‖ Edwards however also points
out that, ―We cannot prove that Justin was acquainted with rabbinic thought, or even with the Fourth
Gospel, but the Johannine terms for Christ were in his own vocabulary,‖ Idem., 266, and see n. 23 for
scholarship. Edwards therefore affirms the idea that the language of Logos theology was well established
in the ancient intellectual and religious world.
9
Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines: The Partition of Judeao-Christianity (Philadelphia, PA: The
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
10
Heine, along with others, believes that Origen returned from Rome also with a special interest in
weighing in on the theological debate, which included the heavy dependence upon the Gospel of John. He
therefore began his Commentary on John shortly after his return to Alexandria, ―Christology of Callistus,‖
57-58.
11
Adam Kamesar explains that precedents for this distinction appear in both Plato and Aristotle,
though scholars mostly agree that later philosophers treated these ideas as part of Stoic thinking. See Adam
Kamesar, ―The Logos Endiathetos and the Logos Prophorikos in Allegorical Interpretation: Philo and the
D-Scholia to the Iliad,‖ GRBS 44 (2004): 163-181, esp. 163-64, for the related scholarly literature on this
question. See also Goodenough who notes, ―The terms were logical technicalities used to distinguish
between thought in the mind and thought expressed verbally,‖ Theology of Justin Martyr, 19.
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prophorikos within their system as a sound which strikes the air.12 This understanding of
the logos identifies how the Stoics explained the formulation of rational thought and the
physical expression of words.13
Stoic logos language provides possible evidence for the outgrowth of a
personalized divine figure, found in some Middle Platonic works. Such a development
depends upon the Middle Platonic incorporation of the Stoic doctrine regarding divine
all-pervasiveness. Stoic thought affirmed the divine as a spiritually material nature and
as entirely coterminous with the world. Diogenes Laertius notes, ―The substance of God
is declared by Zeno to be the whole world and the heaven, as well as by Chrysippus in his
first book Of the Gods, and by Posidonius in his first book with the same title.‖14
Stoicism rejected the ideal, immaterial world of Platonism as well as the Aristotelian
conception of the unmoved mover God.15 Stoicism‘s emphasis on divine immanence
offered a way of combining the Platonic transcendence of the ideal world with a view of
divinity capable of coming in contact with the world.16

12

Diogenes Laertius‘s description of this topic includes the notions of voice and sound. In Lives
of Eminent Philosophers 7.55, he notes that ―Voice (θσλὴ) according to the Stoics is something
corporeal…For whatever produces an effect is a body (ζῶκα).‖ He then equates Logos to sound in 7.56.
Diogenes appears to be describing, through different terminology, the distinction already noted between
logos endiathetos and logos prophorikos.
13
Daniélou questions the specific Stoic origins of the logos endiathetos and prophorikos. He
believes that the absence of such terminology (attribution of these terms to the divine Logos) in Philo and
all pre-Christian writers ―suggests that it derives rather from a language common to all philosophical
schools, without any particular association with Stoicism,‖ Gospel Message, 353-54.
14
Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 7.148.
15
Osborn notes that Stoics attempted to balance immanent theology while still speaking of the
divine through negative theology: ―Stoics were philosophers of the divine existence, of a God who was
immanent and yet whose transcendence was maintained by a negative tradition,‖ Emergence of Christian
Theology, 115.
16
Reydams-Schils writes, ―Plato‘s scheme could be reduced to two components, an active one
comprising Being, the Demiurge, and the World Soul, and a passive one, a corollary to Plato‘s receptacle.
According to our sources, this is precisely what the Stoics did. They took up the challenge of the Timaeus
and subsequent debates. The active principle in the framework of the Stoic theory is rational, divine and
immanent: the divine reason/rationale (ιόγνο), constantly operating with the universe, structures an
unqualified, passive matter into the entities which constitute our world,‖ Demiurge and Providence, 43.
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Stoic cosmology also described a distinction between an active principle (the
divine) and a passive one (the elemental universe).17 The Stoics referred to the divine
under numerous categories, sometimes as a primordial element such as creative fire (pur
technikon) or spirit (pneuma).18 At other times the divine was given traditional religious
names, such as ―Zeus,‖ and still yet as attributes or even concepts such as ―fate.‖19
Apart from a variety of names for the divine, Stoicism made certain attributes of
the divine‘s nature central to their thinking. No Stoic could conceive of the divine apart
from reason and rationality. Diogenes Laertius writes, ―The deity, say they [Stoics], is a
living being, immortal, rational (ινγηθόλ), perfect or intelligent in happiness, admitting
nothing evil [into him], taking providential care of the world and all that therein is, but he
is not of human shape.‖20 I make special note of the inclusion of rationality in this
description of divinity. In Stoic thinking, man‘s own logos (endiathetos and
prophorikos) modeled the activity of the divine. However, the term logos itself appears
to be infrequently used as one of the many names of the deity,21 even if logos (reason)
and physis (nature) are, according to A.A. Long, ―the two fundamental concepts in
17

These distinctions were intellectually separable though the doctrine of divine all-pervasiveness
meant that such separation was an intellectual affair rather than reflective of actuality. See Michael
Lapidge, ―Stoic Cosmology,‖ in The Stoics, Ed. John M. Rist (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1978): 161-86, and White, ―Stoic Natural Philosophy,‖ 124-52.
18
White, ―Stoic Natural Philosophy,‖ 133-4.
19
Diogenes Laertius states, ―God is one and the same with Reason, Fate, and Zeus; he is also
called by many other names,‖ Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 7.135-136
20
Lives of Eminent Philosophers. 7.147.
21
Reydams-Schils translates a quotation from S.V.F., 1, 160: ―Zeno labeled the one who is
responsible of the order in nature and who is the craftsman of the universe ιόγνο, also calling him fate,
necessity of things, god and soul of Jupiter‖ (Zeno rerum naturae dispositorem atque artificem universitatis
ιόγνλ praedicat, quem et fatum et necessitatem rerum et deum et animum Iovis nuncupat), in Demiurge
and Providence, 43. White notes, ―Once one, as a Stoic, has come to understand the essential unity and
cohesion of ‗the whole‘, it might seem considerably less significant which of the following terms one uses
to designate the ‗active aspect‘ of that essentially corporeal whole: pur, to hegemonikon, pneuma, theos,
nous, sperma, hexis, or tonike kinesis. Although there are contextual differences, subtle or not so subtle,
among these terms, there is a sense in which one is referring to the same (corporeal) thing or ‗stuff‘ by all
of them; and one is connoting that stuff under its active aspect,‖ in ―Stoic Natural Philosophy,‖ 136. Stead
adds, ―With the Stoics, logos could stand for the supreme divinity in his capacity as a rational, ordering
principle,‖ Philosophy, 139.

145
Stoicism.‖22 This can be explained by the fact that all the names used for divinity by the
Stoics presupposed rationality as a characteristic. Therefore, Stoics used logos language
(and related terms associated with rationality and intelligence) to describe a central
attribute of divinity.
Some scholars note that Chrysippus made a special connection between logos and
pneuma.23 The Stoic identification of divinity as an all-pervasive, variously-named
rational principle makes Chrysippus‘ connection reasonably clear. The Stoic use of
reason, spirit, mind, etc. characterizes the active (divine) principle in the universe.
Without a doctrine of an ideal world above and apart from the world of matter, some
Stoics embraced logos language to describe immanent divine activity, since they rejected
divine transcendence.
Like the Stoics, some Middle Platonists made use of similar personal and
impersonal names for the divine.24 Middle Platonists, however, linked such concepts to
their teachings concerning divine immanence and divine transcendence. In Middle
Platonism, the typical formulation of the divine‘s contact with the world revolved around
intermediaries of one sort or another.25 Plato himself spoke in a hierarchical and tripartite

22

A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. 2nd Ed. (Berkley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), 120.
23
Lappidge speaks of the foregoing interconnectedness of terms, stating, ―In Chrysippus‘ system,
pneuma becomes equivalent to god and equivalent to divine reason: either nous or logos,‖ ―Stoic
Cosmology, 170. Josiah B. Gould likewise notes that for Chrysippus, pneuma has a function ―similar, if
not identical, to that assigned to the active power, logos, or god,‖ in his The Philosophy of Chrysippus
(Leiden: Brill, 1970), 102. Aetius (1.7.33) also offers a comment to this effect when he states, ―the Stoics
made god out to be intelligent, a designing fire…and a breath pervading the whole world, which takes on
different names owing to the alterations of the matter through which it passes.‖
24
Edwards comments that the term Middle Platonism ―is a convenient designation for those
philosophers who wrote before Plotinus and exhibit an important debt to Plato,‖ in ―Justin‘s Logos,‖ 264.
He further points out that most of the philosophers labeled as Middle Platonists probably did not know each
other‘s works and that we must be wary of attributing the thought of one author to any others.
25
For example in his De deo Socr. 1-5, Apuleius speaks of the highest god, visible gods, radiant
gods as well as the middle powers called daemons. See also Alcinous‘ created gods or daemons who
administer the universe according to God‘s will and command in Did. 15.1-2.
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manner about divinity in several important places. This tripartition was sometimes
expressed as God, ideas, and matter.26 J. Dillon notes that some Middle Platonists made
a distinction between a First God (the Highest) and Second God (the Demiurge or
Creator).27 He argues that this connection came about by Middle Platonists who attached
Stoic logos language to the understanding of the Demiurge.28 Dillon‘s analysis connects
the transcendent Supreme God with the Middle Platonic need for identifying the
Demiurge as ―closer‖ to the universe than was logically possible for the Supreme God.
Some of the Middle Platonic works we possess from this period describe the
Demiurge in personal language. These sources portray a hierarchy of gods in which the
Supreme God wills creation and the second god, of a slightly lesser transcendence
creates. It is the lesser degree of the second god‘s divinity which apparently allowed for

26

Plato spoke of divinity within the hierarchy of the God, the ideas, and matter based upon the
concept of greater or lesser Being vs. Becoming (see Timaeus 27d5–28a1). All three were seen as eternal
by definition since they all shared in Being, yet there existed a hierarchy of Being amongst them which
indicated God as the highest divinity. All things (including man) could claim a relationship with the divine
in so far as man reflected or participated in Being (typically through expressions about the mind). Yet to
the extent that man was not eternal, he was categorized as involved with the flux of the Becoming world
and therefore not divine and not eternal. A version of such theology is given by Varro, a student of
Antiochus of Ascalon, ―God is the soul of the universe, and this universe is God. But just as a wise man,
though consisting of body and mind, is called wise because of his mind, so the universe is called God
because of its mind, though it likewise consists of mind and body,‖ quoted in Dillon, Middle Platonists, 90.
For comments about the Gnostic evaluation of the eternal forms/models in contrast to the Middle Platonic
association of the forms as the eternal thoughts of the Creator, see E. P. Meirjering, ―Irenaeus‘ Relation to
Philosophy in the Light of His Concept of Free Will,‖ in God Being History (Amsterdam: North-Holland,
1975), 20.
27
Dillon, Middle Platonists, 48. Meirjering, ―Irenaeus‘ Relation to Philosophy,‖ 19-30, sees a
shift in Middle Platonic thinking with the understanding that the ideas are the eternal thoughts of the
Creator.
28
Dillon‘s contention that Middle Platonists took over Stoic Logos language and thus added a
personalized dimension to the Creator has not always been held. See for example Evans, who writes, ―But
they [Christian writers] can hardly have been unaware that lo,goj in the philosophers is neither speech nor
reason, far less a divine person (though they designate it ‗god‘—for god to them is depersonalized), but is
little more than mathematical ratio,‖ Tertullian‟s Treatise, 32. This limited portrayal of Logos language is
not accurate according to the majority of scholars.
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the act of creating the world and thus engaging with the world of Becoming.29 J. R.
Lyman explains,
Taking on the dynamism of Stoic cosmology, Middle Platonists affirmed divine
purpose and power in the world, yet within the definitions of the transcendent and
rational nature of the divine. Activity itself was thus increasingly relegated to the
second principle, described as word (ιόγνο) or mind (λνϋο), in order to protect the
transcendence and simplicity of the first principle.30
Some Middle Platonists held to the idealism of a transcendent world, but allowed for an
avenue of divine contact with the world through the creator god, as well as
intermediaries. This creator god and the intermediaries were still understood as gods, but
were seen as possessing a lesser degree of divinity, thus enabling them to have contact
with the universe.
Some scholars see the Platonic Second Epistle as the basis for a Middle Platonic
association between some of the language related to the logos in Stoicism and the second
god.31 The Second Epistle alludes to the divine tripartition described above: ―The matter
stands thus: Related to the King of All are all things, and for his sake they are, and of all
things fair He is the cause. And related to the Second are the second things; and related

29

See Hans Dörrie, ―Formula Analogiae: An exploration of a Theme in Hellenistic and Imperial
Platonism,‖ in Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought. Ed. by H. J. Blumentahl and R. A. Markus
(London: Variorum Publications LTD, 1981), 33-4, for comments on the analogy between Being/Becoming
and knowledge/faith in Timaeus 29c and Republic 6.509d, 6.510a, and 7.534a.
30
J. Rebecca Lyman. Christology and Cosmology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 14.
31
Although scholarship agrees that this letter is spurious, ancient philosophers, including Plotinus,
treated it as genuine. See Plotinus, Enneids V.1.8.1-10 . Steven K. Strange, states, ―Given the close
connection of fragment 221F with the beginning of Ennead V.1.8, we may suspect that fragment 222F too
is connected with the same Ennead chapter, where Plotinus cites (Enn. V. 1.8,1-4) the same passage of the
Pseudo-Platonic Epistle II concerning the ‗Three Kings‘ (312e) that Porphyry quotes in 222F. However,
Porphyry unlike Plotinus quotes Plato‘s text directly rather than paraphrasing (and does so fairly accurately,
with only minor variation from our received text of the Epistle) and makes clear what Plotinus does not,
that the three kings are the same as the ‗three gods‘ of Numenius of Apamea, whereas Plotinus picks out
only a few key phrases from the Epistle,‖ in ―Porphyry and Plotinus‘ Metaphysics,‖ in G. Karamanolis and
A. Sheppard, eds., Studies on Porphyry, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supplementary
Volume 98 (2007), 26.
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to the Third the third.‖ 32 Some authors in the ancient world apparently viewed this
passage as referring to three gods. According to Proclus‘ account, Numenius of
Apameia, a Platonic and Pythagorean philosopher of the 2nd century A.D., developed a
tripartition of the divine, with the first two being personalized. Concerning Numenius‘
doctrines, Proclus writes: ―Numenius proclaims three gods, calling the first ‗Father,‘ the
second ‗Creator,‘ and the third ‗Creation;‘ for the cosmos, according to him, is the third
god. So, according to him, the Demiurge is double, being both the first god and the
second, and the third god is the object of his demiurgic activity.‖33 A. Droge suggests
that Numenius‘ doctrine on this count was based on the Second Epistle, since Numenius
also quotes another portion of this epistle.34
If Proclus is correct, then Numenius advocated three gods to address the topics of
divine transcendence and immanence. The transcendent Supreme God creates by way of
the second god, the Demiurge, while divine immanence is held through the doctrine that
the world itself is a god and that the Demiurge has contact with it. As noted above, the
Stoics did not need a link between logos language and divine, demiurgic activity because
of the central tenet of divine, corporeal immanence. Numenius‘ theology takes the
demiurgic functions found within Stoic Logos theology as indicative of the functions of
the first and second god. Although both gods share a demiurgic role, the inherent
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Plato, vol. 7 Loeb. Trans. R. G. Bury. Rev. 1952 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1952), 411. Justin, 1 Apol. 60, also refers to part of this passage: ―For he [Plato] gives the second place to
the logos who is with God, who, he said, was place Chi-wise in the universe, and the third to the Spirit who
was said to be borne over the water, saying, ‗And the third around the third.‘‖ Justin argues that all
similarities found in philosophy to the mysteries of Christianity derive from imitation and/or corruption of
the scriptures.
33
Frag. 21, Translated in Dillon, Middle Platonists, 366-367.
34
Arthur J. Droge, ―Justin Martyr and the Restoration of Philosophy,‖ CH 56 (1987), 310.
Numenius quotes the Second Epistle 312e in Fragment 24.
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hierarchy reveals the traces of a tripartition of divinity according to Academic tradition.
Numenius‘ contribution appears to be the personalization of the second god.
Because few Middle Platonic sources have survived, it is difficult to determine
whether Numenius‘ doctrines were unique. However, another example makes an explicit
connection between the logos and a divine figure. Dillon takes note of several elements
in Plutarch‘s On Isis and Osiris which appear to make a connection between Hermes and
the logos.35 Justin also acknowledges the connection in philosophical works, when he
states:
Moreover, the Son of God called Jesus, even if only a man by ordinary
generation, yet, on account of His wisdom, is worthy to be called the Son of God;
for all writers call God the Father of men and gods. And if we assert that the
Word of God was born of God in a peculiar manner, different from ordinary
generation, let this, as said above, be no extraordinary thing to you, who say that
Mercury is the angelic word of God. [1 Apol. 22]36
Justin‘s comments demonstrate that the broader religious environment accepted a
hypostasized portrayal of the logos figure (in this case as Hermes).
R. M. Price criticizes Dillon‘s analysis as ―seriously misleading.‖ He argues that
Dillon cannot present much evidence for an emphasis on the logos found within Middle
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Platonism.37 Dillon acknowledges the limitations of the evidence. After commenting on
Plutarch, Dillon states, ―Logos-theology, then, has at least a foothold in Platonism in the
Middle Platonic period, but it is not, perhaps, the dominant pattern.‖38 Though perhaps
not dominant, several examples during the period up to the 3rd century A.D. contain
references to the mind, intelligence, and/or reason of god functioning as a personality. 39
For this reason, most scholars continue to reflect a judgment similar to Dillon‘s and
others who have made similar arguments. For example, Goodenough, who wrote before
Dillon, made the same point,
The Logos then in all circles but the Stoic, and often apparently even in Stoicism,
was a link of some kind which connected a transcendent Absolute with the world
and humanity. Logos came into general popularity because of the wide-spread
desire to conceive of God as transcendent and yet immanent at the same time.40
In all of the examples discussed above, the Logos, whether as a principle or a personal
figure, functions as something of an intermediary between the supreme God and the
creation.

Philo
Philo‘s writings demonstrate a thorough education in both pagan philosophic
thought and Jewish exegetical training, as well as a particular interest in logos language.
Wolfson, for example, pointed to numerous connections between Philo‘s thought and
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contemporary Hellenistic philosophy, especially Logos theology.41 Other scholars from
the middle of the 20th century concluded that Philo derived his Logos theology from his
Jewish background. R. Holte, for example, produced compelling evidence which
demonstrates that Philo‘s ideas about the logos are consistent with a common pool of
rabbinic exegetical speculations from the same period.42 Taken as a whole, no group of
scholars has been able to conclusively exclude the probability that both philosophical and
Jewish sources influenced Philo‘s ideas about Logos theology.
As noted above, some Middle Platonists connected Logos theology either to the
Demiurge or to demiurgic activity.43 An example of this teaching in Philo‘s work comes
from De opificio mundi 5.20,
As therefore the city, when previously shadowed out in the mind of the man of
architectural skill had no external place, but was stamped solely in the mind of the
workman, so in the same manner neither can the world which existed in ideas
have had any other local position except the divine reason [logos] which made
them.44
The logos in this case refers to a kind of personified power of God (the workman).45
According to this idea, God plans and executes demiurgic activity with His logos.
Connected to the demiurgic activity of the logos is Philo‘s determination that the
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incomprehensible God is known through His works. This makes the activities of the
logos essential to knowledge about God.46
In addition to the use of logos as a creative power, Philo also refers to it in terms
of divine sonship. In De confusione linguarum 63, Philo states, ―For the Father of the
universe has caused him to spring up as the eldest son, whom, in another passage, he
[Moses] calls the first-born; and he who is thus born, imitating the ways of his father, has
formed such and such species, looking to his archetypal patterns.‖47 A. Grillmeier
concludes, ―Philo‘s Logos speculation is the most far-reaching attempt at the
hypostatization of Wisdom (or of the Logos) within the Hebrew tradition.‖48 And yet,
Philo may not to have been alone in personalizing the logos in terms of sonship. A
comment by Origen may also suggest that Celsus, the Middle Platonic philosopher, spoke
in a similar way.49 Such evidence proves only that Christianity developed in an
intellectual environment which provided examples of a connection between a
personalized divine logos (sometimes with overtones of divine sonship) and demiurgic
activity. Scholars also continue to weigh in on the possible influence which Philo‘s
writings had on the Gospel of John50 as well as Word Christology in general.51
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Justin
The debate over the sources of Justin‘s Word Christology is as wide-ranging in
opinion as that over the sources of Philo‘s Logos theology.52 E. Evans called it ―perverse
ingenuity‖ to look for Greek sources behind Justin‘s Word Christology.53 L. W. Barnard
disagreed, saying that Justin ―is more influenced by prevailing philosophical speculation
than the writer of the Fourth Gospel.‖54 H. B. Timothy offered specific responses to, and
a rejection of, several of Evans‘ points.55 R. M. Price challenged the suggestion of
philosophic influence, stating, ―The easy and frequent use of ‗Logos‘ as a title of the Son
came to Justin not from Greek philosophy but from the constant mention of the ‗word of
God‘ in the Old Testament, as transmitted to him in the Greek of the Septuagint and
developed by such Jewish biblical commentators as Philo.‖56 R. M. Grant came to a
similar conclusion as Price, though he thinks Justin did not know Philo.57 Barnard
concluded, ―It would be fair to say that there is a wide divergence of opinion among
scholars on this question.‖58 The basis of the foregoing debate arises out of Justin‘s
possible exposure to nearly all the sources of Logos theology. 59
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Justin is one of the first writers to extensively describe Jesus within a Word
Christology framework.60 He writes, ―Jesus Christ is the only proper Son who has been
begotten by God, being His Word and first-begotten, and power; and, becoming man
according to His will, He taught us these things for the conversion and restoration of the
human race.‖61 I will discuss three topics associated with the contents of this passage.
The first will address the role of the Father‘s will in bringing forth the Word, and the
second will treat Justin‘s understanding of the relationship of the Word as the Father‘s
only-begotten Word. The third topic concerns the link Justin makes between
―restoration‖ and ―creation‖ through the Word. In Justin‘s theology, both of these ideas
(creation and restoration) relate to his understanding that the Word is God‘s immanent
presence while the Father remains transcendent.62
The first and second topics, the will of God in generating the Word and the
manner by which the Word is of God, are closely connected. Addressing one naturally
brings up the need to address the other. I begin with Justin‘s repeated assertions that the
Word originates from the will of the Father. Wolfson identifies Justin as holding a Twostage theory of the Logos.63 By this Wolfson means that Justin follows Philo and others
in a specific identification of the Logos existing in the Father and then coming forth from

origins open up the likely possibility that he knew Jewish exegetical traditions. Justin‘s contact with or
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see Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, 108-113.
61
Apol. 1.23. θαὶ Ἰεζνῦο Χξηζηὸο κόλνο ἰδίσο πἱὸο ηῷ ζεῷ γεγέλλεηαη, ιόγνο αὐηνῦ ὑπάξρσλ θαὶ
πξσηόηνθνο θαὶ δύλακηο, θαὶ ηῇ βνπιῇ αὐηνῦ γελόκελνο ἄλζξσπνο ηαῦηα ἡκᾶο ἐδίδαμελ ἐπ‘ ἀιιαγῇ θαὶ
ἐπαλαγσγῇ ηνῦ ἀλζξσπείνπ γέλνπο.
62
Justin identifies Jesus Christ as the divine Word who creates, appears to man prior to the
Incarnation, and also enacts the Father‘s will to redeem man through the Incarnation. Daniélou considered
Justin to be one of the Apologists, thus leading him to, in my opinion, downplay this topic. He writes,
―Furthermore, in their treatment of this divine activity in the world the emphasis was more on its
cosmological than on its soteriological aspect,‖ Gospel Message, 345.
63
Wolfson, Philosophy of the Church Fathers, 192-93.

155
out of the Father.64 As will be noted later, Two-stage theories often reject a personal
distinction of the Word in the first stage, whereas a Single-stage model usually attempts
to describe an eternal generation of the Word from the Father, and thus an eternal
distinction.
Justin teaches that Jesus Christ is the second God who enacts God‘s will
throughout all of history. I make this point because Justin names the Word prior to the
Incarnation often as Christ and at least once as Jesus.65 The obvious issue is the temporal
one: Justin employs the name Jesus and the title Christ to the pre-incarnate Word. His
willingness to use Jesus, the Word, and Christ interchangeably demonstrates his
understanding that all three names designate one and the same person.66 In fact, all the
names and titles attributable to the Son come directly from the will of the Father. Justin
sees the titles, Glory of the Lord, Son, Wisdom, Angel, God, Lord, Word, Commanderin-chief as belonging to the Son. ―He can justly lay claim to all these titles,‖ Justin
asserts, ―from the fact that He performs the Father‘s will and also that He was begotten
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by an act of the Father‘s will.‖67 Justin equates the will of the Father with the Son‘s
begotten nature as well as with the Son acting on the Father‘s will.
In regard to the two stages of the Logos, Justin unites the creation of the world
with the Father‘s begetting of the Son. Proverbs 8 provides the justification for this
connection, and it includes the very important passage: ―The Lord begot Me in the
beginning of His ways for His works. I was set up from eternity, before He made the
earth, and before He made the depths…Before all the hills, He begets Me.‖68 This
portion of Proverbs, specifically 8.22, reappears frequently in the next several centuries
of Christological debates. Goodenough notes, ―…Justin says the Logos is Son of God
because God wills it. Indeed all of the glory and power which the Logos possesses is
His, not by His own right but by the will of the Father.‖69 God the Father wills to beget
the Logos, to whom the Father bestows glory and power, in order for the Word to act as
an agent of creation.
Although Justin emphasizes the Father‘s will in establishing the Word as a second
God, he does not outright suggest the Son‘s eternality. Justin puts the singularity of the
eternal Father at the forefront of his theology. It is arguable that Justin teaches the shared
and common nature of the Father and the Son (i.e. ―fire from fire‖), while also holding to
a temporal subordination of the Son to the Father.
Justin uses two primary metaphors for explaining the manner by which the Son
comes from the Father, the second topic in this section. He compares the Father
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begetting the Word to the sun and its light and also a fire lighting another fire. He uses
the first of these metaphors in Dial. 128.3-4 when he writes that the Scriptures,
―call Him the Word, because He carries tidings from the Father, just as they say
that the light of the sun on earth is indivisible and inseparable from the sun in the
heavens; as when it sinks, the light sinks along with it; so the Father, when He
chooses, say they, causes His power (δύλακηλ) to spring forth, and when He
chooses, He makes it return to Himself.‖
The act of the Father choosing to send forth His power relates to the subject of God‘s will
mentioned above.70 In addition, this passage also demonstrates that Justin believes that
God‘s will to send forth the Word can be just as readily associated with the Father‘s will
to return that power to Himself. Justin‘s metaphor of the sun and its light establishes the
will of the Father as omnipotent, even in relation to the Son. Furthermore, it is evident
that the Son‘s glory and power are manifested by his obedience to perform the Father‘s
will.
Justin also makes it clear that the Father can will to offer any creature permanent
existence. Jews, Christians, and some Platonists shared the speculation that God can will
immortality for mortal things and creatures.71 Jews, including Trypho,72 and Christians
embraced such a notion mostly because Scripture guaranteed eternal life to some.73 On
the other hand, some Academic philosophers held to this possibility even under a barrage
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of ridicule from Stoics and Aristotelians.74 Justin suggests, for example, that some of the
angels have been made and are never reduced in their power. Furthermore, according to
Justin, the Son is to be especially attributed with immortality.
Justin‘s second metaphor implies that while the Word comes from the will of
God, it also shares a kind of special equality with the Father not found among other
immortal beings. Justin states:
When I asserted that this power was begotten from the Father, by His power and
will, but not by abscission, as if the essence of the Father were divided; as all
other things partitioned and divided are not the same after as before they were
divided: and, for the sake of example, I took the case of fires kindled from a fire,
which we see to be distinct from it, and yet that from which many can be kindled
is by no means made less, but remains the same. [Dial. 128]75
Although Justin identifies a second subject as God, he is less concerned with a detailed
investigation into the shared nature of the Father and Son, and more interested in
avoiding any outright classification of total equality. For this reason Goodenough takes
note of the fact that ―the Logos, in passage after passage is represented as subordinate to
the Father.‖76 But Goodenough also thinks that Justin attempts to balance the metaphors
of the sun and the fire in order to safeguard belief that the Son is rightfully identified as
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God.77 Justin‘s metaphors provide one form of argument for his claims that the Logos is
God. The Logos is uniquely begotten of the Father and uniquely does the will of the
Father, not the least of which includes the activities of creation and redemption.
I turn now to the third topic in this section. Justin‘s treatment of the Word as the
agent of redemption begins with his identification of the Word as the agent of creation.78
After quoting Genesis 1:1-3, Justin states, ―So that both Plato and they who agree with
him, and we ourselves, have learned, and you also can be convinced, that by the word of
God the whole world was made out of the substance79 spoken of before by Moses.‖80
Justin notes that the creative activity of the Word is common property to the intellectual
world of philosophers.81 As seen above, Philo‘s writings also embraced this idea.
However, when Justin historicized the Word through the Incarnation as the man Jesus he
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shocked the Jews82 and challenged the philosophical presuppositions of educated
pagans.83
Justin makes Jesus the linchpin of all divine activity on earth. Since Justin is
speaking to Jews in the Dial., he attempts to show that the Old Testament‘s prophecies
only make sense when Jesus is seen as the center of the Scriptures and the fulfillment of
God‘s plans. Jesus is the promised Messiah,84 but He is also God and not simply an
anointed man.85 Justin anchors his theology of divine immanence on the same aspects of
topological theology presented in chapter 4. For example, Justin says, ―For, the Ineffable
Father and Lord of all neither comes to any place, nor walks, nor sleeps, nor arises, but
always remains in His place, wherever it may be, acutely seeing and hearing, not with
eyes or ears, but with a power beyond description.‖86 His understanding of divine
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that Jesus existed eternally, he is undoubtedly the foretold Messiah for he submitted to the Father‘s will.
The pattern of the Son‘s action, whether as cosmic Logos appearing for the Father to the patriarchs of the
Hebrew Scriptures or as the incarnate Jesus obedient to God‘s command, was therefore the same,‖
Christology and Cosmology, 24-5.
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Dial. 127. See Ps.-Aristotle who uses similar language in Mund. 6: ―For God is indeed the
preserver of all things and the creator of everything in this cosmos however it is brought to fruition; but he
does not take upon himself the toil of a creature that works and labours for itself, but uses an indefatigable
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immanence begins with the assertion that the Father cannot be the divine figure who
reveals Himself in a particular place.
When it comes to the theophanies, Justin‘s twofold approach includes 1) denying
the Jews the possibility that the Father became present on earth, while simultaneously 2)
affirming that the Scriptures declare God‘s presence. Justin therefore speaks of the
theophanies as manifestations of the Word rather than manifestations of the Father.87 For
example, in response to Trypho‘s suggestion that the burning bush was an episode
involving an angel and the voice of God, Justin replies, ―Thus, even if there were two
persons, as you claim, an Angel and God, yet no one with even the slightest intelligence
would dare to assert that the Creator and Father of all things left His super-celestial
realms to make Himself visible in a little spot on earth.‖88 Justin‘s understanding of the
Father‘s nature demands a necessary transcendence from the world.89 He expresses this
transcendence in part through topological theology. In order to discuss God‘s
immanence, Justin turns to the theological proposition that the Father begets the Word in
order to create the world, appear in it, and then redeem it.90
I conclude this section by making one point about the role Justin assigns to the
Spirit. Earlier, I described ‗spirit‘ as enjoying the near universal acceptance of naming
power, by means of which he controls even things that seem a great way off. God has his home in the
highest and first place…‖
87
Osborn observes, ―Justin‘s account of the divine theophanies is important for both Judaism and
Christianity, presenting a common front against the super-celestial tendencies of Gnosticism,‖ Emergence
of Christian Theology, 184. Philippe Henne, ―Pour Justin, Jésus est-il un autre dieu?‖ RSPT 81 (1997): 5768, argues that Justin uses the theophanies in order to declare a second, distinct divine figure along with the
transcendent Father.
88
Dial. 60. Theophanic examples were a point of discussion within both Judaism and philosophy
in general. Justin‘s comments regarding the ultimate God would in this case match the tendency within
Judaism and Platonism to affirm a transcendent God. See also Dial. 56 and 127.
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Mortley, From Word to Silence (2), 34.
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Grillmeier connects ―the Word made flesh with the pre-existenct Logos, who is also the
mediator of creation and revelation,‖ Christ in Christian Tradition, 90. See also Carl Andresen, Logos und
Nomos (Berlin: 1955), 312-44 as well as his ―Justin und der mittlere Platonismus,‖ ZAW 44 (1952/53): 15795, for an extended analysis of Justin‘s connection to Middle Platonism.
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the divine nature or specifically the divine substance among some philosophers and Jews.
The philosophical schools‘ doctrines concerning the questions of divine transcendence
and immanence depended in part on the manner by which spirit supposedly interacted
with the world.91 In chapter 2, I pointed to one instance in which Justin seems to have
associated the Word with the term ―spirit‖ in order to speak about immanence.92 Most
often, Justin‘s references to ―spirit‖ or ―Holy Spirit‖ refer to either created spirits, such as
angels, or the agent who evokes or provides prophetic utterances. He repeatedly
emphasizes the freedom of men and angels to follow God‘s command and therefore
accept the eternal life which God is able to freely bestow.93 God‘s gift of eternal life to
man, or man‘s spirit, follows from man‘s choice of obedience. Therefore, Justin‘s
understanding of God‘s immanence in the world depends upon the Word and the Holy
Spirit as agents of His will. This makes the transcendence of the Father a central aspect
of his theology.

Theophilus
In chapter 2, I presented Theophilus‘ Autol. as an important source for negative
theology. Like Justin, Theophilus distinguishes the Word from the Father in the
theophanies because of the Father‘s transcendent nature. Theophilus, for example, takes
up the theophany in Genesis 3 in which God speaks to Adam and walks in the Garden.
Theophilus writes,
91

The Stoic use of the all-pervading pneuma certainly could make a greater claim to divine
immanence over the Middle Platonic theories of divine, albeit spiritual, intermediaries who were
responsible for direct contact with the world.
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One notable example is found in 1 Apol. 33 in which Justin states, ―It is wrong, therefore, to
understand the Spirit and the power of God as anything else than the Word, who is also the first-born of
God, as the foresaid prophet Moses declared; and it was this which, when it came upon the virgin and
overshadowed her, caused her to conceive, not by intercourse, but by power.‖
93
See especially 1 Apol. 10.
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But his Logos, through whom he made all things, who is his Power and Wisdom,
assuming the role of the Father and Lord of the universe, was present in paradise
in the role of God and conversed with Adam. For the divine scripture itself
teaches us that Adam said that he ‗heard the voice‘. What is the ‗voice‘ but the
Logos of God, who is also his Son? (Autol. 2.22).
Like Justin, Theophilus rejects the possibility of the Father‘s presence based on the logic
associated with topological theology:94 the Supreme God and Father of the universe
cannot be confined in a place.95 However, the Father sends the Logos in the ―role of the
Father and Lord of the universe‖ because the Son is able to be immanent in the world and
present in a place.96
Theophilus is the first Christian to use Stoic language in his description of the
Word coming out of the Father.97 Using the term endiathetos, Theophilus states that the
Word was ―always innate (ελδηάζεηνλ) in the heart of God.‖98 This is the language
pioneered by the Stoics, and Theophilus does not fail to complete the second half of the
formulation with the term prophorikos.99 He continues, ―For before anything came into
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Justin‘s Dial. 60 is the example used above.
Autol. 2.3. See also Autol. 2.22 which states, ―Indeed the God and Father of the universe is
unconfined and is not present in a place, for there is no place of his rest [Isa. 66:1].‖
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Autol. 2.22: ―Since the Logos is God and derived his nature from God, whenever the Father of
the universe wills to do so he sends him into some place where he is present and is heard and see. He is
sent by God and is present in a place.‖
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By using such language, Theophilus attempts to frame the procession of the Logos (and Sophia)
out of the Father in language familiar to Autolycus, a non-Christian. See Rick Roger‘s, Theophilus of
Antioch: The Life and Thought of a Second-Century Bishop (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2000), 15-29
for a discussion of the genre and content of Autol.
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Autol. 2.22.
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Grant, Greek Apologists, 167, follows Goodenough and investigates the similarities between
Theophilus‘ description of God with that presented by Philo in De opificio mundi. W. R. Schoedel,
―Theophilus of Antioch,‖ 279-97, effectively countered the argument that Theophilus represents the
thinking of a Jewish Christian community, which was made by Grant. See Schoedel, Curry, ―The
Theogony of Theophilus,‖ 318-26, and Kathleen E. McVey, ―The Use of Stoic Cosmogony in Theophilus
of Antioch‘s Hexaemeron,‖ in Biblical Hermeneutics in Historical Perspective: Studies in Honor of
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the studies mentioned above.
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existence he had this as his Counselor, his own Mind and Intelligence. When God
wished to make what he had planned to make, he generated this Logos, making him
external (πξνθνξηθόλ), as the firstborn of all creation.‖100 Theophilus accepts the Twostage Word theory as expressed in Justin‘s work and conforms it to traditional
philosophic language.101
Theophilus also uses the image of the Logos and Sophia being brought forth out
of God‘s torso. He says, ―Therefore God, having his own Logos innate in his own
bowels, generated him together with his own Sophia, vomiting him forth before
everything else.‖102 There appears to be a dependence on Ps. 109:3 and 44:1-2,103 as well
as a literary connection with Hesiod.104 With this quotation from 2.11 and that mentioned
already from 2.22, in which the Son is stated to reside in God‘s heart until he is brought
forth, Theophilus draws attention to the Father as the source of the Logos (and of
Sophia). Autol. 2.22‘s identification of the Word as Councilor, Mind, and Intelligence,
along with the graphic description of the Word being brought forth out of God,
establishes the intimacy of nature between the Word and the Father. Theophilus does not
speculate on, nor make any suggestion about, the Word‘s personal distinction prior to the
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Autol. 2.22.
Rick Rogers makes a related point to Theophilus and philosophy. When explaining the manner
by which Theophilus expresses the terms such as logos, sophia, and pneuma, Rogers notes, ―It is important
to notice that Theophilus is not writing philosophical theology per se; and therefore, he does not distinguish
what appears to be two separate usages, one describing these terms as representing attributes of God and a
second as divine agency,‖ Theophilus of Antioch: The Life and Thought of a Second-Century Bishop
(Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2000), 74. I do not take Rogers to mean that Theophilus is either
uninterested or unengaged with philosophy, though I am arguing that Theophilus is interacting with
philosophy more that Rogers gives him credit. I am, therefore, not surprised that Rogers does not mention
the background of the logos as endiathetos and prophorikos in the Stoic philosophical tradition.
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See Grant, Theophilus of Antioch: Ad Autolycum, 39.
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Curry‘s work demonstrates that Theophilus relied in language on Hesiod‘s Theogony, thereby
producing a work more dependent on philosophical and pagan religious sources than some scholars, such
as Grant, have been willing to recognize.
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generation from the Father.105 Although he affirms that the Father had within Him
Logos, Sophia, etc., Theophilus‘ theology emphasizes the transcendent Father‘ will to
create and the subsequent generation of the Logos and Sophia.
In most cases, Theophilus refers to the Word as uniquely related to God and also
as the primary instrument of creation.106 In Autol. 2.18, Theophilus identifies the Logos
and Sophia as the hands of God, responsible for creating man. Theophilus states,
For after making everything else by a word, God considered all this as incidental;
he regarded the making of man as the only work worthy of his own hands.
Furthermore, God is found saying ‗Let us make man after the image and likeness‘
as if he needed assistance; but he said ‗Let us make‘ to none other than his own
Logos and his own Sophia.‖ [Autol. 2.18].
God makes the world through His Logos and then mankind with the special dignity of
both the Logos and Sophia. Theophilus does not seem to make a triple hypostatization of
Father, Logos, and Sophia in this passage. In fact, because he refers to the Logos
elsewhere as Sophia,107 I think R. Rogers provides a sufficient explanation of Autol. 2.18.
Rogers notes, ―Theophilus speaks directly to the topic of God‘s self-sufficiency in
creating with the help of now traditional tripartite language.‖108 Theophilus‘
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Numerous scholars, including Grant, argue that Theophilus‘ Two-stage formulation
demonstrates a clear case of the Son‘s inferior divine nature to that of the Father. See Robert M. Grant,
Early Christian Doctrine of God (Virginia: University Press of Virginia, 1966), 82-84.
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See Autol. 2.18.
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Autol. 2.22 follows 1 Cor. 1:24 in identifying the Word as the Power and Wisdom of God.
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Rick Rogers, Theophilus of Antioch: The Life and Thought of a Second-Century Bishop
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2000), 77-79. See also Autol. 3.9, ―We acknowledge a god, but only one,
the Founder and Maker and Demiurge of this whole universe. We know that everything is governed by
providential care, but by him alone.‖ Robert M.Grant, ―Theophilus of Antioch to Autolycus,‖ HTR 40
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pneuma. Rogers disputes this saying, ―I am not so sure that Theophilus considered the logos and the sophia
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inclined to separate them from the pneuma in the bishop‘s underlying theological system,‖ Theophilus of
Antioch, 114 n.19.
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anthropomorphic ―hands‖ language, in the case of the world and man‘s creation, suggests
that God needs no help and is essentially speaking to Himself.109
Theophilus‘ ―hands‖ language also demonstrates an important aspect of his
understanding of God‘s transcendence. He presents the Word as the means of demiurgic
and theophanic activity. Theophilus‘ Word theology sets the Father apart as transcendent
while also affirming the Father‘s contact with the world through His Logos (and Sophia).
His ―hands‖ language also sets the stage for Irenaeus to use and refine this theme.110 We
will likewise see that Novatian reworks such language common to Theophilus and
Irenaeus in a manner which alters the value they placed on an anthropomorphic image of
God.

Irenaeus

Irenaeus describes and refutes major Gnostic groups with a strong Word
Christology in Haer. Much of his work attacks the Valentinians who proclaimed the
Logos to be both a divine individual and one of the many Aeons. Of course, Irenaeus did
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Rogers stresses two points. The first is that God is utterly removed from his creation and that
He is ineffable and nearly incomprehensible (Autol. 1.3). The second point is that man‘s creation
apparently needed God‘s logos hand and sophia hand, ―just as without three days there would be no
fourth,‖ Theophilus of Antioch, 79. Rogers concludes by saying, ―Such teachings and theological rhetoric
were designed to draw Autolycus away from his paganism long enough to at least consider what the
bishop‘s religion had to offer,‖ Idem. I find this final analysis largely unsatisfying. Theophilus is certainly
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expression.
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not find the Valentinian acceptance of the Word‘s individuality to be problematic.
Rather, he rejected the system of degrading divine emanations (the Aeons) which formed
the backbone of Valentinian doctrines.111 In response to the Valentinians, Irenaeus
develops a Word Christology containing approaches to the issues of divine transcendence
and immanence different from those seen in Justin and Theophilus. Although most
scholars accept a clear influence from these two authors on Irenaeus,112 the polemical
nature of Haer. contributes much to his theological uniqueness.113
I will not attempt to summarize the teachings of the Gnostics, or even their
accounts of the Aeons, except to mention the reason and manner by which Irenaeus
rejected them. Irenaeus states,
[Gnostics] transfer the generation of the word to which men gave utterance to the
eternal Word of God, assigning a beginning and course of production [to Him],
even as they do to their own word. And in what respect will the Word of God—
yea, rather God Himself, since He is the Word—differ from the word of men, if
He follows the same order and process of generation? [Haer. 2.13.8]
Wolfson suggests that this passage, among others, contains the first dim articulation of a
Single-stage Logos theory.114 This theory prioritizes the eternality of the Son or Word.
111

See Einar Thomasen, The Spiritual Seed: The Church of the Valentinians, NHS 60 (Leiden:
Brill, 2006).
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See A. Briggman, ―Dating Irenaeus' Acquisition,‖ 397-402.
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Gerard Vallée, ―Irenaeus‘s Refutation of the Gnostics,‖ in Jewish and Christian Self-Definition,
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Fortress, 1980): 174-185; Richard A. Norris, ―Irenaeus and Plotinus Answer the Gnostics: A Note on the
Relation Between Christian Thought and Platonism‖, USQR 36:1 (Fall, 1980): 13-24; Pheme Perkins,
―Irenaeus and the Gnostics. Rhetoric and Composition in Adversus Haereses Book One‖ VC 30 (1976):
193-200; and ―Ordering the Cosmos: Irenaeus and the Gnostics,‖ in Nag Hammadi, Gnosticism, and Early
Christianity, ed. Charles W. Hendrick and Robert Hodgson, Jr. (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1986): 22138.
114
Wolfson, Philosophy of the Church Fathers, 198. However, Wolfson‘s analysis of Irenaeus‘
development of this theory seems tenuous at points. He acknowledges that much of what Irenaeus does say
could have been and was said by proponents of a Two-stage theory such as Justin and Theophilus.
Wolfson decides that Irenaeus‘ overriding rejection of gnostic emanations draws out Irenaeus‘ emphasis on
the eternal Word in a way not seen previously, 199-210. Wolfson also sees Irenaeus‘ acceptance of eternal
generation of the Son as different from Justin and Theophilus in which the Logos came forth most
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Barnes also looks at this passage and comes to a similar conclusion. He argues that
Irenaeus rejects the multiple noetic states of God inherent in the process of aeonic
emissions, since multiple states would appear to challenge God‘s simplicity as Spirit. 115
Furthermore, Barnes also points out that Irenaeus discards the unavoidable sense of
beginning and duration found within the Gnostic understanding of divine begetting.116
Finally, Irenaeus makes a strong case for refusing to speculate about the begetting of the
Son.117
Irenaeus also describes the transcendence of the Word in terms similar to those
which he uses with the Father. Irenaeus states,
There is therefore, as I have pointed out, one God the Father, and one Christ
Jesus, who came by means of the whole dispensational arrangements [connected
with Him], and gathered together all things in Himself. But in every respect, too,
He is man, the formation of God; and thus He took up man into Himself, the
invisible becoming visible, the incomprehensible being made comprehensible, the
impassible becoming capable of suffering, and the Word being made man, thus
summing up all things in Himself: so that as in super-celestial, spiritual, and
invisible things, the Word of God is supreme, so also in things visible and
corporeal He might possess the supremacy, and, taking to Himself the preeminence, as well as constituting Himself Head of the Church, He might draw all
things to Himself at the proper time. [Haer. 3.16.6]
I wish to discuss two topics in this passage. First, Irenaeus says that the Word of God is
―invisible,‖ ―incomprehensible,‖ and ―impassible.‖118 Irenaeus assigns these terms to the
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Father as well.119 Daniélou concludes from Irenaeus‘ remarks that, ―what is involved,
therefore, is not a difference of nature between the Son and the Father, but the reflection
in their activity in the world of their inter-relation with the Trinity, by which the Son is
the manifestation of the Father.‖120 Secondly, the above passage demonstrates Irenaeus‘
commitment to describing the same person as Word, Jesus, Christ, and Son, in many
other passages.121 Grillmeier cites the above quotation and mentions that Irenaeus also
repeatedly uses ―a quote which will occur some seven times even in the Chalcedonian
Definition, ‗Christ, one and the same.‘‖122 As seen above, Justin similarly makes the
names interchangeable. The single subjectivity of the Word, who is Christ, remained a
focal point in the Word Christology tradition against a variety of theological opponents.
The preceding paragraphs bring to light two important aspects of Irenaeus‘ Word
Christology which, when combined, set him apart from the work of Justin and
Theophilus. First, Irenaeus describes the Word as eternal and distinct from the Father
whereas Justin and Theophilus attribute a causal rationality for the hypostatization of the
Word.123 This is the difference between a Single-stage Logos theology (Irenaeus) and a
Two-stage theory (Justin and Theophilus). We only get the impression with Justin and
Theophilus that the Word becomes a distinct figure in conjunction with the creation of
119
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the world. Second, after Irenaeus suggests the eternal distinction of the Word from the
Father, he goes on to attribute characteristics of divinity to the Word not seen previously
in Justin or Theophilus.124 R. A. Norris offers a typical evaluation of Irenaeus‘ work,
―He tries to make of the Logos not a buffer between the ingenerate God and the generate
world, but the presence within the world of the Godhead itself.‖125 Irenaeus maintains
the Father‘s divine transcendence while designating the Word‘s divinity through the same
transcendent terms and categories noted above. Although Justin and Theophilus use
ideas which demonstrate that the Word shares in the divine nature, Irenaeus is the first of
these authors to argue from an equality of attributes.
Norris‘ evaluation shows that Irenaeus in no way abandons the element of divine
immanence. The major difference can be described as Irenaeus‘ attempt to either limit or
eliminate the subordination of the Son‘s nature in relation to the Father‘s.126 Justin, by
contrast, developed a Word Christology with hints of the essential/natural subordination
of the Son to the Father.
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When Irenaeus follows his predecessors in seeing the Word as the subject of the
theophanies,127 he does not use the topic to contrast the attributes of the Father with the
Son, but rather to simply affirm the Father‘s transcendence. One topic on which Irenaeus
follows Justin is the mention of activities related to creation and redemption as divine
activities. According to Irenaeus, God created with His two hands.128 The parallel with
Theophilus‘ hands language is striking, but Irenaeus moves beyond Theophilus‘ point to
speak also of God‘s constant contact, which in turn relates to the subject of redemption.
Irenaeus develops the teaching regarding God‘s purposefull interaction with mankind
beyond theophanies. He writes,
At the beginning of our formation in Adam, that breath of life which proceeded
from God, having been united to what had been fashioned, animated the man, and
manifested him as a being endowed with reason; so also, in [the times of] the end,
the Word of the Father and the Spirit of God, having become united with the
ancient substance of Adam‘s formation, rendered man living and perfect,
receptive of the perfect Father, in order that as in the natural [Adam] we all were
dead, so in the spiritual we may all be made alive. For never at any time did
Adam escape the hands of God, to whom the Father speaking, said, ―Let Us make
man in Our image, after Our likeness. [Haer. 5.1.3]
The Father has always kept His hands upon mankind in a way which continues
mankind‘s growth. God forms and shapes mankind until it receives a new and permanent
spiritual life. Some scholars have described these concepts as the foundation of Irenaeus‘
anthropology.129 Man is formed and always reformed in order to be brought, through the
hands of God, to a final presence with the Father.130
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Irenaeus‘ description of God‘s transcendence distinguishes his thinking from that
of both Justin and Theophilus on three important counts. First, Irenaeus relies upon
terminology associated with the Word‘s shared nature with the Father in ways
unexpressed in either Justin or Theophilus. Second, Irenaeus‘ writings contain strong
indications that he taught a doctrine of eternal generation. Third, Irenaeus‘ emphasis on
hands language suggests an avenue for the Father‘s immanence not found in either Justin
or Theophilus. With the preceding theological points in mind regarding the Logos,
Irenaeus turns towards the Incarnation as the pinnacle of revelation. He names the vision
of God as the center of humanity‘s growth. This vision begins and develops only through
the vision of God the Son here on earth. Barnes, R. Tremblay, and D. E. Lanné each
discuss this point and demonstrate Irenaeus‘ uniqueness in this regard.131 Irenaeus‘
approach to God‘s immanence is distinct from that of his predecessors.

Hippolytus

The Refutation of All Heresies (Ref.) and the Contra Noetum (Noet.) contain the
most developed Word Christologies within the Hippolytean corpus.132 As noted in the
Introduction, I accept the judgment that a single author probably did not produce these
works. In addition, scholars remain divided on the whether these works, at least Noet.,
influenced Tertullian or the reverse.133 I will present the Word Christology first of the
Ref. and then of Noet. Both of these works rely on the traditions seen thus far in Justin,
131

Barnes, ―A Night at the OPERA‖; Réal Tremblay, La manifestation et la vision de Dieu selon
saint Irénée de Lyon (Münster: Aschendorff, 1978); D. E. Lanné, ―La vision de Dieu dans l‘ouvre de S.
Irénée,‖ Irenikon 33 (1960), 311-320.
132
I refer to the author of the Ref. as ―Hippolytus‖ following traditional attribution and for
convenience sake. I refer to the author of Noet. simply as that, which is clumsy, but avoids the confusion
of attributing Ref. and Noet. to the same person.
133
I have not come to a final judgment on this matter. In regard to Novatian, the question does not
matter all that much since it seems that Novatian knew both works.
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Theophilus, and Irenaeus. Furthermore, the theological challenge of defending the
aforementioned Word Christology tradition against the Logos theology of
Modalists/Sabellians certainly helped to shape the Hippolytean works. The Ref. and
Noet. present a Word Christology in light of this theological fight.
Hippolytus bases his theology in the Ref. on the teaching that the Father existed
alone in eternity:134
The first and only (one God), both Creator and Lord of all, had nothing coeval
with Himself, not infinite chaos, nor measureless water, nor solid earth, nor dense
air, not warm fire, nor refined spirit, nor the azure canopy of the stupendous
firmament. But He was One, alone in Himself. [Ref. 10.28]
Hippolytus affirms that God‘s transcendence can be found in His unique, eternal being.135
In addition, the inherent acceptance of creatio ex nihilo in the above passage shows that
Hippolytus accepted Theophilus and Irenaeus‘ insistence on this doctrine.136

134

Hippolytus‘ Ref. attacks philosophers, Jewish sects, Gnostic groups, and also the monarchian
Christian groups which have, according to the author, fallen away from the truth. I will only emphasize
Hippolytus‘ specific arguments against the last group. Hippolytus accepts that monarchian theologies
found in Rome and supported by some in the Church hierarchy may have become dominant among the
majority of believers; Ref. 9.2 suggests that the teachings of Zephyrinus and Callistus were the prevalent
form of theology. Hippolytus makes it a point to state that he and his group never ―colluded‖ with them.
Of Callistus‘ theology Simonetti writes, ―[T]he formula put forward by Callistus took into account the
Monarchian sympathies of this majority [towards Sabellianism] and was thus thrown somewhat out of
balance by its leaning in that direction. The concept—a new one in the controversy—on which the formula
was based was that of spirit (pneuma): a spirit which, in the Soic manner, is entirely one with the Logos,
pervades the universe, and is identical with God in all God‘s manifestations, whether as Father or as Son.
This Spirit descended and was incarnated in the Virgin,‖ ―Beginnings of Theological Reflections,‖ in The
Cambridge History of Early Christianity, Eds. Young, Francis, Lewis Ayres, Andrew Louth (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 215.
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Hippolytus may of course also be addressing his theological opponents, led by Callistus, who
called him a ―ditheist.‖ See Ref. 9.6 and 9.7.
136
Torchia details the shift in teaching on the topic of creatio ex nihilo from Justin and
Athenagoras, to Tatian and Theophilus. His conclusion is that Christians originally worked within a
Hellenistic philosophical framework which may have accepted eternal matter. Tatian and Theophilus,
however, base their cosmologies on the Christian teaching of creatio ex nihilo. See his, ―Theories of
Creation,‖ 192-99. Tertullian‘s attack on Hermogenes demonstrates the fact that, by the beginning of the
3rd century A.D., creatio ex nihilo was viewed by many as a requirement of Christian belief. See also
Gerhard May, Creatio Ex Nihilo: The Doctrine of „Creation out of Nothing‟ in Early Christian Thought.
Trans. by A. S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1994), especially 156-178 for a treatment of Theophilus
and Irenaeus.
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Through his treatment of the Son‘s generation, Hippolytus draws out the
uniqueness and transcendence of the Father. He returns to the Two-stage Logos theology
held by Justin and Theophilus, as opposed to following Irenaeus‘ indication of the eternal
distinction of the Son. Hippolytus writes, ―Therefore this solitary and supreme Deity, by
an exercise of reflection, brought forth the Logos first; not the word in the sense of being
articulated by voice, but as a ratiocination of the universe, conceived and residing in the
divine mind.‖137 The Logos was in the Father, but then the Father brought him forth in
order to create according to the Father‘s will.138 Hippolytus rejects the tradition based on
the Stoic emphasis of the Word as a voice or sound. This inclusion is a necessity in light
of Hippolytus‘ polemics against the monarchians.139 The monarchians appear to have
accepted the Stoic understanding of Logos as voice and in turn used this classification to
reject the belief in a divine Logos figure distinguishable from the Father.140
Hippolytus calls the Word ―God‖ based upon two factors. First, the Word arises
not out of a combination of created elements but out of the substance of the Father.
Hippolytus states, ―The Logos alone of this God is from God himself; wherefore also the
Logos is God, being the substance of God.‖141 Shared substance language grounds
Hippolytus‘ association of the Son being God like the Father.142 Second, Hippolytus
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Ref. 10.29.
Idem.
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These topics revolve around ideas about transcendence and immanence. The monarchians
claim that the Father became incarnate. Since the Logos is not a distinct divine personality, the
monarchians reject the tradition seen in Justin, Theophilus, and Irenaeus which speaks of divine
immanence through the presence of the Logos and/or the Spirit. I am unaware of the need of either Justin
or Theophilus to specifically counter theological opponents arguing for a similarity between human speech
and the begetting of the Word.
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Heine has persuasively argued this point in his ―Christology of Callistus,‖ 61.
141
Ref. 10.29.
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Irenaeus‘ contribution to this topic is based on the connection he makes between the Son‘s
divinity and the Son‘s nature as Spirit. Barnes develops this aspect of Irenaeus‘ theology by joining the
idea of the divinity of the Word/Son to the fact that the Father is Word and Spirit, since Irenaeus at times
uses these terms to designate the divine nature. The fact that the Son is Spirit from the Father, who is also
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associates the divinity of the Word with the Father‘s will, which was a connection made
by Justin. The Word shares the Father‘s will and enacts the ―ideas conceived in the
Father.‖143
Hippolytus treats the distinction of the Word from the Father as dependent on
creation and identifies the Word as the center of revelation. He uses the Word to depict
divine creative activity, immanence, guidance, and redemption for the world. Since
mankind possesses free will, the activity of the Word offers the opportunity to seek after
God. First, the Word brings the divine commands through the prophets: ―But the Word,
by declaring them, promulgated the divine commandments, thereby turning man from
disobedience.‖144 Though Justin at times attributes the role of prophetic utterance to the
Word, he like Irenaeus, mentions this activity as primarily the Spirit‘s work. Hippolytus
forgoes language about the Spirit for a variety of possible reasons.145
Next, Hippolytus identifies the Incarnation as the pinnacle of divine-human
contact, as had Justin and Irenaeus. According to Hippolytus, man is offered the chance
to freely follow God when the Word Himself offers guidance in the flesh:
This Logos the Father in the latter days sent forth, no longer to speak by a
prophet, and not wishing that the Word, being obscurely proclaimed, should be
made the subject of mere conjecture, but that He should be manifested, so that we
could see Him with our own eyes. This Logos, I say, the Father sent forth, in
order that the world, on beholding Him, might reverence Him who was delivering
precepts not by the person of prophets, nor terrifying the soul by an angel, but
who was Himself—He that had spoken—corporally present amongst us. This

Spirit, necessarily includes the notion that the Son is God. Barnes writes, ―It is not because the Second
Person is ―God‘s Word [Logos]‖ that He is God, but because He is Word He is God, for only God is
Word,‖ ―Irenaeus‘s Trinitarian Theology,‖ 75.
143
Ref. 10.29
144
Idem.
145
The fact that he was called a ―ditheist‖ by Callistus may indicate that Hippolytus‘ theology
made no mention of a distinctive or hypostatic Spirit. Another possible interpretation of Hippolytus‘
silence on the Holy Spirit in the Ref. may be the refusal to give any space to the modalist emphasis on the
Spirit as the ultimate description of divinity. See Heine, ―Christology of Callistus,‖ 64.
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Logos we know to have received a body from a virgin, and to have remodeled the
old man by a new creation. [Ref. 10.29]
The Father, who brought forth the Logos as the agent of creation, also offers man
redemption through the Logos. Man‘s free will to see and follow the Incarnate Logos
becomes for Hippolytus the avenue by which man gains divinization: ―Whatever it is
consistent with God to impart, these God has promised to bestow upon thee, because thou
hast been deified, and begotten unto immortality.‖146 By ―consistent,‖ Hippolytus seems
to suggest the granting of immortality to divinized man in conjunction with the
immortality already granted to man‘s soul.147
In Ref., Hippolytus draws together the topics of immanence and transcendence in
a unique way. Although he portrays divinization through the gift of immortality, a
certain ambivalence remains about Hippolytus‘ understanding of the sharing of the divine
substance itself. In passing, Hippolytus mentions the possibility of the Father begetting
other divinities. He writes, ―For if He had willed to make thee a god, He could have done
so. Thou hast the example of the Logos.‖148 This passage implies that God can bring or
choose not to bring an undefined amount of divine beings out of His substance. Because
Ref. identifies the Logos exclusively as God and as sharing the divine substance, it is
difficult to ascertain all of his underlying thoughts on the matter. Beyond the theological
possibilities implied by Ref. 10.29, Hippolytus certainly recognizes the Word as uniquely
sharing the Father‘s divinity and substance.
Although I will point to several discrepancies between the Noet. and Ref. in the
following portion of this section, it is important to point out that both contain numerous
146

Ref. 10.30.
Idem.
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Ref. 10.29. Cf. Justin Dial. 127: ―…but [they saw] Him who, according to God‘s will, is God
the Son, and His Angel because He served the Father‘s will.‖
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similarities in their respective Word Christologies. When describing the creation of the
world, Noet. begins with the following statement concerning God‘s singularity: ―While
God was existing alone, and had nothing contemporaneous with himself, he resolved to
create the world.‖149 The parallel with Ref. 10.28, cited above, is obvious. Noet.
immediately clarifies the singularity of the Father with the following, ―But alone though
he was, he was manifold (πνιὺο). For he was not Word-less nor Wisdom-less nor Powerless nor Mind-less. But everything was in him, and he was himself the All.‖150 Both Ref.
and Noet. speak of Word, Wisdom, Power, and Mind as attributes of the one God. Both
also treat the singularity of the Father as central to their theological starting point.151
After identifying the singularity of the Father, Noet. points to the Word as the
instrument of creation. The author also incorporates Wisdom‘s role in the arrangement of
the things made by the Word into his creation narrative. Noet. 10.3 states, ―For
everything that has come into being he contrives through Word and Wisdom—creating
by Word and setting in due order by Wisdom.‖ Noet. perhaps draws on Irenaeus, who
spoke of the Word as the instrument of creation and the Spirit as responsible for
arranging the newly made works.152 Also, like Irenaeus‘ Haer., Noet. links Wisdom with
the Holy Spirit.153
Noet. 10.4 elaborates on God‘s manifold attributes. It states,
This word which he has in himself and is invisible to the world that is being
created, he makes visible. In uttering what was formerly a sound (θσλὴλ), and in
bringing forth light out of light, he sent forth in the creation, as its Lord, his own
Mind, which previously was visible to himself alone. And him who was invisible
149

Noet. 10.1.
Noet. 10.2.
151
As mentioned above, Ref. 10.29 suggests that other individuals (humans in this case) may have
been put forth as gods, like the Logos. The possibility that the author of Noet. might share the same
theological ambivalence to the possibility of a greater array of divinities remains open.
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Haer. 2.30.9; Proof of the Apostolic Preaching 5.
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In Noet. 14.5-6, the author is referring to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as God.
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to the world that is coming into being, he makes visible, so that through his
appearance the world might be able to see and be saved.
By calling the Logos a sound (phone), Noet. does two things. First, Noet. appears to
amplify Justin and Theophilus‘ Two-stage Logos theories. Where they wrote with
ambivalence about the distinction of the Logos while still in the Father (as opposed to
Irenaeus‘ inclination towards eternal distinction and the explicit repudiation of comparing
a man‘s begetting of a word to the divine begetting), the author of Noet. states that the
Logos was only first a ―sound.‖ Second, the multiplicity (polus) of 10.2 appears to
describe divine attributes only. Noet. therefore most likely teaches that the Logos was
not a distinct figure (even within God) prior to being sent forth.154
There is no doubt, however, that Noet. treats the Word as sent forth by the Father
for creation and redemption.155 In fact, the author emphasizes this point by identifying
the Word as the Son only at the Incarnation.156 Therefore, in Noet. we see a progressive
development of the distinction and subjectivity of the Word. First it is regarded as the
mind of the Father. Next, the Word is sent out of the Father as the distinct agent of
creation. Finally, the Word takes on the flesh of humanity and properly becomes the Son.
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This statement relies in part on the arguments of A. Brent‘s, Hippolytus and the Roman
Church. He concludes that Noet. represents a depersonalization of both the Logos and the Spirit. Brent
believes Hippolytus authored the Noet. as an attempt at theological rapproachment with the community of
Callistus. Brent states, ―The author of Noet. 10,4 is to the contrary quite prepared to acknowledge the
relationship between the pre-incarnate [Logos] and the Father as an uttered voice…, inseparable in such a
form from himself. We see here that the [Logos] is far more an instrument of the Father‘s will than
separate in his own right,‖ Hippolytus and the Roman Church, 210. Cf. Butterworth‘s comments in
Hippolytus of Rome: Contra Noetum, especially 98-99. Butterworth concludes nearly the opposite of
Brent.
155
Noet. makes this point in a later section by connecting the voice of God to subjectivity and
visibility and hence distinction: ―Now, only God‘s Word is visible—that of man is audible,‖ Noet. 13.1.
156
Noet. 15.7 states, ―For the Word was not a perfect Son when he was fleshless and on his own,
although because he was Word, he was perfect Only-begotten. Nor could the flesh exist on its own apart
from the Word, because it has its subsistence in the Word. So in this way a single perfect Son of God was
made manifest.‖
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In this progression, Noet. insists on the divinity of the Logos, thereby identifying the
divine immanence in the world through his Word Christology.
Noet. offers a variation on the explanation of divine unity between the Father and
the Word from that seen in Hippolytus‘ Ref. or in Justin‘s works. Where these authors
spoke of shared substance, Noet. attributes unity most explicitly to the idea of a shared
power. The accusation of ditheism by the monarchians, however, seems to have led
Noet.‘s author to include in his arguments familiar metaphors (or variations of them)
related to sameness of nature:
Now when I say ‗other‘, I am not saying there are two gods. But it is like light
out of light, or like water out of a spring, or like a sunbeam out of the sun. For
there is a single Power (δύλακηο) that comes out of the All. But the All is the
Father, and the Power (δύλακηζ) that comes out of him is the Word.‖ [Noet. 11.1]
The metaphors suggest a shared substance between Father and Logos, yet Noet. explains
the connection through the idea of a singularity of power. This passage recalls the use
Justin made of power in Dial. 127, cited above. There Justin also employs the category
of divine power to speak about God‘s immanence in the world;157 however, Justin did not
press the connection between Logos and Power as directly as the author of Noet.158
Noet. joins the foregoing description of shared power to language about the
oikonomia.159 In Noet. 14.3, the author denies the existence of two gods but embraces the
idea that the Logos is a second person (prosopon). This section states, ―While I will not
say that there are two gods—but rather one—I will say there are two persons; and that a
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Recall that Ps.-Aristotle‘s Mund. also presents divine immanence through the concept of

power.
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See Noet. 16.1.
In his description of Tertullian‘s understanding of the oikonmia, Daniélou agrees with Moingt‘s
assessment of the widespread use of the term: ―[Moingt] points out that the word νίθνλνκία, which, it has
often been observed, expresses the underlying inner organization of the substance of God, always has the
same meaning in Tertullian‘s writings as it had in those of Irenaeus before him and was to retain in later
times, namely the unfolding of the divine plan of salvation,‖ Origins of Latin Christianity, 365.
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third economy is the grace of the Holy Spirit.‖ The author then begins to treat the Word
and Holy Spirit as distinct subjects who act in accord with the Father‘s will: ―The Father
gives orders, the Word performs the work…This is because there is one God. For the one
who commands is the Father, the one who obeys is the Son, and the one who promotes
mutual understanding is the Holy Spirit.‖160 A. B. McGowan concludes, ―For
Hippolytus, the ‗economy‘ is a matter of divine interaction with the world, as in the more
enduring and better-known use of the term by Irenaeus.‖161 Noet.‘s Trinitarian focus, as
in the passage above, may have been influenced by Irenaeus‘ Trinitarian theology, which
identified the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as sharing divine activities.162
Along with the description of the Logos obeying the command of the Father and
the Son being visible (in contrast to the Father),163 Noet. concludes by suggesting an
interplay of transcendence and immanence language. Alluding to Eph. 4:6, Noet. states,
―He who is Father is over all things, and the Son is through all things, and the Holy Spirit
is in all things. We can get no idea of the one God other than by really believing in
Father and Son and Holy Spirit.‖164 This passage suggests the common demarcation of
divine transcendence and immanence. The Father is transcendent (―above‖) and the Son
and Spirit are immanent (―through‖ and ―in,‖ respectively). Noet., however, clouds this
clear demarcation with the pronouncement that knowledge of the one God equates to
160

Noet. 14.4-5. Cf. Brent who argues that Noet. presents the Spirit throughout as an instrument.
Andrew B. McGowan, ―God in Early Latin Theology: Tertullian and the Trinity,‖ in God in
Early Christian Thought, Ed. Andrew B. McGowan, Brian E. Daley S.J. and Timothy J. Gaden (Leiden:
Brill, 2009), 69. Pollard emphasizes a slightly different understanding of the economic Trinitarianism in
Noet. by pointed out that ―Hippolytus appears…to be reluctant to call the second Person of the trinity ‗Son‘
before the incarnation, so that frequently he seems to suggest that the Word became Son at the incarnation.
Thus he forshadows the economic trinitarianism of Marcellus of Ancyra,‖ Johannine Christology, 56.
Noet. reflects a similar identification of the Word becoming Son which can be found in Tertullian. On this
point, see the section on Tertullian below.
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See Briggman, Theology of the Holy Spirit, 276-307.
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Grillmeier suggests that Noet. lays a great stress on the Incarnation in order to demonstrate the
Son‘s visibility compared with the Father‘s invisibility, Christ in Christian Tradition, 114.
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Noet. 14:5-6.
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belief in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This passage makes the categories of
transcendence and immanence relative to the fundamental oneness of God. The one God
includes the transcendent Father and the immanent Son and Spirit.
Noet. formulates the transcendence and immanence of God based on the concept
of the oikonomia. The distinct roles of the Father, Son, and Spirit mark the boundary of
belief in opposition to the doctrines of the modalists. Noet. states, ―But let us keep our
eyes on the subject in hand: that it really was the Father‘s own Power, brethren,—which
is the Word—that came down from heaven, and not the Father in person.‖165 The
distinction of the Word from the Father equates to the difference between the
transcendent and singular Father, who remains apart from creation, and the immanent
presence and power of God, which is sent forth by becoming the visible Word and
eventually the perfect Son.166 Even so, Noet.‘s identification of the one God as Father,
Son, and Spirit, offers a Trinitarian approach to thinking about the one God which I will
show Novatian rejects.

Tertullian

Tertullian contributed numerous technical Latin terms into the Word Christology
tradition. He is credited with influencing all subsequent theology written in Latin in the
Western Church.167 Apart from the novelty he brought into the Western tradition, he also
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Noet. 16.1.
I agree with Brent and others who argue for the presence both of subordinationism in Noet. as
well as the probability that the author would not or did not side with Irenaeus‘ acceptance of the eternal
distinction between the Word and the Father.
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For a discussion of some of the contributions of Tertullian‘s terminology, see Mohrmann, ―Les
origins de la latinité chrétienne,‖ 67-106, 163-83. Grillmeier notes, ―In the opinion of many writers, the
older Western christology finds its consummation in Tertullian, particularly in the formulation of his
christology,‖ Christ in Christian Tradition, 117. He also adds that Hilary, in his Commentary on Matthew
5.1, suggested Tertullian‘s influence was not very great, but concludes, ―Certainly much of his
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continued and developed many of the theological traditions which he inherited from
Justin and Irenaeus.168 Additionally, important parallels with the language and thought of
Noet. stand out in Tertullian‘s work.169 Taking into account his reliance on several
theological traditions, Tertullian adds new dimensions to language concerning divine
transcendence and immanence. Tertullian, unlike Noet., bases divine unity on the shared
substance of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, rather than the Noet.‘s emphasis on
power.170 Tertullian couples this position with arguments affirming the necessity of the
Son‘s (and Spirit‘s) immanence, rather than the Father‘s.
Tertullian wrote Prax. perhaps in 213,171 and the Word Christology presented
within it represents his theologically mature work.172 Therefore, I use Prax. as the basis
for presenting Tertullian‘s Word Christology.173 By doing so, I will also better be able to
point out in which ways Novatian departs from Tertullian‘s later, Christological thinking.

[Tertullian‘s] influence remained alive, even if his name is often passed over in silence,‖ Ibid., 118. Again,
my project does not judge Novatian‘s theology based on his appropriation of Tertullian‘s terminology.
168
Although both of these authors lived in the West, they exhibited aspects of the Eastern theology
of their geographic origins; Justin was a Samaritan while Irenaeus was from Antioch.
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McGowan, ―God in Early Latin Theology,‖ 68-99, believes Tertullian used Noet., relying, in
part, on Manlio Simonetti‘s, ―Due note su Ippolito,‖ Ricerche su Ippolito (Studia Ephemeridis
Augustinianum 13; Rome: Institutum Patristicum ―Augustiniam,‖ 1977): 126-36. Cf. Brent, Hippolytus
and the Roman Church, 529-535, who believes Noet. depends on Tertullian.
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Pollard, Johannine Christology, 58.
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Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, 41. See also W. H. C. Frend, The Rise of Christianity
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 345; Edgar G. Foster, Angelomorphic Christology and the Exegesis of
Psalm 8:5 in Tertullian‟s Adversus Praxean (Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 2005), v.
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McGowan explores the development of Tertullian‘s Trinitarian thought in light of Herm. and
Prax. in ―God in Early Latin Theology.‖ He writes, ―The change between Against Hermogenes to Against
Praxeas is significant. Where previously Tertullian regarded the divine economy as effected fully only in
the actual course of salvation history, now he expounds inner-trinitarian relations as pre-historic. There
was when the threeness of God was not, although this was before all things,‖ Ibid. 68.
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I am arguing that Novatian did not see Tertullian‘s work in this light. Although Novatian
clearly understood the applicability of Prax. to the theological controversies of his own time (especially in
light of Tertullian‘s anti-Sabellian arguments), we are not required to believe that Novatian read
Tertullian‘s works as if they possessed greater or better doctrinal formulations the later they were written.
Much of my analysis of Novatian‘s work looks to Herm. as a source for his theological ideas. By
presenting Tertullian‘s Word Christology here, I will better be able to point out in what ways the theology
of the Father from Herm. (which so greatly influenced Novatian) trumps any Christological or Trinitarian
sense of importance regarding the theological development of what were later understood as orthodox
positions in Prax.
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Tertullian begins by affirming the oneness of God. He writes, ―For before all things God
was alone (solus), himself his own world and location and everything—alone (solus)
however because there was nothing external beside him.‖174 Tertullian‘s statement uses
the same kind of language found in Ref. 10.28 and Noet. 10.1, to describe God‘s
singleness.
Like Ref. and Noet., Tertullian‘s affirmation of God‘s singleness counters both
Sabellian theology as well as the Sabellian175 claims that he proposed more than one
God.176 Tertullian then turns to God‘s interior life to also insist on some form of
multiplicity. He continues, ―Yet not even then was he alone (solus): for he had with him
that Reason (ratio) which he had in himself—his own, of course. For God is rational,
and reason is primarily in him, and thus from him are all things: and that Reason is his
consciousness (sensus).‖177 Tertullian joins Hippolytus and the author of Noet. in
emphasizing the noetic foundation of divine life. Prax., for example, shares with Ref. the
idea that the basis for speaking about the bringing forth of the Word concerns the
ratiocination of God. Like Noet., Tertullian identifies God as manifold with his Word,
Wisdom, Power, and Mind.178
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Prax. 5.
Of course, Tertullian identifies this theology with Praxeus.
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As noted, Hippolytus and the author of Noet contended with the accusation of being called
ditheists in Ref. 9.7 in Noet. 11.1. Tertullian acknowledges a similar charge, saying in Prax. 3, ―And so
<people> put it about that by us two or even three <gods> are preached, while they, they claim, are
worshippers of one God.‖
177
Prax. 5.
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Cf. Brent, Hippolytus and the Roman Church, 209, who argues that Ref. proposes a distinction
between the mind (nous) of God and the Logos whereas Noet. equates them. This, for Brent, means that
Noet.‘s theology depends upon the depersonalization of the Word in order to make peace with the
monarchians. I disagree with Brent‘s understanding of Noet.‘s Word Christology.
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Tertullian also connects the term sermo, his equivalent of the Greek logos, with
ratio. Tertullian writes:179
For God is rational (rationalis), and reason is primarily in him, and thus from him
are all things: and that Reason (ratio) is his consciousness (sensus). This the
Greeks call Logos, by which expression we also designate discourse (sermonem):
and consequently our people are already wont, through the artlessness of the
translation, to say that Discourse (sermonem)180 was in the beginning with God,
though it would be more appropriate to consider Reason (rationem) of older
standing, seeing that God is [not] discursive (sermonalis) from the beginning but
is rational (rationalis) even before the beginning, and because discourse (sermo)
itself, having its ground in reason (ratione), shows reason to be prior as being its
substance (substantium). [Prax. 5]
Tertullian formulates an approach to God‘s nature as noetic in light of his own
development of Word Christology.181 He begins by affirming divine rationality (ratio) as
the basis of speaking about divine attributes. Tertullian emphasizes the noetic nature of
the terms associated with Word Christology (sermo, verbum, or logos) in his presentation
of God‘s nature as rational.
By making ratio the basis of characterizing God‘s nature, Tertullian claims that
sermo also always exists in God as a faculty of ratio. He writes, ―For although God had
not yet uttered his Discourse, he always had it within himself along with and in his
179

Evans points out that Tertullian mentions the connection between the philosophical precedents
and the traditional Christian use of sermo for Word in North Africa (see Prax. 5), Tertullian‟s Treatise, 37.
This point is significant because verbum is the term used in John‘s Gospel in some of the Latin translations.
Tertullian‘s use of sermo probably reflects a local or regional use which he must cater to, perhaps because
it may have been a part of some of the most ancient Latin biblical translations.
180
Evans translates sermo as ―Discourse‖ rather than ―Word‖ until the middle of Prax. 7. He
believes that Tertullina‘s goal in these chapters strictly concerns the affirmation of the divine rational
nature. Evans suggests that these preliminary remarks by Tertullian allow him to discuss the relationship
between the Father and His Word based upon a shared nature. While I accept the underlying thematic and
linguistic understanding which Evans attempts to get across through his translation, I do not think his
understanding of Tertullian‘s content necessarily holds out until chapter 7. See, for example, Prax. 6 in
which Tertullian writes, ―For when first God‘s will was to produce in their own substances and species
those things which in company of Wisdom and Reason and Discourse he had ordained within himself, he
first brought forth Discourse, which had within it its own inseparable Reason and Wisdom, so that the
universe of things might come into existence by the agency of none other than him by whose agency they
had been thought out and ordained, yea even already made as far as concerns the consciousness of God.‖ I
believe that Tertullian is already building upon the idea of a personal Word in this passage.
181
―To say that Discourse was in the beginning with God,‖ clearly refers to John 1.1.
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Reason, while he silently thought out and ordained with himself the things which he was
shortly to say by the agency of Discourse.‖182 Tertullian‘s thinking is bound to the idea
that a second divine figure must not infringe on the singleness of the one God. By
claiming that God‘s sermo is directly connected to His ratio,183 Tertullian offers his Word
Christology as a bridge between divine multiplicity and the idea of the divine rational
nature. This recalls Noet. 10.2‘s equating of the Word with the mind of God, noted
above.
In his description of the sending forth of the sermo by God, Tertullian‘s
statements contain clear affinities with the traditions about the stages of the Word‘s
begetting. Tertullian writes,
At that point therefore Discourse also itself receives its manifestation and
equipment, namely sound and voice, when God says, Let there be light. This is
the complete nativity (nativitas perfecta) of Discourse, when it comes forth from
God: <it was> first established by him for thought under the name of Wisdom—
The Lord established me as a beginning of his ways: then begotten for activity—
When he prepared the heaven I was present with him: thereafter causing him to be
his Father by proceeding from whom he became Son, the first-begotten before all
things, the only-begotten as alone begotten out of God in a true sense from the
womb of his heart. [Prax. 7]184
We already saw that Autol. and Ref. implied that the Logos lacked distinction while in the
Father, apparently presupposing some of the Stoic understanding of Logos as sound.
Noet. took this a step further and spoke of the Logos being originally a sound. In
contrast, it seems that Tertullian reproduces this language in order to co-opt it as
descriptive of one of the Word‘s stages. This passage therefore describes the internal
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Prax. 5: nam etsi deus nondum sermonem suum miserat, proinde eum cum ipsa et in ipsa
ratione intra semetipsum habebat, tacite cogitando et disponendo secum quae per sermonem mox erat
dicturus.
183
See the quotation of Prax. 5 above: ―…seeing that God is [not] discursive (sermonalis) from
the beginning but is rational (rationalis) even before the beginning…‖
184
The scriptural citations in this passge are Gen. 1:3, Prov. 8:22 and 8:27.
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distinction between God‘s ratio and that of sermo‘s in order to highlight the progressive
stages whereby the sermo may finally be called Son. For Tertullian the identification of
the Word as Son is connected to the idea of God sending forth the sermo as voice and
Son. Unlike Irenaeus, but like Justin, Theophilus, and Hippolytus before him, Tertullian
does not advocate the position that the Word is a personal and eternal distinction from the
Father.
The topics of divine transcendence and immanence play a central role in
Tertullian‘s use of sermo. God exists alone, but God‘s possession of a rational nature
means that God always had His sermo in Him. The sermo‘s sending forth corresponds
with the identification of sermo as Son. Tertullian identifies the Word as voice strictly
with the act of the sermo‘s exteriorization. He does not utilize the term for voice to
identify the sermo as a distinct figure from the Father.185 The Word becomes complete
Son and person upon being sent forth as the voice of creation.186 The Word was always
in the Father and became distinguishable as the Son upon being sent forth as the creative
voice/sound.187
185

Foster adds, ―It is indeed significant that the noted church apologist opts for the Latin sermo
(Discourse) instead of verbum (word), implying that God mentally discourses with Himself in eternity and
does not simply articulate a mere word while subsisting as the sole personal agent in existence,‖
Angelomorphic Christology, 54. Compare the comments here with those by Evans cited above, in which he
discusses Tertullian‘s choice of sermo as opposed to verbum. Although I think Evans is correct in his
depiction of the origins of sermo in Tertullian‘s writing, the theological content of Foster‘s interpretation
also seems likely to me.
186
Simonetti notes, ―[Tertullian] transfers to the Latin persona the meaning which Hippolytus had
given to the Greek prosôpon, making it, that is, an expression of the individuality of the Father and the Son
within the one divinity,‖ in ―The Beginnings of Theological Reflection,‖ 213.
187
Daniélou connects Tertullian‘s description of the Word‘s exteriorization for the purpose of
creation to the entire Christian tradition prior to Nicaea. He writes, ―It cannot be disputed that Tertullian
belongs to a theological world in which the begetting of the Son was linked to the creation of the universe.
It was only after the Council of Nicaea that the theology of the Trinity was set free from all connection with
cosmology, a development for which, it must be admitted, we are indebted to what was valid in the thought
of monarchians such as Praxeas,‖ Origins of Latin Christianity, 366. Although I agree with the first portion
of this quotation, I am not convinced by Daniélou‘s claim that monarchian theology was the catalyst for
such a development in Trinitarian thought, and he does not provide an extended treatment demonstrating
such an influence.
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Pollard offers a persuasive evaluation of Tertullian‘s Word Christology as
confused and at odds with his presentation of the relationship between the Father and the
Son.188 He acknowledges that Tertullian shows signs that he is attempting to include
some form of eternal multiplicity in God. However, Pollard concludes that Tertullian‘s
Word Christology fails to specifically account for the personal distinction in his internal
description of God. Other scholars contend that Tertullian denies outright the distinct
personhood of the Word prior to His generation as the creator.189 Evans challenged this
position.190 I am of the opinion that Tertullian‘s Word Christology does not fully express
the eternal distinction of the Word and shows some disconnect with his theological
terminology related to divine Fatherhood and Sonship. In regard to the Word‘s
distinction from the Father, Tertullian appears to be indebted to the Two-stage Logos
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Pollard discusses Tertullian‘s identification of ratio as the substance of sermo and also the
connection between the later identification of the Son as the sermo. He correctly points out that Tertullian
does not make this classification permanent—the Father becomes Father only when the Son becomes Son
through external generation. Tertullian goes back on these ideas by later associating ratio and sermo with
Son. See Pollard, Johannine Christology, 58-71. Daniélou comes to a similar conclusion, writing, ―The
Son and the Spirit are distinguished, therefore, from the Father in that they have their own subsistent being,
which is not, however, based on their eternal specific individuality, but rather on their function in relation
to God‘s creation. Tertullian does not manage to get beyond the combination of a modalism with regard to
the distinctness of the individual persons and a subordinationism with regard to their existential plurality,‖
Origins of Latin Christianity, 364.
189
Benjamin B. Warfield describes this common interpretation of Tertullian: ―In this case, while
certainly he would take the personal distinctions seriously, he might be supposed not to look upon them as
rooted essentially in the very being of God. God in Himself would be conceived as a monad: God flowing
out to create the world and to uphold and govern it, as becoming for these purposes a triad,‖ Studies in
Tertullian and Augustine (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970 originally 1930), 48. He attributes
these views to Dorner, Hagemann, Harnack, and Stier. Roy Kearsley provides a more recent argument of
this view. He identifies Prax. as evidence that the Word was not distinct from the Father prior to being sent
forth for creation. Kearsley first notes that Tertullian probably knew Irenaeus‘ rejection of a Two-stage
theory, but then he adds, ―Although probably concurring with the belief of Irenaeus that the Word was
always with the Father…, Tertullian nevertheless also fell heir to the economic and ‗temporalist‘
atmosphere which pervaded second century speculation on the Logos. Adv Prax 7, for instance, provides
an example. The ‗nativity of the Word‘ coincides with the creation fiat. Here God generates the Word for
action and the Word advances to distinct subsistence,‖ Kearsley, Tertullian‟s Theology of Divine Power
(Carlisle, Cumbria: Paternoster Press, 1998), 57.
190
Evans writes, ―Tertullian does not really think that the Father ever existed without the Son: as
he says almost immediately, ceterum ne tunc quidem solus. But he is unable to rid himself of the idea of a
priority of the Father, at least in thought, or to dissociate it from some sort of time sequence,‖ Tertullian‟s
Treatise, 211.
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Christologies seen expressed by Justin, Theophilus, Hippolytus, and the author the of
Noet.
Tertullian also expands on the topic of the Father and Son sharing the divine
substance by adding a Trinitarian interpretation to some of the traditional metaphors used
to express the natural relation between divine figures discussed already.191 The Son is the
ground shoot, river, and beam, while (or since) the Father is the root, spring, and sun.192
Tertullian states,
But where there is a second <one> there are two, and where there is a third there
are three. For the Spirit is third with God and <his> Son, as the fruit out of the
shoot is third from the root, and the irrigation canal out of the river third from the
spring, and the illumination point out of the beam third from the sun: yet in no
respect is he alienated from that origin from which he derives his proper
attributes. In this way the Trinity, proceeding by intermingled and connected
degrees from the Father, in no respect challenges the monarchy, while it
conserves the quality of the economy. [Prax. 8]
This passage, and others in which Tertullian describes the relationship between the
persons of the Trinity,193 demonstrates that Tertullian saw the logical need for extending
the metaphors of shared substance to the Holy Spirit.194 He also makes the explicit point

191

See my discussion of Tertullian‘s classification of God‘s substance as spirit in the section
―Rejecting God‘s substantia as spiritus: Trin. 7.1,9‖ in chapter 2 above. Simonetti comments about
Tertullian‘s idea of spirit in Prax. with: ―The unity of the three persons is ensured not only by their
possession of one power, as in Hippolytus, but also by their oneness in substance (2,4). This single
substance is conceived by Tertullian after the manner of the Stoics, that is, as a tenuously material spirit
(7,7-8), of which the Father is the totality and the Son a part (9,2),‖ ―The Beginnings of Theological
Reflection,‖ 213.
192
Prax. 8.
193
See for example the often commented upon passage in Prax. 9 in which Tertullian states, ―For
look now, I say that the Father is one, and the son another, and the Spirit another…not however that the
Son is other than the Father by diversity, but by distribution, not by division but by distinction, because the
Father is not identical with the Son, they even being numerically one and another.‖
194
Although Noet. speaks of the Spirit as a third, it never calls the Spirit a person (prosopon) as
the Father and Son are described. Tertullian rejects the description of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as
one person. See Prax. 12: ―And if he himself is God, as John says—the Word was God—you have two,
one commanding a thing to be made, another making it. But how you must understand ‗another‘ I have
already professed, in the sense of person, not of substance, for distinctiveness, not for division. Yet
although I always maintain one substance in three who cohere, I must still, as a necessary consequence of
the meaning <of the passage>, say that he who commands is other than he who makes. For he would not
be commanding if he himself were making while commanding things to be made. Yet he did command
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of attempting to harmonize two seemingly competing ways of speaking about God—
through his discussion of the monarchy and economy of God.
McGowan convincingly argues that the importance of the metaphors in
Tertullian‘s thinking lies in the connection of the metaphors to the topics of
transcendence and immanence.195 Tertullian‘s comparison to the Father as root, spring,
and sun, shows his desire to maintain the emphasis on the Father‘s invisibility. The Son
as shoot, river, and beam of sun, along with the Spirit as fruit, irrigation canal, and point
of illumination, all speak to a visible presence or activity in the world. Tertullian uses the
metaphors to articulate an implicit distinction between the Father‘s transcendence and
invisibility and the Son‘s immanence and visibility. 196
Like some of his predecessors, Tertullian turns to the theophanies to speak about
God‘s immanence and develop the contrast between the Father‘s invisibility and the
Word‘s visibility. He argues that the theophanies offer direct evidence of the distinction
of the Father and Son‘s attributes. After recounting Moses‘ theophanic experiences in
Exodus 33, Tertullian writes,
We must understand the Father as invisible because of the fullness of his majesty,
but must acknowledge the Son as visible because of the enumeration of his
derivation, just as we may not look upon the sun in respect of the total of its
substance which is in the sky, though we can with our eyes bear its beam because

<them to be made> by him, since he would not have commanded himself if he had been one <alone>: or he
would have made them without command, for he would not have waited to command himself.‖
195
McGowan, ―God in Early Latin Theology,‖ 76-78.
196
McGowan links Tertullian‘s emphasis on the issue of visibility/invisibility to the absence in
Prax. of the familiar torch-from-torch analogy seen in previous authors. McGowan writes, ―[The torch]
metaphor does not work in this schema, since one torch is as visible as another, and the properties of each
are the same, except for the sequence of lighting. These new and more elaborate metaphorical renderings
of divine disposition thus involve not just a third stage of general differentiation within a sort of unity, but a
more specific set of Trinitarian relations and qualities beyond those conveyed by the topoi of Justin and
Hippolytus,‖ Ibid. 75-76.
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of the moderation of the assignment which from thence reaches out to the earth.
[Prax. 14]197
Tertullian‘s Trinitarian theology depends on the insistence of shared substance, but he
nuances this concept by speaking of the Son‘s distinction from the Father based on the
Son‘s nature of being derived from the Father. Some of Tertullian‘s other statements
clarify this idea. In one example, Tertullian writes, ―For the Father is the whole
substance, while the Son is an outflow and assignment of the whole, as he himself
professes, Because my Father is greater than I.‖198 In short, Tertullian presents the Son‘s
derivation from the Father as offering an essential component to his understanding of
divine immanence.199
Tertullian also explicitly treats immanence in relation to the difference in
attributes of the Father and Son. For example, he points to passages such as Exodus
33:20 (If a man sees my face he shall not live) and John 1:18 (No one has seen God at
any time) to contrast the permanent invisibility of the Father with the visibility and
immanence of the Word.200 Other writers, such as Irenaeus, spoke of the visible God in
terms of the Incarnation. Tertullian, however, argues that the Word‘s derivation from the

197

Et consequens erit ut invisibilem patrem intellegamus pro plenitudine maiestatis, visibilem vero
filium agnoscamus pro modulo derivationis, sicut nec solem nobis contemplari licet quantum ad ipsam
substantiae summam quae est in caelis, radium autem eius toleramus oculis pro temperatura portionis quae
in terram inde porrigitur.
198
Prax. 9, quoting John 14:28: pater enim tota substantia est, filius vero, derivatio totius et portio,
sicut ipse profitetur, Quia pater maior me est.
199
Prax. 2 states that the Father, Son, and Spirit are three, ―not in condition [statu], but in degree
[gradu]; not in substance [substantia], but in form [forma]; not in power [potestate], but in aspect [specie];
yet of one substance, and of one condition, and of one power, inasmuch as He is one God, from whom
these degrees and forms and aspects are reckoned, under the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the
Holy Ghost‖ (trans. Holmes, ANF 3, 598).
200
In Prax. 14, Tertullian admits that the Son, ―also on his own account is, as Word and Spirit,
invisible even now by the quality of his substance, but that he was visible before the incarnation.‖ While
this is something that Irenaeus is willing to affirm, Tertullian sees this concession as playing into the hands
of those who will not maintain a distinction between the Father and the Son. His emphasis is on the fact
that the Word becomes visible in one degree or another upon generation. For Tertullian, the distinction
with the Father is that He never does since creation cannot but be destroyed in such circumstances.
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Father is itself a basis for understanding the Son‘s visibility. Although Tertullian asserts
the common and shared substance of the Father, Son, and Spirit, the distinction between
the Father‘s invisibility and the Son‘s visibility has led numerous scholars to question
Tertullian‘s desire to coherently avoid ontological subordination.201
Tertullian connects divine immanence with visibility and affirms God‘s constant
contact with the world from the moment of creation. He likewise builds on ideas seen in
previous authors, such as the identification of the Word as the agent of creation.202 In
fact, Tertullian connects his understanding of the Word as the agent of creation with the
activity of the visible God: ―And think not that solely the works of the world were made
by the Son, but those also which from then on were performed by God.‖203 According to
Tertullian, the Word creates and continues to work God‘s will in creation precisely
because he shares the same divine nature with the transcendent Father.204 The foregoing
sets the stage for Tertullian to describe the event of the Incarnation as the fulfillment of
God‘s immanence.205

201

For an example of this, see Evans, Tertullian‟s Treatise, 217. Cf. Kearsley, Tertullian‟s
Theology, 55, who addresses Evans‘ argument and adds, ―As it happens, it does not matter a great deal to
an understanding of Tertullian‘s Trinitarian formulation whether Evans is right on this score or not, since
most commentators are agreed that Tertullian is heir to the traditional Logos conceptuality, which in his
hands undergoes no radical change to exclude subordinationist overtones.‖ Kearsley‘s point is exactly the
reason that scholars such as Pollard argue that Tertullian‘s use of a Logos theology does not harmonize
with his eventual embrace of a theology based upon the relationship between the Son and the Father. See
Pollard, Johannine Christology, 62-66.
202
According to the quotation of Prax. 7, cited above, creation occurs because the Word is sent
forth for this very purpose.
203
Prax. 16.
204
Kearsley looks at numerous texts by Tertullian and comments, ―First, the incarnation aims at a
new creation. Secondly, this achievement ranks in power with the original creatio ex nihilo. Thirdly, the
Word of God assumes in this renovating operation his unique position and role in the original creation,‖
Tertullian‟s Theology, 80.
205
So Grillmeier states, ―The Father is the guarantee of the unity of God, of the monarchia. The
Son is assigned the second and the Spirit the third place. Here Tertullian is thinking not of a purely static
threeness within God, the metaphysical Trinity, but of an economic, organic, dynamic threeness. I.e. for
him the second and the third persons proceed from the unitas substantiae because they have a task to fulfill.
Only the Father remains completely transcendent,‖ Christ in Christian Tradition, 120.
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Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates the variety of methods for speaking about divine
transcendence and immanence as well as the description of the Word‘s generation in light
of these topics. I have shown in this chapter that the Word Christology tradition does not
develop in a clear path on the way to later standards of orthodoxy. We can look again,
for instance to the Single and Two-stage Logos theories. Even though Irenaeus‘ Singlestage theory looks as if it attempts to articulate the Son‘s eternal distinction, this was not
a model employed by Hippolytus, Tertullian, or even Novatian.
Scholars often take note of overtones and undertones of ontological
subordinationism which accompany formulations of the Word becoming distinct in the
Two-stage Logos model. This model concerns the presumption that the Word exists
originally (somehow) in the Father. At some point, however, the Word is brought out of
the Father for the purpose of creation. The uncertainty regarding the distinctions in
nature between the Father and Son (such as visibility and invisibility) can only be asked
in light of the theological developments based on early Word traditions and Scripture, as
well as the influence of theological philosophy known to the authors I discuss above.
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that Novatain‘s reading of the Word Christology
tradition did not mean that he wanted to conform his own theology to the teachings which
scholars take to be advancements towards later orthodox formulations, such as
Tertullian‘s in Prax.
In the next two chapters, my analysis of Novatian‘s Word Christology will focus
on the arguments he uses to declare the Son‘s divinity. I will also look at the statements
Novatian makes by which we can interpret the ontological relationship between the
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Father and the Son. The current chapter outlines the ontological considerations and
affirmations about the unique Supreme God and how those affirmations play a complex
role in individual theological systems. What we cannot say is that the Word
Christologies on which Novatian relied presented a consistent teaching about the Father
and Son‘s ontological equality. I will present Novatian‘s theology of the Son as a
response and engagement with the sources of the Word Christology tradition discussed
above. Furthermore, my presentation of Novatian‘s theology of the Son would be
impossible without my earlier analysis of Novatian‘s articulation of the transcendence,
supremacy, and uniqueness of the Father and His attributes.
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Chapter Six: Arguments for the Son’s Divinity

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I outlined the development of the Word theology tradition
and discussed the Word Christologies influential to Novatian‘s Trin. These Word
traditions provided a framework through which philosophers, Jews, and Christians chose
to speak about divine transcendence and immanence. Furthermore, these traditions were
also used to argue for the Word‘s divine nature while maintaining the Father‘s
supremacy.1
By reiterating two conclusions in regard to the Word Christology examples
presented in chapter 5, I will contextualize my analysis of Novatian‘s theology of the
Son. First, the Son‘s ontological equality with the Father was not explicitly stated by
most of Novatian‘s predecessors. Second, it is neither helpful nor accurate to frame the
Word Christology tradition as developing in a linear, chronological progression
according to doctrinal concerns of later centuries.2 With these points in mind, I will
contend that we can find much in common between Novatian‘s understanding of the
Son‘s divinity and those articulations of the Word Christology suggesting the Son‘s
ontological subordination.3

1

The Middle Platonic examples I pointed to in chapters 1 and 5 describe a Supreme God and other
divine figures sharing in divine attributes while showing concern for maintaining various teachings about
transcendence and immanence. For a discussion of Platonists, especially Numenius on the Demiurge as
second God, see Mark J. Edwards, ―On the Platonic Schooling of Justin Martyr,‖ JTS 42:1 (1991), 27-8.
Edwards‘ also provides a helpful discussion of Plotinus regarding emanations.
2
Even though much of Tertullian‘s terminology and ideas were taken over by the Western
Church, we can also note that Irenaeus‘ teachings concerning the generation of the Son and also the shared
attributes of the Father and the Son are equally integral to the later, orthodox position.
3
Justin‘s theology of the Father and his understanding of the Son is an example of this kind of
articulation. However, I also believe that Tertullian‘s early works, such as his Herm., similarly make
statements about the Father which would be seen by Novatian as supporting ontological inequality. Cf.

195
I will begin this chapter by pointing out the epistemological role Scripture plays
in Novatian‘s assertion that the Son/Word is God. Then I will describe Novatian‘s six
primary arguments for calling the Son ―God,‖ according to my reading of Trin.4 They
include: 1) the Son is before the world and all things, 2) all things are through the Word,
3) the Word performs the Works of God, 4) the Word is obedient to the Father, 5) the
Word is the minister of the Father‘s will, as well as 6) the Son deserves to be identified as
―God‖ more than angels and human beings. Novatian treats these topics as essential both
for proving that the Son is God and for identifying the Son‘s personal distinction from the
Father. He also combines some of these arguments into single passages, which suggests
that he sees them as logically interrelated.5
Novatian‘s arguments for calling the Son ―God,‖ which I present in this chapter,
do not focus on the Son‘s divine ontology as such. Although some of Novatian‘s
arguments presented below have implications regarding the Son‘s divine nature, he does
DeSimone who states, ―We must bear in mind that Novatian is energetically defending against the
Gnostics, Docetists, Adoptianists, and Sebellianists. He is not concerned with irrelevant, subtle questions.
He upholds the real human nature and divinity of Christ. He strives to place in bold relief the posteriority
of the Son, insofar as His origin is concerned, so that he can better defend the personal distinction of the
Father and the Son. He has been charged with subordinationism. Novatian, however, did not make use of
explicit formulas to formally defend subordinationism,‖ On the Trinity, 19. Part of my justification for
writing chapters 1 and 5 includes the necessity of rebutting questionable or unproven assumptions in the
literature on Novatian. In DeSimone‘s case, I take his last sentence to be highly misleading. Novatian‘s
formulations about the Father‘s unique attributes and his later and explicit exclusion of the Son from those
formulations function in exactly the way DeSimone denies.
4
Novatian mentions other proofs for Christ‘s divinity which I do not discuss in this chapter.
These arguments derive from Scripture proof texts, and they are important in so far as they demonstrate
Novatian‘s belief that Scripture often points to revelations about the divinity of Christ. For example, two
such proofs for Christ‘s divinity are found in Trin. 13.6. In that passage, Novatian argues that Christ‘s
ability to see the secrets of the heart as well as his ability to forgive sins necessitates his divinity. The first
argument appears to be a spiritual power which Tertullian at least views as similarly applicable to angels, a
topic I discuss below. The second argument fits with the subject of the Father sharing His power with the
Son, which I also treat below. Ultimately, those arguments made by Novatian which I do not specifically
treat have some basis of justification in those topics which I do analyze.
5
See for example Trin. 26.20 where he combines several of them: ―For throughout the Divine
Scripture of the Old, as well as the New Testament, He [Jesus] is shown to us as born of the Father, one
through (per) whom ‗all things were made, and without whom nothing was made,‘ who has ever been
obedient (oboedierit) to the Father and still obeys (oboediat). He is also revealed to us as having power
(potestatem) over all things, power, however, that has been given, that has been granted and conferred upon
Him by His own Father.‖
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not often take the opportunity to describe the attributes of the Son‘s divinity as compared
with the attribrutes of the Father‘s. In chapter 7, I will discuss Novatian‘s arguments
which do directly engage with such comparisons in order to confirm that Novatian‘s
theology of the Son incorporates the idea of the Son‘s ontological subordination to the
Father. The six topics I discuss below will reveal that Novatian‘s rationale concerning
the classification of the Son as God neither begins with nor relies on the assertion of
equality with the Father. Since many of these topics are overlooked in the secondary
literature, the current chapter addresses the scholarly failure to fully contextualize and
analyze Novatian‘s logic for asserting the Son‘s identification as ―God.‖6 Novatian does
not make ontological arguments of equality between the Son and the Father the basis for
calling the Son ―God‖ because, I believe, he does not teach that the Son is ontologically
equal with the Father.
My references to Novatian‘s ―Word Christology‖ will focus on the Son‘s
generation from and relationship with the Father. His justification for calling the Son the
―Word‖ most often involves the fact that Scriptures assert this connection, especially
those made in the Gospel of John.7 Novatian offers little insight into his reasons for
connecting the terms ―Son‖ and ―Word.‖ Therefore, when I speak about Novatian‘s
Word Christology or his theological dependence on the Word Christology in authors such
as Justin, I will be directing my comments towards the theological connections made

6

Novatian does not suggest that there is a difference between talking about the Son as God (deus)
or as divine (divinitas). In the majority of cases, he simply says that the Son or Word is rightfully called
God. Discerning what he means by this term is the question at hand in both chapters 6 and 7.
7
Novatian also mentions Ps. 45:1 in Trin. 13.1, 15.6, and 17.3 as proof that the Word which the
Father speaks is the Son. I will point out below that Novatian, in a few passages, refers to the connection
between the Word and the creative activity of God. However, he does not use this as a principle, or even
clear, argument for calling the Son the ―Word.‖
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between the Father and the Son. I will then analyze the implications this relationship has
to Novatian‘s expression of divine transcendence and immanence.

The Role of Scripture

Novatian begins his discussion of the Son in Trin. 9 by pointing to the regula:
―The same Rule of truth teaches us, after we believe in the Father, to believe also in the
Son of God, Christ Jesus, the Lord Our God, nevertheless the Son of God.‖8 He then
affirms the central role of scripture in guaranteeing knowledge of the Son:
For we read that this Jesus Christ, the Son, I repeat, of this God, was not only
promised in the Old Testament, but also has been manifested in the New
Testament, fulfilling the shadows and types of all the prophecies concerning the
presence of His Incarnate Truth. [Trin. 9.2]9
Novatian quotes texts from Genesis, Exodus, Deuteronomy, Isaiah, and the Psalms in
order to show that Jesus is both the Son of God and that God foretold the Incarnation to
His people.10 Like Justin, Novatian connects the legitimacy of the Old Testament to the
fulfillment of God‘s prophecies in the Son‘s appearance and activities in the New
Testament.11 This God who appears in the creation cannot be the Father, but rather must
be the Son.12

8

Trin. 9.1.
Hunc enim Iesum Christum, iterum dicam huius Dei Filium, et in ueteri testamento legimus esse
repromissum et in nouo testamento animaduertimus exhibitum, omnium sacramentorum umbras et figures
de praesentia corporatae ueritatis implentem.
10
Trin. 9.2-9 recounts fulfilled prophecies from Genesis, Exodus, Deuteronomy, Isaiah, Hosea,
and Psalms. See my discussion of Justin in chapter 5 for a summary of similar arguments.
11
Papandrea notes, ―In his choice of passages, Novatian shows a marked preoccupation with
Christological texts. Of his over 140 references to New Testament passages in the De Trinitate, a full 80%
have Christological implications,‖ Trinitarian Theology, 295.
12
See, for example, Novatian‘s explanation of Hosea 1:7 in Trin. 12.2: ―If God says that He will
save them by God (Hosea 1:7) and if God does not save except by Christ, then why should man hesitate to
call Christ God when he realizes that the Father declares, through the Scriptures, that He is God. In fact, if
God the Father can not save, except by God, no one can be save by God the Father, unless he has
acknowledged that Christ is God, in whom and through whom the Father promises to grant salvation.‖
9
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Throughout Trin., Novatian discusses the theophanies in terms of how they
distinguish the Son from the Father, while also designating the Son as God. He draws on
principles of his philosophical theology to reject the Father‘s ability to appear on earth.
For example, Novatian explains Habakkuk‘s prophecy that God will come from the
South (Hab. 3:3) by declaring that the Son must be the subject of the text:
If they say that God the Father almighty came, then God the Father came from a
place (loco); consequently, He is also enclosed by a place and contained with the
limits of some abode…If Christ, who is also called God by the Scriptures, was
born in Bethlehem, which geographically faces towards the South, then this God
is rightly described as coming from the South, because it was foreseen that He
would come from Bethlehem. [Trin. 12.7-8]13
According to Novatian, passages, such as the one from Habukkuk, say that the subject
identified as God interacts with the world in a way impossible to the Father.14 He
concludes that the text must be referring to the Son, and in so doing, follows a method of
interpretation seen among some of his Christian predecessors.15
In the above instance, Novatian calls the Son ―God‖ based on his philosophic and
theological presentation of the Father‘s nature. His approach to explaining statements
about the Son in theophanies is twofold. First, he begins with the scriptural affirmation
that the Son is God.16 Second, he relies on the theological conviction that the
transcendent Father must be logically limited from certain kinds of contact with
13

See my discussion of this passage in the section on topological theology in chapter 4 and my
discussion of it below. See also Mattei‘s treatment of some of these themes in his discussion of
theophanies as they relate to the Father as invisible and the Son as visible, ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 205-208.
14
With a similar set of exegetical principles, Novatian explains the theophany with Hagar in Gen.
21, in Trin. 18.18-22. Novatian concludes in Trin. 18.22, ―Now, although all this [the interaction between
God and Hagar] cannot be appropriately and suitably applied to the Father, who is only God, it can,
however, be appropriately applied to Christ who has been proclaimed not only God but an angel also.‖
15
See chapter 5 for quotations of Justin‘s Dial. 127 and Theophilus‘ Autol. 2.3 and 2.22, which
follow a logic similar to Novatian‘s.
16
See, for example, Trin. 30.2. Papandrea provides a list of the statements which Novatian makes
affirming the divinity of the Son with corresponding references to Novatian‘s citations of Scripture,
Trinitarian Theology, 306-310. See also DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 82-91 for a discussion of
Novatian‘s use of Scripture.
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creation.17 Novatian describes the Father as creator of the world with allusions to, and
some citations of, Genesis and the Psalms.18 Without effort, he couples Scripture with
philosophical language of negative theology related to the Supreme God.19 Novatian
explains Romans 1:20 by stating,
―Since we cannot see Him with the sight of our eyes, we learn to know Him from
the greatness, the power, and the majesty of His works. ‗For since the creation of
the world,‘ says the Apostle, ‗His invisible attributes are clearly seen—His
everlasting power also and divinity—being understood through the things that are
made.‘ Thus the human mind, learning to know the hidden things from those
which are manifest, may consider in spirit the greatness of the Maker from the
greatness of His works which it sees with the eyes of the mind.‖ [Trin. 3.6]
17

The structure of Novatian‘s presentation of the Son does not lend itself to a comparable
organization which scholars find in Novatian‘s structural presentation of the Father. See for example,
Dunn who comments, ―While the first chapter considers the works of God, the remaining seven chapters of
this first section consider the nature of God. Chapters 2 and 4 do so from a philosophical or rational
perspective while chapters 3 and 5 to 8 do so from Scripture,‖ ―Diversity and Unity,‖ 392. Dunn also
points out that he diverges from DeSimone who took Trin. 4 as an argument from Scripture. Dunn reads
Trin. 4 as primarily influenced by philosophical arguments.
18
Because he bases his argument on the truthfulness of the Jewish Scriptures, he counters the
claims of groups such as the Sebellians, Marcionites, and Valentinians, whose Scriptural interpretations
Novatian later claims to be wrong by ignorance or malice. In Trin. 30.3, Novatian notes that ―the
heretics…have drawn from Scripture the elements and the reasons for their error and perversity.‖ He then
states in 30.7, ―However, neither do the Holy Scriptures nor de we afford them any ground for their present
ruin and blindness, because they either will not, or cannot, see what has been so clearly laid down on the
open page of the Divine Writings.‖ Dunn rejects DeSimone‘s suggestion that Novatian specifically seeks
to target Marcionites in Trin. 10 in ―Diversity and Unity,‖ 394. I agree with Dunn in so far as he accepts
the probability that Novatian‘s arguments deny Marcion‘s theology by using the Old Testament as
authoritative.
19
See my discussion of this topic in chapter 3. Note also that Trin. 5-7 is Novatian‘s attempt to
harmonize his theology with his previous presentation of the Father‘s transcendence and attributes by
offering non-anthropomorphic and non-literal interpretations of Scripture passages about God and His
attributes. DeSimone and Dunn both see Trin. 1 as an ―argument for the existence of God from design,‖
Dunn, ―Diversity and Unity,‖ 392 n. 26; DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 60. This is correct, as long as we
keep in mind the idea that the Father designs man and the world in such a way that theological
epistemology is possible at all. Novatian‘s ability to make such an easy transition can be accounted for by
a lack of theological controversy concerning his description of the Father. Not only were the Marcionites
and Valentinians less of a theological threat during his time, but Novatian‘s intellectual climate, which
included non-Christian philosophical works, also contained an array of uncontroversial approaches for
affirming the highest God‘s supremacy and transcendence. Sabellians and the humanistic monarchians
shared, in some respect, the concern for God‘s transcendent supremacy. Even in the case of Callistus‘
modified Sabellianism, the Father‘s ―suffering‖ did not interfere with His transcendence. Heine writes,
―The Roman modalists appear to have denied the death of deity on the cross as strongly as the Logos
theologians did. What Callistus and the Roman modalists appear to have argued was that the Son had no
divine substance distinct from the Father, for they were both one spirit (and lo,goj endia,qetoj) in substance.
As Son, however, he differed from the Father in having the substance flesh. The latter admitted him to the
human world of suffering and death. Because the Father, as spirit, was united with the flesh and interacted
with it, he also partook of the experiences of the Son, though this partaking was limited by the respective
capabilities of spirit and flesh,‖ ―Christology of Callistus,‖ 77-78.
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Novatian argues that Scriptural revelation and natural revelation jointly guide human
beings to appreciate the Supreme Father.
Unlike the Father, the Son‘s divinity (or existence) is not known by the human
experience of natural revelation.20 To speak about the Son, Novatian begins by pointing
to references in Scripture to another God besides the Father. He argues that Jesus fulfills
the prophecies, and that this subject, whether referred to as Jesus, Word, or Christ, is also
called ―God.‖ In other words, Novatian looks to instances in which the Scriptures
identify a subject as God, yet ones which also are inconsistent with his theology of the
Father. In those cases, Novatian declares that the divine subject must be the Son.
The evidence of Scripture stands at the heart of Novatian‘s knowledge about the
Son. From the time of Justin, Word Christologies included the idea that the interaction
between man and God‘s reason was linked by some activity of the Word. This led to
statements regarding the incipient knowledge about the Word which Novatian seems to
either discount or simply not acknowledge. Although Novatian treats Scripture as the
basis for his identification of the Son with divinity, such an identification does little to fill
out the meaning of how Novatian understands the nature of the Son‘s divinity. What
Novatian does tell us about the Son‘s nature has as much to do with the distinction he

20

Novatian‘s position on this is not entirely clear to me. Word Christologies beginning at least
with Justin appealled to the universality of the Word‘s presence in a way suggestive of some inherent
universal knowledge of the Word. Recall the quotation of 1 Apol. 59 which I quoted in chapter 5. I suspect
that Novatian rejects this theological tradition. As I demonstrated in chapter 3, his theological
epistemology relies on the activity of the Supreme God. Even natural revelation is but an expression of the
revelation available because of the structure of the universe and the structure of man‘s nature. In regard to
knowledge about the Word, Novatian always begins with the fulfillment of biblical revelation.
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makes between the Son‘s attributes and the Father‘s,21 such as can be seen in his exegesis
of Habukkuk.

The Word is before the World

In Trin. 11, Novatian combines numerous Scriptural passages which, he argues,
proclaim the divinity and humanity of Jesus. He insists in Trin. 11.8 that the Word ―as
Man, is born after the world existed, so, as God, is He shown to have existed before the
world (ante mundum).‖ In the notes to his translation, DeSimone suggests that Novatian
has in mind John 17:5 for this passage.22 I think this is likely since Novatian quotes this
verse in three separate places in Trin.23 Trin. 11.8 is one of the numerous instances in
which Novatian makes the Son‘s temporal priority a central feature in his logic of the
Son‘s divinity.
Later, when Novatian cites John 17:5 in Trin. 16.6, he treats the subject of the
Son‘s temporal priority at greater length, writing,
If Christ is only man, how does He say: ―And now glorify Me with the glory
which I had with Thee before the world was‖? If He had glory with God before
the world (ante mundum) was and retained His glory with the Father, certainly He
existed before the world. For He could not have had this glory (gloriam) unless
He had existed before the world, so as to keep the glory (gloriam). No one who
possesses anything can have anything unless He exists before (ante) it. [Trin.
16.6]24
21

Amann, ―Novatien et novatianisme,‖ 823-824; Keilbach, ―Divinitas Filii,‖ 208; Fausset,
Novatiani Romanae, xlvi-xlvii.
22
―And now, Father, glorify thou me with the glory which I had with thee before the world was
made.‖ (Et nunc honorifica me gloria quam habebam apud te prius quam mundus esset.)
23
See Trin. 13.4, 16.6, and 26.15. I am departing somewhat from DeSimone who focuses on
Novatian‘s arguments that Christ existed before the Incarnation. While this is certainly a main feature of
Novatian‘s argument, I think the principle of the Son‘s temporal priority over the world plays a more
distinct role than DeSimone‘s organization allows. See DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 83-86.
24
Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo dicit : Et nunc honorifica me gloria quam habebam
apud te priusquam mundus esset? Si antequam mundus esset gloriam habuit apud Deum et claritatem
tenuit apud Patrem, ante mundum fuit; nec enim habuisset gloriam, nisi ipse prius fuisset, qui gloriam
posset tenere. Nemo enim habere aliquid poterit, nisi ante ipse fuerit qui aliquid tenet. See also Trin.
13.5: ―He [the Word] ascends with His spouse, the flesh, to the same place from which He had descended
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The Word‘s personal existence prior to creation accounts for the Word‘s preeminence or
rank,25 which Novatian describes with the term gloria.26 Unfortunately, Novatian does
not explain his understanding of glory beyond the implication that temporal priority
indicates preeminence or rank.27
Later, Novatian cites Col. 1:15 as part of his argument that Christ is called God on
the basis of his temporal rank:28
Now, if Christ is called by the Apostle ―the firstborn of all creatures‖
(primogenitus omnis creaturae), how could He be the firstborn of all creatures
unless—in virtue of His divinity (diuinitatem)—He came forth (processit), as the
Word from the Father before (ante) every creature? [Trin. 21.4]29
without the flesh and receives not that glory which He is shown to have had before the creation of the
world. This proves, without the least doubt, that He is God.‖
25
In Trin. 16.8-9, Novatian declares that Christ would be less than (minor) the patriarchs if he
were to come temporally after them. See also Trin. 11.8: ―In the same manner that He, as Man, was after
(post) many, He was, as God, before (ante) all men. In the same manner that He, as Man, was lower in
rank (inferior) than the other, as God He was greater (maior) than all.
26
See also Trin. 13.6 in which Novatian says that the world‘s creation through Christ (meaning,
therefore, that Christ exists before the creation of the world) proves the glory (gloria) and authority
(auctoritas) of Christ‘s divinity (divinitas). I think that part of Novatian‘s logic comes from his citation of
John 1:30 in Trin. 14.11. ―If Christ is only man,‖ Novatian writes, ―how does John the Baptist bear witness
of Him when he says: ‗He who comes after me was made before me, for He was before me‘?‖ (Si homo
tantummodo Christus, quomodo Ioannes Baptista testatur et dicit: qui post me uenit, ante me factus est,
quia prior me fuit.) I am unaware of any instances in which John 1:30 appears in Novatian‘s primary
Christian sources.
27
Although Novatian identifies (without explanation) the term gloria with God the Father (Trin.
3.7; 18.3; 22.12) and also with the Word (Trin. 16.6 and perhaps 22.1), he also uses it to describe simple
honor and rank in Trin. 16.8-9. Novatian, however, does reject the possibility that Christ‘s glory is one of
predestination. Of Trin. 16.6, DeSimone notes, ―Novatian is contending with the Artemonites, who
maintained that Jesus Christ was God only by predestination,‖ Treatise of Novatian, 63,n. 6. See also
Papandrea who agrees with DeSimone on this point, Trinitarian Theology, 339 n. 188. In The Church
History 5.28, Eusebius mentions only that the Artemonites regarded Jesus as a mere man. In regard to the
Son and predestination, Novatian responds to those making the suggestion by claiming that other human
beings, such as Adam, Abel, and Abraham, would have to be considered greater than Christ. They would
both be predestined to glory before him and also live before him. Novatian‘s principle is clear: if Christ
begins a personal existence after other men, then he is somehow less than them due to his lack of temporal
priority. Novatian counters every rejection of this principle by stating the logical necessity of Christ‘s
personhood in substantia, prior to the world. See Trin. 16.7 and also Fausset, Novatiani Romanae, 58 n. 9
on this point. Novatian‘s argument, found in Trin. 16, works against a theology which identifies Christ‘s
personhood, or subjectivity, with the Incarnation.
28
See also Mattei, ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 202-208 for a discussion on the visibility of the Son related
to Novatian‘s citations of Col. 1:15.
29
Trin. 21.4: Quodsi et primogenitus omnis creaturae ab apostolo dictus sit Christus,

quomodo omnis creaturae primogenitus esse potuit, nisi quoniam secundum diuinitatem ante omnem
creaturam ex Patre Deo sermo processit?
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Novatian acknowledges no difficulty in assigning divinity to the Word, while calling the
Word the firstborn of all creatures (primogenitus omnis creaturae).30 His reason, in this
case, for saying that the Word is divine comes entirely from the Word‘s temporal rank.31
All Things Are Through the Word: Demiurgic Activity32

As shown in chapters 1 and 5, the identification of creative activity with divine
nature was common to both the Word Christology traditions and theological philosophy.
Based on scriptural witness, Novatian speaks often of the world as coming through (per)
the Word, who is the agent or instrument of creation.33 Novatian, however, does not use
this demiurgic activity as a justification for calling the Son ―Creator.‖34 This title he
reserves exclusively for the Father.35

30

Papandrea translates primogenitus omnis creaturae as ―the firstborn of all creation.‖ He writes,
―As we have seen, Novatian maintains that the preexistence of Christ proves His divine nature. Christ as
the ‗firstborn‘ of all creation means that He existed before all creation as the Word of God. This
necessarily implies that He existed before humanity, so therefore He cannot be a mere human, He must be
divine,‖ Trinitarian Theology, 276. I disagree with Papandrea only in that he treats the existence of the
Word of God as defined by an eternality equivalent to the Father‘s.
31
Cf. DeSimone who takes the Col. 1:15 reference to Christ as the firstborn as equivalent to
eternality, Treatise of Novatian, 85. See the next chapter for my discussion of the Son as eternal.
32
See also chapter 7‘s section, ―Stages of the Word,‖ for another aspect of the discussion of how
Novatian understands the begetting of the Word as it is tied to creative activity.
33
Novatian says that Christ is ―the Lord and Prince of the whole world, to whom ‗all things have
been‘ entrusted and ‗granted by His Father,‘ through (per) whom all things were made, all things created
(creata sunt tota), all things set in order…‖ (Trin. 11.2, modified slightly: Totius Dominum et principem
mundi, cui a suo Patre omnia tradita sunt et cuncta concessa, per quem instituta sunt uniuersa, creata sunt
tota, digesta sunt cuncta…). In this case, Novatian uses the terms for ―through‖ and ―created‖ (per and
creatio) as relating the same idea. All his other statements using per in such a context I read in light of the
Word‘s demiurgic activity.
34
DeSimone calls the Son ―Creator‖ in Novatian‘s theology despite a lack of textual evidence. He
states, for example, ―Novatian distinguishes the generation of the Word from His procession as Lord and
Creator,‖ On the Trinity, 17. I think this confuses the issue and underplays the distinctions which Novatian
make regarding the Father and the Son. Although the Son is clearly the instrument of creation, scholarship
which identifies the Son as the ―creator‖ when interpreting Trin. presses Novatian‘s theology into a
vocabulary he chose not to use.
35
See Trin. 9.1.
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The Gospel of John has a significant influence on Novatian‘s statements that the
world comes through the Word. In Trin. 13.2, Novatian connects John 1:3, Col. 1:16,
and John 1:10-11 to make this point:
For ―All‖ (omnia) works (opera) ―were made through (per) Him, and nothing was
made without Him.‖ Indeed, the apostle says, ―Whether thrones or authorities, or
rulers (uirtutes), or powers (potestas), visible and invisible…all things exist
through (per) Him.‖ However this is the Word which ―came into His own and
His own did not receive Him.‖ For ―The world was made through (per) Him, and
[yet] the world did not know Him.‖ Now this ―Word was in the beginning with
God, and the Word was God.‖ [Trin. 13.2, trans. Papandrea, modified slightly]36
Novatian relies on John 1:3 (the first citation in the quotation above), here and in several
places, to prove that God never creates apart from the instrumentality of the Word.
Furthermore, we see in this passage that Novatian links demiurgic activity with the
Word‘s temporal priority.
In Trin. 13.7 Novatian develops the association of the Word‘s demiurgic role with
the Word‘s temporal priority over the world,37 in his most extensive and sustained use of
John 1:3. The combination of these factors leads to his conclusion that the Word is both
God and man:
At this point, therefore, one of two alternatives must be true. Since it is evident
that all things were made through (per) Christ, either He is before (ante) all
things, because ―all things are through (per) Him,‖ and consequently He is God,
or else, because He is man, He is after (post) all things, and consequently nothing
was made through (per) Him. But we cannot say that nothing was made through
(per) Him, since we know that it is written: ―All things were made through (per)
Him.‖ He is not after (post) all things; that is, He is not a mere man who is after
(post) all things for He is also God because God is before (ante) all things. He is
before (ante) all things because ―all things are through (per) Him‖; otherwise,
were He only a man, nothing would be through (per) Him. On the other hand, if
all things were made through (per) Him, He would not be a mere man. Were He
36

Per ipsum enim omnia facta sunt opera et sine ipso factum est nihil. Siue enim, inquit apostolus,
throni, siue dominationes, siue uirtutes, siue potestates, uisibilia et inuisibilia, omnia per ipsum constant.
Verbum autem hoc iliud est, quod in sua uenit, et sui eum non receperunt. Mundus enim per ipsum factus
est, et mundus eum non cognouit. Verbum autem hoc erat in principio apud Deum, et Deus erat uerbum.
37
See also Trin. 17.2. and 31.4-5.
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merely a man, all things would not be made through (per) Him; in fact nothing
would be made through (per) Him. [Trin. 13.7]38
Novatian rejects the idea that Christ was a mere man by making the Word‘s temporal
priority essential to the Word‘s creative activity; this is seen in his repetitious use of
per.39 He treats the relationship of the temporal terms ante (regarding the Word) and post
(regarding the world) as the cornerstone of his logic for calling the Word ―God.‖
Furthermore, Novatian couples this temporal point with his assertion of the Word‘s single
subjectivity: the Word is the Son who is Jesus Christ.40 Novatian feels at liberty to
exchange these names at will. His constant insistence on the single subjectivity of the
Word as Son and as Jesus counteracts both Sabellianism and humanitarian
monarchianism, which denied, respectively, that the Word personally created the world
and that the Son Incarnate is the Word.
Although Novatian waits until chapter 9 to explicitly treat the Son,41 I believe that
the first reference to the Son‘s demiurgic role appears when Novatian describes the
activity of the Father. In Trin. 3 Novatian exegetes Romans 11:36, which includes the
term per, by noting the activity of the verbum. Novatian writes,
For He [the Father] who surpassed the greatness of thought went beyond the
contemplation of the eyes. ―Because,‖ he says, ―all things are from (ex) Him and
through (per) Him and in (in) Him.‖ For indeed all things [exist] by His
command, so that they are ―from Him‖, and are created by His word (uerbo), so
38

Itaque hoc in loco ex duobus alterum constare debebit. Cum enim manifestum sit omnia esse
facta per Christum aut ante omnia est, quoniam omnia per ipsum, et merito et Deus est, aut quia homo est,
post omnia est et merito per ipsum nihil factum est. Sed nihil per ipsum factum esse non possumus dicere,
cum animaduertamus omnia per ipsum facta esse scriptum. Non ergo post omnia est, id est non homo
tantum est, qui post omnia est, sed et Deus, quoniam Deus ante omnia est. Ante omnia est enim, quia per
ipsum omnia, ne si homo tantum, nihil per ipsum, aut si omnia per ipsum, non homo tantum, quoniam si
homo tantum, non omnia per ipsum, immo nihil per ipsum.
39
Fausset describes this section as ―not very logically set out,‖ although I am not sure why,
Novatiani Romanae, 45 n. 2.
40
In chapter 5, I provide examples of this same use of names in the works of Justin and Irenaeus.
41
Trin. 9.1: ―The same Rule of truth teaches us, after we believe in the Father, to believe also in
the Son of God…‖
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that they are ―through Him‖ (per), and everything relies upon His judgment, that
while ―in Him‖ [all things] look forward to freedom, corruption having been done
away with, [and] in Him [all things] may be seen to be reclaimed. [Trin. 3.7,
translation Papandrea] 42
I am unaware of any of Novatian‘s sources using Romans 11:36 to articulate the role of
the Son.43 However, a similar verse, Ephesians 4:6, appears in Irenaeus‘ Haer.44 and also
Noet.45 Both authors interpret Paul‘s statement that God is above (super), through (per,
dia in the case of Noet.), and in (in) all things by linking it with a Trinitarian explanation.
Both also associate the Word with the term for ―through.‖46 In the case of Irenaeus, the
affirmation that the Word is ―through‖ all things indicates His continual presence in the
Church, while Noet. does not clarify whether the attribution of ―through all things‖
relates specifically to demiurgic activity or presence. If Novatian associated Romans
11:36 with the exegetical tradition of Eph. 4:6, as I suspect he does, then he followed the
tradition in so far as he associates the term for ―through‖ with the Word, who is the Son.
Novatian‘s exegesis is unique in his unambiguous identification of ―through‖ as

42

Euasit enim oculorum contemplationem qui cogitationis uicit magnitudinem. Quoniam, inquit,
ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia. Nam et imperio eius omnia, ut ex ipso sint, et uerbo eius digesta,
ut per ipsum sint, et in iudicium eius recidunt uniuersa, ut dum in ipso expectant libertatem corruptione
deposita, in ipsum uideantur esse reuocata.
43
In Haer. 1.3.4, Irenaeus says that the Valentinians use this passage to describe the Ogdoad.
44
Haer. 5.18.2 states, ―And thus one God the Father is declared, who is above all, and through all,
and in all. The Father is indeed above all, and He is the Head of Christ; but the Word is through all things,
and is Himself the Head of the Church; while the Spirit is in us all, and He is the living water, which the
Lord grants to those who rightly believe in Him, and love Him, and who know that ‗there is one Father,
who is above all, and through all, and in us all.‘‖ In Haer. 2.2.5, Irenaeus only refers to the Father when
quoting Eph. 4:6: ―Now, that this God is the father of our Lord Jesus Christ, Paul the apostle also has
declared, [saying,] ‗There is one God, the Father, who is above all, and through all things, and in us all.‘ I
have indeed proved already that there is only one God.‖
45
Noet. 14.4-5 states, ―The Father gives order, the Word performs the work, and is revealed as
Son, through whom belief is accorded to the Father. By a harmonious economy the result is a single God.
This is because there is one God. For the one who commands is the Father, the one who obeys is the Son,
and the one who promotes mutual understandings is the Holy Spirit. He who is Father is over all things,
and the Son is through all things, and the Holy Spirit is in all things.‖
46
Haer. and Noet. refer to the Father as ―above‖ all things and the Spirit as ―in‖ all things.
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representative of demiurgic activity.47 As a central argument for the Word‘s divinity, I
pointed out in chapter 5 that demiurgic activity was central to Word Christology,
especially in light of Prov. 8:22.
Earlier in this chapter, I noted that Novatian finds his reasons for calling the Son
―God‖ in revelation rather than as part of man‘s natural epistemological capacities. In
contrast to this position, Justin explains Gen. 1:1-3 in 1 Apol. 59 as describing the
agreement between Moses and Plato on the instrumental activity of the Word for
creation.48 Novatian avoids any explicit connection to philosophical wisdom when
positing knowledge of the Word.49 Unlike Justin, Novatian focuses entirely on the
revelation of Scripture when he alludes to the opening passages of Genesis 1. He notes a
long list of God‘s demiurgic activities, beginning with the creation of light and moves on
to the creation of the heavens, waters, land, vegetation, animals, and celestial bodies.

47

Note that in Trin. 3.7 Novatian exegetes the Latin in simply by saying, ―and everything relies
upon His judgment, that while ‗in Him‘ [all things] look forward to freedom, corruption having been done
away with, [and] in Him [all things] may be seen to be reclaimed. My interpretation of the entirety of Trin.
3.7 has a bearing on understanding Novatian‘s doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Although all scholars interested
in the topic point out that Novatian avoids calling the Holy Spirit ―God,‖ I am familiar with no study which
identifies Novatian‘s alteration of this traditional exegesis of Trinitarian theology, in order to elimintate or
downplay the Spirit‘s role. If we read Novatian‘s interpretation of Rom. 11:36 as an exegetical
reformulation of traditions which exegete Eph. 4:6 (and which he found in his theological sources), then
Novatian seems to strip explicit mention of the Holy Spirit from a verse about God‘s activity. This is
further evidence which points to Novatian‘s unwillingness to speak about God in Trinitarian terms as was
seen in Noet., for example.
48
See chapter 5‘s section on Justin for a quotation of this text.
49
Tertullian also proposes an analogy for understanding the personal existence of the Word
through natural revelation in Prax 5: ―And that you may understand this the more easily, observe first from
yourself, as from the image and likeness of God, how you also have reason within yourself, who are a
rational animal not only as having been made by a rational Creator but also as out of his substance having
been made a living soul. See how, when you by reason argue silently with yourself, this same action takes
place within you, while reason accompanied by discourse meets you at every movement of your thought,
at every impression of your consciousness: your every thought is discourse, your every consciousness is
reason: you must perforce speak it in your mind, and while you speak it you experience as a partner in
conversation that discourse which has in it this very reason by which you speak when you think in
company of that <discourse> in speaking by means of which you think. So in a sort of way you have in
you as a second <person> discourse by means of which you speak by thinking and by means of which you
think by speaking: discourse itself is another than your. How much more completely therefore does this
action take place in God whose image and similitude you are authoritatively declared to be, that even while
silent he has in himself reason, and in <that> reason discourse.‖

208
Novatian concludes, ―[Moses] thus makes it clear that no one else was then present with
God, on whom could be enjoined the task of executing these works, save Him through
(per) whom ‗all things were made, and without whom nothing was made.‘‖50 In addition
to quoting John 1:3 at the end of the passage, Novatian also quotes it prior to referencing
the demiurgic work found in Genesis. For Novatian, only revelation through Scripture
allows for the investigation of the Word‘s role in demiurgic activity. Since the Word is
the instrument of creation, Novatian sees this as ultimately a participation in the will and
power of the Father.51

The Word Performs the Works of God

Novatian places the personal distinction of the Father from the Son at the
forefront of his attack on Sabellian theology.52 Sabellians could speak about the
demiurgic activity of Christ, since they argued that Christ referred to the Father (or the
Spirit of the Father) in the human being Jesus.53 Novatian counters this idea by citing
scriptural quotations used by his predecessors as proof texts for the distinct subjectivities
of Christ (the Son/Word) and the Father. He includes passages from Genesis, Psalms,

50

Trin. 17.2: non alium ostendit tunc adfuisse Deo cui praeciperenter haec opera ut fierent,
nisi eum per quem facta sunt omnia, et sine quo factum est nihil.
51

DeSimone understands Novatian to be emphasizing the unity of divine will between the Father
and Son, Treatise of Novatian, 92, against Keilbach who takes the instrumentality as evidence of
inferiority, ―Divinitas Filii,‖ 207.
52
Novatian singles out two groups as his primary theological targets in Trin.: the Sabellians and
those who claim that Christ was only a man. See Trin. 30.3-6. Papandrea and Dunn make a special effort
to point out that Novatian would have seen these two groups as polar opposites, which means that Novatian
is trying to counter, what he sees as, the two most dangerous groups on either side of his doctrinal position.
Both of these traditions employ Scriptural interpretations which Novatian spends a great deal of time
refuting. See also Pollard, ―The Exegesis of John 10:30,‖ 334-39 (especially 338-39) for a discussion of
Novatian‘s theological environment; See Wiles, Spiritual Gospel, 112-128 for an overview of the
Christological interpretations in the 3rd and 4th centuries.
53
Evans, Tertullian‟s Treatise, 13.
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Isaiah, John, and Matthew,54 such as ―Let us make men to Our image and likeness,‖ ―The
Lord poured down on Sodom and Gomorrah fire and sulphur from the Lord out of
heaven,‖ and ―I did not come down from heaven to do My own will, but the will of Him
who sent Me.‖55 After bringing out just a few ―of the possible passages bearing on this
question,‖56 Novatian concludes,
What could make it more evident that He is not the Father but the Son than the
fact that He is set before us as obedient to God the Father? If we were to believe
otherwise—that He is the Father—then we would have to say that Christ is
subject to another God the Father. [Trin. 26.21]57
Novatian jeers at the Sabellian inability to acknowledge the personal distinction between
the Father and Son, which, he contends, Jesus himself made clear. In Novatian‘s
presentation, neither the Son‘s obedience nor the idea of one person sending another
comports with the notion of a single divine person; Scripture repeatedly mentions two
subjects when addressing divine activities.
Novatian at times characterizes the Son‘s works as an imitation of the Father‘s.
For this idea, Novatian uses the verb imitare, and I will focus on this verb in my
discussion of the following quotation. Novatian writes,
He is also the image of God the Father; therefore this truth can be added to the
other: As the Father works (operatur), so does the Son also; and the Son is the
imitator (imitator) of all His Father‘s works (operum). Accordingly, every man
can feel that, in a sense, he has already seen the Father, inasmuch as he sees Him
who always imitates (imitatur) the invisible Father in all His works (operibus).
[Trin. 28.15]58
54

Many of the scriptural quotations found in this section of Trin. 26 can be found as proof texts
for the personal distinction of the Word in Justin, Irenaeus, and Tertullian. See Justin Dial. 59-66; Irenaeus
Haer. 4.2.1-3; Tertullian Prax. 8-13.
55
Gen. 1:26; Gen. 19:24; John 6:38.
56
Trin. 26.20.
57
Quid enim tam euidens potest esse, hunc non Patrem esse, sed Filium, quam quod oboediens
Patri Deo proponitur, ne si Pater esse credatur, alteri iam Deo Patri Christus subiectus esse elicatur?
58
Nam et imago est Dei Patris, ut his etiam illud accedat, quoniam sicut Pater operatur, ita
operatur et Filius, et imitator est Filius omnium operum paternorum, ut perinde habeat unusquisque quasi
iam uiderit Patrem, dum eum uidet qui inuisibilem Patrem in omnibus operibus semper imitatur.

210

Since so much of Novatian‘s argument comes from John‘s Gospel, it seems likely that
Novatian is offering a paraphrase of John 5:19 (―Jesus said to them, "Truly, truly, I say to
you, the Son can do nothing of his own accord, but only what he sees the Father doing;
for whatever he does, that the Son does likewise‖)59 when it comes to the idea of the Son
doing the works of the Father.60 Although Novatian quotes this particular passage only
once and without including the portion of the verse which uses imitare,61 I agree with
DeSimone that this verse likely served as an influence on those passages in which
Novatian uses the term imitare.62
Barnes proposed that Novatian‘s novel application of the term imitare raises the
issue of temporal duration in divine activity: the Father works, the Son sees what the
Father does, and then the Son follows suit by performing the same kind of works.63 As
such, Novatian‘s ―imitate‖ language seems to reformulate John 5:19 to reflect his interest
in affirming the Son‘s function as the minister who enacts the Father‘s will by copying

59

Although the idea of the Son ―seeing‖ the Father is another major element of both Trin. 28.15
and John 5:19 (as well as Novatian‘s citation of John 14:7-9 in Trin. 28), I do not think the verb videre
functions any differently from my understanding of how Novatian uses imitare. Both terms point directly
to the Son manifesting the will of the Father as opposed to meaning that the Son watches the Father do
something and then acts similarly. Papandrea reads Trin. 28.15 as primarily about the invisibility of the
Father and the visibility of the Son. He then connects the invisibility of the Father to the fact that the
Father cannot be localized, Trinitarian Theology, 77. Fausset notes only that imitare comes from a
dependence on John 5:19 and points to the use of the term in Trin. 22, Novatiani Romanae, 102 n.16.
60
See also Prax. 22 in which Tertullian quotes John 5:19-27 (and other texts) to show the
distinction between the Father and Son. In that chapter, Tertullian offers no interpretation of the text, but
rather lets the temporally sounding ideas stand in which the Son watches or observes the Father in order to
do the same works.
61
Trin. 14.12: ―If Christ is only man, how is it that ‗what the Father does, the Son also does in like
manner,‘ when man cannot do works like the heavenly works of God?‖ (Si homo tantummodo Christus,
quomodo quae Pater facit, et Filius facit similiter, cum homo caelestibus operibus Dei similia opera facere
non possit?)
62
Trin. 21.3; 22.3; 28.15. DeSimone suggests a possible reference to John 5:19 in his footnotes
for each of these passages. Trin. 22.3 also plays a significant role in Novatian scholarship because
Novatian identifies the Word ―in the form of God‖ with the Word‘s performing and imitating the Father‘s
works. I will address this passage in the next chapter because I believe Novatian is ultimately making a
similar case to that which I am describing above.
63
Barnes, ―A Night at the OPERA.‖
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the works seen. However, this interpretation calls into question an indisputable point of
his theology: all of creation comes through the Word.64 Below, I discuss Novatian‘s
comment in Trin. 6.7 that the works of the Father are produced at the same time that He
wills them, which I take to mean that the Son produces works as the Father wills them,
rather than through imitation. Novatian‘s comments make sense in light of the Word
Christology tradition representing the Word as overtly performing the works which the
Father thinks or wills.65
Novatian also associates the Son performing/imitating the works of the Father
with the terms virtus and potestas. In almost every case,66 potestas should be translated
as power, which he associates with divine strength, or what M. R. Barnes describes as
―the capacity of an existent to affect.‖67 In a few passages Novatian uses potestas to
mean a spiritual or celestial power (such as in his references to Col. 1:16).68 Virtus,
however, carries a greater range of meanings. It too can be seen as a spiritual or celestial

64

See also Trin. 8.11: ―That is the reason He also ‗sits above the Cherubim‘; that is, He presides
over His various works. The living creatures, which hold dominion over the rest, are subject to His throne,
and the crystal from above covers all things.‖
65
Barnes also points to this tradition in his paper, but he sees Novatian as reformulating it into a
temporal or multi-step activity. Mattei, however, evaluates Trin. 28.15 in light of the idea that the Son is
the image of the Father who imitates all His works. His analysis of these themes leads him to the judgment
that Novatian treats the demiurgic activities of the Son and the divine status of the Son as indicators of the
Son‘s ontological equality with the Father, ―De Trinitate,‖ 216-217.
65
Barnes also points to this tradition in his paper, but he sees Novatian as reformulating it into a temporal
or multi-step activity. Mattei, however, evaluates Trin. 28.15 in light of the idea that the Son is the image
of the Father who imitates all His works. His analysis of these themes leads him to the judgment that
Novatian treats the demiurgic activities of the Son and the divine status of the Son as indicators of the
Son‘s ontological equality with the Father, ―De Trinitate,‖ 216-217.
66
Trin. 22.4‘s use of potestas may be translated as ―authority,‖ while Trin. 25.9‘s use can be
understood as ―attribute.‖
67
Michel R. Barnes, ―One Nature, One Power: Consensus Doctrine in Pro-Nicene Polemic,‖
StPatr 29 (Leuven: Peeters, 1997), 206. An example of this understanding in Trin. can be found in 26.20:
―For throughout the Divine Scripture of the Old, as well as the New Testament, He is shown to us as born
of the Father, one through whom ‗all things were made, and without whom nothing was made,‘ who has
ever been obedient to the Father and still obeys. He is also revealed to us as having power (potesta) over
all things, power, however, that has been given, that has been granted and conferred.‖
68
See Trin. 1.13-14; 13.2; 21.9.
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power,69 but Novatian also frequently employs it to mean attribute or virtue,70 power
(with a meaning similar to potestas),71 and work/miracle.72
Much of Novatian‘s focus on power relates to the ability of the Son to perform
works associated with divinity, thus enabling Novatian to maintain that the Word is God.
For example, Novatian writes,
For they consider in Him the frailities of man, but they do not regard the miracles
of a God (Dei uirtutes). They reflect on the infirmities of His flesh, but they
exclude from their minds the powers of His divinity (potestates diuinitatis). If
this proof drawn from the infirmities of Christ has such efficacy as to prove that
He is man precisely because of those infirmities, then the proof of His divinity,
drawn from His miracles (uirtutibus), will have enough efficacy to show on
account of His might works (operibus) that He is also God. If His sufferings
manifest human frailty in Him, why should not His works (opera) confirm the
divine power (diuinam potestatem) in Him? If the miracles (uirtutibus) do not
suffice to prove Him God, then neither will the sufferings alone suffice to prove
Him man. [Trin. 11.4, slightly altered]73
Following Morhmann‘s classification of virtutes as having the meaning of ―miracles,‖
DeSimone translates virtus twice as that, but once also as power.74 I see no justification
for not retaining consistency in this passage; Novatian sets Christ‘s frail humanity in
contrast with the virtutes and operae, both of which indicate divine works/miracles and
which he associates with divine power (potestas). The context of Trin. 11.4 gives no
indication of which works or miracles Novatian has in mind, but it is clear that his
69

Trin. 1.13; 13.2; 14.6; 29.16.
Trin. 2.8; 2.12; 9.6.
71
Trin. 2.4; 2.11; 3.6; 4.6; 29.12. See my discussion in the next chapter on the connection
Novatian makes between substantia and virtus in 31.1-2.
72
Trin. 11.4-5; 21.3; 29.10.
73
Quasi hominis enim in illo fragilitates considerant, quasi Dei uirtutes non computant,
infirmitates carnis recolunt, potestates diuinitatis excludunt, quando si probatio haec ex infirmitatibus
Christi illuc proficit, ut homo ex infirmitatibus comprobetur, probatio diuinitatis in illo collecta ex
uirtutibus illuc proficiet, ut etiam Deus ex operibus asseratur. Si enim passiones ostendunt in illo humanam
fragilitatem, cur opera non asseratur in illo diuinam potestatem? Ne si hoc non profecerit, ut Deus ex
uirtutibus asseratur, nec passiones proficiant, ut etiam homo ab ipsis esse monstretur.
74
See DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 40, and Mohrmann, ―Les origines de la latinité
chrétienne,‖ 170. Papandrea translates virtus in this passage as ―power‖ twice and then with ―attribute.‖ I
am convinced that Novatian is specifically comparing Jesus Christ‘s human frailty with the scriptural
evidence of miracles.
70
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authority for making the case for Christ‘s divinity comes from Scripture; Novatian would
have us to understand all of the miracles of Jesus recorded in the Gospels.75 Novatian‘s
point is clear: the Son is called God because his works can come only from God‘s power,
or capacity to affect.76
Another passage in Trin. makes the association between divinity and works
equally clear. Novatian quotes Jesus‘ words from John 10:35-36 in which Jesus
proclaims himself to be the Son of God by pointing to the works which he has
manifested. Novatian writes,
With these words He did not deny that He was God; on the contrary he affirmed
that He was God…In fact, He said that He was sent, and pointed out to them:
―Many works (multa opera) have I shown you from My Father.‖ Therefore, He
wanted Himself to be considered not the Father but the Son. [Trin. 15.12]77
In this passage Novatian offers the Son‘s works during the Incarnation as evidence that
he is God.78 To combat Sabellian theology, Novatian claims that the Son‘s distinction
from the Father is proved by His ability to enact the miracles/works of the Father. What
Novatian does not suggest, however, is that the Son‘s performance of divine works,

75

Trin. 11.6: ―Just as Scripture proclaims that Christ is also God, so, too, does it proclaim that
God is very Man. It describes Jesus Christ as Man, just as it describes Christ the Lord as God…‖
Although Novatian does not quote Acts 2:22, it may have played a role on Novatian‘s terminology. The
Vetus Latina, Cod. 51 for Acts 22:2 reads, ―Viri israhelitae! Audite haec uerba: ihesum nazarenum uirum
sanctum a deo ostensum in uovis uirtutibus ac prodigiis ac signis, quae fecit dues in medio uestrum sicut
uos ipsi scitis.‖
76
Mattei also considers the power of the Son to create and recreate as evidence for understanding
Christ‘s divinity in light of John 5:19, ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 217. See also DeSimone for comments about how
the shared demiurgic work of the Father and Son indicates the Son‘s divinity, Treatise of Novatian, 92.

Quibus uocibus neque se negauit Deum, quinimmo Deum se esse fumauit…Missum enim
se esse dixit et multa opera se ex Patre ostendisse monstrauit, ex quo non Patrem se, sed Filium esse
intellegi uoluit.
77

78

Trin. 14.12 also seems to imply this: ―If Christ is only man, how is it that ―what the Father does
the Son also does in like manner,‖ when man cannot do works (operibus) like the heavenly works
(caelestibus operibus) of God?‖ Although it is possible that Novatian is referring in this case to the
creation of the world, it is unlikely. His ultimate point is that no human being can be thought of as being
prior to the world and therefore his suggestion that Christ is only a man makes no sense. In this case, he
must be arguing against the humanitarian monarchians and demanding how it is that Jesus manifests works
attributable only to God, namely miracles.
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which leads to the recognition that the Son is God, entails ontological equality between
the Father and Son.79

The Word as Obedient to the Father: Contrasting Divine Attributes
Novatian writes that the Word ―rendered and still renders perfect obedience
(oboedientiam) to His Father in all things.‖80 He uses the terms oboedientia and oboedire
to describe the Son‘s activities, especially those related to theophanies and the
circumstances and consequences of the Incarnation.81 Novatian speaks about the
obedience of the Son in being sent from, or in descending from, the Father. He develops
the theme of the Father sending the Son by pointing to the Son‘s distinction from the
Father and then affirming the Son‘s divinity.82 In other instances, Novatian uses the
terms for obedience to refer to the Son‘s general obedience to the Father in all things.83
Novatian relates the Son‘s obedience to his relationship to space and place. His
philosophical understanding of the Father‘s divine nature, which cannot be localized,
leads him to explain God‘s appearance in creation as pertaining to the Word. Novatian
79

DeSimone writes, ―Scripture and Tradition had obliged Praxeas and his followers to temper the
rigor of their doctrine, when it was a question of deciding just who Jesus Christ was. They now made some
sort of distinction between the Father and the Son. However, having recourse to Luke 1.35, they restricted
this distinction to the person of Christ Incarnate. They maintained that in the Savior, the Son was the flesh;
that is, the humanity of Jesus. The Father was the Spirit; that is, God and Christ,‖ Treatise of Novatian,
113. Wiles notes, ―Praxeas apparently based his case on a selection of texts, including especially three
assertions of Jesus recorded in St John‘s Gospel—‗I and my Father are one‘: ‗He that hath seen me hath
seen the Father‘: ‗I am in the Father and the Father in me.‘ The orthodox needed to give an account of
these texts which did not involve the assertion of a personal identity of Father and Son,‖ Spiritual Gospel,
118.
80
Trin. 22.5. See also Trin. 22.6.
81
For comments about the Son‘s obedience in distinguishing the Son from the Father while
arguing for the Son‘s divinity in Trin. 22.6, see Mark Weedman, The Trinitarian Theology of Hilary of
Poitiers (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 34-36.
82
Trin. 11.8 and 27.13. In Trin. 22.1 and 22.12 Novatian quotes Phil. 2:8 which states that
Christ‘s obedience extends to his death on the cross.
83
Trin. 22.6 states, ―Consequently, this proves that He never regarded His divinity as a means of
unlawfully arrogating to Himself equality with God the Father. On the contrary, obedient and subject to
His Father‘s every command and will, He was even content to take upon Himself the form of a slave—that
is, to become man.‖ See also Trin. 22.5, 26.20-1, and 31.15.
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thus casts the Son‘s ability to interact with space and place as distinguishing him from the
Father, whose nature makes such interaction impossible. In a summary of these themes,
Novatian writes, ―In the same manner that He, as Man, ascended into heaven, as God, He
first descended from heaven. In the same manner that he, as Man, goes to the Father, so
as a Son obedient (oboediens) to His Father shall he descend from the Father.‖84 Because
the Scriptures refer to God descending and ascending in theophanies,85 Novatian
highlights the Son‘s obedience as proof that divine activity is unified. He avoids the idea
that the Son‘s activities are in any way independent of the Father‘s will, which would
result in the suggestion of two divinities.86
Although the specific terms for obedience do not always appear in Novatian‘s
descriptions of the Father sending the Son, the Son‘s descent clearly implies the Son‘s
obedience in being sent. Therefore, I treat the passages referring to the Son being sent as
dependant on the idea of the Son‘s obedience.87 For example in Trin. 26, Novatian again
asserts the ―sacred authority of Divine Scripture‖ in affirming Christ‘s divinity based
upon his being sent from the Father. In making his case for the distinction of the Father
from the Son, he quotes numerous passages from the Old and New Testaments, nine of
which come from the Gospel of John:88

84

Trin. 11.8: Et quomodo in caelum, qua homo, ascendit, sic inde, qua Deus, ante descendit. Et
quomodo ad Patrem, qua homo, uadit, sic oboediens Patri, qua Filius, in de descensurus est. DeSimone
lists the Scriptural allusions in this passage: Mark 16:19, Luke 24:51, Acts 1:9, John 6:38, John 6:63, John
14:3, John 14:28, and Acts 1:11.
85
See Joseph Barbel‘s assessment that the Son‘s appearance as an angel in the theophanies proves
the Son‘s divinity. Barbel presumes the Son‘s inferior divinity as compared with the Father, Christos
Angelos. Theophaneia, Vol. 3 (Bonn: Hanstein, 1941), 82-85.
86
Trin. 31.6-8; 13.
87
See also, for example, Trin. 26.8 in which Novatian quotes John 6:38 to prove that God the Son
has appeared on earth to do the will of God the Father who sent him.
88
Gen. 1:26; Gen. 1:27; Gen. 19:24; Ps. 2:7-8; Ps. 109 (110):1; Isa. 45:1; John 6:38; John 14:28;
John 20:17; John 8:17-18; John 12:28; Matt. 16:16; Matt. 16:17; John 17:5; John 11:42; John 17:3-4; Matt
11:27/Luke 10:22; Ps. 109 (110):1/Mark 16:19/Heb. 1:3.
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For who does not acknowledge that the Second Person after the Father is the Son,
when he reads [that]…the same Christ says: ―Father, I knew that You always hear
Me; but because of the people who stand round, I spoke, that they may believe
that you sent (misisti) Me‖? Or when Christ Himself makes a pronouncement on
the Rule [of Truth] and says: ―Now this is everlasting life, that they may know
You, the one true God, and Him whom You have sent (misisti), Jesus Christ. I
have glorified You on earth; I have accomplished the work that You have given
Me‖?89
In the passages following this one, Novatian claims that all things come through the
Word, that the Son obeys and has always obeyed the Father, and that the Father grants
(concedere) and gives (indulgere) his power (potestas) to the Son over all things.90
Above all else, Novatian presents his ―sent‖ theology (based on his repeated usage of the
term mittere) as proclaiming the distinction between the Father and the Son.
In chapter 4, I described how Novatian defined the Father‘s divinity by making
divine localization an impossible proposition. In his logic concerning the Son‘s personal
distinction from the Father, Novatian closely follows the Word Christology tradition
which identifies the Word as the personal presence of God in the theophanies and in the
Incarnation. In chapter 4, I also quoted the first portion of Trin. 17.7 in order to discuss
the Father‘s relationship to space. I now quote the passage in its entirety to demonstrate
the contrast Novatian makes between the Father and Son concerning place:
Finally, what would you reply if I should say that the same Moses everywhere
represents God the Father as boundless (immensum), without end (fine)? He
cannot be confined by space (loco), for He includes all space (locum). He is not
in one place (loco), but rather all place (locus) is in Him. He contains
(continentem) all things and embraces (complexum) all things; therefore He
cannot descend (descendat) or ascend (ascendat) inasmuch as He contains
(continet) all things and fills (implet) all things. Yet Moses represents God as
89

Trin. 26.2; 26.16-17: nolunt enim illum secundam esse personam post Patrem, sed ipsum
Patrem…ab eodem dicitur: Pater, sciebam quia semper me audis, uerum propter circumstantes dixi, ut
credant quia tu me misisti? Aut cum definitio regulae ab ipso Christo collocatur et dicitur: Haec est autem
uita aeterna, ut sciant te unum et uerum Deum et quem misisti Iesum Christum. Ego te honorificaui super
terram, opus perfeci quod dedisti mihi? The two Scripture passages Novatian quotes are John 11:42 and
17:3-4.
90
Trin. 26.20-1.
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descending to the tower which the sons of men were building, seeking to inspect
it and saying: ―Come, let us go down quickly, and there confuse their language, so
that they may not understand one another‘s speech.‖ Who do the heretics think
was the God that descended to the tower in this passage, and then sought to visit
these men? Was He God the Father? In that case, God is enclosed (clauditur) in
a place (loco); how then does He embrace (complectitur) all things? [Trin. 17.7]91
The logic of the passage begins with the hypothetical: imagine if Moses was actually
speaking about the Father concerning the theophany of the tower of Babel. He then
works through the topological theology which governs one aspect of his theology of the
Father. Next, he presses his opponents to accept the impossibility of the Father having
such contact with the world; the Father‘s nature as defined by Novatian‘s use of
immensus makes such contact incomprehensible.92 His reasoning therefore shifts to the
application of Word Christology topics discussed above, which include his emphasis on
the Son‘s subjectivity in the theophanies.93
Some scholars look to one passage in particular to determine whether Novatian
bifurcates or blends his topological theology concerning the Father and his comments on
the Son‘s ability to be present in a place. In Trin. 14.7, Novatian writes, ―If Christ is only
man, how is He present wherever He is invoked—since it is not Man‘s nature but God‘s
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Quid si idem Moyses ubique introducit Deum Patrem immensum atque sine fine, non qui loco
c1udatur, sed qui omnem locum cludat, nec eum qui in loco sit, sed potius in quo omnis locus sit, omnia
continentem et cuncta complexum, ut merito nec descendat nec ascendat, quoniam ipse omnia et continet et
implet, et tamen nihilominus introducit Deum descendentem ad turrem quam aedificabant filii hominum,
considerare quaerentem et dicentem: Venite et mox descendamus et confundamus illic ipsorum linguas, ut
non audiat unusquisque uocem proximi sui? Quem uolunt hic Deum descendisse ad turrem illam et
homines tunc illos uisitare quaerentem? Deum Patrem? Ergo iam loco clauditur. Et quomodo omnia ipse
complectitur? Novatian uses implere in this passage, and his meaning clearly stands in line with the ideas
that God both contains and pervades all things. This is not the same usage which Novatian has in mind in
Trin. 17.9 when he states, ―Accordingly, the only remaining conclusion is that He descended of whom the
apostle Paul says: ‗He who descended, He it is who ascended also above all the heavens, that He might fill
(impleret) all things,‘ that is the Son of God, the Word of God.‖ As in Trin. 9.2, 10.1, and 23.8, Novatian
seems to be referring to the fulfillment of prophecy or the mystery of God‘s will in Trin. 17.9.
92
Keilbach makes a similar argument, ―Divinitas Filii,‖ 208.
93
Justin makes a similar argument in Dial. 127.
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to be able to be present everywhere‖94 DeSimone takes a guarded approach to this
passage: ―This omnipresence or ubiquity is included in the dogma of God‘s immensity as
a part is included in the whole.‖95 He approvingly quotes an assessment by Keilbach,
who describes Novatian‘s theology as a kind of mitigated subordination.96 Keilbach
notes that Novatian ―adjudicates such things of one or other Person which hardly leaves
that equality intact.‖97 DeSimone ultimately hedges his interpretation of an ontological
subordination of the Son to the Father by citing other statements in Trin. which point to
equality.98
Unfortunately, DeSimone does not explain with any detail how the Son‘s ability
to be present everywhere relates to the philosophical categories of topological theology
which Novatian embraces. Papandrea, however, seems to view DeSimone‘s conclusion
as too tentative. He interprets Novatian‘s reference of the Son‘s ability to be omni loco
as a terminological equivalent to the Father‘s nature as immensus.99 Neither Papandrea‘s
equating of immensus to the phrase omni loco, nor DeSimone‘s tentative approach stand
up to scrutiny. Novatian rejects any association between the Father‘s divine nature and
any language of place (loco) in accordance with his topological theology.100 Papandrea‘s
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Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo adest ubique inuocatus, cum haec hominis natura non
sit, sed Dei, ut adesse omni loco possit? Novatian‘s reference is to Matt. 18:20.
95
DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 94. Fausset also makes a similar claim about the Son when he
writes, ―[Novatian] attributes to the Son of God the ‗natura dei‘ in the way of omnipresence, and the ‗uirtus
dei‘ and ‗uis diuinitatis,‘ Novatiani Romanae, xlvii.
96
Keilbach, ―Divinitas Filii,‖ 208.
97
Ibid., 206, quoted in DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 94.
98
Specifically, DeSimone points out the unity of substance between Father and Son, Treatise of
Novatian, 100.
99
Papandrea argues that the Son, according to Novatian, is omnipresent in his pre-Incarnational
and post-ascension states, and he then suggests, ―While the Father is invisible and omnipresent (immensus),
the Son is the visible image of the Father, and is localized in space and time by virtue of the incarnation,‖
Trinitarian Theology, 326.
100
Keilbach makes a similar point in ―Divinitas Filii,‖ 207-8. Cf. Papandrea, who attempts to
answer for the distinction stating, ―But the heart of the issue is the assumed underlying distinction, that the
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suggestion of terminological equivalence entirely overlooks the meaning of Novatian‘s
terms as they relate to his theology of the transcendent Father and his theology of the
Son. DeSimone‘s suggestion of part-to-a-whole logic is vague enough to provide little
depth to the analysis.101 In fact, Novatian‘s affirmation about the Son‘s ability to be
everywhere, as proof of his divinity, offers a distinct contrast with the Father‘s nature as
immensus. Novatian makes no reconciliation between the difference in attributes he
claims for the Son and those he claims for the Father.
Furthermore, scholars have overlooked the probable influence of Tertullian on
this question as well as the general understanding of the significant role and powers of
spiritual beings.102 In his Apology 22, Tertullian outlines the vast powers of angels and
demons, adding,
Every spirit (spiritus) is [as though it were] winged. Both angels and demons
have this property. Therefore, they are everywhere (ubique) in a moment. For
them, the whole world is but a single place (locus unus); what happens and where
it happened they can know and tell with the same ease. Their swiftness is
considered divine (divinitas) because their nature (substantia) is not understood.
[Apol. 22.8, altered slightly]103
I think it is useful to compare Tertullian‘s comment with Novatian‘s in Trin. 14.7: ―Si
homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo adest ubique inuocatus, cum haec hominis natura
non sit, sed Dei, ut adesse omni loco possit?‖ The terminology between the two is
similar and Tertullian attributes a form of omnipresense to angels. Furthermore, ―God‖
Father is never visible or localized, while the Son can be, though He is not always so,‖ Trinitarian
Theology, 326.
101
Such an analysis can be cross applied to what I describe in the next section as Novatian‘s
linguistic arguments or relative comparisons. Suggesting that Novatian intends omni loco to fit into the
concept of the Father as immensus tells us nothing about how such attributes of divine persons can be
related.
102
For a brief survey of these topics in patristic texts, see Jean Daniélou, The Angels and Their
Missions, Trans. David Heimann (Notre Dame, Ind.: Christian Classics, 1987).
103
Omnis spiritus ales est: hoc angeli et daemones. Igitur momento ubique sunt. Totus orbis illis
locus unus est; quid ubi geratur tam facile sciunt quam adnuntiant. Velocitas divinitas creditur, quia
substantia ignoratur.
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in Novatian‘s passage does not refer to the Father. When we bring to mind the fact that
Novatian calls both the Son and Father ―God‖ on the basis, at times, of a distinction
between the different relationships they have to place, then this passage in Trin. 14.7
appears to highlight the Son‘s interaction with place and not the Father‘s. Novatian
makes this distinction clear in his accounting of the Son‘s obedience to be sent from
heaven.104 Attempts to view Novatian‘s theology of the Son‘s relationship to place as
equivalent to that of the Father‘s must be read as false efforts to harmonize an issue
which is ultimately destructive to Novatian‘s thought. Throughout Trin., the nature of the
Son‘s divinity enables him to act and function in a manner impossible for the Father‘s
nature.
Finally, Novatian ties together the themes mentioned so far in this section when
he discusses John 10:30‘s statement, ―I and the Father are one.‖105 In Trin. 27, he uses
the topics of the Son‘s obedience and sending as a way of articulating the personal
distinction of the Father and Son.106 In order to reach his specific teachings about the
distinction of the the Father and Son, Novatian first establishes what it means for the
Father and Son to be unum. Novatian writes that John 10:30‘s use of the neuter form of
―one‖ (unum) indicates that the Father and Son are ―one through harmony (concordiam),
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Mattei treats the spatial language related to the Son‘s coming out of the Father and being with
the Father as a distraction from the greater context of Trin. 31, which he believes is a full endorsement by
Novatian of divine essential equality, in ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 193. He believes that Novatian attempts,
unsuccessfully, to eliminate or modify the impact of spatial understanding from his concept of divinity. I
agree with Mattei, to a certain extent in his treatment of the Father, however I am unconvinced that such
logic applies to Novatian‘s theology of the Son.
105
Ego Pater unum sumus. See my section ―The supreme God is one‖ in chapter 4, for a
discussion of John 10:30 and a citation of the parallel passage in Tertullian‘s Prax. 22.
106
On this point see Pelland, ―Une passage difficile,‖ 43; Loi, ―La Latinità Cristiana,‖ 283-284;
Papandrea, Trinitarian Theology, 331-332.

221
through love (amorem), and through affection (dilectionem).107 To explain this unity,
Novatian offers 1 Cor. 3:6-8 as an analogy; Apollos and Paul are held up as two persons
yet also ―one (unum), with regard to the harmony existing between them.‖108 ―In fact,‖
Novatian continues, ―when two persons are of one mind, one truth, one faith, of one and
the same religion, one also in the fear of God, the two are really one, even though they
are two (duo).‖109 Thus far in his explanation, Novatian explains that John 10:30
establishes a unity based on love and a desire for the same things.110
Again, what we find is Novatian introducing the topic of the Son‘s obedience to
suggest the distinction between the Father and Son. According to later passages in this
chapter, Novatian develops the theme that the Father and Son‘s conformity of will is
manifested in the Son‘s obedience to being sent: ―[Christ] says that He has been sent, so
that the Lord Christ, coming as He did through obedience, might prove, having been sent,
that He was not the Father but the Son, who certainly would have been the sender if He
107

Trin. 27.4. In Trin. 27.3 Novatian explains, ―Furthermore, since He said ‗one‘ [unum], let the
heretics realize that He did not say ‗one‘ [unus]. For ‗one in the neuter gender denotes harmony of
fellowship, not unity of person. He is said to be ‗one‘ [unum], and not ‗one‘ [unus], because there is no
reference to number but to association of fellowship with another.‖
108
Trin. 27.7.
109
Trin. 27.8, modified slightly: Nam quando duorum una sententia est, neritas nna est, fides

una est, una atque eadem religio est, unus etiam Dei timor est, unum sunt, etiamsi duo sint.
110

Fausset, for example, speaks about a moral unity being at the center of Novatian‘s teaching
concerning the Father and Son, Novatiani Romanae, xlvii. Pollard uses Fausset to claim the same moral
unity and suggests Novatian is open to the charge of ditheism since he takes Novatian‘s understanding of
substantiae communion in Trin. 31.20 as different from Tertullian‘s unitas substantiae or una substantia, in
Johannine Christology, 74. Simonetti agrees with the emphasis on a moral unity between the Father and
Son and also believes that Novatian rejects Tertullian‘s teaching of divinity based upon a shared substance.
Simonetti writes, ―But Novatian rejects this concept [Tertullian‘s idea of shared divine substance] in the
name of a less materialist view of the divinity; consequently he also rejects the idea of a single substance in
his explanation of how the Father and the Son can constitute one God. He speaks of a dynamic union of
concordia and caritas and, above all, he takes, as foundation of the union, the clear subordination of the
Son to the Father,‖ ―Beginnings of Theological Reflections,‖ 217. I am arguing that Novatian does indeed
make the shared substance of the Father and Son a critical rationale for identifying the Son as ―God,‖ even
though I also believe that Novatian does not consider the Son to share the Father‘s supreme nature and
attributes. Furthermore, I think that Pollard makes an unintentional mistake of blending the categories of
God‘s oneness with the assertion that Novatian had an interest in speaking of the Father and Son as
―constituting one God.‖ Novatian surely wants to avoid the charge of ditheism, but he also does not
attempt to articulate his theology with anything like this statement by Pollard.
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had been the Father.‖111 Divine unity in Trin. 27 cannot be summed up entirely by a
simple teaching regarding the Son‘s obedience to the Father. The conformity of wills
between the Father and Son is based on a love, which contains no conflict. Novatian
connects these themes together in order to demonstrate that such love occurs between the
distinct persons of the Father and Son. Previously, Novatian has argued at length that the
Father cannot be sent, since this violates his topological theology. Novatian ultimately
uses his teaching of John 10:30 to develop his understanding that only the Son can be
sent, since any particular manifestation of the Father violates the logic of his theology.
The Word‟s Obedience Makes Him Minister of the Father‟s Will

Before assigning the Word the definitive role in demiurgic activity, Novatian
attacks any connection between the Father as Creator with any form of
anthropomorphism.112 He writes
He does not have members, nor are the functions of members necessary to Him at
whose will alone (solum arbitrium), even though it be unexpressed (tacitum), all
things serve and are present. Why should He, who is light, have need of eyes?
Why should He, who is everywhere, seek to procure feet? Why would He want to
walk, when He can go nowhere outside Himself? Why should he desire hands,
whose silent Will (silens uoluntas) is the artificer of all things to be created? Nor
does He, who knows even our secret wishes, have need of ears. Why should He
need a tongue, whose very thought (cogitare) is a command (iussisse)? [Trin.
6.6]113
111

Trin. 27.13. Keilbach looks at this chapter and finds that Novatian overemphasizes the Son‘s
obedience to the Father which leads to a sense of subordinationism, ―Divinitas Filii,‖ 214-215. Justin
makes a similar case in Dial. 56: ―‗Then,‘ I said, ‗let us return to the Scriptures and I shall try to convince
you that He who is said to have appeared to Abraham, Jacob, and Moses, and is called God, is distinct from
God, the Creator; distinct, that is, in number, but not in mind. For I state that He never did or said anything
else than what the Creator—above whom there is no other God—desired that He do or say.‘‖
112
This includes the two hands language seen in both Theophilus and Irenaeus discussed in
chapter 5.
113
Neque enim sunt ei aut membra aut membrorum officia necessaria, ad cuius solum etiam
tacitum arbitrium et seruiunt et adsunt omnia. Cur enim requirat oculos, qui lux est ? Aut cur quaerat pedes,
qui ubique est? Aut cur ingredi uelit, cum non sit quo extra se progredi possit ? Aut cur manus expetat,
cuius ad omnia instituenda artifex est et silens uoluntas? Nec auribus eget, qui etiam tacitas nouit
uoluntates. Aut propter quam causam linguam quaerat, cui cogitare iussisse est?

223

Novatian speaks of the Father‘s ―unexpressed will‖ (tacitum arbitrium), ―silent will‖
(silens uoluntas), and ―thought‖ (cogitare) as synonymous. The terminology Novation
chooses shows a clear literary parallel with that found in Tertullian‘s Prax. When
describing the Father‘s creative activity, Tertullian claims that God silently planned
(tacite cogitando) the world in the company of Reason (ratio).114 Above all else,
Novatian follows one of the major elements found in the Word tradition; he connects the
Father‘s creative activities with the activity of the divine Mind and the bringing forth of
the Word.
Novatian explains that the objects of the Father‘s demiurgic will are created
simultaneously with the thought to create them. In Trin. 6.7, he writes, ―[Body parts] are
not necessary to God, whose works (opera) not only immediately follow His Will
(uoluntatem) without any effort, but even proceed simultaneously (cum) with His Will
(uoluntate).‖115 To strengthen his attack on any anthropomorphic portrait of the Father
physically carrying out His works, Novatian argues that the Father‘s
will/command/thought to create produces the works themselves. Noet. 10.3 contains a
similar idea, connecting the topics of the Father‘s will to create, the immediate
production of the work, and the role of the Word: ―When he willed, in the way he willed,
at times he had fixed, he showed forth his Word, through whom he made all things. Just
as when he wills, he makes, so when he puts his mind to it, his work is done.‖116
Although Novatian does not include a reference to the Word in Trin. 6.6-7, I have already
114

Prax. 5: ―For although God had not yet uttered his Discourse (sermonem), he always had it
within himself along with and in his Reason (ratione), while he silently thought out (tacite cogitando) and
ordained with himself the things which he was shortly to say by the agency of Discourse (sermonem).‖
115
Deo autem non necessaria, cuius uoluntatem non tantum sine aliqua molitione opera
subsequuntur, sed ipsa statim opera cum uoluntate procedunt.
116
ὅηε ἠζέιεζελ, θαζὼο ἠζέιεζελ, ἔδεημελ ηὸλ Λόγνλ αὐηνῦ θαηξνῖο ὡξηζκέλνηο παξ‘ αὐηῷ· δη‘
νὗ ηὰ πάληα ἐπνίεζελ. ὅηε κὲλ ζέιεη, πνηεῖ· ὅηε δὲ ἐλζπκεῖηαη, ηειεῖ.
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outlined his teaching that all things come through the Word. Therefore, Noet. and Trin.
share a common teaching about the simultaneity of the Father‘s will and the Word‘s
activity, which may be the clearest evidence of Novatian‘s literary dependence on
Noet.117
Novatian connects the Son‘s divinity with his role in creation when he identifies
the Son as the ―minister‖ (minister) of the Father, a designation which can be found in
other expressions of Word Christology.118 Novatian writes,
The Son does nothing of His own will (arbitrio) or counsel and He does not come
from Himself. He obeys (oboedit) all His Father‘s commands and precepts; hence
although his birth proves that He is the Son, His docile obedience (oboedientia)
proclaims Him to be the minister (ministrum) of the will of the Father (paternae
uoluntatis) from whom He is. While He renders Himself obedient
(obtemperatem) to the Father in all things, even though He is also God, yet by His
obedience (oboedientia) He shows that the Father, from whom He also drew His
origin, is the one God. [Trin. 31.15]119
I believe that in this passage Novatian has in mind all the activities of the Son, including
the activity of the world‘s creation. Although Novatian juxtaposes the Son as God with
the Son as minister, his description of the Son as minister depends on the idea of
obedience. In the last section, I demonstrated that Novatian used the Son‘s obedience as
a way of categorizing the Son as God. I also earlier demonstrated that demiurgic activity,
including the Son‘s manifestation of the Father‘s will to create, likewise became a
117

As noted in the Introduction, the numerous parallel themes found between Prax. and Noet.
make it difficult to determine whether Novatian knew Noet. A shared idea, such as the simultaneous event
of the Father‘s will with the production of His works, makes it more probable that Novatian knew both
works since nothing of this doctrine appears in Prax.
118
Although Justin is writing in Greek, a similar idea can be found in Justin‘s discussion of the
Old Testament theophanies. In Dial. 126, he concludes, ―From these passage it has been conclusively
proved that He who appeared to Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and the other Patriarchs was appointed by the
Father and Lord, and administers to His will, and is called God.‖ See also Dial. 58 and 127.
119
Filius autem nihil ex arbitrio suo gerit nec ex consilio suo facit nec a se uenit, sed imperiis
paternis omnibus et praeceptis oboedit, ut quamuis probet illum natiuitas Filium, tamen morigera
oboedientia asserat illum paternae uoluntatis ex quo est ministrum. Ita dum se Patri in omnibus
obtemperantem reddit, quamuis sit et Deus, unum tamen Deum Patrem de oboedientia sua ostendit, ex quo
et originem traxit.
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justification for Novatian to call the Son ―God.‖ In the passage above, Novatian draws
these topics together to demonstrate that the Son‘s classification as God arises from the
fact that the Son perfectly obeys the Father and is thus the Father‘s minister.
Tertullian‘s use of minister illustrates the connection between the Son as the
minister of the Father and the Son as divine in a similar way to Novatian‘s statement. In
Herm. 22, Tertullian states:
And so in the beginning God made the heaven and the earth. I worship the
fullness of the Scripture by means of which He reveals to me both the Maker and
the things made; but in the Gospel I find in addition Him who is both the Minister
(ministrum) and the Intermediary (arbitrum)120 of the Maker—the Word. [Herm.
22.3 modified slightly].121
In both Trin. and Herm., the Son‘s role as the minister of the Father‘s will entails the
demiurgic function of the Word as a subject distinct from the Father. For both authors,
demiurgic activity presumes the classification of divinity, regardless of whether
Tertullian and Novatian understood the divine hierarchy differently.
It is true that Sabellian theology rejected the Word‘s subjectivity. Heine, for
example, summarizes the major difference between the Word Christology tradition and
the Sabellian theology concerning the Word: Sabellians denounced the idea of a
personal/subjective Word, based on a Stoic interpretation of Logos language in
Scripture.122 For the Sabellians, the Word was the command of the Father rather than a
subject distinguishable from the Father. Heine portrays the Word Christology tradition‘s
120

Holmes translates this ―Witness‖ in the ANF. Such a translation suggests a greater scope to the
Father‘s direct activity, which I do not think Tertullian intended. Waszink‘s choice of ―intermediary‖
glosses the role of the Word as entirely enacting the creative will of the Father.
121
Igitur in principio deus fecit caelum et terram. Adoro scripturae plenitudinem qua mihi et
factorem manifestat et facta. In euangelio uero amplius et ministrum atque arbitrum factoris inuenio
sermonem.
122
See Heine‘s, ―Christology of Callistus,‖ 67. Cf. Evans who writes, ―The Deity is a monad, a
singular individual unity, which possesses internal powers of expansion, appearing in the act of creation as
the Father, in redemption as the Son, and in grace and inspiration as the Holy Spirit, the Three being not
three realities but three aspect of one reality,‖ Tertullian‟s Treatise, 13.
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advocacy of the subjectivity of the Word against the Sabellian understanding of the term
as something of a philosophical proxy war of Middle Platonic and Stoic ideas,
respectively. The Word Christology tradition looked similar to the Middle Platonic ideas
about the Supreme God and the Demiurge. In regard to Novatian and Tertullian‘s
formulations of subjectivity, theirs are not reactionary positions against a theological
opponent, but rather expressions of a stable element in the Word Christology tradition.
The ideas discussed in the sections above, all pertain to the assertion that the
Son‘s activities stand in harmony with the Father‘s will to create. Even the Son‘s
existence prior to the world is notable for the fact that the Son comes out of the Father in
order to enact the Father‘s demiurgic will. That the Son is the minister of the Father‘s
will must be read in light of the fact that the Son gains this designation by serving as the
instrument of creation, which in and of itself is grounds for calling the Son ―God‖ in
Novatian‘s estimation.

Compared to Angels and Men, The Son Is Uniquely God
The final example I address of Novatian‘s justification for calling the Son ―God‖
concerns the manner by which he compares the relative merit of identifying the Son and
other beings as divine. Novatian begins his argument based on the fact that the Scriptures
call the Son ―God.‖ He compares this appellation given to the Son with instances in
which the Bible calls angels and humans ―gods.‖ Novatian‘s explicit logic regarding the
Son‘s designation in this case centers almost entirely on the assertion of greater propriety
for the Son to be called ―God.‖ As noted in the introduction to this chapter, Novatian
thought of all the justifications for calling the Son ―God‖ as interrelated. Therefore, the
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discussion below will concern Novatian‘s direct statements for justifying the naming of
the Son as God as compared with other beings. We can safely assume, however, that
Novatian also understood the other justifications for calling the Son ―God‖ as inherently
supporting this particular argument.123
Novatian argues simultaneously that the Son is rightfully called ―God‖ and that
this does not interfere with the assertion that there is one God.124 In Trin. 30.5, Novatian
describes ―heretics who maintain that Christ is only a man.‖ He repeats the syllogism
which they use against his theology: ―If the Father is one and the Son another and if the
Father is God and Christ is God, then there is not one God, but there are two gods
introduced in like manner: the Father and the Son.‖125 Novatian responds to the charge
by pointing out that the Scriptures affirm that ―there is only one Lord,‖ that Christ is
called ―the one Master,‖ and that only God is said to be good.126 He then notes that the
Bible calls Christ ―Lord,‖ Paul a ―master,‖ and Christ ―good,‖ concluding,
They do not think that the truth, that there is one Lord, is prejudiced in any way
but that other truth, that Christ is also Lord. Nor do we think that the truth, that
there is one Master, is prejudiced in any way by the truth, that Paul is also a
master. Finally, neither do they assert that the truth, that there is one who is good,
is prejudiced in any way by the truth, that Christ is also called good. Let them
acknowledge, then, by the same line of reasoning that the truth, that there is one
123

As I have noted above, Trin. 26.20 is a good example in which Novatian combines several of
the arguments found in this chapter.
124
DeSimone offers the following distinction, ―Novatian considered (as did St. Paul and the other
Ante-Nicene writers) the divine nature as the primary possession of the Father who communicates it to the
Son. The Father alone is ὁ Θεόο, while the Son is Θεόο without the article,‖ Treatise of Novatian, 92. Of
course Novatian‘s Latin could not make this distinction, but I essentially agree with DeSimone that
Novatian does intend to make a distinction between how the Father‘s divinity is spoken of as compared
with the Son‘s.
125
Trin. 30.5, altered slightly: si alter Pater, alter est Filius, Pater autem Deus et Christus Deus,
non ergo unus Deus, sed duo dii introducuntur pariter, Pater et Filius. Hippolytus, the author of Noet. and
Tertullian also countered the charge of ditheism. See again Ref. 9.7, Noet. 11.1 and Prax. 3. In Trin. 30.21,
Novatian states, ―First of all, then, we must refute the argument of those who presume to make against us
the charge of saying that there are two gods.‖ (Et in primis illud retorquendum in istos qui duorum nobis
deorum controuersiam facere praesumunt.)
126
He refers to Deut. 6:4 and Eph. 4:5 for the first identification, Matt. 23:8 for the second, and
Matt. 19:17; Mark 10:18; and Luke 18:19 for the third. See Trin. 30.22-25.
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God, is not prejudiced in any way by the other truth, that Christ also is declared to
be God. [Trin. 30.25]127
In this passage, Novatian merely demands that his theological opponents be consistent in
their response to the categories which the Bible ascribes to Christ. He does not attempt to
say whether his opponents should treat the term ―God‖ exactly the same way in regard to
the Father and Son.128 Therefore, Novatian‘s argument is not one based on the assertion
of divine ontological equality between Father and Son.
Twice in Trin. Novatian uses Psalm 82:6, in which God calls men and/or angels
―gods,‖ to explain why the Son rightfully is called ―God.‖ His first citation of this
passage comes in the context of Jesus himself quoting it. In Trin. 15.10, Novatian recalls
Jesus‘ words in John 10:30. There Christ affirms that he is one with the Father.
Novatian describes how the suggestion enraged the Jews, and he incorporates John
10:35-36 into his explanation of what the Father and Son being one means,
(Jesus) vigorously refuted His adversaries with the precedent and testimony of the
Scriptures. ―If [the Law] called them gods,‖ (Ps. 82:6) He says, ―to whom the
words of God were addressed—and the Scripture cannot be broken—do you say
to Me whom the Father has made holy and sent into this world. ‗You blaspheme,‘
because I said, ‗I am the Son of God‘?‖ [Trin. 15.11]129

127

Ac si non putant aliqua ratione offici posse ei quod unus Dominus est per illud quod est
Dominus et Christus neque ei quod unus est magister per illud quod est magister et Paulus aut illi quod
unus est bonus per illud quod bonus sit nuncupatus et Christus, eadem ratione intellegant offici non posse
ab illo quod unus est Deus ei quod Deus pronuntiatus est et Christus.
128
Similarly, he does not bother to suggest whether the identification of God and Paul as ―master‖
means the same thing.
129
Exemplo et testimonio scripturarum aduersarios suos fortiter refutauit. Si illos, inquit, dixit
deos, ad quos uerba facta sunt, et non potest solui scriptura: quem Pater sanctificauit et misit in hunc
mundum uos dicitis quia blasphemas, quia dixi: Filius Dei sum ego? Novatian is quoting from John 10:3536, which states, ―Jesus answered, ‗Is it not written in your law, ―I said: You are gods‖? It is those to
whom God‘s word came who are called gods—and scripture cannot be set aside. Then why do you charge
me with blasphemy for saying, ‗I am God‘s son,‘ I whom the Father consecrated and sent into the world.‖
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Novatian cites this text in order to demonstrate that Jesus himself makes a claim about
relative merit: since others have been called ―gods,‖ in Scripture no less, the title Son of
God should not be so alarming.
Novatian next clarifies the implications of calling the Son ―God‖ while
recognizing the Son‘s distinction from the Father. ―If, beyond any question of a doubt,‖
Novatian continues, ―[men] are said to be gods to whom the words of God were
addressed, much more is He God who is found to be better than all of them.‖130 This is
the first point in his argument and it builds off of Jesus‘ statement. Novatian suggests a
gradation of proper usage: if men can be called gods, then this title belongs even more
justly to the Word. We recall that all of Novatian‘s justifications for calling the Son
―God‖ stand in the background for making this claim even though those arguments
discussed above lacked a clear ontological component. His second point concerns the
distinction of the Son from the Father: ―And yet He (Jesus) refuted their slanderous
blasphemy in a fitting manner by a proper ordering; for He wants Himself to be
considered God and considered precisely as the Son of God, not the Father Himself.‖131
In this case, Novatian does not speak about the nature of divinity but merely the Son‘s
special deservedness of the title ―God.‖132

130

Trin. 15.12: Nam quia sine dubitatione dei esse dicuntur ad quos uerba facta sunt, multo magis
hic Deus qui melior illis omnibus inuenitur.
131
Trin. 15.12: Et nihilominus calumniosam blasphemiam dispositione legitima congruenter
refutauit. Deum enim se sic intellegi uult, ut Filium Dei et non ipsum Patrem uellet intellegi.
132
Novatian‘s logic closely follows that of Tertullian in Prax. 13, in which he also quotes Ps. 82 to
make the same point as Novatian: ―But if you are of those who on one occasion did not tolerate our Lord
when he showed himself to be the Son of God, for fear of having to believe that he is the Lord, recollect,
along with them that it is written, ‗I said, Ye are gods and sons of the Most High; and, God standeth in the
congregation of the gods‘: so that, if scripture has not been afraid to pronounce to be gods those men who
by faith have been made sons of God, you may know that much more has it by right applied the name of
God and Lord to the true and only Son of God.‖
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Novatian does not propose a hard and fast line between the existence of divine
beings and created beings. Rather, Novatian simply asserts the relative appropriateness
for speaking about the Father, Son, angels, and men as gods. The title God belongs fully
to the Father. The Son is likewise to be called God, yet in a way which does not suggest
that he is the Father. The fact that the Scriptures refer to men and angels as ―gods‖
means that Novatian is obliged to find an explanation for this suggestion. Although he
does not make mention of the Platonic levels of divinity, it is useful to remember the
Platonic distinction between Being and Becoming and perhaps regard this distinction as a
parallel idea to Novatian‘s. The Supreme God, in both cases, possesses an unquantifiable
abundance of existence or attributes and chooses to share them. In Novatian‘s theology,
the unique generation and activity of the Son make him incomparable to the angels and
men, and yet, the Son is presented as unequal to the Father. Below, I will discuss in what
ways human beings share in divinity according to Novatian.
The second use Novatian makes of Ps. 82 illustrates the manner by which he
distinguishes the eminence of the Father, Son, angels, and human beings. Previously, I
demonstrated that Novatian held temporal existence to be indicative of preeminence,
rank, power, and, therefore an indication of who is subject to whom. Just as the Father is
subject to no one, the Son is subject only to the Father. For this reason, Novatian again
takes Ps. 82‘s reference to ―gods‖ (this time understood as angels) to call the Son ―God‖
based on the concept of subjection. He states,
For if an angel, who is subject to Christ, is declared to be a god, much more and
more fittingly will Christ, to whom all angels are subject, be said to be God. In
fact, it is not in accord with natural propriety to deny to the greater what has been
granted to the lesser. So if an angel who is less than Christ, is, nevertheless,
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called a god, it follows quite readily that Christ, who is both greater and better
than not just one angel but all of them, is to be called God. [Trin. 20.3]133
Novatian sets the Son apart from the angels in relative deservedness of the title ―God.‖134
He does not define the connection between the Father‘s divinity and the Son‘s divinity in
order to distance the Son from the angels who are called ―gods.‖ Rather, a seemingly
Platonic-like scale of relative sharing in the Father‘s nature appears to be the extent of
Novatian‘s analysis. This statement neither denies nor downplays the uniqueness of the
Son‘s relationship to the Father or special deservedness of the title ―God‖ which
Novatian seeks to justify.
Novatian‘s argument closely parallels some of what Tertullian says in Prax.
However, Tertullian also chooses to argue from the idea of the Son‘s ontological
connection to the Father, when he addresses the topic of calling the Son ―God‖ in light of
passages such as Ps. 82:6. This is a line of reasoning which Novatian avoids, at least in
the context of the discussion related to Ps. 82. Tertullian states that God‘s unity is based
on the idea that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit share ―one undivided substance.‖135 He
adds this element to his argument for the greater propriety of calling the Son ―God‖
rather than the angels:
[I] shall follow the apostle, with the result that if the Father and the Son are to be
mentioned together, I call the Father "God" and name Jesus Christ ―the Lord‖.
But Christ by himself I shall be able to call God, as does the same apostle
133

Si enim qui subiectus Christo angelus deus promitur, multo magis et constantius Christus, cui
sunt omnes angeli subiecti, Deus esse dicetur. Nec enim naturae congruit ut quae minoribus concessa sunt
maioribus denegentur. Ita si angelus Christo minor est, angelus autem deus dicitur, magis consequenter
Christus Deus esse dicitur, qui non uno, sed omnibus angelis et maior et melior inuenitur.
134
The Son‘s ministry of the Father‘s will also shapes Novatian‘s presentation of the Son as the
Great Angel, meaning messenger or herald, as we find in Trin. 18.9. In light of examples of an angel
appearing as a divine figure, Novatian argues that it cannot be the Father who is called and angel ―lest he be
subject to another,‖ (Trin. 18.8), nor could it be the Father in violation of His attributes, such as invisibility
(Trin. 18.13). The Son‘s subjection to the Father as His angel describes the Word‘s obedience to the
Father‘s will. This obedience distinguishes the Son from the Father.
135
Prax. 13: unius et indivisae substantiae.
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<when> he says, Of whom is Christ, who is God over all, blessed for evermore.
For also the sun's beam, when by itself, I shall call ―the sun‖: but when naming
the sun, whose the beam is, I shall not immediately call the beam "the sun". For
though I make two suns, yet the sun and its beam I shall count as two objects, and
two manifestations of one undivided substance, in the same sense as <I count>
God and his Word, the Father and the Son. [Prax. 13]136
Tertullian makes an ontological connection between the Father and Son, and he adds an
ontological dimension of the Son‘s preeminence over the angels which is not found in
Novatian‘s argument. Tertullian, therefore, distinguishes between the divine ontology (of
the Father and the Son) with the ontology of created beings.137
Novatian concludes Trin. 20, in which he makes his comments about the angels
being subject to the Son, by also comparing the difference between naming Moses ―god‖
and Christ ―God.‖ He states, ―in the former case the name [God] is given with a
qualification in the latter unreservedly…in the former case, for a time; in the latter,
without reference to time.‖138 Elsewhere he declares that the Son shares in God‘s
substance (which I discuss in the next chapter), but he does not offer this line of thought
in the course of his linguistic argument, as Tertullian had done before him.
In fact, Justin‘s analysis of Ps. 82 looks the most similar to the position I have
identified in Novatian‘s explanation. Justin argues for the Son‘s divinity, or
identification with the title ―God,‖ on the basis of God sharing his attributes with the Son,

136

Sed apostolum sequar ut si pariter nominandi fuerint pater et filius deum patrem appellem et
Iesum Christum dominum nominem. solum autem Christum potero deum dicere, sicut idem apostolus : Ex
quibus Christus, qui est, inquit, deus super omnia, benedictus in aevum omne. nam et radium solis seorsum
solem vocabo : solem autem nominans cuius est radius, non statim et radium solem appellabo. nam etsi
soles duos faciam, tamen et solem et radium eius tam duas res et duas species unius et indivisae substantiae
numerabo quam deum et sermonem eius, quam patrem et filium.
137
Barnes points to Tertullian‘s Prax. 2 and notes: ―Tertullian, for example, uses ‗power‘ (often
potestatis, but also virtus) in doctrinal formulations in which the sense is ‗one power, one substance‘. This
understanding and use of the term appears particularly in Prax., when Tertullian, having insisted upon the
distinctness of the Divine Persons, draws back to affirm their substantial unity: the three are ‗one substance,
and one condition, and of one power…‘,‖ in ―One Nature, One Power,‖ 210.
138
Trin. 20.8.
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angels, and human beings. Justin quotes the entire Psalm to prove that Scripture
identifies human beings as ―gods,‖ because they were created to share immortal life. He
concludes, ―It has been shown that they were considered worthy to become gods, and to
have the capability of becoming sons of the Most High, yet each is to be judged and
convicted, as Adam and Eve.‖139 Justin‘s comment relates to the subject of deification.
He argues that the title ―God‖ applies strictly to the Father, but it also applies to the Son
and to those beings who share in, or will share in, divine attributes such as immortality.
Such was a position also shared by Irenaeus.140 These authors share with Novatian a
similar logic when they refrain from demarcating the divine natures of the Father and Son
from created beings such as angels and human beings.
Furthermore, Justin‘s thinking is not an anomaly in the Word tradition known to
Novatian. Hippolytus‘ Ref. provides evidence that the understanding of deification
relates not only to the special rank of the Word, but also to God‘s creative potential:
For if He had willed to make thee a god, He could have done so. Thou hast the
example of the Logos. His will, however, was, that you should be a man, and He
has made thee a man. But if thou art desirous of also becoming a god, obey Him
that has created thee, and resist not now, in order that, being found faithful in that
which is small, you may be enabled to have entrusted to you also that which is
great. [Ref. 10.29]141
Like Justin and Irenaeus (and Novatian later), Hippolytus avoids drawing a line between
divinity and creation in favor of speaking about creatures sharing in the Supreme God‘s

139

Dial. 124: θαὶ νὕησο ἀπνδέδεηθηαη ὅηη ζενὶ θαηεμίσληαη γελέζζαη, θαὶ πἱνὶ ὑςίζηνπ πάληεο
δύλαζζαη γελέζζαη θαηεμίσληαη, θαὶ παξ‘ ἑαπηνὺο θαὶ θξίλεζζαη θαὶ θαηαδηθάδεζζαη κέιινζζηλ, ὡο θαὶ
Ἀδὰκ θαὶ Εὔα.
140
See Irenaeus‘ Haer. 4.38.4: ―For we cast blame upon Him, because we have not been made
gods from the beginning, but at first merely men, then at length gods.‖ In that passage, he also cites Ps. 82.
See also Haer. 4.11.2 and 5.pref.
141
I discuss this passage above in chapter 5. Cf. Justin Dial. 127, ―…but [they saw] Him who,
according to God‘s will, is God the Son, and His Angel because He served the Father‘s will.‖
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divine attributes. This participation entails the understandable categorization of human
beings as ―gods.‖
Novatian speaks in other passages about humanity‘s salvation as a sharing in
divinity in a way reminiscent of Justin, Irenaeus, and Hippolytus.142 This sharing in
divinity is exactly what I mean above when I mention deification in Justin‘s theology,
and it is also related to Hippolytus‘ comments about the capacity of created beings to
become gods. For example, Novatian writes, ―[Christ] says: ‗Whoever keeps my word
will never see death.‘ Hence the word of Christ bestows immortality and through
immortality bestows divinity (diuinitatem).‖143 Although Novatian steers clear of
Hippolytus‘ suggestion that the Father could have made gods like He made the Logos,
Novatian clearly accepts the language of deification. In this way, Novatian offers a
justification for associating angels, men, and the Son with divinity: the Son, who is above
all mankind and the angels, rightfully deserves to be called God, while the angels and
men do in a lesser sense.144
In one instance, Novatian even comes close to Hippolytus‘ and Justin‘s
suggestion that God decided to make a God out of the Word when he states, ―Therefore
He is God, but begotten (genitus) precisely that He might be God. He is also Lord, but
for this very reason was He born of the Father, that He might be Lord.‖145 Although

142

Although I will avoid any lengthy discussion about eschatology and the ideas suggestive of
man‘s deification in Trin., Novatian‘s treatment of these topics include other parallels, such as an
eschatological vision, which are also developed by some of these authors,.
143
Trin. 15.7: Sed qui uerbum custodierit, inquit, meum, mortem non uidebit in aeternum. Ergo
uerbum Christi praestat immortalitatem et per immortalitatem praestat diuinitatem.
144
In the next chapter I will look to the terms aeternus and aeternitas as they relate to the Son.
Although I ultimately disagree with some of Mattei‘s conclusions, he too recognizes that Novatian‘s usage
of these terms for the Father, Son, Spirit and saints has an analogical dimension pointing to a usage
dependent on the idea of participation.
145
Trin. 31.17: Est ergo Deus, sed in hoc ipsum genitus, ut esset Deus. Est et Dominus, sed in hoc
ipsum natus ex Patre, ut esset Dominus.
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Novatian treats the Son‘s claim to the categorization of ―God‖ as unique, his theology
does not function by making a hard and fast line between the divine life (of the Father
and the Son) and creation, as was the case in Tertullian‘s theology.146 It is the Father‘s
divinity which Novatian identifies as singular. In that light, he speaks in various ways
about how the Father‘s attributes are manifested uniquely in the second person, the Word.
However, other beings (angels and humans) are called ―gods‖ in several scriptural
passages. Novatian does not develop a sophisticated rationale as to why human beings
and angels can be called ―gods.‖ The closest he gets to an explanation involves the idea
that God shares immortality which entails a sharing of His divinity. As I note above, this
position contains several important parallels with the Platonic understanding of Being
and Becoming.

Conclusion

DeSimone makes the curious suggestion that, in the places where Novatian relies
on Word Christology traditions, we should not presume a teaching based on the Son‘s
ontological subordinationism.147 In fact, we have seen that Novatian‘s use of the Word
Christology traditions conforms with his previous presentation of the transcendent Father.
In the case of his explanation of Ps. 82, for example, Novatian drew from both Tertullian
146

A good comparison for my point can be seen in a typical approach to explaining Arianism.
The method for describing the central point of Arian theology usually involves the idea that Arius drew an
ontological line between the God who always was and creatures who came into being. By making this
separation between the eternal divine and the created, Arius placed the Son on the side of the creation since
he denies the eternality of the Son. The very act of making a hard and fast line is, I think, foreign to
Novatian‘s thinking. Cf. Harnack who views the subject of deification during Novatian‘s time as
pervasively different: ―The hope of deification is the expression of the idea that this world and human
nature do not correspond to that exalted world which man has built up within his own mind and which he
may reasonably demand to be realized, because it is only in it that he can come to himself,‖ History of
Dogma (2), 317.
147
DeSimone writes, ―The note of subordinationism in Novatian, however, is not found so much
in his exegesis of the theophanies (chs. 17, 18, 19, 20)—where he follows the safe and sure tradition of
previous Ante-Nicene writers,‖ Treatise of Novatian, 108.
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and Justin. The content of his analysis favored the Word Christology of Justin over
Tertullian in that Novatian justified calling the Son ―God‖ in relation to the Son‘s
preeminence over angels and human beings. He did not follow Tertullian‘s argument
which also included a teaching distinguishing the divine ontology of the Father and the
Son from all creatures. DeSimone‘s proposal reveals a clear methodological problem. In
Novatian‘s choice of arguments for identifying the Son as God, I have shown that
Novatian neither argues from nor presupposes the idea of ontological equality between
the Son with the Father. This is the case even when theological precedents were known
or available to him.
Novatian‘s explanation of the Son‘s divinity, in light of the Son‘s contact with
time and the world, follow from his commitments to philosophical theology. The
transcendent Father cannot execute the role of the God who appears in theophanies and
ultimately becomes incarnate. However, knowledge of the Son‘s existence and the
evidence Novatian presents for calling the Son ―God‖ comes from the witness and
fulfillment of revelation associated with Scripture. The Scriptures identify the Son as
God and Novatian interprets the Son as bringing meaning to the topic of divine
immanence. He does this because the Scriptures identify the Son as the Word, as existing
before the world, as the agent of creation, and as ministering to and enacting the Father‘s
will.
Novatian‘s dependence on the Word Christologies of his predecessors reveals that
he does not treat his sources as necessarily articulating an ever advancing clarification of
doctrine. In fact, we have seen evidence that Novatian departs from Tertullian in favor of
earlier expressions of Word Christology. This very important fact is largely missing from
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scholarship on Novatian. Novatian utilizes arguments and statements from earlier
theologians only when they conform to his overarching theology. That theology, I have
shown, consists of the transcendence of the Father and the ability of the Son to act as the
immanent divine presence. Not only have Novatian‘s arguments not evidenced a reliance
on positing ontological equality of the Son and Father, but I have also demonstrated that
some of his arguments require a distinction in the Son‘s divine nature as compared with
the nature of the Supreme Father.
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Chapter Seven: The Son as Ontologically Subordinate
Introduction

As discussed in chapter 6, Novatian identifies the Son as God while also declaring
that the Father is the one and Supreme God. All scholars agree that Novatian teaches a
divine hierarchy or subordination related to the pre-eminence of the Father over the Son.
However, scholars continue to debate whether this hierarchy of the Father over the Son
also constitutes diminished attributes in the Son, which is another way of speaking about
ontological subordination.
In this chapter, I will demonstrate that Novatian teaches the Son‘s ontological
subordination to the Father against those scholars who believe that Novatian holds to the
ontological equality of the Father and the Son. I also will discuss Novatian‘s insistence
that the Son and Father share an ontological connection, in relation to his teaching of the
Son‘s ontological subordination. The Father shares His divine substance with the Son,
which makes the Son divine. This unique sharing in substance constitutes an ontological
connection between the Father and Son. At the same time, Novatian denies that the
Son‘s divine attributes equal those of the Father, which means that the Son is
ontologically subordinate to the Father.
In conjunction with chapter 6‘s finding that Novatian argues for the Son‘s
classification as God apart from the notion of ontological equality with the Father, my
discussion will bring to light the fact that his teaching of the Son‘s ontological
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subordination supports his theology of the transcendent Father.1 First, I will analyze
Novatian‘s language of the Son‘s generation or birth. Second, I will look at Novatian‘s
use of the Two-stage Logos theory. Third, I will examine the kind of association
Novatian makes between the Son and eternality. Fourth, I will describe the importance of
temporal terminology related to the Son‘s begetting. Fifth, I will show that Novatian
teaches that the Son shares the substance of the Father, only in a qualified way. Finally, I
will point to Novatian‘s explicit insistence on the inequality of the Son and the Father. I
will show how all of these topics work in Novatian‘s theology as distinguishing the
supreme nature of the Father from the lesser nature of the Son. To be clear, I am
affirming that Novatian teaches an ontological connection between the Father and the
Son, since the Father shares His substance with the Son. This sharing makes the Son
divine because the Father is divine. However, the Son‘s divinity (his nature or essence)
also must be described as inferior to the Father‘s divinity.
Three major trends in scholarship have offered the following interpretations of
Novatian‘s understanding of the Son‘s divinity: 1) the Son is ontologically subordinate to
the Father,2 2) Novatian taught a form of mitigated subordinationism,3 or 3) the Son is
ontologically equal with the Father.4 As I mention in the Introduction to this study, my
concern is not with engaging authors in the first group. Although I share many of their
conclusions, my approach to reading Trin. differs significantly enough that I will argue
from the framework which my previous six chapters have established.
1

In order to make my case, I will look at six topics which are interconnected throughout Trin.
These topics are treated by scholars as critical data for ascertaining Novatian‘s understanding of the Son‘s
nature.
2
Scholars in this group include Tixeront, Amann, Prat, Peterson, Loi, Pollard, and Simonetti.
3
The primary scholars in this group are D‘Alès, Kielbach, and Desimone. Again, I previously
included Fausset in this group because he believes that Novatian understands a unity but fails to articulate a
coherent doctrine.
4
Mattei and Papandrea have articulated this position in the past few decades.
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I will interact more with the second group. This group includes Keilbach, who
coined the phrase ―mitigated subordinationism‖ to help rebut some of the views
expressed by those reading Novatian as teaching only the Son‘s ontological
subordination.5 DeSimone follows much of Keilbach‘s interpretation, and acknowledges
the presence of some inequalities of the Son‘s divinity. At the same time, DeSimone
points to Novatian‘s doctrine of the Son‘s shared substance with the Father as suggesting
ontological equality. He sees the combination of these factors in Novatian‘s theology as
evidence that early Christians, and not just Novatian, struggled towards a theology which
identifies the Father and the Son as equally divine, albeit with some conceptual and
terminological failure.6 I will be arguing that a false sense of ontological equality has
been fostered by this understanding of substance in the second and third groups of
scholars.

Generation of the Word

P. Mattei offers a strong case for reading the variety of terms which Novatian uses
to speak about the Son‘s generation and birth synonymously.7 His work challenges the

5

Keilbach, ―Divinitas Filii,‖ 208.
DeSimone writes, ―The manner of expression of the Ante-Nicene writers sounds truly strange to
ears accustomed to the precision of Nicaea. Accordingly, unless one places the language of these writers in
its proper setting and time, place, etc., and studies carefully their purpose in writing, as well as their
adversaries, he will surely misinterpret their doctrine. Furthermore, one or two seemingly ill-sounding
statements are to be diligently compared with the author‘s complete thought and are not to be imprudently
wrenched from their context,‖ Treatise of Novatian, 98. DeSimone‘s concern is one of orthodoxy. He
wants to rescue Novatian from the charge of heresy and does so by assuming that Novatian wished to stand
within the orthodox tradition. To him, Novatian produced an orthodox work with problematic issues of
phrasing suggestive of certain heresies. Dunn rightfully chastens DeSimone‘s methodological
presuppositions and anachronisms, ―Diversity and Unity,‖ 387-390.
7
Mattei writes, ―Des passages rassemblés il resort nettement que 4 des 5 verbes sont, dans la
perspective ‗trinitaire‘ ici retenue, equivalents, interchangeables: Novatien n‘hésite pas à remplacer
procedere et nasci par proferri (respectivement 15, 6; 31, 2) ou doubler nasci par procedere (15, 10) et
gigni par proferri (22, 4). Pur effet de uariatio ou simple gout pour la copia dicendi.,‖ ―De Trinitate 31,‖
180.
6
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conclusions of D‘Alès and P. G. Aeby. D‘Alès identified generare with the Son‘s
begetting before time and nasci with the Incarnation.8 Aeby added two additional terms
to d‘Alès‘ categories; he argued that Novatian employs both generare and gigni to refer
to the generation of the Word from the Father and nasci as well as procedere to refer to
the Incarnation.9 Mattei, however, believes that Novatian avoids making the terminology
about the Word‘s generation or birth technical.10 Mattei contrasts Novatian‘s approach to
Tertullian‘s, which refers to the birth of the humanity of Christ by the terms nasci and
natus.11 I agree with Mattei to the extent that I think Novatian treats all terms for birth
and generation as fundamentally related and essentially interchangeable.12 According to
my reading of Trin., this point is critical since Novatian will use all instances of talking
about the Son‘s birth and beginning to contrast his nature with the Father‘s.
Novatian uses two key concepts to discuss the Son‘s birth or generation from the
Father. First, he takes the Son‘s generation from the Father as evidence that the divine
nature or substance is passed from the Father to the Son. There is an ontological
connection or relationship between the Father and Son because the Father shares His
8

D‘Alès, Novatien, 123-124.
P. Gervais Aeby, Les Missions Divines: de Saint Justin a Origène (Éditions Universitaires
Fribourg Suisse, 1958), 108. Aeby adds, ―Et ici, dans ce contexte de procession, Novatien dira que le
Verbe n‘est pas proféré en vain mais en vue de la creation. Chez lui, ginere et procedere ne sont pas
synonymes. Procedere comporte un lien au temps, à la creation, que n‘a pas gignere qui se rapporte à la
generation éternelle,‖ Idem.
10
Cf. DeSimone who distinguishes generation as ab aeterno and the Word‘s birth at time when
the Father wills it, Treatise of Novatian, 172-173.
11
Mattei, ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 181. Additionally, Novatian connects procession (prolatae) with
birth (natus) in Trin. 31.2 and prolatus with generare in Trin. 22.4: ―However, He received this from His
own Father, that He might be both God and Lord of all and God according to the form of God the Father,
begotten (genitus) and brought forth (prolatus) from Him.‖ In Tertullian‘s theology, the Word does not
become ―Son‖ until later the Incarnation, however he defend the appropriate use of the term prolatio
despite the Gnostic incorporation of it into their theology. See Prax 8 for his defense of retaining the term.
Novatian likewise inherently denies the Gnostics a theological ground for using this term by connecting the
Father‘s will with the procession of the Word/Son in birth. Gnostics used the verb πξνβνιέ in their
understanding that one aeon broke away from the Depth on its own, leading to the establishment of a
hierarchy of aeons. See Irenaeus Haer. 1.preface.3 for a lengthy account.
12
I disagree with Mattei in that he does not associate terms related to the Son‘s birth and
generation as contributing to a distinction in divine attributes between the Son and the Father.
9
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substance with the Son. Second, Novatian attributes the personal distinction of the Son
from the Father as necessitated by the fact that the Father cannot be born while the Son
must have a beginning. In Novatian‘s theology, the fact that the Son has any sort of
beginning or birth stands in complete opposition to Novatian‘s description of the
Father.13 The Son‘s beginning and birth contradict the categories Novatian sees as
necessary for defining the Supreme God‘s ontology, such as aeternus and immensus.
In Trin. 31.12-14, Novatian develops both concepts mentioned above. ―As a
matter of fact,‖ Novatian states, ―whatever (quicquid) He [the Word] is, He is not of
Himself because He is not unborn (innatus), but is of the Father (ex Patre) because He is
begotten (genitus est).‖14 Novatian gives no indication that innatus or generare refer to
separate concepts in this passage, as d‘Alès and Aeby suggested. Both terms point to the
fact that the Son receives his existence from the Father, and this makes the Son unlike the
unborn Father. This contrast points to Novatian‘s understanding of the Son‘s ontological
subordination. In addition, Novatian‘s use of quicquid, in light of the phrase ex Patre,
refers to the idea that the Word‘s nature and substance derive from the Father. By
connecting the Son‘s divine standing with his generation and birth in this passage,
Novatian expresses the Son‘s ontological connection to the Father despite the fact that
concepts such as birth and beginning cannot be applied to the nature of the Father.
Novatian continues this section of Trin. 31 by identifying the second person after
the Father as Word, Son, and Christ, and also by accepting other theological categories,
such as power and wisdom to refer to the Son. This use of categories sets Novatian in
13

Cf. Loi who argues that Novatian‘s theology distinguishes itself from the prior Word
Christology tradition in by separating the Son‘s demiurgic role entirely from his generation, La Trinità,
299.
14
Trin. 31.12: Nunc autem quicquid est non ex se est, quia nec innatus est, sed ex Patre est, quia
genitus est.
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line with other Word Christologies.15 These traditions allow him to speak about the
Son‘s ontological connection to the Father with an array of concepts.16 Novatian writes,
―For whether He is the Word (uerbum), whether He is Power (uirtus), whether He is
Wisdom (sapientia), whether He is Light (lux), whether He is the Son (Filius)—whatever
(quicquid) He is of these, He is not from any other, but from the Father, as we have
already mentioned above.‖17 Novatian‘s logic can be summarized by the following:
whichever theological tradition is used to speak about the Father and the second person, it
must be based on an ontological connection between the two.18 According to Novatian,
whether the second person after the Father is called Word, Power, Wisdom, Light, or
Son, this person derives his substance and nature from the Father, which is indicated by
his use of quicquid in the the quotation above.
Novatian concludes this section of Trin. 31 by combining the biblical traditions
about the Word‘s generation with the philosophical and theological categories separating
the Father from birth or a beginning. He writes:
Owing His origin (originem) to the Father, He could not cause any disunion
(discordiam) in the godhead (diuinatis) by making two gods (numero duorum
15

Loi emphasizes the biblical origin of these categories, La Trinità, 300.
See, for example, the section on Hippolytus in chapter 5 and especially my discussion of Noet.
See also below in the section ―Novatian‘s use of semper and tempus‖ for a citation of Barnes‘ discussion of
Tertullian‘s identification of the Son as the Power of God. One example of Tertullian blending some these
traditions can be found in Prax. 6 where he calls the Word the Wisdom.
17
Trin. 31.12-13, modified slightly: Siue dum uerbum est, siue dum uirtus est, siue dum sapientia
est, siue dum lux est, siue dum Filius est. Et quicquid horum est, dum non aliunde est quam, sicut diximus
iam superius, ex Patre.
18
Novatian‘s position shows some harmony with the metaphors used by his predecessors of the
sun and the beam of light, the fire from fire, and the water source and the river. The closest Novatian gets
to using any of these metaphors is Trin. 18.4-5: ―Great things are dangerous if they happen suddenly. Even
the light of the sun, striking suddenly with excessive brilliance upon eyes accustomed to the darkness, will
not manifest the light of day but rather will cause blindness…In like manner Christ, the image of God and
the very Son of God, was presented to the eyes of men only insofar as He was able to be seen.‖ (Periculosa
sunt enim quae magna sunt, si repentina sunt. Nam etiam lux solis subita post tenebras splendore nimio
insuetis oculis non ostendet diem, sed potius faciet caecitatem… Sic ergo et Christus, id est imago Dei et
Filius Dei, ab hominibus inspicitur, qua poterat uideri.) Norris discusses Alcinous‘ use of the tradition
which describes the Supreme God as a blinding light, and he traces the idea back to Plato, God and World,
35-36.
16
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deorum), inasmuch as He drew His origin (originem), in being born (nascendo),
of Him (ex illo) who is the one God (unus Deus). In this respect, since He is the
Only-begotten (unigenitus) and the First-born (primogenitus) of [the Father]
who—because He has no origin (originem)—is alone (unus) the beginning
(principium) and head (caput) of all things, [the Word] declared accordingly that
God is one (unum). And [the Word] proved that [the Father] is not subject to any
beginning (principio) or origin (initio), but rather that [the Father] is the origin
(initium) and the beginning (principium) of all things. [Trin. 31.13-14, slightly
modified] 19
Novatian affirms the ontological connection between the Father and Son based on the
Son‘s origin from the Father. In light of his remarks in Trin. 31.12, he treats the Son‘s
generation from the Father as consisting in the Son‘s reception of the Father‘s substance.
Furthermore, Trin. 31.13-14 ties the personal distinction of the Word as the onlybegotten (John 1:14) and as the first begotten (Col. 1:14) to the concept of the Word‘s
beginning.20 When calling the Father the origin or source of the Word, Novatian
confirms the distinction between the two by advocating a distinction in divine attributes.
The concept of divine birth negates the Son‘s equality with the Father. As I argued in
chapter 4, Novatian attributes the terms aeternus and immensus/infinitus only to the
Father‘s divine nature. The Son‘s beginning and origin from the Father make the
technical application of these terms to the Son impossible and otherwise
incomprehensible.21 Therefore, Novatian affirms the ontological relationship by
maintaining that the Son comes out of the Father, yet denies ontological equality by
19

Patri suo originem suam debens discordiam diuinitatis de numero duorum deorum facere non
potuit, qui ex illo qui est unus Deus originem nascendo contraxit. Quo genere dum et unigenitus est et
primogenitus ex illo est, qui originem non habet, unus est omnium rerum et principium et caput. Idcirco
unum Deum asseruit, quem non sub ullo principio aut initio, sed initium potius et principium rerum
omnium comprobauit.
20
See also Trin. 21.4 for Novatian‘s interpretation of Col. 1:15‘s use of primogenitus and 13.1 for
a citation of John 1:14, with its use of the term unigenitus.
21
In chapter 4, I discuss the range of meanings which terms, such as aeternus, possess in Trin. In
his application of aeternus to the Father, Novatian identifies the impossibility that the Supreme God‘s
nature can be described by having any contact with a beginning or a birth. Novatian‘s emphasis on the
Son‘s beginning as a way to speak about the Word‘s personal distinction from the Father must mean that
the Son does not possess eternality as the Father does.
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maintaining the Son‘s beginning and birth. His teaching finds its basis in the categories
of ontological terminology used by his philosophical and Christian sources.

Stages of the Word
Novatian follows the Two-stage Logos model by identifying the Word‘s
progressive move from in (in)22 the Father to the Word‘s eventual birth out of (ex) and
then position with (cum)23 the Father. In the Word Christologies I presented in chapter 5,
I pointed to the distinction between Two-stage theories of the Logos (Justin, Theophilus,
Hippolytus, Noet., and Tertullian) and Irenaeus‘ Single-stage theory. A fundamental
difference between these two theories concerns their respective clarity regarding the
timeframe of the Word‘s personal distinction. It is unclear whether or not Tertullian‘s
Two-stage theory suggests the Word‘s distinct personality prior to being generated, but
his insistence that the Word only becomes a Son at a point in time makes an argument for
the Son‘s eternal distinction difficult to prove.24 Noet.‘s Two-stage theory, however,
offers the explicit argument that the Word was originally a sound.25 Only in Irenaeus‘
Single-stage theory do we see a logic suggesting the Word‘s eternal distinction.

22

Trin. 31.3 and 4: ―Since He is begotten of the Father, he is always in (in) the Father…‖
Trin. 31. 4: ―…and He who was in (in) the Father, because He was of the Father, was afterwards
with (cum) the Father…‖ Novatian also uses apud in several places.
24
Mattei presents some of the recent scholarship on this topic highlighting the probability that
Tertullian‘s logic suggests the eternal subjectivity of the Word, “De Trinitate 31,‖ 183-184.
25
Novatian rejects this teaching in Trin. 31.2: ―The Word is to be understood here not as a sound
that strikes the air nor the tone of the voice forced from the lungs…‖ See DeSimone who points out that
Praxeas ―utterly rejected the concept of the Word‖ as it was described by Word Christologies in favor of
speaking about a mere voice, Treatise of Novatian, 74 (italics his).
23
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In Trin. 31, Novatian offers a Two-stage Logos theory similar to those described
in chapter 5. First, he names the Word as the Son26 and then affirms that the Word was
always (semper) in (in) the Father.27 He also emphasizes the Father‘s will in choosing to
bring forth the Word.28 Finally, Novatian connects the Word to the creation of all
things.29 When Novatian affirms that the Word is always Son, he departs from the
tradition seen in Tertullian‘s works and Noet. which treat the Word as becoming Son at
some point after being begotten.30 Because of this distinction, some scholars have
interpreted Novatian‘s claim that the Father has always been Father to indicate the Son‘s
personal distinction from the Father aside from the issue of the Word‘s exteriorization.
V. Loi argues that Novatian implies the eternal generation of the Son in these
passages from Trin. 31 cited above, because Novatian claims that the Word/Son was
always in the Father.31 However, Loi also believes that Novatian‘s case is weakened by
the influence of Stoic ideas in his theology, specifically the concepts of logos endiathetos

26

Trin. 31.2. Below, in the section ―Novatian‘s use of semper and tempus,‖ I discuss the fact that
Novatian rejects Tertullian‘s understanding of God becoming Father. Tertullian held that the Father only
became the Father when the Word was begotten as Son.
27
Trin. 31.3.
28
Trin. 31.4. For discussions of the centrality of the Father‘s will in bringing forth the Son, see
Papandrea, Trinitarian Theology, 339-342; DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 174; Quarry, ―Nouatiani De
Trinitate liber: it‘s probable history,‖ Hermathena 10 (1899), 66-67; and Mattei, ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 182-5.
Mattei also takes note of Prax. 6.3, Hippolytus‘ Ref. 10.32.1, and Noet. 10 as Novatian‘s literary sources
which acknowledge the primacy of the Father‘s will in bringing forth the Word.
29
Trin. 31.4-5. Fausset writes, ―A careful study of that chapter [Trin. 31] will reveal a certain
distinction between the views of Novatian and Tertullian. Novatian does without doubt find the purpose of
the Son‘s generation in the creation of the Universe,‖ Novatiani Romanae, xxxvii.
30
As seen in chapter 5, the single subjectivity of speaking about the Son, Christ, and Word
interchangeably was well established in the tradition which Novatian received, especially in Justin.
However, this identification was not clearly made in regard to the begetting of the Son and was, in fact,
explicitly denied by a few of the authors. Justin was not one of them. DeSimone contrasts Origen and
Novatian, stating, ―Origen thought that he could safeguard the eternal generation of the Son by upholding
the eternity of creation. Novatian had the merit of not identifying Sonship with the prolation of the Word
for the purpose of creation,‖ Treatise of Novatian, 173.
31
Loi, La Trinità, 27-8.
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and logos prophorikos.32 G. Pelland likewise points to the Stoic influence on Novatian
and highlights Novatian‘s identification of the Father as eternal and the Son as ―before
time.‖33 He suggests that for Novatian, the Son always exists ―in,‖ and then ―with‖ the
Father, and he concludes that Novatian does not reach the notion of eternal generation.34
Loi and Pelland both believe that the influence of Stoic language theory must mean that
Novatian holds to the idea of the Word‘s impersonality while in the Father (i.e. when the
Word is simply the logos endiathetos). They understand Novatian as following the Word
Christologies of Theophilus, the author of Noet., and Tertullian.
Although I agree with Pelland‘s conclusion that Novatian does not speak about
the Word‘s personalization while in the Father, I do not share the certainty that Novatian
alludes to or depends on Stoic terminology (in this case logos endiathetos) to
depersonalize the Word while in the Father. It even appears that Novatian may counter
Stoic thinking it in at least one place.35 We should look instead to Novatian‘s reliance on
a few Scriptural verses to explore the subject of the Word‘s ―vocalization‖ or

32

Papandrea argues that ―within the one God, Novatian distinguishes between persons by
maintaining that there are stages of existence in the divine life of the Λόγνο,‖ over against the implied
immutability of the Father, Trinitarian Theology, 336. DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 173, Simonetti,
―Alcune osservazioni‖, 778, and Papandrea, Trinitarian Theology, 341 explore the importance which Stoic
language may have had on Novatian. However, it is important to keep in mind the extent of speculation
involved since Novatian does not use this language himself. See chapter 5 above for my comments on the
influence of this language.
33
Pelland, ―Une Passage difficile,‖ 28-31.
34
Pelland states, ―Bref, Novatien ne parvient pas à la notion de génération éternelle, meme s‘il
voit bien que le Père et le Fils coesistent toujours,‖ Ibid. 31. Mattei correctly points out that the difference
between Loi and Pelland rests in the fact that Loi thinks Novatian does not make the Son‘s generation
dependent upon creative activity, whereas Pelland emphasizes the Father‘s will to generate the Son in
conjunction with creative activity, ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 182.
35
Trin. 31.2. For the specific argument that Word Christology, as influenced by Middle
Platonism, implicitly counters numerous aspects of Stoically influenced monarchian theology, see Heine,
―Christology of Callistus,‖ 61. Heine also suggests that Sabellians had no interest in articulating theology
with Logos language. Cf. Simonetti who writes about Callistus‘ theological project: ―The concept—a new
one in the controversy—on which the formula was based was that of spirit (pneuma): a spirit which, in the
Stoic manner, is entirely one with the Logos, pervades the universe, and is identical with God in all God‘s
manifestations, whether as Father or as Son. This Spirit descended and was incarnated in the Virgin,‖ ―The
Beginnings of Theological Reflection,‖ 215.
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externalization out of the Father. In Trin. 17.2-3, he quotes portions of Psalm 44:2,
noting that God‘s demiurgic commands are fulfilled by the instrumentality of the Word.
He states, ―And as He was the Word of God (‗My heart has uttered a good word‘), he
shows that the Word was in the beginning, that this Word was with the Father, and that
the Word was God, all things were made through Him.‖36 We recall from chapter 5 the
common understanding in the Word Christology tradition of the Son‘s generation for the
purpose of creation. Novatian also cites Ps. 44:2 in conjunction with verses from John
and Revelation, which speak of the Word as God and emphasize the distinction between
the Word and the Father in light of demiurgic activity.37 Novatian may have thought of
the Word was not personally distinct while in the Father, but the source of his conclusion
can not be positively associated with Stoic doctrine or terminology.
DeSimone judges that Novatian did conceive of an eternal, personal distinction,
but he leaves some ambiguity in his analysis. While he states that ―the Son exists ab
aeterno in the Father and is eternally generated,‖38 he also quotes with approval J. H.
Newman who writes, ―Novatian, then, might hold that the Father was Father from
eternity, because there lay hid within Him One who had the nature of a Son (both as
being the Word and as being the Son at length); yet might hold also that the actual

36

Trin. 17.3: Ac si hic uerbum Dei est—nam eructauit cor meum uerbum bonum—, ostendit in
principio uerbum fuisse et uerbum hoc apud Patrem fuisse, Deum praeterea uerbum fuisse, omnia per
ipsum facta esse. See also the references to prolatio in the previous section.
37
See Trin. 13.1 and 15.6. The former cites John 1:14 and Rev. 19:13, the latter John 1:1.
38
DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 173. See also DeSimone‘s comments on Novatian‘s inclusion
of Col. 1:15 in Trin. 21.4. There he takes ―firstborn‖ to mean ―eternal.‖ DeSimone writes, ―In the mind of
the Fathers of the Church, the expression ‗firstborn of every creature‘ can only signify ‗born before every
creature.‘ It is used in the metaphorical sense of pre-existence before creation; it implies a relationship to
God which cannot be predicated even of angels or men, much less of other creatures. Christ, then, being
eternal, has absolute supremacy over all nature creation,‖ Ibid., 85.
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genesis or nativitas was temporal.‖39 DeSimone adds, ―Only ‗quando Pater voluit,
processit ex Patre: when the Father willed, did He proceed from the Father,‘ becoming
effectively a divine person.‖40 Papandrea understands DeSimone as rejecting the separate
divine personhood of the Word because of this comment. For his part, Papandrea argues
that because Novatian connects the Son/Word to the idea of his always being in the
Father, Novatian must logically presume the Word‘s eternal generation.41 For Papandrea,
and to a degree DeSimone, Novatian‘s Two-stage Logos theory speaks only to the Son‘s
movement (whatever that might actually be) from inside to outside of God, and not to a
personalization associated with this movement/generation.
Papandrea and others who argue that Novatian teaches the Son‘s eternal
distinction share the same shortcoming in their assessment; they fail to account for the
fact that the primary passage used to argue for the Son‘s eternal generation neither uses
the term aeternus nor speaks directly of Sonship. This passage is Trin. 31.3: ―Now, He
who is before all time must be said to have been always in the Father; for no time can be
attributed to Him who is before time. He is always in the Father, lest the Father be not
always the Father.‖42 Some scholars claim that the passage necessitates the eternality of
the Word because Novatian describes the Fatherhood of God as ―always.‖ Therefore,
they argue that the concept of the eternal Sonship of the Word must follow from

39

John Henry Newman, Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical (London, 1874), 237-8 cited by
DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 173.
40
Papandrea writes, ―DeSimone maintains that Novatian thought before the Word proceeded from
God, the Word did not exist as a separate divine person. But Novatian did not say this. In fact, if he had,
he would have given ammunition for the same Sabellians he was arguing against,‖ Trinitarian Theology,
337 n. 185 and see also 341.
41
Idem.
42
Sed qui ante omne tempus est, semper in Patre fuisse dicendus est. Nec enim tempus illi
assignari potest qui ante tempus est. Semper enim in Patre, ne Pater non semper sit Pater.
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Novatian‘s use of semper in Trin. 31.3.43 In fact, the final phrase in the passage (―lest
the Father be not always the Father‖) may be speaking directly to Novatian‘s emphasis on
the Father‘s immutability, rather than to an implied Sonship.44 I will look more closely at
the meaning of semper in the next section.
Mattei, however, follows part of Pelland‘s argument and concludes that Novatian
neither teaches an ―impersonal‖ state of the Word nor explicitly conceives of eternal
generation.45 Furthermore, Mattei accepts that Novatian speaks within the tradition of the
Two-stage logos theories. I am unconvinced by his position that Novatian uses spatial
terms such as in, ex, cum, and apud in only a figurative manner.46 By suggesting only a
figurative meaning to spatial terms, Mattei denies that Novatian is trying to contrast the
Son‘s nature with the Father‘s.47 Therefore, Mattei‘s position can only be upheld by
negating Novatian‘s presentation of the Father‘s divine nature, especially throughout
Trin. 1-8.48 In contrast to that assessment, I am arguing that Novatian‘s theology of the

43

Pointing to Trin. 17.3 and 31.3-4, Papandrea acknowledges that ―Novatian implies that the
Word is not properly called the Son until the incarnation, but this cannot be pushed too far, since he
maintains that the Father is always a Father, and the eternally preexistent Word is substantially the same
person as the Son, at least in His divine nature,‖ Trinitarian Theology, 338 n. 187.
44
See my comments in chapter 4 on the Father‘s immutability in the section, ―Aeternus and
aeternitatis.‖
45
Mattei, ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 198.
46
Mattie specifically warns that accepting positions of the Son in respect to the Father creates a
false, materialistic understanding of Trin.‘s theology, Ibid. 195.
47
Ibid., 193.
48
We can compare Novatian‘s understanding of the Word‘s generation with that of Irenaeus.
Barnes describes Irenaeus‘ teaching with the following: ―Whatever is said about God cannot run contrary to
the reality or nature of Spirit. In particular, if we think about the generation of the Word we cannot think of
a transition in the life of the Word from ‗in‘ God to ‗out‘ of God, since these are spatial notions which
cannot be applied to Spirit. As spirit, the Word is always entirely ‗in‘ God and ‗outside‘ of God. We must
completely purge our thoughts of any place-related notions of causality. The Word is so completely and
perfectly present ‗here‘ and ‗there‘ that we must think of a continuous presence, distinguished not
according to place by activity, not in any sort of either/or localization. When the Word is generated from
the Father, he is not by that fact removed from previous indwelling ‗in‘ the Father. When the Word is
present ‗in‘ union with the flesh, he is not by that fact removed from any ‗where‘ he was before. The Word
is in the Father, in the cosmos, and, later, in the flesh of Jesus,‖ ―Irenaeus‘s Trinitarian Theology,‖ 83.
Novatian‘s presentation of the Father as infinite and the Son as distinguished by his exteriorization and
ability to be sent challenges everything mentioned above in regard to Irenaeus‘ theology of the Son. In
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one, unique, and Supreme Father guides and orders his understanding of the Son‘s
nature.49
I agree with Mattei in so far as he accepts a lack of evidence for determining
Novatian‘s teaching on this matter. However, Mattei‘s final conclusion overreaches the
evidence. His understanding of Novatian‘s logic prompts him to suggest that Novatian
inherently accepts the Word‘s personal, eternal distinction—even though Mattei
acknowledges that Novatian could not quite articulate this position. Although Novatian
does not offer direct testimony on this topic, I believe he does not argue for the Son‘s
equality with the Father in light of his description of the stages of his exteriorization out
of the Father (i.e., ―inside‖ to outside‖). If I am correct that Novatian‘s spatial language
cannot be read figuratively, a point I argue in regard to Novatian‘s topological theology,
then the language of the Son‘s stages of exteriorization indicates that the Son‘s divine
nature does not equal the Father‘s. Essentially, Novatian‘s use of spatial language
designates change for the Son, a change in place and (probably) a new status of
distinction from the Father. Change in all cases, as I discuss in chapter 4, stands at odds

other words, Novatian‘s Word Christology does not share important assumptions about the nature of the
Son‘s divinity of the sort we find in Irenaeus‘ Word Christology.
49
I think it is useful to remember that Papandrea and Mattei propose, to one degree or another,
that Novatian‘s inclusion of temporal and spatial language regarding the Son‘s distinction from the Father
cannot be understood as having any literal meaning; both believe that Novatian uses the terms as
figuratively pointing to a causal or logical relationship. Although Novatian may not have know Origen‘s
work, it is important to note that Papandrea and Mattei‘s method of interpretation cannot be used to
understand all theology from the early to middle of the 2 nd century. In fact, more often than not, the
interpretation these scholars give sound as if they are explaining Origen‘s theology rather than Novatian‘s.
Origen writes, for example, in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans 7.7.13.9: ―[The Son] who is
over all has no one over himself. For he himself is not later than the Father, but from the Father. But the
wisdom of God has granted that this same thing be understood of the Holy Spirit as well, where it says,
‗The Spirit of the Lord filled the earth, and he who contains all things, has knowledge of his voice.‘ If,
therefore the Son is called ‗God over all‘ and the Holy Spirit is recorded to contain all things, but God is
the Father ‗from whom are all things,‘ then clearly the nature and essence of the Trinity, which is over all
things, are shown to be one.‖ According to my understanding of the theology in Trin., Novatian could
never have written a passage such as this, even though this is essentially what Papandrea thinks Novatian
teaches.
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with the Father‘s eternality, simplicity, and immutability. Although Novatian does not
ultimately clarify the implications of the Son‘s exteriorization, the terms and language he
associates with the Supreme God‘s divine nature cannot conform to those with which he
describes the Son as coming out of the Father.

The Word as Aeternus

Mattei notes that Novatian uses aeternus in association with the Father, Son, body
of believers, and the Spirit.50 He also points out that Novatian speaks about the human
association or contact with divinity as leading to a state of eternality.51 Because of the
variety of contexts in which Novatian uses aeternus, Mattei identifies Novatian‘s use of
the term as analogical;52 depending on the subject being described, aeternus can refer to
absolute divine eternality or the immortality which comes from the grace or will of
God.53 Mattei, however, mistakenly assumes that references connecting the Son to
aeternus and aeternitas reflect the same meaning as Novatian‘s understanding of the
Father‘s eternality. There is, in fact, no point at which Novatian connects these terms to
the Son in a manner comparable to his explanation of the Father‘s eternality.
I demonstrated in chapter 4, and pointed out above, that Novatian defined the
Father‘s nature as eternal (aeternus) by asserting that the Father lacks a beginning or
birth. The aeternus Father, by definition, cannot have a principium, originum, initium, or

50

Mattei, ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 188.
He cites Trin. 15.7‘s reference to John 8:51: ―Si quis uerbum meum seruauerit, mortem non
uidebit in aeternum.‖ I mention this topic in relation to my discussion of deification in the final section of
chapter 6.
52
Mattei, ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 188-189.
53
For example, when describing the man‘s association with the Holy Spirit, Novatian writes in
Trin. 29.16, ―He brings our bodies, by this operation of His in us, to eternity (aeternitatem) and to the
resurrection of immortality (immortalitates), inasmuch as He accustoms them to be mingled in Himself
with celestial power and to be associated with the divine eternity (divina aeternitate) of His Holy Spirit.‖
51
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natum; Novatian accepts this principle of theological philosophy and presents it in a
manner comparable to both Cicero and Tertullian.54 I also showed that Novatian treats
the Father‘s eternality as related to the Father‘s lack of time. He does not, however,
make these two concepts synonymous. Furthermore, I pointed out that Novatian
connected the concept of time to the creation of the world. His approach to the Son‘s
divinity carries with it the affirmation that the Word is God, despite the fact that the
categories used to describe him contrast with the definition and attributes of the Father‘s
divinity. In this section, I am arguing that Novatian‘s use of aeternus in relation to the
Son is primarily a Scriptural designation, which Novatian explains through the idea of
participation and union with the divine nature, rather than in the narrowest and most
exclusive definition which he reserves for the Father.
Before outlining Novatian‘s association of the Son with the term aeternus, it is
important to recall the fact that Novatian means it frequently as synonymous with
―immortal.‖ He writes, ―If Christ is only man, how does He say: ‗If any man keep my
word, he will never see death (mortem non videbit in aeternum)‘? What is never seeing
death but immortality (immortalitas)?‖55 In this case, man‘s obedience and faithfulness
to Christ lead to immortality. Novatian also describes God‘s establishment of man in the
Garden of Eden as a place of immortal life with the term aeternus. ―He created for the
special occupation of our first parents,‖ writes Novatian, ―a Paradise in the East as a
world of eternal life (aeternae vitae).‖56 In the first passage cited above, Novatian
defines his use of aeternus by the concept of immortality (immortalitas). In both
54
55

See chapter 4‘s section, ―Aeternus and aeternitatis.‖
Trin. 15.7: Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo ait: Si quis uerbum meum seruauerit,

mortem non uidebit in aeternum? Mortem in aeternum non uidere, quid aliud quam immortalitas est?
56
Trin. 8.2: Qui peculiarem protoplastis aeternae uitae mundum quendam paradisum in
oriente constituit.
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passages, the subjects who receive or partake in this immortal life (the faithful believers
in the first case and Adam and Eve in the second) clearly have a beginning and birth. We
therefore know, without Novatian‘s clarification in all cases, that aeternus can designate
immortal life as something provided for directly by God.
When Novatian attaches aeternus to the Son, he does so in reference to specific
Scripture passages and within the context of offering everlasting life. One instance is in
reference to John 6:51 when Jesus identifies himself as the bread of life. Novatian writes,
If Christ is only man, how could He say: ‗I am the bread of eternal life (panis
uitae aeternae) that came down from heaven,‘ when man who is himself mortal
neither can be the bread of life (panis uitae), nor has descended from heaven,
since no matter of frailty can be found in heaven? [Trin. 14:14]57
Novatian‘s justification for Jesus calling himself the panis uitae aeternae does not equate
to identifying the Son with the definition he ascribes to the Father as aeternus. Likewise,
he calls man‘s graced, immortal life aeterna vita. Therefore, Novatian emphasizes God‘s
gift of immortality to man with the term aeternus.
Another passage also contextualizes Novatian‘s approach to using the term
aeternus with the Son. In Trin. 15, Novatian writes,
If Christ is only man, how is it that He himself says: ―And whoever sees and
believes in Me, shall never die (non morietur in aeternum)‖? Whereas he who
trusts (credit) in a mere man is said to be accursed, he who believes (credit) in
Christ is not accursed; on the contrary, it is stated that he will never die (in
aeternum non moriturus). Consequently, if He is only man, as the heretics would
have it, how is it that whoever believes (credit) in Him shall never die (non
morietur in aeternum), since he who trusts (confidit) in man is considered
accursed? Or if he is not accursed, but rather, as one reads, destined for the
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Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo refert: Ego sum panis uitae aeternae qui de caelo
descendi, cum neque panis uitae homo esse possit ipse mortalis nec de caelo descenderit nulla in caelo
constituta materia fragilitatis? The references to Jesus providing eternal life to man in John 6 all revolve
around the Father giving to the Son.
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attainment of eternal life (ad aeternae uitae), Christ is not man only but God.
[Trin. 16.1]58
The gift of eternal life (phrased as non morietur in aeternum and aeterna uita) refers to
mankind‘s possible future. In chapter 6, I discuss Novatian‘s argument for Christ‘s
identification as God based upon Christ‘s obedience. I read Novatian‘s use of credere
and confidere to be related to the topic of obedience in that both terms refer to some
alignment with the Father‘s will. Therefore, the connection Novatian makes between
Christ and the offer of uita aeterna should not be compared with the definition of the
Father as aeternus. Instead, Novatian is highlighting the result of obedience to God,
which is immortality.
I note above that Novatian describes the Garden of Eden as a place designed to
provide for vita aeterna. Novatian suggests that man‘s creation in the image of God
provides mankind with the chance to be obedient and to live forever (aeternus) or to
disobey God, which leads to mortality.59 He concludes, ―Whence, indeed, hated
mortality (mortalitatis) comes back upon him. He could have avoided mortality by
obedience (oboedientia), but he subjected himself to it by his headlong and perverse
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Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo ipse dicit: Et omnis qui uidet et credit in me, non
morietur in aeternum? Sed enim qui in hominem solitarium credit et nudum, maledictus dicitur, hie autem
qui credit in Christum, non maledictus, sed in aeternum non moriturus refertur. Ex quo si aut homo est
tantum, ut haeretici uolunt, quomodo quisquis in eum credit non morietur in aeternum, cum maledictus esse
teneatur qui confidit in homine ? Aut si non maledictus, sed potius ad aeternae uitae consecutionem, ut
legitur, destinatus, non homo tantummodo Christus, sed et Deus.
59
Trin. 1.10: ―On the one hand, man ought to be free lest the image of God serve in unbecoming
manner. On the other hand, a law had to be imposed that unrestrained liberty might not break forth even to
contempt for its Giver. Hence, man might receive either merited rewards or due punishments as the result
of his actions, recognizing these actions as his own doings, because it was in his power to act, through the
movement of his mind in the one or the other direction.‖ (Nam et liber esse debuerat, ne incongruenter Dei
imago seruiret, et lex addenda, ne usque ad contemptum dantis libertas effrenata prorumperet, ut et praemia
condigna et merita poenarum consequenter exciperet, suum iam habens illud, quod motu mentis in
alterutram partem agitare uoluisset.
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determination to be God.‖60 From this passage and from Trin. 16.1 (quoted in the
previous paragraph), we see that man‘s obedience to God leads to man‘s ability to have
immortal (aeternus) life. Christ‘s role is that of mediator.61 Novatian says that man can
enjoy aeternus life because God grants immortality through obedience or through Christ.
Novatian argues that Christ‘s identification as God is based (in part) on his own
obedience to the Father; therefore, I think it is impossible to argue from the passages
above that Novatian is using the term aeternus in an equivalent manner for both the
Father and the Son. If Novatian presumes that the Son is aeternus in the manner which
he defines the Father, then the examples above do not provide evidence for it.
Mattei looks to Trin. 14.13 as an indication that the Son shares eternality with the
Father.62 Novatian states,
If Christ is only man, how is it that ‗as the Father has life (uitam) in Himself, so
has He given to the Son to have life (uitam) in Himself,‘ when man cannot have
life in himself after the manner (cum exemplo) of God the Father, because he is
not glorious in eternity (in aeternitate sit gloriosus), but is made with the
perishable matter of mortality. [Trin. 14.13]63
Although Novatian assigns to the Word a unique reception of the Father‘s ―life,‖ I
disagree with Mattei‘s conclusion about this text for three reasons. First, since Novatian
refers to both eternality and immortality with the term aeternus, we must decide which
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Trin. 1.11: Ex quo mortalitatis inuidia utique in ipsum redit, qui cum illam de oboedientia posset
euadere, in eandem incurrit, dum ex consilio peruerso Deus esse festinat.
61
See Trin. 14.8 and also Trin. 21.8, 23.7, and 31.22 which all quote 1 Tim. 2:5. Trin. 31.22
states, ―Thus ‗the Mediator between God and men, Christ Jesus‘ has power—since He is God—over every
creature subjected to Him by His own Father, together with all creation subject to Him.‖
62
Mattei, ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 188-189. Papandrea boldly interprets Trin. 14.13 with the following:
―Since the Son (like the Father) has life ‗in Himself,‘ which Novatian interprets as indicating an eternal
existence, Christ must be more than a mere human. Humans are mortal and perishable, and therefore have
no eternal glory. Christ, on the other hand, had life ‗in Himself,‘ and therefore does have eternal glory,
even though His life is originally derived from the Father. So even though His divinity is a derived
divinity, Christ is divine,‖ Trinitarian Theology, 173.
63
Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo sicut Pater in se uitam habet, ita dedit Filio uitam
habere in semetipso, cum exemplo Patris Dei homo in se uitam habere non possit, cum non in aeternitate sit
gloriosus, sed in materia mortalitatis effectus?
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definition Novatian applies in this passage. Novatian‘s position on the Son includes a
unique relationship to the Father‘s eternality, which he expresses with the phrase cum
exemplo (―after the manner‖). This is not the same as claiming, as Mattei and others do,
that the definition of the Father as aeternus necessarily carries the same understanding
when Novatian associates the Word with aeternus and aeternitas.64
Second, Novatian contrasts existence in eternity with man‘s constitution, which
contains mortal parts.65 In fact, Trin. 1.12 refers to the idea that God removed man from
the Garden of Eden since man could have stayed there living forever (viven in aeternum).
All references to aeternus, including those which Novatian attaches to the Son, relate to
the Father sharing deathless life or life which never ends. The Father‘s eternality is based
upon His having neither beginning nor end. Participation in everlasting life is enough for
Novatian to identify such life with the term aeternus. Since the Son has a beginning and
birth, we cannot conclude that Novatian intends the connection between the Son and the
term aeternus to be equivalent to the Father as aeternus.
In the last chapter I identified Novatian‘s insistence on the Word‘s preeminence in
glory over the world, because the Word superseded the world temporally.66 The third
reason I doubt Mattei‘s interpretation stems from Novatian‘s other reference to glory:
If Christ is only man, how does He say: ―And now glorify Me with the glory
which I had with Thee before the world was‖? If He had glory with God before
the world was and retained His glory with the Father, certainly He existed before
the world. For He could not have had this glory unless He had existed before the
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Although Novatian does not discuss the immortality of angels, we might assume that Novatian‘s
argument would rely on the quality of the Father‘s sharing immortal life with them. Like man in the
Garden, they too could be described in Novatian‘s theology as possessing and sharing in eternality.
65
According to Novatian‘s theology, everything with a beginning at least potentially shares in
mortality, unless God wills immortality, as Novatian assumes God originally did in the case of man.
66
See the section in chapter 6, ―The Word is before the world.‖
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world, so as to keep the glory. No one who possesses anything can have anything
unless He existed before it.‖ [Trin. 16.6]67
Although Novatian makes this statement not long after he speaks about Christ‘s glory in
eternity, he limits his description of the Son‘s divinity strictly to temporal precedence
over the world. If we agree with Mattei‘s interpretation of Trin. 14.13, then we must
view the argument of 16.6, just two chapters later, as entirely ineffectual. A better
interpretation of the connection Novatian makes between aeternus, gloria, and the Son
derives from the Son‘s mediating relationship between the Father and creation. The
Father invests the Son with glory and eternality in order to share these attributes with
human beings.
Novatian‟s Use of Semper and Tempus

Two of the most recent works on Novatian claim that a literal reading of the
temporal language associated with the Son‘s generation in Trin. misinterprets his
theology. Mattei argues that Novatian employs temporal language about the Father and
Son, but that Novatian neuters it of meaning by affirming the Son‘s eternality. 68
Papandrea thinks Novatian‘s temporal language is not in accordance with his true
theological meaning.69 Both authors identify Novatian‘s language of temporality as
contributing to the distinction between the Father and the Son. They both also elaborate
on their understanding of the Son having a divine nature equal to the Father‘s by arguing
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Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo dicit: Et nunc honorifica me gloria quam habebam
apud te priusquam mundus esset? Si antequam mundus esset gloriam habuit apud Deum et claritatem
tenuit apud Patrem, ante mundum fuit; nec enim habuisset gloriam, nisi ipse prius fuisset, qui gloriam
posset tenere. Nemo enim habere aliquid poterit, nisi ante ipse fuerit qui aliquid tenet.
68
Mattei, ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 187.
69
See Papandrea, Trinitarian Theology, 337-342. He states, ―Though he uses the language of
time, Novatian knows that this is before time, and therefore outside of the realm of temporality,‖ Ibid. 341.
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that Novatian establishes the divine hierarchy as an atemporal causality; the temporal
language Novatian uses functions only as a figurative indication of this relationship.70
Some scholars have suggested that the primary basis of the distinction between
the Father and Son lies, at least in part, in the Father‘s logical or causal supremacy.71
Such a reading downplays any distinction in the divine natures of the Father and Son.
Against this position, I argue that Novatian identifies the Son with temporal categories in
order to help articulate the lesser quality of the Son‘s divine nature from that of the
Father. Such a distinction in divine nature does not contradict the ontological connection
Novatian affirms between the Father and Son, since the ontological connection is causal
in nature. Novatian uses language about a shared or derived substance in harmony with
the idea that the Son possesses diminished attributes.
The specific terms Novatian uses to address the generation also offer us insights
into his theology of his understanding of the Son‘s ontology. Novatian, for example, says
that the Word ―is discerned in the substance of power proceeding from God‖ (in
substantia prolatae a Deo uirtutis agnoscitur), in Trin. 31.2.72 It would appear at first
sight from this statement that Novatian is drawing on the tradition which classifies the
Word as ―Power,‖ as it is found in Justin, Hippolytus, and Tertullian, among others.73
Among those authors, ―power‖ is used as a category for speaking of the Word in light of
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Mattei, ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 187; Papandrea argues, ―The Father precedes the Son only in the
sense of causality. Since the Son‘s existence is derived from the Father, the Father is necessarily the cause
of the Son…Although the Son of God is generated from the Father, He exists eternally within the Father as
the Word,‖ Trinitarian Theology, 338.
71
D‘Alès, Novatien, 123; DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 170; Papandrea, Trinitarian Theology,
70, 73; Mattei, ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 195.
72
Translation is DeSimone‘s, but I removed his indefinite article before ―power.‖ Papandrea also
translates the passage ―in the substance of power,‖ but see Mattei, ―De Trinitate 31, 171, who translates this
passage like DeSimone, ―mai se reconnaît dans la substance d‘une force proférée par Dieu.‖
73
See, for example, Justin‘s Dial. 128 and Noet. 11.1.
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personal distinction.74 However, I do not think Novatian imports this theological
tradition into Trin. His focus is on the term substantia.75 The Word/Son, as a second
person who shares in the works of God and therefore the potestas and virtus of the
Father, is the divine being who shares in the Father‘s substantia. In this passage,
Novatian emphasizes the connection between Christ and the enactment of the power of
the Father, since Christ shares in the Father‘s substance. Again we see the ontological
connection rather than an ontological equality between the Father and Son.
Part of Mattei and Papandrea‘s argument for the equality of nature between the
Father and the Son includes the notion that the Son must possess eternal distinction.76
The difficulty of interpreting Novatian on this topic comes from the fact that he expresses
himself in two seemingly contradictory ways. About the Son‘s generation and
temporality, he states: 1) that the Word ―is before all time (tempus)‖ because the Word
was ―always (semper) in the Father,‖ and 2) that the Word (supposedly his existence)
comes after (post) the Father, who is prior. We must determine what Novatian sees as
the relationship between the terms tempus and semper, as well as what he means in his
insistence of the Father‘s temporal priority over the Son (i.e., that the Son comes after
[post] the Father).
Novatian comments directly on the Son‘s generation in Trin. 31.2-3. In the first
part of this section, Novatian speaks about the birth and procession of the Son, writing,
Of Him when He willed (quando ipse uoluit), the Word, who is the Son, was born
(natus). The Word is to be understood here not as a sound that strikes the air nor
74

Thus the Son is identified as Word, Power, Angel, etc., with distinct theological ideas attached
to each classification.
75
See Trin. 31.4 and my discussion of this passage below in the section ―Substance of the Word.‖
76
I am avoiding saying ―eternally distinct person,‖ because that would confuse two issues: 1)
whether the Son was distinct from the Father while ―in‖ the Father, or 2) whether the Son being ―in‖ the
Father is meant to be taken literally. I will address this topic below.
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the tone of the voice forced from the lungs, but rather is discerned (agnoscitur) in
the substance of a power proceeding from God (in substantia prolatae a Deo
uirtutis). Apostle has never ascertained, prophet has not discovered, angel has not
fathomed, nor has any creature known the hallowed secrets (arcane) of His sacred
and divine birth (sacrae et diuinae natiuitatis). They are known to the Son alone,
who has known the secrets (secreta) of the Father. [Trin. 31.2]77
Novatian begins by connecting the Son‘s begetting to a certain time (quando). In terms
of the Word‘s movement from inside the Father to outside, Novatian‘s framework
conforms to the Word Christology traditions seen in chapter 5. The actual procession
(prolatae)78 of the Word happens by the will of the Father, a doctrine also in line with the
Word tradition.79 Furthermore, Novatian takes an explicit stand against the Sabellian
description of the Word as a mere sound prior to coming forth.80 In his response, he does
not clearly say that the Word is a person prior the Word‘s begetting, which leaves open
the question of whether he assumes eternal generation or a kind of quasi-personhood
similar to that found in Tertullian‘s Prax.81
77

Ex quo, quando ipse uoluit, sermo Filius natus est, qui non in sono percussi aeris aut tono
coactae de uisceribus uocis accipitur, sed in substantia prolatae a Deo uirtutis agnoscitur, cuius sacrae et
diuinae natiuitatis arcana nec apostolus didicit nec prophetes comperit nec angelus sciuit nec creatura
cognouit; Filio soli nota sunt, qui Patris secreta cognouit.
78
Novatian appears unconcerned with justifying his use of profero/prolatio. Because of its usage
by Gnostic groups, Tertullian makes a case for using the term in Prax. 8. He recognizes the controversial
nature of it, but he explains that the term is correct and traditional: ―The Truth does not abstain from using
that word and the fact and the origin represented by it, on the ground that heresy uses it: nay rather, heresy
has taken over from the Truth that which it might build up into its own lie.‖
79
Even the Valentinians and Ptolomeans held to the idea that the supreme God or Dyad willed the
Aeons. See Haer. 1.1.1, 1.11.1, and 1.12.1. In developing the transcendent will of the supreme God, these
groups also articulated the position that the lesser divine beings had no knowledge of their origin from the
supreme God‘s will. For example, Tertullian states in Prax. 8, ―Valentinus secludes (discernit) and
separates (separat) his ‗projections‘ from their originator and places them so far from him that an aeon is
ignorant of its father.‖ Irenaeus likewise mentions this teaching in Haer. 2.28.5.
80
Novatian may also be rejecting the theology as Noet. presents it in 10.4: ―In uttering what was
formerly a sound…‖
81
In Prax. 5, Tertullian describes the Word in the Father as a mental interlocutor: ―And that you
may understand this the more easily, observe first from yourself, as from the image and likeness of God,
how you also have reason within yourself, who are a rational animal not only as having been made by a
rational Creator but also as out of his substance having been made a living soul. See how, when you by
reason argue silently with yourself, this same action takes place without you…So in a sort of way you have
in you as a second <person> discourse by means of which you speak by thinking and by means of which
you think by speaking.‖ Warfield presents a strong argument for the eternal, personal distinctions of the
Father, Son, and Holy spirit, in Studies in Tertullian, 38-82. He writes, in part, ―The distinction of persons
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Aside from the fact that the Word has a beginning and birth, Novatian also
teaches that knowledge of the Word‘s birth remains an unbroachable mystery (arcanum
and secretum) in Trin. 31.2. By making this claim, Novatian follows a theological
precedent which Irenaeus also affirmed,
If any one, therefore, says to us, ―How then was the Son produced by the Father?‖
we reply to him, that no man understands that production, or generation, or
calling, or revelation, or by whatever name one may describe His generation,
which is in fact altogether indescribable. [Haer. 2.28.6]82
We recall that Novatian describes the Word‘s coming forth in light of when (quando) the
Father chooses. His use of the temporal term in association with the Son‘s mysterious
birth in Trin. 31.2 reinforces the distinction Novatian makes between the natures of the
Father and Son. According to Novatian, all terms of temporality are illogical and
impossible when related to the Father. The connection he makes between quando and the
Son‘s mysterious birth reveals his commitment to articulating the ontological distinction
between the Father and Son.
In the next passage, Trin. 31.3, Novatian makes two claims: 1) that the Son is
before all time and always in the Father (taken by some scholars as indicating the Son‘s
eternal generation) and 2) that the Father is prior to the Son (taken by other scholars as
implying a temporality to the Son‘s generation and hence a beginning point of personal
distinction). Novatian writes in Trin. 31.3,
Since He is begotten of the Father, He is always (semper) in the Father. I say
―always,‖ (semper) however not in such a manner as to prove that He is unborn
(innatum), but to prove that He is born (natum). Now, He who is before all time
in the Godhead, accordingly, as Tertullian conceived them, were not created by the prolations of the Son
and Spirit. These prolations merely brought into manifestation the distinction of persons already existing in
the Godhead…It is the prolations, not the personal distinctions, which in his thought have a beginning and
ending,‖ Ibid. 66.
82
Si quis itaque nobis dixerit: Quomodo ergo Filius prolatus a Patre est? dicimus ei quia
prolationem istam, siue generationem, siue nuncupationem, siue adapertionem, aut quolibet quis nomine
vocaverit generationem eius inenarrabilem exsistentem, nemo novit.
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(ante omne tempus) must be said to have been always (semper) in the Father; for
no time (tempus) can be attributed (assignari) to Him who is before time (ante
tempus). He is always in the Father, lest the Father be not always the Father. On
the other hand, the Father also precedes (praecedit) Him; for, as the Father, He
must of necessity be prior (prior), because He who knows no origin (originem)
must of necessity precede (antecedit) Him who has an origin (originem). At the
same time the Son must be less (minor) than the Father, for He knows that He is
in the Father, having an origin (originem), since he is born (nascitur). Although
He has an origin (originem) inasmuch as He is born (nascitur), yet through His
Father He is, in a certain manner (quodammodo), like Him by birth (natiuitate),
because He is born (nascitur) of (ex) that Father, who alone has no origin
(originem solus non habet).83
The Father‘s eminence stands out in this passage, as well as a unity presented between
the Father and the Son which follows from the Son‘s birth from the Father. However,
Novatian retains and outlines critical distinctions about the attributes of the Father and
Son‘s divinity: the Father, as unborn and having no origin, precedes the Son, whereas the
Son has both a birth and an origin. Novatian asserts that it is the Son‘s beginning which
makes him less than the Father.84
Mattei interprets Novatian‘s use of semper as the acceptance of the Word‘s
eternal Sonship.85 Although he acknowledges that the phrase ―eternal generation‖ must
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Hic ergo cum sit genitus a Patre, semper est in Patre. Semper autem sic dico, ut non innatum,
sed natum probem. Sed qui ante omne tempus est, semper in Patre fuisse dicendus est. Nec enim tempus illi
assignari potest qui ante tempus est. Semper enim in Patre, ne Pater non semper sit Pater, quia et Pater
illum etiam praecedit, quod necesse est prior sit qua Pater sit, quoniam antecedat necesse est eum qui habet
originem ille qui originem nescit, simul ut hic minor sit, dum in illo esse se scit, habens originem quia
nascitur et per Patrem quodammodo, quamuis originem habet qua nascitur, uicinus in natiuitate, dum ex eo
Patre qui originem solus non habet nascitur.
84
Fausset, in his belief that Novatian need not be read as teaching the Son‘s subordination
suggests, ―The writer [Novatian], in his desire to controvert the Sabellian confusion of Persons in the
Godhead (according to which ‗Filius Dei‘ and ‗Deus Pater‘ were not equal, but identical), fails to
emphasise their transcendental equality. And yet even the expression ‗minor Patre‘ has the highest
Authority, and may signify precedence not in essence but in personality,‖ Novatiani Romanae, xxxiv.
85
Mattei, ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 198. Compare Fausset, who though suggesting that Novatian implies
the Father and Son‘s equality, also writes, ―[Novatian] says rather: ‗principium natiuitatis ante omne
tempus accepit‘ (p 121, l. 4); and twice in ch. xxxi asserts that the Son‘s ‗birth‘ was ‗quando pater uoluit‘
(pp 116, l. 4, 118, l. 5). It is a ‗procession from the Father‘ before all time. Beyond this assertion of an
extra-temporal generation the writer does not take us. He does not definitely affirm an eternal generation
of the Son ‗qua filius dei.‘ It must be added, that the passages already quoted suffice to shew that Novatian
affirms the ‗always‘ existence of the Word in the Father, before the generation of the Son: however hard it

264
be considered anachronistic to Novatian‘s actual articulation, Mattei decides that
Novatian‘s logic requires a presumed principle of eternal generation. Such an
interpretation, however, involves several questionable premises which I address in a
moment. First, however, it is important to acknowledge that Novatian uses semper in
reference to the Father‘s nature and in a way indicative of eternality.86 As I have argued
above, Novatian holds multiple meanings of certain terms, such as aeternus and tempus.
We can only understand Novatian‘s meaning of these terms by the subject to whom he is
ascribing them or to the manner in which he explains their usage. Mattei cannot simply
point to the use of the same terms without demonstrating that Novatian uses them in the
way Mattei assumes he does.
In regard to his reading of Trin. 31.3, Mattei‘s interpretation breaks down because
of an incorrect understanding of Novatian‘s use of tempus. Mattei connects the term
semper to Novatian‘s statement that the Word was from before time (ante tempus).87 It
appears that Mattei understands Novatian as holding one particular Platonic theory of
time.88 Mattei assumes that Novatian abides by the following model: there either is
may be to reconcile such language with his disclaimer of temporal relations,‖ Novatiani Romanae, xxxviii.
I disagree with Fausset‘s belief that Novatian has indeed rejected the use of temporal relations.
86
See Trin. 4.4-5, quoted in chapter 4, in the section ―Aeternus and aeternitatis.‖
87
Mattei, ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 192. Semper and ante tempus are found in Trin. 31.3 and 16,
respectively. See also Fausset who states in reference to Trin. 31.3, ―And so we find that [Novatian‘s]
Christology is no less subordinationist than Tertullian‘s, except in one particular: he allows room for the
conception of an absolute and eternal distinction in the Godhead, when he allows that Divine relations are
timeless,‖ Novatiani Romanae, xxxiii. Tertullian also states that the Word is brought forth ante tempus
(Prax. 6-7), yet I have also discussed in chapter 5 the reasons why many scholars think that he does not
teach the eternal distinction of the Word; the argument focuses on the fact that Tertullian proclaims that the
Son only becomes Son at a certain time and the latter is when the Father becomes Father. I am arguing that
Novatian does not say that the Father is always Father in order to imply the Son‘s eternality, but to address
the Father‘s immutability.
88
I discuss this topic in chapter 4. See the section, ―Aeternus: time as dependent on beginning and
end.‖ See also Papandrea who writes, ―Though he uses the language of time, Novatian knows that this is
before time, and therefore outside of the realm of temporality,‖ Trinitarian Theology, 341. J. N. D. Kelly
agrees and concludes: ―Novatian does not tie the generation of the Son to creation, but argues that it is pretemporal; since the Father is always Father, He must always have had a Son,‖ in Early Christian Doctrines,
125.
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divine atemporality (aeternus=non tempus/ante tempus=semper) or there is time (tempus)
as associated with creation.89 His belief that Novatian follows this either/or model allows
him to read Novatian‘s use of semper as equating to ante tempus, which also presumes
equivalence to aeternus. In Mattei‘s reading, Novatian‘s use of semper for the Son
means the same thing as his use of aeternus for the Father.
In chapter 4, I called into question the narrow view of understanding the
relationship between aeternus/aeternitas and tempus, by raising the probability of
Novatian‘s familiarity with other Platonic articulations, Stoic ideas of time associated
with the creation of the world, and the Aristotelian doctrine of eternal duration.
Therefore, I disagree with Mattei and other scholars who read Novatian‘s references to
the Son‘s existence prior to time as equivalent to his presentation of the Father‘s
eternality.90 Furthermore, I detail above how Novatian does not refer to the Son as
aeternus in the same way that he defines the Father‘s nature with this term. Pelland was
correct to reject such a connection and to point to Novatian‘s distinction in terminology
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In addition to the fact that the entire framework by which Novatian defines the Father‘s supreme
and unique attributes is rendered moot by Mattei‘s association between semper and aeternus, it is also
worth noting that Novatian employs semper with a range of implications. For example, he uses the term
for the Spirit dwelling everlastingly with the apostles in Trin. 29.6: ―Therefore, it is one and the same Spirit
who is in the prophets and in the apostles. He was, however, in the former only for awhile; whereas He
abides in the latter forever (semper).‖ Like his use of aeternus to mean both eternal and immortal, semper
carried a range of implications. Mattei sees these issues through the perspective of a biblical notion of time
versus a Platonic one, believing that Novatian should be read with the latter‘s framework of atemporality:
―Entre le temps et l‘éternité, le Romain n‘insère aucun moyen terme: en qui il suit Tertullian. Plus
précisément, de Nat. 2, 3, 5 (et Herm. 4, 1) à Marc. 1, 8, 3 (et 2, 3, 4-5), celui-ci était parvenu à ne plus
seulement penser l‘éternité comme une simple dilatation du temps, sans commencement ni fin—à se
dégager par consequent (au moins pour partie) d‘une notion biblique pour rejoinder une conception
platonicienne; il semble logique d‘estimer que Novatien, pour qui Dieu ‗non habet tempus‘, sur ce point le
suit également,‖ ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 189.
90
Papandrea entirely conflates all of these ideas, writing, ―What is immortal is, by definition,
outside of time and therefore has no beginning. The Father is the ultimate source of immortality, for while
the Son is eternally preexistent, He has a source; the Father,‖ Trinitarian Theology, 70. Of Novatian‘s
identification of the Word as protogenitus (firstborn) DeSimone writes, ―It is used in the metaphorical
sense of pre-existence before creation; it implies a relationship to God which cannot be predicated even of
angels or men, much less of other creatures. Christ, then, being eternal, has absolute supremacy over all
natural creation,‖ Treatise of Novatian, 85.
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as important.91 His conclusion diverges from Papandrea, DeSimone, d‘Alès, and Mattei
who all argue that Trin. 31.3 provides evidence that Novatian implicitly or explicitly
accepted the Son‘s eternal generation.92 Against the reading of these scholars and taking
Pelland‘s assessment a step further, I propose that Novatian connects time with the world
in a way which does not imply the Son‘s eternal generation.93
Novatian‘s use of the term tempus does not find its meaning in the either/or model
described above. Rather, Novatian treats tempus as specifically connected to the creation
of the world and its subsequent progression. However, he also speaks about occurrences
before time in a way which assumes temporal progression. Even if the Son‘s generation
occurs prior to tempus (in the sense of the world‘s beginning and subsequent
movements), Novatian nevertheless presents the Son‘s beginning as still subject to a form
of temporal progression. Because Novatian does not follow the either/or model described
above, there is a ―when‖ (quando) to the Son‘s generation. The ―when‖ of the Son‘s
birth happened in a kind of ―time before time,‖ which is Novatian‘s way of maintaining
the technical definition of tempus (as it relates to the world itself), while asserting a
temporal element to the Son‘s generation prior to the world. By using this model which
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Pelland, ―Une passage difficile,‖ 28-31. His work derives in part from that of Antonio Orbe,
especially his Hacia la Primera Teología de la Procesión del Verbo, Estudios Valentinianos, 2 vols.
(Rome, 1958), 532-539. Loi also suggests a distinction between the Son as immortal rather than eternal, La
Trinità, 28-30. However, these authors do not make a sustained argument about the centrality of
Novatian‘s use of the terms according to the theological philosophy of Novatian‘s times.
92
Papandre, Trinitarian Theology, 337-9; DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 172-173; D‘-Alès,
Novatien, 173; Mattei, ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 187.
93
See, for example, Trin. 8.11 in which Novatian connects the fixed laws of the universe‘s
motions with time: ―The world, this chariot of God and all that is therein, is guided by the angels and the
stars. Although their movements are varied—bound, nevertheless, by fixed laws—we see them guided to
their goals according to the time measure out to them.‖
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defines tempus as related specifically to the world, Novatian is following a form of a
teaching common to some Aristotelians, Stoics, and Middle Platonists.94
My reading of Novatian‘s understanding of tempus makes it necessary to
comment at greater length on his use of the term semper, especially his application of this
term to the Father. In the previous chapter, I noted that Noet. identifies God as originally
alone, yet also containing within Himself reason, wisdom, power, and mind.95 For
Tertullian, God also was alone, while still having reason with Him.96 Both the author of
Noet. and Tertullian claim that God became Father at some point in relation to the
Word‘s generation or Incarnation. Novatian diverges from these authors by insisting that
the Father is always (semper) Father; specifically, it appears that Novatian is rejecting
Tertullian‘s comments in Herm. 3.4, in which Tertullian asserts that God became Father
only at the Son‘s begetting.97 Novatian‘s statement in Trin. 31.3 connects the presence of
the Word in the Father to idea that the Father is always Father. It therefore functions as
an affirmation of the Father‘s immutability. If the Supreme God becomes Father at some
point, then the Supreme God changes. As shown above, any change in regard to the
Father is impossible according to Novatian‘s theology. Against those scholars who read
Novatian‘s statement as confirming the eternal personhood/Sonship of the Word,
94

Warfield identifies a pre-temporal temporality which he finds in Tertullian‘s theology.
Unfortunately, his analysis does not provide much depth. See Warfield, Studies in Tertullian, 50.
95
Noet. 10.1-2
96
Prax. 5.
97
In Herm. 3.4 Tertullian argues, ―For God is also a Father, and God is also a Judge, but He has
not always been Father and Judge for the simple reason that He has always been God; for He could not be
Father before the Son was, nor Judge before there was sin. Now there was a time when for Him there
existed neither sin nor the Son, the former to make God a Judge, and the latter, a Father.‖ Wolfson cites
Trin. 31.2-4 as evidence that Novatian specifically challenges and rejects this passage from Tertullian, in
Philosophy of the Church Fathers, 196. He believes that Novatian corrects Tertullian, and writes the
following to Tertullian in persona of Novatian: ―When in your discussion of the preexistent Logos or Son
you use the expression: ‗He has not always been Father‘ or ‗Father previous to the Son‘ or ‗there was a
time when…the Son‘ did not exist with the Father, you certainly do not use the terms ‗always,‘ ‗previous,‘
and ‗time‘ in their literal sense,‖ Idem. DeSimone quotes Wolfson with approval and claims, ―Thus the
Son exists ab aeterno in the Father and is eternally generated,‖ Treatise of Novatian, 173.
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Novatian seems to be accepting Tertullian‘s quasi-personhood of the Word as sufficient
to claim that the Father is always Father.98 The challenge Novatian poses to Tertullian‘s
theology centers on the Father‘s immutability rather than the Son‘s personhood, which
Novatian does not mention.
Novatian also makes a crucial connection between the terms generare and
nascere/nascor in Trin. 31.3: ―Since He is begotten (genitus) of the Father, He is always
(semper) in (in) the Father. I say ‗always‘ (semper), however, not in such a manner as to
prove that He is unborn (innatum), but to prove that He is born (natum).‖ Novatian is not
arguing that semper equates to the Father‘s nature as aeternus. Had he been, he would
not be connecting semper to terms which he explicitly denies as applicable to aeternitas,
namely gernerare, nascere, or any notion associated with beginning, origin, or birth.
Novatian‘s argument rests on the identification of the one God, who is the Father, as
alone possessing eternality because of a lack of a beginning. By contrast, he explains the
Son‘s birth and generation in conjunction with the term semper. Therefore, I read
Novatian as linking semper in the passages cited above with terms of birth and
generation, terms antithetical to the Father‘s divine nature as he has defined it throughout
Trin.
Novatian further clarifies his association of the Son with a birth when he claims
that the Son‘s birth makes him unequal to the Father. He says that the Son could not
possibly be unborn, unbegotten, or have no beginning, ―since [Father and Son] would
have been found to be equal (aequalis)…Christ, then would have given rise to two
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DeSimone notes, ―Tertullian does not deny that there is an eternal Word; only he would not call
Him Son until He had appeared among men. God could be called Father only from that time onwards,
Treatise of Novatian, 171.
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gods.‖99 Trin. 31.3 expresses the same idea by claiming that the Son is less than (minor)
the Father. Scholars who believe aeternus applies equally to the Son and Father miss the
logic by which Novatian argues for the Father‘s uniqueness in divine attributes. They
also fail to account for the context of his proposal against the traditions mentioned above
of Tertullian and Hippolytus. Like his predecessors, Novatian affirms that the Father
always has the Word in Himself, yet unlike Tertullian and Hippolytus, he believes that
the Word‘s presence in the immutable Father demands the recognition of the Father‘s
permanent Fatherhood.
Novatian states that the Son was before all time (ante omne tempus) in his
description of the Son‘s birth and generation. Tempus, I demonstrated in chapter 4,
relates to Novatian‘s comments on the beginning and progression of the world where he
juxtaposes these ideas with the attributes of the Father.100 In the case of Trin. 31.3,
Novatian states, ―Now, He who is before all time (ante omne tempus) must be said to
have been always (semper) in the Father; for no time can be attributed to Him who is
before time (Nec enim tempus illi assignari potest qui ante tempus est).‖ Apart from
repeating the same comment in Trin. 31.16,101 this is the only instance in which Novatian
identifies the Word‘s relation to time. Like Hippolytus and Tertullian before him,
Novatian begins with the idea of the Word being always in the Father. The connection he
makes to tempus and the world, however, does not result in the cross application of the
Father‘s attribute of eternality to the Son. Rather, the Son‘s origin governs his distinction
from the Father‘s eternality apart from Novatian‘s understanding of tempus. What
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Trin. 31. 6-8.
See the section ―Aeternus: time as dependent on beginning and end,‖ in chapter 4.
101
I treat this passage again in the next section.
100
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Novatian has in mind for the time of the Son‘s generation is a pre-tempus temporality, an
idea about time borrowed from Middle Platonists and Stoics.102

Substance of the Word

In numerous passages, Novatian indicates that the birth of the Son from the Father
means that the Son shares in the Father‘s substance.103 Among the Word Christologies I
discuss in chapter 5, metaphors such as ―fire from fire‖ and ―shoot from root‖ speak to a
clear tradition which teaches that the Father passes on the divine nature (in some cases
substance) to the Son. The logic of this tradition equates to the principle that when X
nature generates something, it generates something with X nature (X from X). However,
we have also seen that some authors in the Word Christology tradition do not employ this
logic to say that the Son possesses a divine nature equal to the Father‘s. The teaching
allowing for an inequality among divine beings in some ways parallels the Platonic idea
that the Supreme God‘s nature shares an ontological connection to lesser divine beings as
well as to the human soul.104 Although Novatian suggests that human beings can
participate in divine attributes, such as immortality, he also follows Scripture in
identifying the Son as uniquely related to the Father. The Son is the unigenitus and
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Pollard likewise comes to this conclusion, and he appropriates for his description of Novatian‘s
theology Warfield‘s use of the phrase ―pre-temporally temporal‖ to describe the Son‘s generation in
Tertullian‘s theology, Johannine Christology, 74. Unfortunately, Pollard‘s analysis is extremely brief and
cannot effectively challenge the more recent works by Mattie and Papandrea.
103
Although I agree with much in Simmonetti‘s work, I disagree with his understanding that the
Son‘s ontological subordination excludes a sharing in substance with the Father. See his ―Beginnings of
Theological Reflection,‖ 217 and ―Alcune osservazioni,‖ 774-775. Cf. Mattei, ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 228-336.
Again, Mattei acknowledges that Novatian speaks about the inequality of the Father and Son, but reduces
the meaning of ―inequality‖ to causal priority, rather than to a diminution of attributes. I explain below
why I think Novatian‘s intellectual environment allows him to hold ontological subordination and a sharing
of substance simultaneously.
104
See the section ―The relationship between God and man,‖ in chapter 1.
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primogenitus. Even these terms, however, amplify the uniqueness of the Father since it is
antithetical to the Father‘s nature to be associated with generation or a beginning.105
Despite Novatian‘s rejection of Tertullian‘s identification of the substance of God
as spirit, he shares with Tertullian the idea that birth, generation, or procession means that
a common nature is shared.106 As noted in chapter 5, Tertullian followed Justin and
others in making use of metaphors associated with the X from X principle. Tertullian
also emphasized the term substantia to speak about the unity of God. Novatian likewise
claims that the Father shares His substantia with the Son, but Novatian does not call this
―spirit,‖ nor does he employ the metaphors mentioned.
Tertullian uses his teaching that the Father and Son share the divine substance to
chastise the Sabellian idea which ―thinks it impossible to believe in one God unless it
says that both Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one and the same.‖ 107 He wonders why
they formulate their idea of unity ―as though the one <God> were not all <these things>
in this way also, that they are all of the one, namely by unity of substance (substantiae
unitatem).‖108 He continues by affirming that the ―mystery of the economy‖109
disposes the unity into trinity (unitatem in trinitatem), setting forth Father and Son
and Spirit as three, three however not in quality (statu) but in sequence (gradu),
not in substance (substantia) but in aspect (forma), not in power (potestate) but in
<its> manifestation (specie), yet of one substance (unius substantiae) and one
quality (unius status) and one power (unius potestatis), seeing it is one God from
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Trin. 31.14. See also 21.4 for Novatian‘s interpretation of Col. 1:15‘s use of primogenitus and
13.1 for a citation of John 1.14, with its use of the term unigenitus.
106
See Christopher Stead‘s, ―Divine Substance in Tertullian,‖ 64, where he notes that the
incarnation could not have altered the divine substance just as the human substance could not be altered by
the Word joining himself to it.
107
Prax. 2: Dum unicum deum non alias putat credendum quam si ipsum eundemque et patrem et
filium et spiritum sanctum dicat:
108
Prax. 2.: Quasi non sic quoque unus sit omnia dum ex uno omnia, per substantiae scilicet
unitatem.
109
Prax. 2: νἰθνλνκίαο sacramentum.
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whom those sequences and aspects and manifestations are reckoned out in the
name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. [Prax. 2]110
Tertullian identifies the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as sharing in one substantia, status,
and potestas, which signify different aspects of divine unity. However in the context of
this dissertation, I am most interested in Tertullian‘s emphasis on the Trinitarian sharing
of substance.111 That the Son and the Spirit come from the Father means that they share
in the Father‘s substance.
I previously noted that Novatian identifies the Word as the substance of divine
power (substantia uirtutis) in Trin. 31.2.112 With this phrase, Novatian seems to blend
two of the categories of divine unity which Tertullian mentions in Prax. 2 (quoted
above). Novatian also reiterates the content of this passage in Trin. 31.4, but without
including the concept of ―power‖:
He, therefore, when the Father willed, proceeded (processit) from the Father; and
He who was in the Father, because He was of the Father, was afterwards with the
Father since He—namely that divine substance (substantia diuina) whose name is
the Word, through whom ‗all things were made and without whom nothing was
made‘—proceeded from the Father. [Trin. 31.4]113
Novatian therefore accepts the use of the term substantia for speaking about what the
Father shares with the Son. Later in this chapter, and after he gathers together his
arguments for the divinity of the Son and the distinction of the divine persons, Novatian
writes,

110

Quae unitatem in trinitatem disponit, tres dirigens patrem et filium et spiritum, tres autem non
statu sed gradu, nec substantia sed forma, nec potestate sed specie, unius autem substantiae et unius status
et unius potestatis, quia unus deus ex quo et gradus isti et formae et species in nomine patris et filii et
spiritus sancti deputantur.
111
Daniélou reminds us that Tertullian‘s insistence on shared substance in this passage relates to
the fact that he identifies this substance as spiritus, Origins of Latin Christianity, 347.
112
See the section ―Novatian‘s use of semper and tempus‖ above.
113
Hic ergo quando Pater uoluit, processit ex Patre; et qui in Patre fuit, [processit ex Patre; et qui
in Patre fuit,] quia ex Patre fuit, cum Patre postmodum fuit, quia ex Patre processit, substantia scilicet illa
diuina, cuius nomen est uerbum, per quod facta sunt omnia et sine quo factum est nihil.
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From this, the true and eternal Father is shown [to be] the one God, the divine
power (uis diuinitatis) having been sent out from Him alone, and communicated
and extended in the Son, it has been reverted back to the Father again through the
sharing of substance (substantiae communionem). [Trin. 31.20]114
In Trin. 31.2, 31.4, and 31.20, Novatian blends the terms for substance, power, and
divinity in such a way that he appears to be simply asserting the notion that the Son
coming from the Father equates to the idea that Son shares the Father‘s divine being.
Novatian also relies on the term natura to convey the X from X principle, or the
shared substance of the Father and the Son:
[Scripture] not only calls Him the Son of Man but has also been accustomed to
refer to Him as the Son of God, so that He is both because He is of both.
Otherwise—if He were only the one—He could not be the other. Nature (natura)
itself demands that we believe that he is a man who is of man. Likewise nature
(natura) demands that we believe that he is God who is of God. [Trin. 11.6-7,
modified slightly]115
In this passage, natura refers to the physical and metaphysical laws, or the order of things
and beings, even God.116 Novatian demonstrates that his principle of a substance
generating the same kind of substance is an a priori argument, as long as one accepts the
revelation that the Father generates another from Himself.
114

Trin. 31.20: Vnde unus Deus ostenditur uerus et aeternus Pater, a quo solo haec uis diuinitatis
emissa, etiam in Filium tradita et directa, rursum per substantiae communionem ad Patrem reuoluitur.
Although Simonetti argues against the notion that Novatian relies on a substantial unity as a major basis for
a relationship between the Father and Son, he suggests that Trin. 31.20 alludes to an entirely unclear theory
of substantial unity which has more to do with the flatus vocis, in ―Alcune osservazioni,‖ 775.
Furthermore, some scholars have taken this passage to mean the Novatian believed there would be an end
for the Son‘s personal distinction by reabsorption into the Father. For this position, see Harnack, History of
Dogma (2), 314 n. 2 and Johannes Quasten, Patrology II, 229. Weyer points out that Loofs, Ammundsen,
and Torm shared this interpretation when arguing against it in Novatianus De Trinitate Über den
dreifaltigen Gott. Edited by H. Weyer (Testimonia II: Düsseldorf, 1962), 204-206. DeSimone states,
―Weyer has captured the true meaning of Novatian,‖ Treatise of Novatian, 180. Pelland, ―Une passage
difficile,‖ 34, 51, and Papandrea, Trinitarian Theology, 256, also agree that Novatian does not teach the
final absorption of the Son into the Father. I agree with the latter scholars.
115
Nec hominis tantum dicit, sed et Dei referre consueuit, ut dum ex utroque est, utrumque sit, ne
si alterum tantum sit, alterum esse non possit. Vt enim praescripsit ipsa natura hominem credendum esse
qui ex homine sit, ita eadem natura praescribit et Deum credendum esse qui ex Deo sit.
116
Natura in this sense means the same as when Novatian declares in Trin. 4.9: ―As the very
nature of things demands, there cannot be two infinities.‖ (Quoniam nec duo infinita esse possunt, ut rerum
dictat ipsa natura.)
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Behind Novatian‘s affirmation of the Son‘s generation stands the revelation of
Scripture. Although natura, by his definition of it, offers the means of acknowledging
the principle of X from X, Novatian introduces a variety of Biblical passages to explore
this topic in greater depth. For example, he elaborates on the unique connection between
the Son and the Father by highlighting the role of Christ as Mediator between God and
man.117 He also emphasizes the unique identification of Christ as one who is in the form
of the Father.118 In these matters, Novatian‘s theology always contains two parts: the
identification of the Son as sharing the Father‘s substance as well as the assertion of the
distinction between Father and Son.
When I discussed Novatian‘s exegesis of John 10:30 (―I and the Father are
one‖),119 I noted that Novatian presents the Son‘s divinity based on the harmony, love,
and affection he shares with the Father.120 Novatian also uses John 10:30 to affirm his X
from X principle when he speaks about the Father and Son‘s unity in reference to the
Son‘s birth (nascor) and procession (procedo).121 Elsewhere, his language does not
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Trin. 21.8 states, ―This is rightly so, since there is something in Him that surpasses every
creature, inasmuch as the union of the divinity and the humanity seems to be secured in Him. For this
reason, He who is declared to have been made ‗the Mediator between God and man‘ is found to have
associated in Himself both God and Man.‖
118
Trin. 22.4. Novatian connects the Son being in the form of God throughout Trin. 22 to the
Son‘s unique birth, the imitation of the Father‘s works, his rank above all things, his divine power over all
creatures, and his likeness to the Father. Papandrea believes that Novatian understands forma and
substantia as synonymous, Trinitarian Theology, 77. Cf. D‘Alès, Novatien, 115. Although Novatian does
not use the terms interchangeably in the manner which Papandrea suggests, the meaning of the Son‘s
sharing the substantia of the Father in some ways mirrors how Novatian discusses Christ as being in the
form of God.
119
See chapter 6‘s section, ―The Word as obedient to the Father: contrasting divine attributes.‖
120
Trin. 27.4.
121
Cf. J. N. D. Kelly, who writes, ―While on occasion speaking of ‗the power of Godhead‘ or ‗the
divine majesty‘ being transmitted by the Father to the Son , and even of the community of being
(substantiae…communionem) between Them, he normally defines Their relationship (in marked contrast to
Tertullian) in terms of moral unity. This comes out strikingly in his avoidance, when expounding texts like
‗I and the Father are one‘ and ‗He who has seen me has seen the Father‘, of any suggestion of unity of
essence,‖ Early Christian Doctrines, 125. Both of the texts which Kelly cites are, in fact, examples in
which a unity of essence is indicated by Novatian. One example in which Novatain connects John 10:30
with the X from X principle can be found in Trin. 15.10 where he states, ―If Christ is only man, what does
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employ specific terminology of generation of birth, even though he implies the X from X
principle. He states in Trin. 27.5, for example: ―And since He is from the Father (ex
Patre), whatever [the Father] is (quicquid illud est), the Son is, although the distinction
remains, so that the one who [is] the Son is not the Father, because the one who is the
Father [is] not the Son.‖122 Novatian refers in this passage to the numerical or personal
distinction which is central to his exegesis of the John 10:30. I will explain in the next
section why I do not take the phrase quicquid illud est to refer to the Son‘s ontological
equality with the Father.123

Inequality of the Father and the Son
Mattei and Papandrea argue that Novatian portrays the Son‘s divine nature as
equal to the Father‘s, and yet subordinate in a causal or logical sense.124 They are correct
to point out that Novatian‘s formulations about the Son‘s divinity stem from the fact that
He mean when He says: ‗I and the Father are one‘? How can ‗I and the Father be one,‘ if He is not both
God and Son, who therefore can be said to be one [with the Father] because He is of Him and because He is
His Son and because He is born (nascitur) of Him inasmuch as He is found to have proceeded (processisse)
from Him? This proves that He is also God‖ (translation modified slightly). (Si homo tantummodo
Christus, quid est quod ait: Ego et Pater unum sumus? Quomodo enim ego et Pater unum sumus, si non et
Deus est et Filius, qui idcirco unum potest dici, dum ex ipso est et dum Filius eius est et dum ex ipso
nascitur, dum ex ipso processisse reperitur, per quod et Deus est?)
122
Trin. 27.5: Et quoniam ex Patre est, quicquid illud est, Filius est, manente tamen distinctione, ut
non sit Pater ille qui Filius, quia nec Filius ille qui Pater est.
123
Dunn states, ―There is even a sense that Novatian may have considered Father and Son to be of
different natures or essences, although this seemed to be too philosophical an issue for him to warrant
investigating. The use of quicquid quickly dismisses the possibility of distraction on this arcane point.
Unity is found in the fact that the Son is ex Patre,‖ ―Diversity and Unity,‖ 399. This quotation summarizes
Dunn‘s approach to reading Trin. based on the assumption that Novatian avoids deep philosophical
reflection in favor of a direct form of catechetical instruction. It is my opinion that Dunn therefore misses
the depth and contours of Novatian‘s thinking.
124
A central portion of Papandrea‘s argument can be found in Trinitarian Theology, 329-336. He
concludes, ―so that while Novatian makes it clear that the Son is subordinate to the Father in His
incarnation, he does not imply that the Son is essentially inferior; that the Son‘s divinity is of a lower form,
or that the Son‘s divine nature is anything less than equal to that of the Father,‖ 336. Mattei acknowledges
that Novatian does not fully express his understanding of the Son‘s generation, but nonetheless holds that
Novatian‘s logic about the theology of the Son must reject any point of an impersonal Word as well as any
non-figurative reading of exteriorization language. He therefore concludes that Novatian ―propose,
semble-t-il, l‘égalité de substance et l‘inégalité d‘origine,‖ ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 198.
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the Father is the origin or source of the Son. In fact, Novatian‘s X from X logic requires
that the Son‘s existence derives exclusively and directly from the Father. However, I
have shown in chapter 5 and in the previous section of this chapter that the acceptance of
an X from X principle does not necessitate the teaching of ontological equality. Some
philosophers and Christians shared the idea of divine figures possessing a degraded
nature compared to the nature of the Supreme God.125 Novatian‘s theology follows just
such principles in that the Father shares his substance with the Son and also that the Son
is ontologically subordinate to the Father.
Novatian consistently contrasts the attributes of the Father from those of the
Son.126 In so doing, he affirms that the Son is less than (minor)127 the Father and denies
that the Father and Son are equal (aequalis).128 In Trin. 27.10, Novatian quotes John
10:36 in which Jesus states, ―Do you say of Him whom the Father has made holy and
sent into this world, ‗You blaspheme,‘ because I said, ‗I am the Son of God‘?‖129
Novatian explains this passage writing, ―[The Son] declares that He has been made holy
by His Father. Since, then, He receives sanctification (sanctificatum) from the Father, He

125

Disregarding any possible connections, DeSimone simply asserts that Novatian shares nothing
with Platonism on this count, ―Again the Kenosis,‖ 96.
126
According to my reading and that of some other scholars, all of the discrepancies of attributes
Novatian mentions between the Son and the Father reflect the Son‘s ontological subordination. See
D‘Alès‘ list of the attributes which Novatian uses to contrast the Father with the Son in Novatien, 122-123.
See also below my citation and discussion of Trin. 31.6-11. For statements that the distinction in attributes
equates to the Son‘s inferiority and subordination to the Father, see Peterson, ―Novaziano e Novazianismo,‖
1979; Amann, ―Novatien et novatianism,‖ 827.
127
Trin. 27.12 and 31.3.
128
Trin. 31.6-7. One manuscript (Jac) affirms the use of aequalis in Trin. 31.18. Mattei follows
P. Petitmengin, ―Une nouvelle edition et un ancient manuscript de Novatien,‖ REAug. 21 (1975), 272. in
his argument for replacing the more commonly found inaequalitate with aequalitate in this passage: ―Cuius
sic diuinitas traditur, ut non aut dissonantia aut aequalitate diuinitatis duos deos reddidisse uideatur.‖ (His
divinity is so presented to us that it may not appear, either through discordancy or through equality in the
Godhead.) I agree with Mattei that the inclusion of the term inaequalitate would demonstrate a marked
contrast from the rest of Trin. and therefore suggests an error of copyists.
129
Quem Pater sanctificauit, inquit, et misit in hunc mundum, uos dicitis quia blasphemat, quia
dixi: Filius Dei sum?
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is less than (minor) the Father. Because He is less than (minor) the Father, He is
consequently <not the Father>, but the Son.‖130 The two points Novatian raises to prove
the distinction between the Father and the Son include the Father‘s sanctifying activity
and the statement that the Son is less than the Father. For Novatian, being less than the
Father means being ontologically subordinate.
Novatian develops his idea of the preeminence of the Father over the Son with the
concept of subjection. He continues his argument for the personal distinction of the Son
in Trin. 27 by shifting to the ideas I have discussed above regarding the Son‘s obedience
and the fact that the Son is sent. He states, ―The Father, however, was not sent, lest the
Father, by being sent, would prove to be subject (subditus) to another god.‖131 Novatian
is not proposing that the Father‘s nature (as he has defined it) could remain intact if the
Father were sent. He is, instead, attacking the hypothetical suggestion, since he thinks
that ―being sent‖ contradicts the nature of the Supreme God.132 Unlike the Son, the
Father cannot be subject to, obedient to, sent from, or less than a more supreme God.
Novatian‘s argument can only be understood if the Father‘s attributes are supreme while
the Son‘s are not.133 In this example, Novatian rejects the Son‘s equality with the Father
because the Son can be sent while the Father cannot.

130

Trin. 27.12: Et sanctificatum se a suo Patre esse proponit. Dum ergo accipit sanctificationem a
Patre, minor Patre est; minor autem Patre consequenter <non Pater> est, sed Filius. Novatian makes a
parallel argument for Christ‘s supremacy over the Holy Spirit in Trin. 16.3.
131
Trin. 27.13: Missus autem non fuit Pater, ne Pater subditus alteri Deo, dum mittitur, probaretur.
132
In fact, Novatian makes a parallel hypothetical argument about the Father and time in Trin. 2.2:
―But if He began to exist after something else, He would be inferior (infra) to that previously existing
thing; hence He would be found to be of lesser power (minor potestate), since designated as subsequent
(posterior) even in time itself.‖132 In this passage and the one preceding it, Novatian uses a similar logic
about ontological inferiority which begins with the unique supremacy of the Father by definition of His
divinity.
133
Although this dissertation does not analyze Novatian‘s theology of the Holy Spirit, it is worth
pointing out that the logic which Novatian uses to proclaim the Father‘s supremacy over the Son is
paralleled in his description of the Son‘s superiority over the Holy Spirit. See Trin. 16.3 for Novatian‘s
statement that Christ would be less than the Holy Spirit if he received from the Holy Spirit. It is well
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The comments above clarify and enhance those which I have already made in
relation to Trin. 31.3.134 Novatian contrasts the Father, who has no origin and cannot be
preceded by anything, to the Son, who owes his origin to the Father because of his birth.
Therefore, the Son knows he is less (minor) than the Father, leading Novatian to
conclude, ―Although He has an origin (originem) inasmuch as He is born, yet through His
Father He is, in a certain manner (quodammodo), like Him by birth (nascitur), because
He is born of that Father, who alone has no origin.‖135 Novatian makes his case for the
Son‘s diminutive divine nature while advocating his X from X principle. He teaches that
the Son is less than the Father because the Son has an origin and birth, two terms
logically inapplicable to his theology of the Father.
Novatian‘s use of the term quodammodo in Trin. 31.3 also qualifies his insistence
on the X from X principle. The term suggests a likeness to God‘s attributes rather than
an equality. Two passages later, Novatian states, ―God assuredly proceeded from God,
constituting as Son the Second Person after the Father, but not taking from the Father that
which makes Him one God (quod unus est Deus).‖136 My analysis in chapter 4 demands
that the final phrase be a reference to the Father.137 Novatian claims that X from X logic

known that Novatian never calls the Holy Spirit ―God.‖ It appears that Novatian saw no biblical
justification in making a similar case for the Holy Spirit‘s divinity apart from his comments that the Spirit
shares in heavenly power and is associated with divine eternity (Trin. 29.16). Since Novatian‘s description
of the powers and the nature of the Spirit are directed towards man‘s capability in sharing in divine life, I
am unconvinced by scholarly readings which suggest that Novatian‘s association between the Holy Spirit
and certain divine activities means that he would ever call the Holy Spirit ―God‖ in the manner he does the
Son.
134
See the section in this chapter, ―Novatian‘s use of semper and tempus.‖
135
Trin. 31.3: quod necesse est prior sit qua Pater sit, quoniam antecedat necesse est eum qui habet
originem ille qui originem nescit, simul ut hic minor sit, dum in illo esse se scit, habens originem quia
nascitur et per Patrem quodammodo, quamuis originem habet qua nascitur, uicinus in natiuitate, dum ex eo
Patre qui originem solus non habet nascitur.
136
Trin. 31.5: Deus utique procedens ex Deo, secundam personam efficiens post Patrem, qua
Filius, sed non eripiens illud Patri, quod unus est Deus.
137
Novatian‘s insistence that the Father alone is the one God sets him apart from predecessors,
such as Tertullian and Noet., who, at times, identify the term Deus with the unity of the Father, Son, and
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means that God proceeded from God, but quodammodo in this case carries the sense that
the Son‘s procession from the Father does not entail equality with the Supreme God‘s
unique attributes.
Novatian develops his explanation of how the Son is less than the Father as he
continues in Trin. 31. He declares that the Son is not the Father‘s equal when he
compares a list of respective attributes. I wish to quote the following passage at length
since Novatian piles together the Father and Son‘s distinctions in order to strike the
reader with the weight of its cumulative effect. Novatian writes,
If he had not been born (natus), as unborn (innatus) He would have been
compared with the Father who is unborn. Since an equality (aequatione) would
have appeared in both, He would have constituted a second unborn, and therefore
two gods. If He had not been begotten (genitus), He would have been placed side
by side with Him who is not begotten. Since both would have been found to be
equal (aequales), as unbegotten, they would accordingly have given us two gods;
Christ, then, would have given rise to two gods. If He were, as the Father,
without origin (sine origine), He Himself would also have proved to be, as the
Father, the beginning (principium) of all things, making two beginnings
(principia); consequently He would have also placed before us two gods. Again
if He Himself were not the Son, but a Father begetting (generans) another son
from Himself, then He would have been rightly compared with the Father and
would have been shown to be as great (et tantus denotus) as the latter. Thus, He
would have constituted two Fathers and approved also of two gods. If He had
been invisible (inuisibilis), He would have been compared with Him who is
invisible. He would have placed before us two invisibles; consequently He would
have also permitted two gods. If He had been incomprehensible
(incomprehensibilis), if He had also possessed whatever other attributes belong to
the Father, then we assert that He would have certainly occasioned the
controversy of two gods that these heretics raise. [Trin. 31.6-11, slightly
altered]138
Holy Spirit. Novatian‘s rejection of this tradition necessarily structures the way he speaks about the divine
unity. See my comments in the section ―The supreme God is one,‖ in chapter 4. Some scholars have
blended the idea of God‘s oneness and the idea of divine unity in a way which muddies Novatian‘s
distinction. For an example of this confusion, see DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 168.
138
Si enim natus non fuisset, innatus comparatus cum eo qui esset innatus, aequatione in utroque
ostensa, duos faceret innatos et ideo duos faceret deos. Si non genitus esset, collatus cum eo qui genitus non
esset et aequales inuenti, duos deos merito reddidissent non geniti atque ideo duos Christus reddidisset
deos. Si sine origine esset ut Pater inuentus et ipse principium omnium ut Pater, duo faciens principia duos
ostendisset nobis consequenter et deos. Aut si et ipse Filius non esset, sed Pater generans de se alterum
filium, merito collatus cum Patre et tantus denotatus duos patres effecisset et ideo duos approbasset etiam
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The Father and the Son, Novatian assures us, can not logically be equal, since two gods
would then be proclaimed. Novatian sets the Son‘s birth, generation, origin, lack of
generative experience, visibility,139 and comprehensibility140 against his presentation of
the Father‘s attributes.141 However, Novatian also asserts the X from X principle for the
effect of denying two gods. Novatian believes that he fully counters the charge of
ditheism by combining his teaching that the Son shares the substance of the Father with
his teaching that the Sun is unequal to the Father in attributes.
Novatian‘s arguments against the profession of two Gods contain much in
common with Tertullian‘s theology in Herm. In defending the Father‘s supremacy,
Tertullian denies the possibility of two supreme beings sharing equal attributes.142
Tertullian develops this logic when he describes the Trinity in terms of the Father sharing
deos. Si inuisibilis fuisset, cum inuisibili collatus par expressus duos inuisibiles ostendisset et ideo duos
comprobasset et deos. Si incomprehensibilis, si et cetera quaecumque sunt Patris, merito, dicimus, duorum
deorum quam isti confingunt controuersiam suscitasset.
139
Novatian insists that theophanies prove the necessity of the Son‘s presence against the
possibility of the Father‘s visibility. Regardless of any invisibility proper to the Son, like that of angels,
Novatian distinguishes the Father as invisible from the Son who can be visible. See Trin. 18.13: ―The only
possible explanation that will render to God the Father His proper invisibility and to an angel His proper
inferior position is to belief that no one but the Son of God, who is also God, was seen and hospitably
received by Abraham.‖ See too Trin. 28 which speaks about knowing the invisible Father through the Son
who imitates His works. Keilbach views the distinctions Novatian makes between the invisibility of the
Father and visibility of the Son central to his logic for making a personal distinction between the two,
―Divinitas Filii,‖ 104.
140
Novatian does not entirely make it clear what he means by the Son‘s comprehensibility,
however he does provide a useful contrast with the Father‘s incomprehensibility in Trin. 2.6 when he states,
―Whatever can be thought about Him is less than He; whatever can be uttered about Him will be less than
He when compared with Him. (Quicquid enim de illo cogitatum fuerit, minus ipso erit; et quicquid
enuntiatum fuerit, minus illo comparatum circum ipsurn erit.) See also Trin. 2.5 for God‘s preeminence
over mind and speech.
141
Amann concludes from this passage the following: ―[The Son] ne peut être mis à côté du Père
comme un deuxième Dieu. C‘est fort bien, dirons-nous, mais alors il n‘est plus qu‘un Dieu de seconde
majesté; nous n‘échappons au dithéisme que pour tomber dans le subordinationisme…Tout n‘est pas à
rejecter cependant dans l‘argumentation de Novatien. Son grand tort est seulement d‘avoir mis les
attributes de l‘essence divine (invisibilis, incomprehensibilis, etc.) sur le meme pied que les propriétés
personnelles,‖ ―Novatien et novatianism,‖ 827. According to my understanding of Novatian‘s theology, he
must have connected attributes of essence to his understanding of the Word as person. Amann‘s distinction
is a construct foreign to Novatian‘s thinking.
142
Herm. 4.5-6. Tertullian affirms the uniqueness and supremacy of the Father against the
possibility that Matter is also eternal.

281
the divine substance with the Son and Spirit in his later works.143 Novatian‘s comments
in Trin. 31.6-11 follow the logic which Tertullian establishes in Herm.;144 the X from X
principle brings the assurance that the Son is God, but it negates the possibility that the
Father divests those attributes which identify Him as supreme. The development in
Tertullian‘s later works provided him the opportunity to equate the One God with the
Father, Son, and Spirit in a way which Novatian completely avoids.145
Another way of gaining insight into Novatian‘s doctrine of the inequality of the
Father and Son can be found in his treatment of Phil. 2:6-11.146 Novatian confirms that
the Father offers the Son divine supremacy over the creation, and he begins Trin. 22 by
quoting Phil. 2:6-11.147 His explanation of how the Son is in the form of God sheds light
on his understanding of the Philippians hymn as a whole. He begins by stating that

143

E.g. Prax. 12: ―And if he himself is God, as John says—the Word was God—you have two,
one commanding a thing to be made, another making it. But how you must understand ‗another‘ I have
already professed, in the sense of person, not of substance, for distinctiveness, not for division. Yet
although I always maintain one substance in three who cohere, I must still, as a necessary consequence of
the meaning <of the passage>, say that he who commands is other than he who makes. For he would not be
commanding if he himself were making while commanding things to be made.‖
144
Some differences between Tertullian‘s Trinitarian theology and Novatian‘s theology of the
Father and Son have already been noted. However, I understand the differences in their theology
concerning the Holy Spirit to be far more significant than many scholars. I believe much more work must
be done on Novatian‘s understanding of Tertullian‘s writings and the influence those writings had on his
theology.
145
See again chapter 4‘s section, ―The supreme God is one.‖
146
Papandrea sees Philippians 2:6-11 as ―the most important New Testament passage for
Novatian, since it is the only one he interprets at length which he does not claim to be rescuing from a
heterodox interpretation, and therefore it is a text which he has chosen for himself, rather than being
pressed to interpret it for polemical reasons,‖ Trinitarian Theology, 268. I am less inclined to see the same
degree of importance in light of the fact that Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Tertullian, and others discuss it.
147
Trin. 22.1: ―Who though He was in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal to God,
but emptied Himself, taking the form of a slave, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a
man. He humbled Himself, becoming obedient even to death, the death of the Cross. Therefore God also
has exalted Him exceedingly, and has bestowed upon Him the name that is above every name; so that at the
name of Jesus every knee should bend of those in heaven, on earth and under the earth, and every tongue
confess that the Lord Jesus is in the glory of God the Father.‖ (Qui cum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam
arbitratus est aequalem se Deo esse, sed semetipsum exinaniuit formam serui accipiens, in similitudine
hominum factus et habitu inuentus ut homo; humiliauit se oboediens factus usque ad mortem, mortem
autem crucis; propterea et Deus illum superexaltauit et dedit illi nomen quod est super omne nomen, ut in
nomine Iesu omne genu flectatur caelestium, terrestrium et infernorum et omnis lingua confiteatur quoniam
Dominus Iesus in gloria est Dei Patris?)
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―[Christ] alone is the first and of noble birth (generosus) before all others: the Son of
God, the Word of God, the Imitator of all His Father‘s works. Inasmuch as He also
works as His Father does, He is, as we have said, in the form (forma) of God the
Father.‖148 He goes on to explain that the Son is,
declared to be in the form of God, because He is above all things, holds divine
authority (diuinam potestatem) over every creature, and is God after the likeness
of the Father (exemplo Patris). However, He received this from His own Father,
that He might be both God and Lord of all and God according to the form of God
the Father, begotten and brought forth from Him. [Trin. 22.4]149
Here, Novatian blends the teachings concerning the X from X principle with the Father‘s
impartation of power and authority over creation to the Son. In speaking of the Son as in
the form of God, Novatian explains that he is simultaneously identifying the Son‘s birth
from the Father, the Son‘s performance of the same works as the Father, and the Son‘s
authority over all of creation as the Father has given it to him.150
When Novatian comes to his explanation of the phrase non rapinam arbitratus est
aequalem se Deo esse (Phil. 2:6) in Trin. 22.5,151 he stresses the Father‘s giving of
divinity to the Son:
148

Trin. 22.3: hic praecipuus atque generosus prae omnibus Dei Filius, uerbum Dei, imitator
omnium paternorum operum, dum et ipse operatur sicut et Pater eius, forma, ut expressimus, est Dei Patris.
149
Et merito in forma pronuntiatus est Dei, dum et ipse super omnia et omnis creaturae diuinam
obtinens potestatem et Deus est exemplo Patris, hoc ipsum tamen a Patre proprio consecutus, ut omnium et
Deus esset et Dominus esset, et Deus ad formam Dei Patris ex ipso genitus atque prolatus. Fausset believes
that the Son‘s reception of divinity and lordship indicates ―a strong assertion of the subordination of the
Son,‖ Novatiani Romanae, 81 n. 12. Cf. D‘Alès, who argues that the divine nature is equal. The giving
and reception of divinity mark the distinct persons rather than alter the divine nature, Novatien, 116-117.
This is the position of Papandrea, Trinitarian Theology, 270.
150
I am not convinced by Papandrea‘s suggestion that Novatian uses forma as a synonym for
substantia in light of Trin. 22. I also disagree with his conclusion that for Novatian ―to say that Christ was
in forma Dei, is tantamount to asserting that He is consubstantial with the Father,‖ Trinitarian Theology,
269. Papandrea‘s point is to argue equality when he says ―consubstantial,‖ which is a term that I think
oversimplifies Novatian‘s theology. Mattei argues that the unity of substance manifests itself as demiurgic
activity as well as the divine activity throughout history, ―De Trinitate 31,‖ 220-228.
151
Some scholars have cited this phrase as likely holding an important key to understanding
Novatian‘s teaching regarding the ontological equality of the Son with the Father. See Fausset, Novatiani
Romanae, 81-81; DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 103; and Papandrea, Trinitarian Theology, 268-274,
esp. 270 n. 361. Papandrea places the greatest emphasis on the term rapinam. He renders the phase in
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For though He was ever mindful that He was God of God the Father, He never
compared (comparauit) or ranked (contulit) Himself with God the Father,
knowing that He is of His Father; and this very thing (that He is) He had, because
the Father had given (dedisset) it to Him. Hence, not only before He took upon
Himself the flesh but even after He had taken a body, and again, after His
Resurrection, He rendered and still renders complete obedience (oboedientiam) to
His Father in all things. Consequently, this proves that He never regarded His
divinity (diuinitatem) as a means of unlawfully arrogating (rapinum) to Himself
equality (aequaret) with God the Father. [Trin. 22.5-6, modified slightly]152
Novatian relies on the obedience of the Son before, during, and after the Incarnation to
state that the Son does not claim equality with the Father.153 In Trin. 27, Novatian
contrasts these ideas with the argument that the Father‘s attributes would be jeopardized
if He were subject to another. In this regard, the Son‘s obedience to his Father in all his
works and activities, spoken of in the passage above, manifests one aspect of the Son‘s
inequality with the Father.154 Futhermore, the implicit topics of the Son‘s visibility and
his ability to be located in a place, in this case in relation to Novatian‘s comments about

question, ―did not consider equality with God to be a prize.‖ Papandrea‘s argument is that Novatian
acknowledges that the Son knows his equality with the Father. The Son recognizes the causal priority of
the Father, which for Novatian, according to Papandrea, entails the only aspect of subordination. I do not
think that Papandrea pays enough attention to the fact that Novatian does not explain rapinam specifically.
Novatian chooses to describe how the Son is in the form of God in Trin. 22 and speaks about the subject of
equality in other passages. When he does comment on this phrase, as I write above, he simply
acknowledges the Son‘s awareness of his derivation from the Father and subsequent lower rank. For a
summary of the positions of Keilbach, Petavius, Ginoulhiac, Fausset, D‘Alès, Galtier, and Prat, see
DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 108-113 and also his ―Again the Kenosis,‖ 91-96. In the latter work,
DeSimone abandons his earlier view that Novatian teaches the Son‘s ontological subordination in his
exegesis of Phil. 2:6-11.
152
Quamuis enim se ex Deo Patre Deum esse meminisset, numquam se Deo Patri aut comparauit
aut contulit, memor se esse ex suo Patre et hoc ipsum, quod est, habere se, quia Pater dedisset. Inde
denique et ante carnis assumptionem, sed et post assumptionem corporis, post ipsam praeterea
resurrectionem omnem Patri in omnibus rebus oboedientiam praestitit partier ac praestat. Ex quo probatur
numquam arbitratum illum esse rapinam quondam diuinitatem, ut aequaret se Patri Deo.
153
Because of this point, Keilbach suggests that Novatian may be speaking about the Son‘s
ontological subordination, ―Divinitas Filii,‖ 215.
154
Compare P. Grelot who discusses Novatian‘s use of Phil. 2:6-7 as suggesting the equality of the
Son‘s divinity with the Father by virtue of his being in the form of God prior to the kenosis. Grelot then
argues that Novatian uses the passage from Philippians to speak about the Son as God through the language
of condition and obedience, rather than through the language of a shared essence, in ―La traduction et
l‘interprétation de Ph 2,6-7. Quelques elements d‘enquête patristique.‖ NRTh 9-10 (1971): 907-908.
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the Incarnation in this passage, point to another aspect of the Son‘s inequality with the
Father.
I will conclude this chapter by citing and commenting on one text about the
Father, which sets the topics related to the Son‘s divinity in greater relief. Novatian
writes,
God always stays in His own state (semper status suus), ever without the loss of
change (sine detrimento), He is always both the same (similis) as and equal
(aequalis) to Himself. Truly, what is not born (natum) cannot be changed (mutari
potest); for only those things which are made (fiunt) or born (gignuntur) come
into change (conuersionem), while those things which at one time did not exist,
they come to be by being born (nascendo), and so for this reason to be born is to
be changed (conuerti). But truly anything which has neither birth nor maker,
excludes change from itself, since it has no origin (originem), which is the cause
of change (conuersionis). [Trin. 4.7, Papandrea‘s translation, slightly
modified]155
We recall from chapter 4 that Novatian (in this passage as well as in Trin. 4.4) speaks of
the Father‘s ―equality with Himself‖ to affirm that the Father cannot change, since
change has to do with a beginning or birth.156 The theological framework by which
Novatian contrasts the attributes of the Son begin with the principles mentioned in the
above quotation: the Father cannot have a birth or an origin or be changed in any way.
This, according to Novatian makes the Father, ―always both the same (similis) as and
equal (aequalis) to Himself.‖ While Novatian proclaims the Son to be invested with the
authority and power of the Father, he never strays from his emphasis on the Father as the
one God who possesses a unique nature. The Father‘s nature is incompatible with birth,
time, place, visibility, etc., which are all attributes that Novatian links to the Son. For this
155

Deo manet semper status suus, dum sine detrimento commutationis semper sui et similis et
aequalis est. Quod enim natum non est, nec mutari potest; ea enim sola in conuersionem ueniunt,
quaecumque fiunt uel quaecumque gignuntur, dum quae aliquando non fuerant discunt esse nascendo atque
ideo nascendo conuerti. At enim illa quae nec natiuitatem habent nec artificem, exc!userunt a se
demutationem, dum in qua conuersionis causa est non habent originem.
156
In chapter 4‘s section, ―Aeternus and aeternitatis: immortality and incorruptibility,‖ I pointed
out that both Irenaeus, in Haer. 2.13.3, and Apuleius, Dogm. Plat. 1.6, used similar phrasing.
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reason, Novatian states that the Son‘s ―divinity is so presented to us that it may not
appear either through discordancy or through equality (aequalitate) in the Godhead, that
there he has produced two Gods.‖157 Novatian rejects the Son‘s ontological equality with
the Father in all cases.

Conclusion

My reading of Novatian differs from those of other scholars because of the
emphasis I place on Novatian‘s incorporation of technical, philosophical terminology of
ontology and divine attributes. By treating Novatian‘s philosophically-indebted theology
of the Father as the framework for his theology of the Son, I have demonstrated two
primary features of Trin. First, I have shown that the Novatian accepts the Son‘s divinity,
in large part because of the ontological connection between the Father and Son. Second,
I have shown that Novatian understands the Father‘s supremacy and uniqueness as
making the thought of the Son‘s ontological equality impossible.
Scholars who have portrayed Novatian‘s theology of the Son as simultaneously
suggesting the Son‘s ontological subordination and equality have overestimated
Novatian‘s insistence that the Son is God to mean ontological equality. Those scholars
who have argued that Novatian only presents the Son‘s ontological equality with the
Father have not fully accounted for Novatian‘s insistence that the Son‘s attributes are less
than those of the Father, or for Novatian‘s insistence on the uniqueness and supremacy of
the Father. Those scholars who share my view that Novatian treats the Son as
ontologically subordinate to the Father have never offered a detailed study of Novatian‘s
157

Trin. 31.18: Cuius sic diuinitas traditur, ut non aut dissonantia aut aequalitate diuinitatis duos
deos reddidisse uideatur. In this passage, I am following Petitmengin‘s replacement of inaequalitate with
aequalitate.
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critical debt to a philosophical understanding of the Father‘s divine nature. This study
has attempted to close all of the gaps in scholarship mentioned above by showing that
Novatian‘s theology of the Son consistently can be best understood as maintaining the
Son‘s ontological subordination to the Father.
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Conclusion

This study has argued that Novatian uses philosophical, technical language to
describe the Father‘s divine nature and attributes. He presents the Father as both supreme
and unique. In so doing, Novatian depends on a flourishing philosophical tradition of
negative theology as well as Christian traditions about the Father‘s nature. These
Christian traditions also reflect strong ties to philosophical accounts of ontology and
expressions of divine attributes. Furthermore, I have shown that Novatian‘s theology of
the Son does not attempt to make the Son ontologically equal to the Father. In expressing
the Son‘s ontological subordination, Novatian utilizes important aspects of the Word
Christology tradition, which I discussed in chapter 5. According to Novatian, the Son
possesses attributes which are less than those of the Father, even though much of Trin.
functions to prove that the Son is rightfully called ―God.‖
This dissertation challenged the interpretations of two groups of scholars. One
group includes those believing Novatian‘s theology of the Son is inherently
contradictory. These scholars say that Novatian sometimes affirms the Son‘s ontological
subordination to the Father, while at other times he seems to suggest the Son‘s
ontological equality with the Father. In most cases, I have agreed with the examples
these scholars point to as supporting the Son‘s ontological subordination. I have also
offered arguments as to why passages, which have been taken to refer to ontological
equality, ought to be read as supporting his teaching of the Son‘s ontological
subordination. There are two prevailing judgments among scholars in this group as to his
supposed theological contradictions. The first is that Novatian is philosophically
unsophisticated and does not fully grasp the contradictions in his writing. The second
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lays the blame for his supposed inconsistencies on his failed ability to transcend the
historical limitations of the Word Christology tradition known to him. My study has
shown that both of these approaches misread Novatian‘s work. Trin. is, in fact,
philosophically sophisticated, and Novatian avoids those aspects of the Word Christology
tradition which he could have utilized to suggest the Son‘s ontological equality with the
Father. The Father and Son, however, are not ontologically equal according to Novatian,
and he carefully builds a theological framework which challenges such a teaching.
P. Mattei and J. Papandrea have offered the newest interpretations of Novatian‘s
theology, which consist of arguments that Trin. teaches the ontological equality of the
Father and the Son. They explain passages in Trin. suggestive of ontological
subordination in two principal ways. First, they make the case that Novatian‘s statements
concerning the Son‘s lesser status relate to the Son having His origin from the Father.
These scholars believe that Novatian offers only a distinction in the divine nature of the
Father and Son based on an Aristotelian principle of logical causality.1 The Father‘s
logical primacy is not taken to reflect the Son‘s ontological subordination. The second
way these scholars address the statements of inequalities is by suggesting that the Son is
subordinate in relation to the dealings with the creation. To make the case that there is a
form of ―economic‖ subordination, Papandrea emphasizes the Son‘s kenosis while Mattei
dwells on implications of the Father‘s hierarchical position above the obedient Son. My
reading of Trin. challenges these perspectives by arguing that Novatian consistently
demarcates the divine nature of the Father from that of the Son. His philosophical

1

Like other scholars, DeSimone and Fausset also point to the importance of the Father as the
origin or source of the Son, although they do not develop this theme to the extent which Papandrea does.
See DeSimone, Treatise of Novatian, 103; Fausset, Novatiani Romanae, xxxiii-xxxiv.
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commitments to the Father‘s supremacy and uniqueness can be seen in his presentation of
the Father‘s relationship to space and time. The reading Papandrea and Mattei suggest
makes Novatian‘s theology of the Father and the theology of the Son convoluted and
inconsistent.
My study has not emphasized the work of those scholars who have shared my
opinion that Novatian teaches the Son‘s ontological subordination to the Father. These
works came before those of Papandrea and Mattei (and thus have not been able to
respond to them),2 and they have not offered a serious treatment of the presense of
technical, philosophical terminology in Novatian‘s theology of the Father or the Son.
Therefore, my study is unique in that it offers a new contextualization of Novatian‘s
thought in light of philosophical and Christian influences.
The applications of this project‘s conclusions are, I hope, far reaching. As noted
in the Introduction, I originally intended to treat Novatian‘s Christological anthropology
as well as his eschatology. My interpretation that Novatian teaches the Son‘s ontological
subordination affects my reading of both topics, and I would like briefly to address these
topics.3 When looking to Novatian‘s Christological anthropology, I understand the Son‘s
ontological subordination to be the clearest justification for Novatian‘s formulation of the
Son‘s ability to intact with the world. As noted in my study, Novatian treats such an
ability as impossible for the transcendent Father. Novatian distinguishes the nature of the
2

The scholarship of Tixeront, Amann, Prat, and Peterson appeared in 1952 or before. Loi and
Pollard published in the 1970‘s. Although Simonetti‘s latest work on Novatian was published in the same
year (1996) as Mattei‘s ―De Trinitate 31,‖ it appears that Simonetti did not have a chance to interact with it.
3
I also mention in chapter 6, in the section ―All things are through the Word: demiurgic activity,‖
that Novatian appears to be exegeting Rom. 11:36 in a manner similar to traditions of Eph. 4:6. The
primary difference is that it appears Novatian is removing a Trinitarian emphasis in his interpretation. It is
my belief that Novatian does not call the Holy Spirit ―God‖ in Trin. because he has neither the Scriptural
warrant nor the philosophical justification for doing so. In a future study, I hope to make the case that
Novatian does not teach something which can be called a Trinitarian theology, because he does not see the
Holy Spirit as being categorizes as divine in the way he sees the Son as divine.
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Father from that of the Son to demonstrate, on the one hand, that he is speaking of two,
distinct persons; on the other hand, the Son‘s lesser divine nature is precisely the avenue
by which Novatian addresses the incarnation. The union between the divine and human
during the incarnation is, by definition of the Father‘s nature as Supreme God, not
applicable to the Father. According to my analysis of Novatian‘s consistent use of
philosophical principles, his Christological anthropology should be discussed in light of
the Son‘s lesser divine nature.
Novatian‘s theology also includes a strong doctrine of an eschatological vision.4
His affirmation of man‘s future hope in an eschatological vision sounds similar to the
position held by Irenaeus.5 At the same time, Novatian also appears to be repudiating
Tertullian‘s dismissal of such a vision.6 It is my opinion that Novatian‘s teaching of the
Son‘s ontological subordination affects his perspective on man‘s eschatological vision.
Although Novatian reserves a superlative meaning for terms such as aeternus to the
Father alone, he applies this term and others to man in light of a future hope of sharing
eternal life with God. My reading of Trin. shows the philosophical justifications for
Novatian‘s ability to cross-apply the Father‘s attributes in a diminished sense, first to the
Son and then to others. Man‘s metaphysical closeness to the transcendent God is
something which grows with time and only because of the work of the ontologically
subordinate Son (as well as the work of the Spirit). Novatian expresses this concept, in
part, with his teaching about an eschatological vision.

4

Novatian claims that man can anticipate seeing the Father in Trin. 28.5-6.
Irenaeus, for example, speaks about a final vision of the Father in Haer. 4.20.5,
6
Tertullian speaks of the Father as always being invisible (see Prax. 16). Novatian, however,
claims that man can anticipate seeing the Father in Trin. 28.5-6.
5
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Above all, Novatian‘s theology emphasizes the Father‘s supreme, unique, and
transcendent nature. This study offers a reevaluation of Novatian‘s dependence on
philosophy, especially Middle Platonism. Novatian, however, was in no way just a
Middle Platonist, clothing his philosophy in Christian garb. His Christian beliefs are the
core of his thinking, and those beliefs are reflected in all aspects of his theology. What I
believe we can say is that Novatian accepted certain suggestions of the Son‘s ontological
subordination to the Father in the Word Christology tradition and that he added
philosophical depth to an articulation of that position.
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